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ABSTRACT   
This thesis consists of two essays that address the intersection of law, culture and finance.  The 
‘Law and Finance’ theory is augmented to account specifically for the historical complexity in 
legal origin and the variability of legal structure that exist in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA).  The underlying theme throughout this thesis focuses on the role that law and culture 
play in shaping financial markets and global investment opportunities.  How the legal 
environment and the prevailing Islamic culture shape financial market development in the MENA 
region is the subject of Essay 1.  This is followed by an analysis of the determinants of US mutual 
fund investment in MENA firms in Essay 2. 
The first essay examines how the legal rules protecting creditors and shareholders, law 
enforcement, judicial efficiency, legal duality and the prevailing Islamic culture influence the 
development of credit and stock markets in 21 MENA countries for the period 2007-2012.  The 
results from OLS and bootstrap regressions show that the availability of more credit information 
and the quality of the collateral and bankruptcy laws are critical in the development of credit 
markets, whereas, disclosing self-dealing transactions and protecting minority shareholders 
advance stock market development.  However, stock market development is deterred when 
shareholder protection mechanisms allow aggrieved shareholders to sue for self-dealing 
transactions or access to information to examine self-dealing.  Not only does the quality of the 
legal rules matter, but also the extent of its enforcement is a strong determinant of financial 
market development.  Additionally, the judicial efficiency in resolving commercial disputes 
marginally benefits financial markets.  The duality in MENA legal systems creates investment 
uncertainty that dampens financial market development.  Countries with less Islamic endorsement 
in their institutions operate more advanced financial markets. 
The second essay investigates whether US mutual fund investments in MENA firms are 
influenced by the quality of the legal environment and financial market development as predicted 
by the ‘Law and Finance’ theory.  Using the investments of 438 US mutual funds in 7,986 locally 
listed firms in 11 MENA countries for the period 2008-2012, the logistic and tobit regression 
results reveal that reducing information asymmetry is key to attracting US mutual fund 
investment.  Well-developed stock markets and the existence of shareholder protection 
mechanisms related to information disclosure quality are both positively associated with US 
mutual fund investment.  However, remedial shareholder protection mechanisms in the form of 
ease of litigation and the ability to hold directors liable for misconduct are not associated with US 
mutual fund investment.  Empirical evidence also suggests that MENA firms may overcome the 
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legal environmental shortcomings by signalling quality to foreign investors through adopting 
IFRS or via appointing a ‘big-four’ auditor. 
Overall, these two essays contribute to the ‘Law and Finance’ literature.  Countries with complex 
legal systems require a more exacting legal characterisation beyond the historical narrative or 
legal origin.  Further, only ‘pre-emptive’ shareholder protection mechanisms related to the 
disclosure of self-dealing attract foreign capital and promote stock market development.  Finally, 
culture should not be overlooked as a determinant of financial market development as culture 
reflects attitudes and norms not easily detectable and quantifiable in the law. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction  
This thesis investigates the relationship between the legal environment, culture, financial 
development and investment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  Whether legal 
environment and culture add a layer of friction or serve to enhance financial market development, 
both elements are integral parts of the global investment environment.  The thesis is informed by 
the ‘Law and Finance’ theory advanced by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(LLSV) and the subsequent research critiques.  MENA is a rich research setting as it has a 
complex and varied history of legal origin and the country-level legal environments are 
moderated to different degrees by Islamic cultural factors. 
The motivation for this research stems from the interconnectedness of financial market 
development, legal and cultural environments and global investment decision making by the 
‘typical’ foreign investor characterised in terms of US mutual funds.  The degree of financial 
market development is highly dependent on investor protection where both of these elements are 
key determinants of the level of investment.  Consequently, the determinants for the investment 
decision are identified, and, their relative importance in the global investment decision context is 
established. 
This thesis begins with a concise descriptive background of the MENA region in this chapter.  
The purpose of which is to inform the reader about the unique research setting and includes a 
review of MENA regional economies, financial markets, corporate governance structures, legal 
systems and Islamic culture.  This is followed by two self-contained essays examining and 
adapting the ‘Law and Finance’ theory from a unique and different perspective. 
The first essay, contained in Chapter 2, considers how the legal environment protecting investors 
and the role of Islam as the prevailing culture impact upon the development of financial markets 
in the MENA region.  The empirical tests examine the effect of creditor and shareholder 
protection rights, law enforcement, judicial efficiency, legal duality and Islamic culture on credit 
and stock market development in 21 MENA countries for the period 2007-2012.  The analysis 
uses survey-based measure of the legal environment developed by the World Bank.  Additionally, 
the thesis develops two indices and uses a new measure of Islamic culture to reflect the 
peculiarity of the region and the individualised nature of MENA countries.  First, an anti-director 
rights index measuring the legal protection for minority shareholders is constructed by reference 
to the relevant legal provisions of each country’s laws and regulations.  Second, the Sharia index, 
measuring the degree of legal duality is developed by reference to the constitutional provisions 
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that relate to the role of Sharia in the constitution.  Finally, Islamic institutionalisation index 
adopted from Achilov (2010) that gauge the substantive role of Islam in the political, educational 
and financial domains in MENA countries. 
The results of the OLS and bootstrap regressions show that certain legal rules protecting investors 
matter for financial market development.  The strength of legal rights in bankruptcy proceedings 
and the depth of credit information are positively associated with credit market development.  
Pre-emptive shareholder protection mechanisms related to disclosing of self-dealing transactions 
enhance stock market development.  However, remedial shareholder protection mechanisms that 
facilitate legal avenues for aggrieved shareholders to sue and access to information for self-
dealing transactions deter stock market development.  The extent of law enforcement is a strong 
determinant of financial market development while judicial efficiency marginally benefits 
financial markets.  In contrast, both legal duality and Islamic culture deter financial market 
development. 
The second essay incorporated in Chapter 3 examines the determinants of US mutual funds in 
MENA firms.  Country-level and firm-level determinants are considered.  Country-level 
determinants include the quality of the legal environment protecting shareholders and the extent 
of stock market development.  The empirical analysis rests upon the Morningstar
®
 Principia
®
 
database covering 95% of US mutual funds.  The sample covers 438 US mutual funds investing 
in 391 firms in 11 MENA countries over the period 2008-2012.  The logistic and tobit regression 
results show that financial market development, disclosure of self-dealing and legal protection for 
minority shareholder are positively associated with US mutual fund investment in MENA.  Two 
firm-level discretionary policies that reduce information asymmetries for foreign investors are 
analysed: the adoption of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) and the appointment 
of a big-four auditor.  Both policies are associated with increased US mutual fund investment. 
A visual map of the inter-relatedness of the two essays appears in Figure  1.1.  The quality of the 
legal environment protecting investors and the Islamic culture influence the development of 
financial markets in MENA (Essay 1) and both affect investors’ willingness to provide capital to 
firms (Essay 2).  Consequently, the quality of the legal environment protecting investors and the 
degree of financial market development are key determinants of investment allocation and the 
tenet for country selection in an investment decision. 
Chapter 4 provides final remarks about the thesis, connects the results of the two essays and 
highlights the contributions made to the finance literature by this thesis. 
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Figure  1.1 Thesis essays 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
1.1. MENA background 
The MENA region includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen (see Figure  1.2).
1
  This section provides a background on the 
different aspects of the region that reviews MENA country net savings, natural resources, 
economy, financial markets, corporate governance, legal systems and culture. 
The MENA countries have not yet emerged as economic powers.  In the last two decades 
MENA’s role has grown in the global economy.  The region’s sovereign wealth funds (SWF) are 
substantial where SWF assets exceed both the banking sector assets and the stock market 
capitalisation in home economies (Kouamé, 2008, p. 840).  The Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC)
2
 has accumulated significant wealth as a result of increased oil prices during 2007-2010.  
As of March 2012 assets under management by SWFs around the world are estimated at more 
than USD4.9 trillion (around 8% of world’s GDP), of which 35% belongs to the GCC (Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute, 2012).
3
 
                                                 
1
 There is no consensus of what constitutes the MENA among the international organisations. 
2
 GCC countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. 
3
 Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Saudi Arabia holds the largest share and the fourth largest SWF in the world, 
respectively (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2012). 
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Figure  1.2 Map of the MENA region 
 
Source: (Howard, 2007).  Map of the Middle East and North Africa.  Retrieved from 
http://mabryonline.org/blogs/howard/archives/n_africa_mid_east_pol_95.jpg 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) provided an opportunity for the SWFs to expand their 
investment reach locally and abroad.  The SWFs emerged as important providers of project 
finance in MENA financial markets and also played a major role in stabilising the global 
economy by ‘bailing out’ internationally recognised financial institutions during the GFC.  The 
GCC SWFs injected more than USD60 billion into Citigroup, UBS and Merrill Lynch, and from 
a geopolitical perspective, this resulted in an acute shift in investment power from the West to 
MENA (Sultan, Weir, and Karake-Shalhoub, 2011, p. 68). 
The dominant natural resource in the MENA region is oil.  MENA countries are responsible for 
the production of 35% of the world’s daily oil needs and account for 58% and 72% of World and 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil reserves respectively (OPEC, 
2015).
4
  Although the region was insulated from the effects of the GFC, the significant drop in oil 
price was the major driver for the GDP decline in 2009 for oil producing MENA countries. 
The MENA region contributes around 5% to the world’s GDP (World Bank, 2014b).  Each 
country in the region reveals a different stage of economic development.  While few countries 
enjoy huge oil endowments and wealth, other countries struggle with poor economic 
performance, significant external debt and high unemployment levels of over 10% (International 
                                                 
4
 Algeria; Iran; Iraq; Kuwait; Libya; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; and, UAE are members of the OPEC. 
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Labour Organisation, 2011).  The World Bank classifies Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and UAE as ‘high-income’ countries; Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Tunisia, and Turkey as ‘upper-middle-income’ countries; and Egypt, Iraq, Morocco Palestine, 
Syria, and Yemen as ‘low-middle-income’ countries.  According to the International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database 2012, the three largest MENA economies measured 
by nominal gross domestic product (GDP) are Turkey (USD788 billion), Saudi Arabia (USD734 
billion) and Iran (USD398 billion).  When it comes to GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) per 
capita, the three highest ranking countries are Qatar, UAE and Kuwait (International Monetary 
Fund, 2014).  According to 2012 statistics, GDP based on PPP per capita in current USD is 
104,755 for Qatar; 48,761 for Kuwait; and, 43,773 for UAE.
5
  Nonetheless, the growth of the 
MENA economies has been inhibited by political change, corruption, an over-dependence on oil 
revenues and various wars/conflicts. 
Bank financing is the dominant source of capital.  MENA countries are largely bank-based 
economies (Omran and Bolbol, 2003, p. 238) and bond markets are either primitive or non-
existent owing to the lack of a yield curve for government debt (OECD, 2012, p. 28).
6
  According 
to the World Bank 2011 report, MENA bank assets account for 130% of GDP (World Bank, 
2011, p. 67).  Nonetheless, only 20% of small and medium enterprises in the MENA have a loan 
or a line of credit (Madeddu, 2010, p. 2).  This is evident in Figure  1.3 where the capital sources 
are still below the real economic activity.  Many MENA banks are characterised by strong public 
and domestic ownership (Farazi, Feyen, and Rocha, 2011, p. 6).  Governments, government 
investment vehicles and royal/ruling families play a significant role as investors in MENA 
financial firms (Abu Loghod, 2008, p. 3).  The GCC countries operate a strong banking system.  
Despite exposure to the real estate and construction sectors during the GFC, GCC banks 
withstood the shocks and were resilient to the crisis.  Non-GCC banking systems, however, were 
not as exposed to real estate sector shocks stemming from the GFC (International Monetary 
Fund, 2010, p. 22).  Islamic banks and Islamic financial products, like Sukuk, exist in many of 
these markets, particularly in Bahrain and UAE.
7
  Most MENA banks offer Islamic and 
conventional banking to cater for the rising demand for Islamic services. 
                                                 
5
 Qatar has the world's highest GDP (PPP) per capita, Kuwait ranks 11
th 
and UAE ranks 17
th 
compared to Australia 
which ranks 5
th
. 
6
 The governments of Qatar, Dubai and Kuwait issue debt.  Outside the GCC, listed debt is negligible. 
7
 Sukuk are Islamic bonds. 
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Figure  1.3 MENA capital (2007-2012) 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
MENA stock markets lag behind the banking sector as a source of corporate finance.  Regional 
stock markets are heterogeneous, varying considerably by age, market size, liquidity and 
efficiency.  Some MENA stock markets are well established, such as Egypt’s stock market 
(operating since 1883) while others are relatively new, such as UAE’s stock market (operating 
since 2000).  In 2012, the market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP was 87% for Jordan, 52% 
for Saudi Arabia and 2% for Iraq.  Liquidity (measured by the trading value to GDP) ranges from 
72% in Saudi Arabia to 1% in Lebanon.  The number of listed firms also varies widely from 532 
in Israel to 10 in Lebanon (World Bank, 2014b).  Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2008) reveal 
heterogeneous levels of market efficiency in the MENA stock markets while Abraham, Seyyed, 
and Alsakran (2002) identify weak form efficiency in GCC markets.  Egypt, Israel, Morocco, and 
Turkey are members of MSCI for emerging markets while Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Oman, Qatar, Tunisia and UAE are members of MSCI for frontier markets.  The most notable 
remark about the MENA stock markets is that they were insulated from the GFC.  However, the 
Dubai debt crisis in December 2009 affected MENA regional markets.  The growth of the MENA 
markets, particularly those in the GCC, has created an appealing place for fund raising (Sultan et 
al., 2011, p. 68) despite the inherent political and security instability.  Noteworthy many MENA 
stock markets are incomplete since equity derivatives are not offered (Kern, 2012, p. 19).
8
 
                                                 
8
 From an Islamic perspective, the legality of derivatives, particularly options, is not yet settled (Abumustafa and Al-
Abduljader, 2011, pp. 119-120).  Kuwait Stock Exchange was the first MENA market to offer forward and futures 
contracts since 1990s and options since 2005 (Abumustafa and Al-Abduljader, 2011, p. 118).  Iran operates futures 
market since 2010.  NASDAQ Dubai offers derivative platform for futures and options since 2008. 
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Corporate governance frameworks that strengthen investment opportunities are particularly 
important in MENA because the region does not have the long-established financial institutional 
infrastructure (Braendle, 2012).  MENA stock markets are characterised by the dominance of 
domestic retail investors, low foreign investor participation and high ownership concentration.  
The dominance of retail investor participation is attributed to the slow development of insurance, 
pensions and mutual fund sectors in the region (African Development Bank, 2012, p. 10) as well 
as general barriers and restrictions to investment.  Public pension funds operate in few MENA 
countries and they provide limited information about their portfolios, performance, and 
governance (World Bank, 2011, p. 69).  Mako and Sourrouille (2010) attribute the 
underdevelopment of investment funds in the MENA to the lack of investible assets (especially 
government securities and private fixed income instruments), low ‘free float’ in equities markets 
and constraints on cross-border investments that limit diversification.
9
  The highest institutional 
investor participation in stock markets is reported in Kuwait, Egypt and Qatar, and is estimated to 
be approximately 30% (Gavin, 2011).  This is below institutional investor participation in most 
OECD countries and even some emerging markets like China (OECD, 2012, p. 26). 
The dominance of retail investor participation in MENA stock markets increases market volatility 
and weakens the quality of price discovery (OECD, 2012, p. 27).  While MENA markets lack 
institutional investors, regional sovereign and quasi-sovereign type vehicles compensate for the 
lack of more traditional institutional investors especially in GCC markets.  Markaz (2008, p. 10) 
estimates SWFs in the GCC hold stakes in over 130 listed firms representing 27% of GCC market 
capitalisation. 
Until recently, foreign participation in MENA stock markets was limited.  However, under 
pressure to attract capital and reduce volatility, regional markets have adopted a more gradual 
openness.  Investment restrictions still pose significant barriers in some markets.  For example, 
Tadawul (the Saudi stock market and the biggest in the region), has the highest investment 
restrictions where non-GCC nationals can currently invest through swaps or mutual funds only.  
In the UAE, foreign investment is restricted to 49% of total equity and in Qatar the restrictions is 
limited to 25%.  This impediment has disqualified these markets to be considered by MCSI as 
‘emerging markets’ (OECD, 2012).  Girard, Omran, and Zaher (2003, p. 286) argue that risk 
perceptions and institutional under-development are obstacles to access MENA financial markets.  
However, several financial reforms have been initiated to counter these perceptions, boost 
confidence and attract foreign investments.  Some MENA countries have adopted liberal 
approaches towards market-oriented economies, such as privatisation of government-owned firms 
                                                 
9
 Free float is the market capitalisation excluding shares held by controlling shareholders.  The rational for exclusion 
is that these shares are not in circulation and unavailable to other investors. 
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and allowing competition for sectors controlled by government such as banking and 
telecommunication.  Other MENA countries have changed their legislation to allow foreign 
ownership.  Saudi Arabia has recently announced its intentions to allow foreign investors direct 
access to the stock market.  Dubai has created a parallel legal system for Dubai International 
Financial Centre that is closely modelled on international standards and common law principles 
(Dubai International Financial Centre, 2012; Carballo, 2007, p. 99).  Similarly, Qatar established 
the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) in 2005 that settles disputes arising from financial activities 
(Al-Rimawi, 2012, p. 40). 
Publicly traded firms in the MENA are often characterised by highly concentrated domestic share 
ownership due to the prevalence of family businesses, business groups and state ownership 
(OECD, 2005, p. 7; OECD, 2012, p. 3).  Concentrated ownership and control have implications 
on boards of directors as frequently featured family members and close relatives are bestowed 
ultimate decision making authority.  It is common for the controlling family to serve as Chief 
Executive Officer.  Family and other controlling shareholders may also indirectly influence 
corporate decisions through ‘blockholder’ stakes in complex corporate structures involving 
holding companies and subsidiaries (OECD, 2005, p. 8).  Correspondingly, concentrated 
ownership of listed MENA firms has a negative impact on liquidity, transparency and corporate 
governance practices.  Large and politically powerful shareholders face incentives to avoid 
corporate governance mechanisms that weaken their control for example, advocating increased 
transparency. 
The duality of the MENA legal systems is a unique aspect of this research setting.  Due to 
historical events, the religion of Islam plays a major role in these countries.  This religious 
infusion is evidenced by the inclusion of Islam as a main source of legislation in most MENA 
countries constitutions.  MENA countries operate in dual religious-secular legal systems where 
the commercial laws of the MENA countries are largely affected by either Napoleonic civil law 
or British common law alongside the Islamic law.  For example, Koraytem (2000, pp. 63, 69) 
notes that while the Saudi commercial law is inspired by Western laws, this does not mean that 
the Saudi commercial sector is exclusively ruled by Western principles.  Koraytem (2000) 
highlights this ‘pluralism’ and advances the Saudi experience as a fine example of an 
incorporation of Western legal concepts into Sharia.  The degree of secularity varies among 
MENA countries.  While Turkey and Israel are wholly secular, Iran and Saudi Arabia are strictly 
religious, and the remaining countries lie in between these extremes. 
The MENA region has a unique mix of homogenous cultural factors.  Islam is the dominant 
religion in all countries except for Israel, and Arabic is the main spoken language except for Iran, 
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Israel and Turkey.  Moreover, the region has shared values and common historical ties.  Yet, 
apart from GCC and OPEC, no regional community or economic cooperation bind the MENA 
countries together.  Another common feature of the MENA region is that all countries rank high 
in terms of public sector corruption (Transparency International, 2011), low in terms of political 
rights and civil liberty
10
 (Puddington, 2012, p. 32) and moderate in terms of economic freedom
11
 
(Heritage Foundation, 2012). 
In conclusion, the uniqueness of the individualised country-based legal systems and infused 
Islamic cultural identities across the MENA region make it impossible to directly apply Western 
centric models of financial market development without taking into consideration the salient 
features of the MENA region.  Such MENA specific modifications are implemented to adapt the 
seminal ‘Law and Finance’ framework advocated by LLSV in Chapter 2.  Further, MENA region 
peculiarities constitute significant sources of potential investment risk that impact the decision 
making by US mutual funds when investing in the region.  These potential barriers and 
information asymmetries are taken into account in Chapter 3 when identifying the determinants 
of investment by these foreign minority shareholders. 
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 The rating of political rights is based on electoral process, political pluralism and participation of government.  The 
rating of civil liberties is based on freedom of expression and belief, associational/organizational rights, rule of law, 
and personal autonomy/individual rights. 
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 The economic freedom index considers rule of law, limited government, regulatory efficiency and open markets. 
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CHAPTER 2  
Legal environment, culture and financial market development:  
Evidence from the MENA  
2.1. Introduction 
Financial market development is fundamental to economic development.  The importance of 
strong, deep and efficient long-term access to financing is a driver of local employment and 
economic growth (Beck and Levine, 2004; Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; Levine, Loayza, and 
Beck, 2000).  Various influential research papers consider factors leading to the financial market 
development.  La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV) provide a series of 
papers discussing the relationship between legal tradition and financial market development via 
protection of investor rights.
12
  LLSV develop the ‘Law and Finance’ theory proposing that the 
legal traditions transplanted by former colonisers underlie the differences in investor protection 
rights.  Further, better investor protection laws affect investor willingness to provide capital to 
firms, which in turn, influences financial market development. 
Since the publication of the LLSV research, there have been many controversial counterclaims 
challenging and reinterpreting LLSV’s ‘Law and Finance’ theory findings.  LLSV classify the 
world’s legal traditions into either civil law or common law systems, which are both Western 
secular legal traditions.  Such a classification, however, ignores how the secular and religiously 
inspired legal traditions have interacted within the same country.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, p. 1118) argue that the religious traditions, such as Hindu law, Jewish 
law and Muslim law are less relevant in matters of investor protection.  Their argument is based 
on the comparative law literature of Zweigert and Kotz (1987, p. 66) acknowledging that the 
Arabian countries belong to Islamic law; however, the commercial, contract and tort laws are 
heavily influenced by the legal thinking of the colonial and mandatory powers.  This Western 
view is inaccurate; Islamic law (Sharia) is not entirely a religious law.  It comprises two main 
divisions; rituals that deal with purely religious matters and transactions that deal with all those 
subjects which comprise the only content of other legal systems (Badr, 1978, p. 188).  Siems 
(2007, p. 68) criticises LLSV, indicating that a meaningful description of legal families in Africa, 
for example, should reflect how the imposed new legal traditions interact with chthonic and 
Islamic legal traditions.  This same logic applies equally to MENA.  The MENA region presents 
a unique hybrid setting.  It is a salient example of religious-secular mixed legal systems.  The 
                                                 
12 The term ‘investors’ refers to both creditors and shareholders. The term ‘financial markets’ refers to both credit 
and stock markets. 
 11 
commercial laws of the MENA countries are based upon either Napoleonic civil law or British 
common law alongside the Islamic law.  Islamic law represents the third major legal system of 
the world after common law and civil law (Esmaeili, 2011, p. 329; Badr, 1978, p. 188).
13
  The 
MENA region has been under religious Islamic influence for over 14 centuries.  Further, due to 
historical events, religion plays a major role.  It is not the case that in MENA countries a true and 
distinctive separation exists between the state (politics) and religion (church), as in the Western 
tradition.  This is evident by the inclusion of Islam as the state religion and that Sharia is a/the 
main source of legislation in most Islamic MENA countries’ constitutions.  Hence, Sharia is still 
an important contemporary legal source underpinning MENA legal systems in that Sharia 
provides the general principles that apply when there are no provisions to the contrary.  Al-
Rimawi (2012, p. 113) refers to this as the ‘gap-filling role’ of Sharia. 
Cultural isolation and differences also have been cited as possible explanations for the emergence 
of distinctive regional features that shape financial market development (Licht, Goldschmidt, and 
Schwartz, 2005, 2007; Stulz and Williamson, 2003).  Culture moulds a society’s system of 
beliefs, customs and attitudes toward its market institutions.  MENA region has a unique mix of 
homogenous cultural factors.  Islam is the dominant religion in all countries except for Israel, and 
Arabic is the main spoken language except for Iran, Israel and Turkey.  Moreover, the region has 
shared values and common historical ties.  The degree of Islamic influence however varies 
systematically among countries.  The Islamic traditions integrate both religion and state so that 
the impact of Islam is pervasive in both religious practice and enshrined as a legislative source.  
These integrated elements mean that culture and law variables are observationally bundled. 
Further, this essay widens the scope of the ‘Law and Finance’ theory by considering MENA, a 
geographic region that has not been extensively covered in prior research.  Despite the seminal 
LLSV research being a diverse international comparative study of 49 countries, the MENA 
region is marginalised.  In LLSV, four MENA countries are covered (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and 
Turkey).  These four countries are not entirely representative of the MENA region having older 
and more financially developed financial markets.  Further, the legal systems considered by 
LLSV do not represent strictly religious systems in MENA, as both Israel and Turkey are wholly 
secular, while Egypt and Jordan operate under mixed legal traditions. 
In view of the LLSV critique outlined above, a meaningful analysis of financial market 
development in the MENA needs to address the legal environment from a wider cultural context 
in which corporate law operates.  This involves incorporating the peculiarities of MENA’s 
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 Badr (1978, p. 187) argues that Islamic law has not been getting its fair share of attention from comparative law 
literature in the West mainly due to language barriers. 
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Islamic culture and hybrid legal systems where local legal traditions interact with Western 
transplanted traditions. 
2.1.1. Research questions 
While the ‘Law and Finance’ theory purported by LLSV concentrates on Western secular legal 
traditions, this essay tests the prediction of the ‘Law and Finance’ theory in a unique setting 
where the local legal traditions interact with Western transplanted traditions.  This research 
examines whether differences in investor protection rights among the MENA countries explain 
cross-country differences in financial market development.  Further, the key contribution of this 
research lies in the ability to reflect the peculiarities of the MENA region.  This requires 
resolving the key determinant in the legal origin debate in the MENA context by introducing an 
innovation to reflect the presence of Islamic cultural values and hybrid legal systems where 
Sharia law continues to be a source of law alongside the Western transplanted laws.  This essay 
answers the following questions: 
1. Does the legal origin, which purports to explain financial market development in civil 
and common law countries, apply to the MENA region? 
2. Following from Western empirical financial markets, is the development in the MENA 
credit and stock markets positively associated with creditor and shareholder protection 
rights? 
3. Does legal enforcement affect the extent to which financial markets develop? 
4. Does judicial efficiency reinforce the extent to which financial markets develop? 
5. Does the Islamic culture deter financial market development? 
6. How does the gap-filling role of Sharia in MENA's legal systems affect financial 
market development? 
7. Will the Islamic culture and the hybrid legal system in the MENA complement or 
eliminate the impact of legal origin on financial market development? 
2.1.2. Contributions and objectives 
Essay 1 considers the influential nature of the ‘Law and Finance’ theory as originally proposed 
by LLSV with regard to the subsequent critique in the context of the MENA region.  It 
contributes to our understanding of the relative importance of both explicitly stated investor 
protection rights enshrined in regional legal frameworks and implied cultural values to financial 
market development.  To achieve this end, the essay enhances LLSV approach by making the 
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following research method improvements.  First, adopting a more comprehensive set of investor 
protection proxies coded specifically by direct reference to the legal provision issued in each 
MENA country.  Second, cultural proxies are added measuring the role of Islam in politics, 
education and banking.  Third, the impact of Sharia law on a MENA country’s constitution is 
included by way of identifying reference in the constitution. 
These contributions are achieved through the adoption of these research objectives: 
 present a comprehensive literature review by identifying the commonalities, 
controversies and criticisms in the existing ‘Law and Finance’ literature and the cultural 
impact on financial market development. 
 construct comparative description of shareholder protection for each MENA country.  
This involves extracting legal provisions from the national laws that are relevant for 
shareholder protection. 
 compile a dataset of the cultural role of Islam.  Measurement of the cultural role of 
Islam involves identifying the presence of political, financial and educational Islamic 
institutions in each MENA country. 
 construct a dataset of the constitutional role of Sharia in the legal system in each MENA 
country.  Measurement of the role of Sharia in the legal system involves reviewing 
constitutional provisions that refer to the role of Sharia in the legislation. 
 empirically examine the relationship between the legal environment and financial 
market development in the MENA. 
 empirically examine the impact of the Islamic culture and the presence of hybrid legal 
system on the development of financial markets. 
2.1.3. Essay structure 
The literature review of the legal environment and the cultural factors that influence financial 
market development is documented in Section 2.2.  An overview of the conceptual framework 
and a review of the theoretical literature are then provided.  The development of the ‘Law and 
Finance’ theory, the various measures of investor protection and the different alternative 
explanations for the prediction of the theory is reviewed.  The various criticisms of the ’Law and 
Finance’ theory and application are then explored.  The literature of the significance of culture on 
the legal rules is presented. 
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The historical development of the MENA’s legal systems is discussed in Section 2.3.  The 
chronological development of the legal systems is portrayed starting from the Ottoman Empire 
era, the colonisation and the subsequent independence that shape the contemporary legal systems. 
Section 2.4 illustrates the research design.  The sample countries and period of analysis are 
identified.  The development of three critical indices is explained.  The development of the anti-
director rights index for each MENA country is illustrated pointing to the specific national laws 
and legal provisions used to derive to the index scores.  The development of the Sharia index that 
proxies for the hybrid legal system is discussed with reference to the specific provisions in 
MENA countries constitutions.  The measurement of Islamic culture and its dominant role in the 
MENA region is portrayed.  The importance of considering the Islamic culture when 
investigating the development of MENA's financial markets is emphasised.  The model 
specification is reviewed, followed by a description of the variables compiled in this essay and 
their measurement.  Finally, a survey of panel data estimation techniques and the rationale for 
method selection are discussed. 
The empirical results are presented in Section 2.5.  Univariate, bivariate and multivariate analyses 
addressing the relationship between the legal environment, culture and financial market 
development are provided.  Robust regression results using the bootstrap technique are 
subsequently discussed.  Section 2.6 concludes by summarising the overall findings, discussing 
the implications, identifying the limitations of the study and outlining the scope for further 
research. 
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2.2. Literature review 
The standard premise in corporate law is that the legal environment that provides protection for 
outside investors limits the extent of expropriation by corporate insiders.  Investor protection is 
essential to assure the flow of capital to firms and to promote financial market development.  The 
legal environment, however, relates systematically to the prevailing local culture.  The present 
literature review focuses on these two factors, legal and cultural, to explain worldwide financial 
development patterns. 
2.2.1. ‘Law and Finance’: commonalities, controversies and criticism 
The theoretical framework for analysing the effects of the legal environment on financial markets 
traces back to the contractual view of the firm by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  This view 
considers that the protection of investor property rights from expropriation by corporate insiders 
is essential in assuring the flow of capital to firms at lowest possible cost.  There are rights 
attached to different types of securities.  In the case of debt, creditors have the right to control 
assets when the firm fails to pay the interest and/or principal, whereas shareholders have the right 
to vote at general meetings and are residual claimants on cash flows.
14
  Due to the inherent 
conflict of interest between corporate insiders and investors, these rights are essential for 
investors to get the return on their investments and for firms to finance their operations.  
Consequently, the quality of legal rules determines the extent of investor protection, which in 
turn, affects investor’s willingness to invest and eventually influences financial market 
development. 
The intrinsic rights attached to securities vary from one country to another based on the national 
legal rules governing these securities.  One key research question in the literature involves the 
degree to which law promotes financial market development.  LLSV explore this question in a 
series of research studies that articulate the relationship between ‘Law and Finance’.  They 
develop the ‘Law and Finance’ theory which posits that legal traditions transplanted by former 
colonisers underlie differences in investor protection rights.  Higher legal protection of creditors 
and minority shareholders’ rights are expected to positively influence investors to provide debt 
and equity capital to firms, which in turn, affect financial market development in countries 
around the world (Claessens and Laeven, 2003; La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). 
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 Gupta, Obrimah, Prakash, and Rangan (2011, p. 9) call the rights conferred on creditors as remedial rights while 
the rights conferred on shareholders as both pre-emptive and remedial. 
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The ‘Law and Finance’ theory posits that legal rules differ in countries around the world; 
however, they are influenced by either English common law or French civil law.  Political 
differences associated with the relative power of the monarch and property holders shape the 
creation of the two major legal traditions.  The two legal systems operate in very different ways.  
Common law relies on judges, broader legal principles and oral arguments while civil law 
depends on legal codes and written records (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, p. 1193).  Damaska 
(1986) in Xu (2011, p. 838) refers to common law as ‘dispute resolving’ and to civil law as 
‘policy implementing’.  English common law has evolved to protect private property owners 
against the crown.  This facilitated the ability of private property owners to transact confidently 
with positive consequences on financial development.  However, France and Germany did not 
have powerful Parliaments and hence state dominance produced legal traditions that focused 
more on the power of the state and less on the rights of individual investors (Glaeser and Shleifer, 
2002, p. 1211).
15
  According to the ‘Law and Finance’ theory, these legal traditions spread 
throughout the world via conquest, colonisation and imitation (La Porta et al., 1998, p. 1115).  As 
a result, the differences in the development of financial institutions around the world can be 
traced to the prevailing influences of different legal traditions. Figure  2.1 shows LLSV 
classification of the world based on the legal origin as defined by the comparative law literature 
of Zweigert and Kotz (1987). 
La Porta et al. (1998) find that the law and its enforcement differ across 49 countries.  Countries 
with English common law legal origin have higher levels of investor protection, higher levels of 
law enforcement and less ownership concentration than those of French civil law origin.  
Subsequently, La Porta et al. (1997) examine the financing sources as a function of the legal 
origin, the investor protection law and the extent of law enforcement.  They hypothesise that 
countries with better investor protection laws have higher market values and more firms 
accessing the capital market.  Results of the means tests and cross-country ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions show that the legal environment significantly affects the size and the breadth 
of financial markets.  La Porta et al. (1997) conclude that common law countries operate more 
developed financial markets than civil law countries. 
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Islamic law are to be sought first and foremost in the teachings of the authoritative jurists, hence it is Jurist's law. 
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Figure  2.1 Distribution of legal origin 
 
Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2013, p. 430). 
The methodical contribution of LLSV arises in the development of indices to quantify the quality 
of investor protection rules in countries around the world.  They construct indices for creditor and 
shareholder protection rights.  The former measures creditor protection in bankruptcy scenarios, 
whilst the latter measures the degree of minority shareholders’ protection offered by corporate 
and security laws against expropriation by managers or major shareholders.  The indices are an 
aggregate of binary codes that rely on the inclusion or exclusion of certain relevant criterion 
(defined in Panels B and C in Appendix 3).  With mounting critique on the anti-director rights 
index, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) revise the LLSV index by 
providing more precise definitions to the same dimensions of corporate law.  In particular, the 
adjusted version of the anti-director rights index distinguishes between enabling provisions that 
are prevalent in common law and mandatory and default rules.  Further, Djankov, La Porta, et al. 
(2008) construct a new index to measure the legal protection of minority shareholders against 
expropriation by corporate insiders.  The anti-self dealing index is a survey-based measure that is 
better grounded in theory than LLSV index of anti-director rights (defined in Panel C of 
Appendix 3). 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) analyse the securities law and examine the 
relationship between certain provisions in securities law and stock market development.  The 
primary focus is on provisions in securities law that regulate the issuance of new equity to the 
public, in particular mandatory disclosure and liability law (defined in Panel C of Appendix 3).  
Prospectus disclosure relates to the requirement to disclose the insiders' compensation, ownership 
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by large shareholders, inside ownership, contracts outside the normal course of business and 
transactions with related parties.  The prospectus liability disclosure relates to the procedural 
difficulty for investors to recover losses from the issuer, the distributor or the accountant in a civil 
liability case due to misleading statements in the prospectus.  La Porta et al. (2006, p. 27) argue 
that securities law matters and financial markets do not prosper when left to market forces.  Their 
results show that disclosure requirements and liability law are associated with larger stock 
markets.  The superiority of common law once again is evident in the disclosure and liability 
standards.  However, the anti-director rights index is not important in explaining cross-country 
differences in financial development once disclosure requirements and liability law are included. 
An unexpected result of La Porta et al. (1997) is that the creditor rights index does predict credit 
market development differences (La Porta et al., 1997, p. 1145).  Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 
(2007, p. 300) examine two theories, the power of creditors and information theories, of the 
determinant of how much private credit a financial system would extend to firms and individuals.  
The power of creditors theory suggests that lenders are more willing to extend credit when it is 
easy to force repayment, grab collateral, or gain control of the firm.  The information theory 
suggests that when lenders know more about borrowers, their credit history or their other lenders, 
they are not as concerned about the ‘lemons’ problem of financing non-viable projects and 
therefore extend more credit.  Djankov et al. (2007) amass data on the public and private credit 
registries which collect credit histories and current indebtedness of borrowers and share this 
information with the lenders.  Djankov et al. (2007) note that creditor power theory and 
information theory are not mutually exclusive.  However, less developed countries with poorly 
functioning legal systems might be unable to sustain an effective lending channel based on 
creditor rights and could depend on information sharing for their credit markets to function.  
Whereas richer countries might develop more functional bankruptcy systems so that creditor 
power is important in these countries.  The results show that creditor rights and the presence of 
credit registries explain differences in private credit ratios.  Djankov et al. (2007) examine the 
relative importance of power and information theories for countries at different levels of 
development and find that creditor right scores and the incidence of private credit registries are 
higher in richer countries.  Further, public credit registries are common in civil law counties.  The 
dominance of common law is evident where the results show that common law countries enjoy 
higher levels of creditor rights than civil law countries. 
Other studies provide empirical evidence supporting the ‘Law and Finance’ theory.  Levine 
(1998) finds that both the creditor rights index and the legal origin of LLSV positively affect 
bank development.  Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) find that financial intermediaries are more 
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developed in countries where the law gives a high priority to secured creditors in bankruptcy, 
enforces contracts effectively and promotes comprehensive and quality financial reporting.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) examine how the proportions of firms that rely on 
external finance differ among financial systems.  They find that a firm’s access to external 
finance is dependent on the development of both the banking system and the securities’ markets; 
this in turn is a function of the legal environment development.  Beck and Levine (2002) argue 
that bank-based systems or market-based systems do not matter for industry growth; however, the 
legal system efficiency and financial development affect positively the growth of industries that 
depend extensively on external financing. 
Several theories have been proposed to explain how legal origin shapes finance; such as the 
political theory, the adaptability theory and endowment theory.
16
  The political theory states that 
legal origins vary in the priority they provide to investors against the state which in turn has 
implications for the development of property rights and financial markets.  This theory proposes 
that once a group gains power, the group shapes policies and institutions to its own advantage.  
Thus, if the elite see themselves as being enriched by free competitive markets, they put pressure 
on the state to create laws and institutions to stimulate financial development.  If the elite feel 
threatened by competitive financial markets, they exert pressure on the state to restrict private 
transactions and hence the operation of free markets.  A centralised powerful closed political 
system is more responsive to serve the interests of the elite and hence restrict financial 
development more than a decentralised, open, and competitive political system.  The political 
theory predicts that common law emphasises private property rights while civil law emphasises 
the rights of the state. 
The adaptability theory suggests that legal systems that respond to emerging economic issues by 
reducing the gap quickly between contracting needs and the legal rules lead financial 
development more effectively than rigid legal systems.  The comparative law literature suggests 
that common law is dynamic, because judges respond to the changing needs of society, while 
French civil law is static (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2001, p. 3; 2005; Hayek, 1960; 
Mahoney, 2001). 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) propose endowment theory as an alternative 
explanation to the ‘Law and Finance’ theory.  Endowment theory posits that the difference in 
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War II, which radicalised local politics and led to legal rules hostile to financial markets. 
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institutions among countries is due to differences in colonial strategies.  The European 
colonisation strategies were driven by the feasibility of settlement.  When the Europeans suffer 
from high mortality rates due to diseases, they adopt an ‘extractive’ strategy to take resources 
from these colonies, rather than settle down.  This strategy promotes institutions that discourage 
long-term investment and economic development.  Whereas in other colonies the Europeans were 
able to settle and establish institutions to enforce the rule of law and promote long-term 
investment.  The impact of these policies persisted after independence (Acemoglu et al., 2001, p. 
1359).
17
  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) assess the explanatory power of the political 
and the adaptability theories and provide empirical evidence supporting the latter.  Specifically, 
the legal system adaptability explains cross-country differences in financial intermediary, stock 
market development, and private property rights.  Following the same rationale, the findings of 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2005) show that adaptability of the legal system rather than 
the political independence of the judiciary is more important for explaining obstacles that firms 
face in accessing external finance.  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003b) compare the ‘Law 
and Finance’ and the endowment theories.  They conduct cross-country regressions for 70 former 
colonies and find that while both theories play a role in explaining financial development, 
endowment theory explains more of the cross-country variation in financial intermediary and 
stock market development.  Beck et al. (2001) assess the three established theories related to the 
determinants of financial development and provide strong support for the role of legal tradition, 
mild support for the endowment theory, and least support for the political theory. 
While LLSV’s work has been empirically supported and widely cited, their approach has been 
criticised on various grounds including research method, variables selection and measurement of 
indices, contrary historical evidence, and legal origin classification.
18
 
The LLSV studies use OLS regressions to estimate the relationship between law and financial 
development.  Critics argue that reverse causality and bias in estimated parameters are 
unresolved.  Reverse causality (endogeneity) arises because any correlation between investor 
protection law and financial development can be interpreted in two ways.  LLSV assert the 
direction of the relationship is from law to financial development.  However, other researchers 
argue in favour of the opposite direction from financial development to law.  Coffee (2001, p. 64) 
argues that both the US and the UK had well developed stock markets prior to the existence of 
their comprehensive securities’ legislation.  Similarly, Pistor (2009, p. 1661) suggests that better 
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approach in formulating policy prescription for financial development in emerging markets. 
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investor protection legislation is a response to market development and crises associated with it.  
Addressing this endogeneity problem is difficult however.  Using the legal origin as an 
instrumental variable in a two stage least squares regression is inappropriate since legal origin 
affects finance in ways other than investor protection rules (Xu, 2011, p. 845).  For example, 
government ownership of banks (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002), burden of entry 
regulation, regulation of labour markets, government ownership of media and judicial 
independence all vary across legal traditions (La Porta et al., 2008, p. 286).  In response La Porta 
et al. (2013, pp. 443-444) argue that even if instrumental variable techniques are inappropriate 
because legal origin influences finance through channels other than investor protection rules, this 
criticism does not reject the significance of the theory.  Using a quasi-natural experiment 
approach Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig (2010) address the endogeneity between law and financial 
market development.  Haselmann et al. (2010) examine the effect of legal change on the lending 
behaviour of banks in twelve economies and find that banks increase the supply of credit 
subsequent to legal change.  Additionally, changes in collateral law matter more for increases in 
bank lending than do changes in bankruptcy law. 
Bias in the estimated parameters arises when the estimation equation excludes variables that are 
correlated with explanatory variables.  One possible excluded variable in the ‘Law and Finance’ 
theory is culture.  Branson (2001, pp. 345-347) argues that the culture beneath the law and the 
institutions is more important than the law itself.  Licht et al. (2005) emphasise the importance of 
culture on the law and argue that the law reflects cultural values.  Another potential excluded 
explanatory variable proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001) is the initial condition of the colony.  A 
final potential excluded explanatory variable for divergent finance development is political 
institutions.  Proponents of this argument reject the central role of legal tradition, stressing instead 
that political factors shape financial development.  Pagano and Volpin (2005) reveal that electoral 
systems affect investor protection.  Results of the determinants of shareholder protection show 
that when political variables and legal origins are jointly included, the coefficients on the legal 
origin dummies are statistically insignificant.  La Porta et al. (2013, pp. 461-467) acknowledge 
that politics is important for legal rules; however, they reject the assertion that legal origin is a 
proxy for politics.  They regress the legal and institutional rules on three variables considered by 
political theory of corporate finance and find that political variables only occasionally explain 
variation in legal rules.  Legal origin, however, explains the variation in legal rules even with 
political variables in the regression and the difference between common law and civil law 
persists. 
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A final methodological flaw relates to the univariate analysis conducted in the LLSV studies.  
Graff (2008) argues that “the reported t-tests of the differences of the various shareholder 
protection dummy variables are flawed, because a t-test is not adequate for a comparison of 
binary variables” (Graff, 2008, p. 67).  Graff (2008) suggests applying a parametric test based on 
a binomial distribution of the difference between the common law-civil law groups. 
Further criticism relates to LLSV’s method of index construction.  Legal scholars criticise the 
variable selection and the simplicity of judgement in LLSV’s approach to measure the corporate 
law.  Cools (2005, p. 702) criticises the quantification of corporate law and wonders whether 
quantification of law is reasonable, particularly when scoring mechanisms are narrowly defined.  
Dam (2006) and Siems and Deakin (2010) argue that investor protection indices of LLSV may 
not accurately describe the law and call for a functional (how it applies in courts) rather than the 
terminological comparison.  Further, the variables used to measure anti-director rights index are 
insufficient in the measurement of shareholder protection rights since they ignore important 
variables such as the structure of the board of directors (Cools, 2005, pp. 703-704).  Graff (2008) 
questions the exclusion of relevant and valid measures of investor protection in the formation of 
the anti-director rights index, namely ‘one share–one vote’ and ‘mandatory dividend’ variables.  
Other studies object to the LLSV coding method and reassess the anti-director rights index scores 
for several countries.  These studies argue that LLSV coding is incorrect, and in each study, the 
authors refer to the relevant legal provision supporting their argument (Braendle, 2006; 
Schmidbauer, 2006; Cools, 2005).
19
  Further, LLSV consider only the company law as a source 
of investor protection.  However, there exist other important provisions for shareholder protection 
derived from other sources such as the corporate governance code and accounting standards 
(Schmidbauer, 2006, p. 15). 
Siems and Deakin (2010) point out that LLSV’s variables are US centric and measure the extent 
to which other countries’ legal systems are proximate to the US.  Hence, LLSV recipe may not 
necessarily work in other markets.  Testy (1997, p. 507) argues that although several emerging 
countries model their corporate law closely to developed nations; corporate law in emerging 
markets may not work as well.  Testy (1997) attributes this to the fact that corporate law in 
developed nations does not work alone, there are other institutions that constrain corporate 
conduct such as the presence of efficient markets, competent juridical systems and efficient 
securities regulation schemes.  These institutional constraints are either missing or less well 
developed in emerging markets.  Weingast (2009) attributes the resilience of developing 
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 The adjusted scores in the subsequent studies are dramatically different than LLSV; for example, Germany and US 
in Braendle (2006), UK and Austria in Schmidbauer (2006), and France and Belgium in Cools (2005). 
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countries to the rule of law to the instability of state institutions.  He argues that to sustain the rule 
of law over time, state institutions must survive beyond those who create them so the identities of 
political officials do not matter. 
A central criticism to the ‘Law and Finance’ theory is the contrary historical evidence which La 
Porta et al. (2008, p. 315) recognise as the most difficult challenge to their theory.  Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) argue that in 1913 French civil law countries outpaced common law countries in 
terms of financial development.  However, this was reversed between 1913 and 1999.  This ‘great 
reversal’ remains unexplained by LLSV’s theory that predicts a constant influence of legal origin 
over financial development.  La Porta et al. (2013, pp. 470-473) challenge Rajan and Zingales 
(2003) arguing the variation in results is due to the impact of outliers in stock market 
development.  For example, Egypt is reported as the second most financially developed with 
French civil law despite being under British protection.  Further, La Porta et al. (2013) note that 
the statistics used for market capitalisation to GDP included bond values.  La Porta et al. (2013) 
adjust the numbers and present graphically the prevalence of common law financial development 
relative to the civil law since the start of the 20th century.  They point out that it is the divergence 
over time rather than the reversal that requires explanation. 
Additional contrary historical evidence is related to the establishment of well-developed stock 
markets at the beginning of the 20th century, long before the presence of legal codes protecting 
shareholders.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) infer the law provides 
investors with protection against expropriation from insiders in well-developed financial markets 
with dispersed ownership. This inference is unsupported by historical records; Coffee (2001, p. 
25) shows that the early development of both New York Stock Exchange and London Stock 
Exchange witnessed dispersed ownership despite the fact that neither the US nor the UK had 
strong investor protection at the time.  La Porta et al. (2013, p. 476) further acknowledge that 
shareholder rights improved parallel to the growth of Britain’s markets, which presents a 
challenge to their theory. 
Finally, LLSV have been criticised for the classification system used for legal origin.  LLSV 
adopt the comparative law literature of Reynolds and Flores (1989) and Zweigert and Kotz 
(1987) that establish two main legal origins - English common law and Roman civil law.  Siems 
(2007, p. 58) critiques the prevalent approach of the ‘Law and Finance’ research arguing that 
legal origin is less relevant as laws become more internationally standardised.  La Porta et al. 
(2013, p. 432) argue that the international growth of legislation does not imply the irrelevance of 
legal origin.  Norton and Sari-Eldin (1996, p. 340) note that there is a clear distinction between 
common law and civil law models in contract law and commercial law.  However, when it comes 
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to insolvency, banking and securities laws, significant differences exist amongst common law and 
civil law traditions.  Moreover, Siems (2007) argues that the binary classification of legal origin 
ignores important features of the legal structure.  Siems calls for a tentative approach that 
considers a wider definition of the legal culture that goes beyond the content of statutory or case 
law.  Furthermore, Siems (2007) notes that published ‘Law and Finance’ research focuses heavily 
on European or Western legal traditions proves problematic for regions like Africa with mixed 
legal traditions. 
2.2.2. Culture 
The ‘Law and Finance’ theory has been criticised for ignoring cultural differences.  Culture is 
fundamentally related to economic outcomes (North, 2010).  Licht et al. (2005, p. 232) find that 
corporate governance laws relate systematically to prevailing culture and conclude that analyses 
of corporate governance regimes should combine the legal with the cultural approach.  Stulz and 
Williamson (2003) find that culture, measured by religion and language, better explains investor 
protection than legal origin. 
Measuring culture in empirical studies is difficult as there is no consensus of what culture means.  
Culture is defined by Boyd and Richerson (1985) cited in Stulz and Williamson (2003, p. 314) as 
the “transmission from one generation to the next, via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, 
values, and other factors that influence behavior.”  As defined by Bourdieu (1972), cited in Licht 
et al. (2005, p. 233), culture refers to “the complex of meanings, symbols, and assumptions about 
what is good or bad, legitimate or illegitimate that underlie the prevailing practices and norms in 
a society.”  Culture, in this sense, coordinates people’s epistemics and expectations. This justifies 
and guides how social institutions (the family, education, economic, political, religious systems) 
function (Licht et al., 2005, p. 233). 
Religion as a common system of beliefs has frequently been used as a proxy for prevailing 
cultural values.  Since Weber’s (1905) work, religion has been recognised as a key determinant in 
the growth of capitalism (Stulz and Williamson, 2003, p. 317).  At the micro level, religion has 
been empirically associated with economic attitudes and the activities of individuals, groups and 
institutions.  Landes (1998) cited in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999, pp. 
224, 233) identifies that Islam has been detrimental to institutional development.  Ahmed (2006) 
attributes this to the fact that since the 13
th
 century, the doors of the scholarly had been closed and 
this led to the stagnation of Islamic jurisprudence.  Legal reasoning became mechanical and 
Islamic law became a rigid body of rules and principles.  Islam prohibits interest which is the core 
business of bank operations.  This relates to Stulz and Williamson (2003) notion that given the 
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hostility of religions towards interest on lending, religion may be a more fundamental 
determinant of legal rules governing creditor protection than legal tradition.  Islam also prohibits 
gambling and speculation, both of which play an important role in stock markets and are often 
associated with high levels of trading volume, high return volatility and low average returns 
(Kumar, Page, and Spalt, 2011, p. 671). 
Despite the fact that contemporary MENA commercial laws do not explicitly prohibit interest and 
speculation, the Islamic values influence financial behaviour.  Recent research has linked 
individual religiosity to the level of participation in financial markets.  Salaber (2013) 
investigates the impact of religious preferences on stock returns in Europe and finds that religion 
affects the performance of unethical firms or ‘sin stocks’.20  In particular, Protestant countries 
exhibit a strong sin aversion relative to Catholic countries and investors in Protestant countries 
require a higher premium on sin stocks.  Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) provide evidence of 
significant effects of social norms on markets.  Kumar et al. (2011, p. 706) hypothesise that 
religion influences investors’ portfolio choices, corporate decisions and stock returns.  They use 
religious background as a proxy for gambling propensity and find that in regions where the 
Catholic-to-Protestant ratio is high, institutional investors are more likely to hold lottery-type 
stocks, employee stock options are more popular, the initial day return following an initial public 
offering is higher and the magnitude of the negative lottery-stock premium is higher.  This 
evidence implies that religion affects behaviour towards financial markets.
21
 
Differences in culture should not be ignored when examining comparative investor protection 
across countries (Licht, 2001; Licht et al., 2005; Stulz and Williamson, 2003).  Despite the global 
convergence in corporate governance practices, changes in statutory laws that strengthen investor 
rights do not guarantee improvement of corporate governance practices.  The culture beneath the 
law is equally important as the quality of the legal rules.  Branson (2001, pp. 345-346) provides 
an example where during the Asian financial crisis in 1998-99, 38 Indonesian banks collapsed 
because of mismanagement.  Despite the fact that Indonesian company law provides shareholders 
a mechanism for derivative actions against management, no suits were initiated.  Branson (2001) 
argues that if the same mismanagement occurred in the US, shareholders would initiate litigation.  
Branson attributes the difference in attitude toward litigation to the prevailing culture in each 
country.  In Indonesia, the widespread perception is that it is futile to challenge those in power. 
                                                 
20
 Sin stocks refer to the stock of alcohol, tobacco, and gambling firms. 
21
 Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2015) find evidence that cultural differences have substantial impacts on cross-
border mergers.  They report that cross-border mergers are more likely when countries are larger and closer 
geographically, and share a common legal origin, religion and language. 
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The literature addressing culture in the context of financial market development and legal rules is 
limited.  Licht (2001) views national cultures as the mother of path dependence and addresses the 
need to build a cross-cultural theory of corporate governance systems.  The study uses the 
cultural values framework developed by Schwartz and Hofstede to argue that national cultures 
play a role in both the origin and future development of corporate governance systems (Licht, 
2001, p. 203).  The argument is based on the premise that the system of beliefs and values that 
determine the behaviour and actions of individuals within a society explains the differences in 
investor protection.  Licht (2001) argues that culture influences law-making in two ways: cultural 
values may motivate lawmakers and interest groups to prefer certain legal arrangements to others 
or culture may constrain reforms that are not compatible with prevailing value priorities. 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) examine whether differences in culture explain differences in 
investor protection around the world.  They argue that culture affects finance through three 
channels: values; institutions; and resource allocation.  All of these channels are shaped by the 
dominant national culture.  They use two proxies for culture: religion as a key component of the 
system of beliefs; and, language as the vehicle to communicate beliefs.  Stulz and Williamson 
(2003) use dummy variables to represent religion and language.  They consider four religions 
(Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, and Protestantism) and two languages (English and Spanish).  
The results show no differences in anti-director rights index in countries with different religions.  
However, Catholic countries have lower creditor rights index than Buddhist, Muslim and 
Protestant countries.  Further, English speaking countries show the highest anti-director rights 
index.  Yet, countries with English as the primary language have creditor rights that only differ 
significantly from countries with Spanish as the primary language.  Judicial efficiency and rule of 
law is higher in countries where English is the primary language.  The Protestant countries have a 
significantly higher corruption index than all non-Protestant countries. 
Beugelsdijk and Maseland (2011, p. 272) argue that Stulz and Williamson (2003) findings are 
mixed where legal origin is found to be more important than religion for shareholder rights yet 
religion is found more important than legal origin when explaining creditor rights.  Beugelsdijk 
and Maseland (2011, p. 272) object to Stulz and Williamson (2003) conclusion that that 
Protestant countries have better enforcement of rights than do Catholic countries.  They note that 
this conclusion is not robust for inclusion of language.  Additionally, the interpretation of Stulz 
and Williamson (2003) results for culture, which are based on dummies for religion and 
language, is criticised.  Licht et al. (2005) agree that religion is a convenient proxy for culture; 
however, classifying countries by religion fails to capture the richness of cultural differences.  
Licht et al. (2005) argue that the use of religion as a dummy miss both the complexity of religious 
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variation around the world and the large differences in religious commitment within countries.  
Beugelsdijk and Maseland (2011, p. 272) argue that using fixed-effects approach may lead to 
substantial validity problems given that religion is highly correlated with legal origin.  The notion 
that French legal origin is associated with Catholicism and British common law is associated with 
Protestantism makes the interpretation of the statistical results when using both variables 
simultaneously complex. 
Licht et al. (2005) oppose LLSV’s grouping of countries according to legal families, arguing that 
legal origin is only a partial depiction of the universe of corporate governance regimes.  The law, 
they argue, reflects cultural values.  Licht et al. (2005) analyse the relations between investor 
protection indices of LLSV and national cultural profiles across countries using Schwartz and 
Hofstede measures of sociological cultural value.  The results show a high correlation between 
country's aversion to litigation and the harmony and uncertainty avoidance, implying that active 
regulation by government is required in countries where litigation for investor protection cannot 
be relied upon.  Further, cultural emphases on embeddedness and hierarchy, common in many 
developing and transition economies, may be conducive to corruption.  This finding implies that 
countries that develop social norms that do not rely on litigation, such as Asian societies, have 
other mechanisms of governance than the mechanisms known in the West (Licht et al., 2005, p. 
252). 
La Porta et al. (2013, pp. 460-463) accept the importance of culture and its persistent influence on 
legal families, yet challenge the assertion that legal origin is merely a proxy for culture.  La Porta 
et al. (2013, p. 457) state 
“To the extent that ideologies or cultures refer to the beliefs about how the law should 
deal with social problems, the Legal Origin Theory clearly accepts the view that 
ideologies and cultures are crucial for the persistent influence of legal families.  But 
the central point is that the reason for persistence is that the beliefs and ideologies 
become incorporated in legal rules, institutions, and education, and as such are 
transmitted from one generation to the next.  It is this incorporation of beliefs and 
ideologies into the legal and political infrastructure that enables legal origins to have 
such persistent consequences for rules, regulations, and economic outcomesˮ. 
La Porta et al. (2013, p. 461) regress a creditor protection rights index on religion and cultural 
variables on a larger sample of countries.  The results show that religion is not as important for 
creditor rights as is legal origin and indices of cultural attitudes are not shown to influence 
creditor rights once legal origin is held constant.  LLSV conclude that cultural variables are not 
important explanatory variables of legal origin. 
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2.3. Development of MENA legal systems 
The identity of the former coloniser is a major element in the ‘Law and Finance’ theory.  The 
theory predicts that the legal rules transplanted by the former coloniser play a major role in 
financial development.  MENA countries share a similar history prior to colonisation as they 
were under the Islamic Ottoman Empire for over 600 years (Figure  2.2) where Al-Majalla, an 
Islamic coded legal system (Colón, 2011, p. 431) related mainly to commercial transactions 
(Ahmed, 2006, p. 85) was the law of the Ottoman Empire (Kilborn, 2011, p. 340). 
Figure  2.2 Map of Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) 
 
Source: http://www.tunliweb.no/SM/alb_istanbul.htm, retrieved on 23 August 2015. 
In the seventeenth century, Europeans increased their military, commercial and political influence 
over the MENA.  Eventually in the nineteenth century, the Ottomans lost their competitiveness, 
borrowed extensively from Europe, defaulted, and were forced to introduce reforms to modernise 
the empire.  Reforms involved the incorporation of French and British legal rules into the 
Empire’s Islamic legal system (Stewart, 2009, p. 86; Goldschmidt and Davidson, 2012, p. 144) 
and financial Westernisation that involved the emergence of banks,
22
 the legalisation of interest 
and the establishment of secular courts (Kuran, 2005, p. 608; Shaaban, 1999, p. 158). 
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 Banks were mostly European owned and operated such as Bank of Egypt (Baha-Eldin, 1996, p. 313), the Ottoman 
Bank, the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, and the London and Baghdad Association (Kuran, 2005, p. 608). 
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The defeat of the Germans in WWI ended the Ottoman Empire; however, Al-Majalla continued 
to be applied across most of the MENA region (Majid and Majid, 2003).  As the Europeans, 
mainly French and British, colonised MENA (Figure  2.3), Western influences on the legal system 
emerged and the role of Al-Majalla declined.  Shortly after WWII, each MENA country gained 
its independence (Table  2.1) and adopted a unique legal system.
23
  Upon independence, a 
common trend particularly among religious groups was to regain the cultural identity by 
incorporating Islamic principles directly into the legal systems (Ahmed, 2006, p. 85). 
Figure  2.3 Western controlled territories in the 20th century 
 
Source: http://ocw.nd.edu/arabic-and-middle-east-studies/islamic-societies-of-the-middle-east-and-north-
africa-religion-history-and-culture/lectures/lecture-4 retrieved on 23 June 2013. 
Al-Sanhuri, a prominent Egyptian legal scholar, revised the legal codes of Egypt and later Iraq in 
the 1930s.  The codes at that time were distinctively different, while Al-Majalla was the basic 
civil law in Iraq, Egypt adopted French law for over fifty years (Baha-Eldin, 1996, pp. 313, 329; 
Hill, 1988, p. 35).  Al-Sanhuri later used these two models to pattern the codes of other Arab 
countries, such as Syria, Libya and Kuwait (Hill, 1988, p. 39).  The rest of the MENA countries, 
such as Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE modelled their legal codes on Egypt and Iraq.  
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 Al-Suwaidi (1993, p. 289) cites that the British political influence on the GCC that started in the 18
th
 century 
continues to affect the legal system in the region today.  The British jurisdiction was introduced parallel to the local 
jurisdiction and it did not replace it.  Under British influence, much of the legislation adopted by local authorities 
was borrowed from the common law codes.  Commercial regulations were based on English legal principles. 
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Table  2.1 Former coloniser and year of independence for MENA countries 
MENA country Former coloniser Year of independence/creation 
Algeria France 1962 
Bahrain Britain 1971 
Egypt Britain
24
 (France) 1922/1952 (1801) 
Iran Never colonised 1979 
Iraq Britain
25
 1930/1958 
Israel Not applicable Created by the British in 1948 
Jordan Britain 1946 
Kuwait Britain 1961 
Lebanon France 1946 
Libya Italy 1951 
Morocco France (Spain) 1956(1912) 
Oman Never colonised
26
 1970 
Palestine Britain
27
 Occupied by Israel 
Qatar Britain 1971 
Saudi Arabia Never colonised 1932 
Sudan Britain 1956 
Syria France 1946 
Tunisia France 1956 
Turkey Never colonised Created after defeat in 1923 
UAE Britain 1971 
Yemen Britain 1967 
Source: The World Factbook (2012).  From https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html 
As an advocate for modern Islamic law, Al-Sanhuri argues that all of the codes in the Arab world 
were revised to contain Islamic law; however, the extent of incorporation was contingent on a 
country’s existing laws, indigenous customs, commercial practices and its legal history (Hill, 
1988, p. 39; Stovall, 2000, p. 840).
28
  As a result, modern legal rules in the region have been 
inspired by both European as well as Islamic traditions. 
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 Egypt was conquered by Napoleon Bonaparte during 1798-1801.  Despite the short duration, the French have a far 
reaching impact on the Egyptian society and laws (Baha-Eldin, 1996, p. 312).  Egypt gained independence from 
Britain in 1922.  Britain however continued to control the country until 1952 when Egypt acquired full sovereignty 
with the overthrow of the British-backed monarchy. 
25
 Iraq gained independence from Britain in 1932, however, the government maintained close economic and military 
ties with Britain until 1958 where the monarchy was overthrown. 
26
 In the 18th century, a newly established sultanate in Muscat signed friendship treaties with Britain.  Oman's 
dependence on British political and military advisors increased, but it never became a British colony.  Britain 
recognised the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman as a fully independent state in 1951. 
27
 The British withdrew from Palestine in 1948.  Israel was created on some parts of Palestine. 
28
 Al-Sanhuri is a well-known Egyptian legal scholar of modern jurisprudence.  He contributed significantly in the 
writing of the civil law of Egypt of 1948.  His philosophy was that the law must consider both the present and the 
historical experience of each country and that the law should be derived from the people’s historical development 
socially, economically and legally.  His major aim was to revive the Islamic legal heritage in the revision and hence 
to make Egypt's civil law more Islamic (Hill, 1988, p. 34). 
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Israel and Turkey represent exceptions to the rest of the MENA countries.  Israel’s legal system is 
heavily influenced by the British rules.  Upon independence the modern Turkish Republic, 
despite being the centre of the Ottoman Empire, adopted a secular legal system (Bali, 2011, pp. 
269-270, 275-276).  Zweigert and Kotz (1987, p. 178) report: 
“[i]n order to effect a radical modernization of Turkish life, the legislator, at a 
stroke, abolished the Islamic legal practices which had been valid for centuries, 
having hardly been affected at all by the reform legislation of the last Sultans of the 
Ottoman Empire; in their place was introduced a code which was adapted to the 
needs of a society entirely different in its social, religious and economic structure”. 
What is evident from the historical narrative is that the contemporary legal system of MENA 
countries involved reconciliation between Islamic law and Western legal traditions based on their 
ex-colonial power’s legal system (Lombardi and Feener, 2012, p. 2; Majid and Majid, 2003, p. 
179). 
  
 32 
2.4. Research design 
This section identifies the sample, illustrates the construction of three indices, presents the model 
specification, discusses the variables and their definitions and reviews the estimation method 
used in this essay. 
2.4.1. Sample 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of annual data for 21 MENA countries over the 
period 2007-2012.
29
  The countries covered are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, 
Turkey, UAE and Yemen. 
Due to the limited scope, and sometimes absence of bond markets in the MENA, credit market 
development analyses only the banking sector where data is available.  Credit market data is 
available for all countries across all the years, except for Syria for the years 2011 and, 2012 and 
Libya for the years 2010 to 2012. 
The following stock markets are considered; Bourse d’Alger, Bahrain Bourse, Egyptian 
Exchange, Iraqi Stock Exchange, Tehran Stock Exchange, Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, Amman 
Stock Exchange, Kuwait Stock Exchange, Beirut Stock Exchange, Casablanca Stock Exchange, 
Muscat Securities Market, Palestine Exchange, Qatar Exchange, Saudi Financial Market 
(Tadawul), Khartoum Stock Exchange, Bourse de Tunis, Istanbul Stock Exchange, Abu Dhabi 
Securities Exchange and Dubai Financial Market.
30
  The stock market data is available for 18 
countries for the years 2007-2012.  Libya, Syria and Yemen are excluded from the stock market 
development analysis since these countries do not have operating stock markets. 
2.4.2. Index construction  
This section presents the development of three constructs (the anti-director rights index, legal 
duality and Islamic culture) that form the basis of the empirical testing of the impact of the legal 
environment and culture on financial market development in the MENA region. 
2.4.2.1. Anti-director rights index 
This research constructs an anti-director rights index for each MENA country following the 
definitions of La Porta et al. (1997) and the adjustments of Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008) 
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 The analysis period is determined by data availability.  The World Bank reports investor protection indices for the 
MENA countries since 2006 and financial market data until 2012.  The dependent variables are for years (2007-
2012) and the independent variables are lagged one year. 
30
 NASDAQ Dubai will not be taken into account since the equities listed are limited and recent. 
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thereafter.  There are no comparative shareholder protection scores exist for the entire set of 
MENA countries because the ‘Law and Finance’ cover only four MENA countries.  The LLSV 
indices are based on an ad hoc collection of variables that capture particular areas of the law 
expected to mitigate agency problems.  The approach used by LLSV establishes binary scores for 
the existence or the absence of a particular legal rule and then combines the scores to form a 
continuous variable.  The anti-director rights index is the summation of six equally weighted 
variables derived from the corporate and commercial laws that grant protection for minority 
shareholders against expropriation by insiders (managers and controlling shareholders).  First, the 
ability to vote by mail which reflects the ease with which shareholders can cast votes.  Second, 
obstacles to the actual exercise of the right to vote; some countries require shares to be deposited 
before the shareholders’ meeting.  This practice prevents shareholders from selling their shares 
for several days around the time of the meeting.  Third, the extent to which minority shareholders 
are able to obtain representation on the board of directors measured through cumulative voting or 
proportional representation.  Fourth, an oppressed minority mechanism that remedies in case of 
expropriation.  Fifth, the existence of pre-emptive rights to subscribe to new share issues 
protecting against ownership dilution.  Sixth, the right to call a special shareholder meeting which 
measures the percentage of capital required to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting.  A 
country has a score of one if its legal rules protect the minority shareholders according to the 
variable criterion or a score of zero otherwise for each measure.  The aggregated scores form the 
anti-director rights index ranging from zero to six. 
Table  2.2 presents the scores for each MENA country for the anti-director rights index and its 
sub-components as derived from the national laws.  The countries in Table  2.2 are sorted in 
ascending order based on the anti-director rights index score.  The table is colour coded for visual 
analysis where light blue reflects lower level of investor protection, and as the colour intensifies, 
investor protection increases.  The borderlines are subjectively determined. 
Corporate Law, Securities Law, Capital Market Law, Corporate Governance Codes and other 
relevant executive orders and rules are considered when coding the investor protection for 
MENA countries.  The construction of the index involves translation of the legal provisions from 
Arabic, French, Hebrew, Persian or Turkish into English.  Any legal reform that took place 
during the period of the study is included.  Table  2.3 lists the relevant laws and regulations used 
to derive to the scores for the index.  The comparative text for the legal provisions in English and 
the legal sources for each component of the anti-director rights index are presented for each 
country in Appendix 1. Due to the length of the legal provisions for each country, the scores are 
presented in the body of the thesis and the details are contained in Appendix 1.  
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Table  2.2 Anti-director rights index for MENA countries 
Country Vote 
by 
mail† 
Shares not 
deposited†† 
Cumulative 
voting§ 
Oppressed 
minority§§ 
Pre-
emptive 
rights‡ 
Capital to call a 
meeting‡‡ 
Anti-director 
rights indexǂ 
Algeria 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.5 
Jordan 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.5 
Palestine 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
0.0 (West Bank) 
1.0 (Gaza) 
1.5 (West Bank) 
2.5 (Gaza) 
Iran 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 2.5 
Israel 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 2.5 
Lebanon 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 2.5 
Morocco 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 2.5 
Sudan 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 2.5 
Tunisia 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 2.5 
UAE 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 2.5 
Egypt 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 3.0 
Iraq 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 3.5 
Saudi Arabia 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 
Bahrain 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.0 
Kuwait 1.0 0.0 
0.0 (pre 2012) 
1.0 (post 2012) 
1.0 0.0 1.0 
3.0 (pre 2012) 
4.0 (post 2012) 
Oman 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 4.0 
Turkey 1.0 
0.0 (pre 2011) 
1.0 (post 2011) 
0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 
3.0 (pre 2011) 
4.0 (post 2011) 
Qatar 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 4.5 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
† Vote by mail: Equals 1 if the law explicitly mandates that: a) proxy solicitations paid by the firm include a proxy 
form allowing shareholders to vote on the items on the agenda; or b) a proxy form to vote on the items on the agenda 
accompanies the notice to the meeting; or c) shareholders vote by mail on the items on the agenda (i.e., postal ballot); 
and equals 0 otherwise. 
†† Shares not deposited: Equals 1 if the company law or commercial code disallows firms to require that 
shareholders deposit their shares prior to a general shareholders meeting, thus preventing them from selling those 
shares for a number of days, and equals 0 otherwise. 
§ Cumulative voting: Equals 1 if the law explicitly mandates that shareholders owning 10% or less of the capital 
can cast all their votes for one board of directors or supervisory board candidate (cumulative voting) or if the law 
explicitly mandates a mechanism of proportional representation in the board of directors or supervisory board by 
which shareholders owning 10% or less of the capital stock can name a proportional number of directors to the 
board; and equals 0 otherwise. 
§§ Oppressed minority: Equals 1 if minority shareholders can challenge a resolution of both the shareholders and 
the board if it is unfair, prejudicial, oppressive, or abusive; equals 0.5 if shareholders are able to challenge either a 
resolution of the shareholders or the board if it is unfair, prejudicial, or oppressive; and equals 0 otherwise. 
‡ Pre-emptive rights: Equals 1 when the company law or commercial code grants shareholders the first opportunity 
to buy new issues of stock, and this right can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote; and equals 0 otherwise. 
‡‡ Capital to call a meeting: The minimum percentage of share capital or voting power that the law mandates or 
sets as a default rule as entitling a single shareholder to call a shareholders’ meeting (directly or through the court).  
Equals 1 when capital to call a meeting is less than or equal to 10%; and equals 0 otherwise. 
ǂ Anti-director rights index: Aggregate index of shareholder rights.  It is formed by summing: a) vote by mail; b) 
shares not deposited; c) cumulative voting; d) oppressed minority; e) pre-emptive rights; and, f) capital to call a 
meeting. 
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Table  2.3 Laws and regulations relevant for shareholder protection 
Country Laws / Regulations / Corporate Governance Code Language 
Algeria
31
  Code of Commerce, Ordinance No. (75-59) of 1975. 
Arabic and 
French 
Bahrain 
 Commercial Companies Law, Decree No. (21) of 2001. 
 Executive Regulation of Commercial Companies Law No. (21) of 2001, 
Ministerial Order No. (6) of 2002. 
 Amendments to Commercial Companies Law No. (21) of 2001, Law No. 
(50) of 2014. 
 Corporate Governance Code (2011). [Comply or explain] 
Arabic and 
English 
Egypt 
 Companies Law, No. (159) of 1981. 
 Executive Regulation of Companies Law No.159 of 1981, Decree No. (96) 
of 1982. 
 Capital Market Law, No. (95) of 1992. 
 Executive Regulation for the Capital Market Law No. (95) of 1992, Decree 
No. (135) of 1993. 
 Code of Corproate Governance (2005). [Voluntary] 
 Code of Corporate Governance (2011). [Comply or explain] 
Arabic and 
English 
Iran 
 Commercial Code: Treatise 1, Joint stock companies: Ratified by both 
houses of parliament on 15th March 1969. 
English and 
Persian 
Iraq 
32
  Companies Law, No. (21) of 1997. Arabic 
Israel 
 Companies Law, No. (5759) of 1999. 
 Securities Law, No. (5728) of 1968. 
English and 
Hebrew 
Jordan 
 Companies Law, No. (22) of 1997. 
 Corporate Governance Code for Shareholding Companies Listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange, 2008. [Comply or explain] 
 Corporate Governance Code (Private shareholding companies, limited 
liability companies, Non-listed public shareholding companies) 2012. 
[Comply or explain] 
Arabic and 
English 
Kuwait 
33
 
 Commercial Companies Law, No. (15) of 1960. 
 Companies Law, No. (25) of 2012. 
Arabic and 
English 
Lebanon 
 On the Land Commerce, Decision No. (304) of 1942. 
 Code of Corporate Governance (2006). [Voluntary] 
 Corporate Governance Guidelines for Listed Companies (2010). 
[Voluntary] 
Arabic and 
English 
Morocco 
 Companies Law, No. (17) of 1995. 
 Code of Good Corporate Governance Practices (2008). [Comply or 
explain] 
Arabic and 
French 
Oman 
 Commercial Companies Law, No. (4) of 1974. 
 Capital Market Law, Royal Decree No. (80) of 1998. 
 Rules and Conditions for the Election of Directors of Public Joint Stock 
Companies and their Responsibilities, Ministerial Order No. (137) of 2002. 
Arabic and 
English 
                                                 
31
 Corporate governance code is voluntary and directed towards small and medium-sized family business. 
32
 No corporate governance code. 
33
 No corporate governance code. 
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Country Laws / Regulations / Corporate Governance Code Language 
Palestine 
 Companies Law, 1929. [Applicable in Gaza] 
 Jordanian Company Law, No. (12) of 1964. [Applicable in West Bank] 
 Corporate Governance (2009). [Compulsory if the principle is consistent 
with the current legislation, comply or explain if the principle does not 
contradict with current legislation, and if it contradicts with current 
legislation then it is not applied until such amendments are done.] 
Arabic 
Qatar 
 Commercial Companies, Act No. (5) of 2002. 
 Corporate Governance Code, 2009. [Comply or explain] 
Arabic and 
Enlgish 
Saudi 
Arabia 
 Companies Regulations, Royal Decree No. (M/6) of 1385 Hijri. 
 Corporate Governance Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Resolution No. (1/212/2006) dated 21/10/1427AH. [Comply or explain 
except for Article 9 (since 2008), paragraph (b) of Article 10 (since 2012), 
paragraphs (c) and (e) of Article 12 and Article 14 (since 2009) and Article 
15 (since 2011) are all mandatory] 
Arabic 
Sudan  Companies Act of 1925. Arabic 
Tunisia 
 Companies Law, No. (93) of 2000. 
 Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2008). [Voluntary] 
Arabic and 
French 
Turkey 
 Commercial Law, No. (6102) of 2011. 
 Capital Market Law, No. (2499) of 2007. 
 Communiqué on Corporate Governance, No. (28871) of 2014. [Comply or 
explain] 
Turkish and 
English 
UAE 
 Commercial Companies Law, No. (8) of 1984. 
 Corporate Governance Code for joint-stock companies and institutional 
discipline criteria, Decision No. (32\R) of 2007. [Mandatory] 
 Governance Rules and Corporate Discipline Standards, Ministerial 
Resolution No. (518) of 2009. [Mandatory for publicly traded companies 
after 30 April 2010] 
Arabic and 
English 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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2.4.2.2. Sharia constitutional role 
One of the distinctive features of MENA is that unlike Western countries the separation between 
state (politics) and religion (church) does not entirely apply.  Platteau (2008) attributes the lack of 
separation between the religious and the political spheres in the Muslim world to Prophet 
Muhammed being a political leader in his city causing a complete merging of religion and 
politics.  Lewis (1990) in Stewart (2009, p. 9) argues that the West secularisation reduces the 
power of religious institutions, creates higher tolerance, and enhances the economic and scientific 
achievements. 
By comparison, Islam has experienced no such separation.  The MENA region has been under 
religious Islamic influence for over 14 centuries.  Further, due to historical events, religion plays 
a major role in these countries.  This is evident by the specific reference to Islam as a state 
religion and a source of legislation in most Islamic MENA constitutions.  Yet the extent to which 
Islamic law applies in the MENA countries varies based on the constitution and the civil code of 
the country (Stovall, 2000, p. 840).  Some countries specify the role of Islam as the state religion 
where as others, like Jordan and Kuwait, hold Islamic Jurisprudence to be their first source of law 
in the absence of legislation (Al-Rimawi, 2012, p. 113). 
The critical question is to what extent, if at all, Sharia affects commercial transactions and 
financial markets in the 21
st
 century? Al-Suwaidi (1993, p. 290) notes that the extent to which the 
Sharia influences the legislation, particularly commercial and bankruptcy laws, is ambiguous.
34
  
Al-Rimawi (2012, p. 118) criticises the MENA judicial authorities for never addressing the 
complex role of Sharia in a structured and comprehensive manner.  Ballantyne (1985, p. 3) and 
Majid and Majid (2003, p. 180) argue that there is no criterion as to when and where Islamic law 
applies.  While Sharia has no impact in a problem falling within the Commercial Code of Turkey, 
it may apply directly as a common law of the country, or indirectly through the application of 
statute law that is based fully or partially on Islamic Law.  Alternatively, Sharia may apply as a 
source of law to fill legislative gaps when a certain provision is missing in the statute.  
Mohammed (1988, p. 116) argues that the role of Islamic law in temporal transactions is less 
pervasive yet still vital.  Stovall (2000, p. 840) notes that the irrelevance of Islamic law in the 
MENA is a myth.  Stovall further adds that Islamic law allows all business transactions except 
                                                 
34
 For example, interest is prohibited under the Islamic law, yet all banks other than Islamic banks operating in the 
MENA are dealing with interest similar to Western banking practices. 
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transactions involving riba and gharar.
35
  The application of Sharia law has implications as the 
presence of Islamic precepts of riba or gharar render the contractual obligations null and void.  
However, the modern securities laws in MENA do not follow the Sharia precepts of riba and 
gharar.  In particular; the modern laws do not prohibit speculative behaviour in stock markets on 
the grounds of gharar; nor do they prohibit trading in firms that are considered unacceptable 
under the Sharia such as those dealing with alcohol or tobacco.  Similarly, securities laws in 
MENA countries do not prohibit trading in firms that issue bonds or dealing with interest.  
Despite the separation between Sharia and financial markets, Al-Rimawi (2012, p. 133) argues 
that Sharia has socio-legal influence and the imposition of Sharia as a constitutional source 
represents unquantifiable juridical risk in the MENA.  Both of the Sharia concepts of riba and 
gharar result in rescinding offending contemporary MENA commercial legislation in the sense 
that they potentially may annul the modern commercial legislation.  Consequently, Sharia should 
not be ignored when examining the MENA commercial legislation.  Similarly, Ballantyne (1985, 
p. 3) notes that there is always uncertainty in the commercial contracts in the MENA region 
because of the looming presence of the Sharia.
36
 
The above discussion suggests the presence of hybrid legal systems.  Despite the fact that the 
written commercial and company laws in the MENA region are Western influenced, Sharia is 
still an important legal auxiliary source to contemporary MENA legal systems.  Sharia within the 
MENA legal framework acts as both a constitutional source as well as being a legal source for 
commercial legislation in a majority of Arab countries.  It includes the general principles that 
apply in circumstances where there are no provisions to the contrary; Al-Rimawi (2012, p. 113) 
calls it a ‘gap-filling role’ of Sharia.  The critical issue is the ability to reflect the impact of Sharia 
on the legal system. 
One way to analyse the extent to which Sharia applies to the laws of MENA is to classify 
countries according to the Sharia’s role in the constitution.  Reviewing the text of the MENA 
countries’ constitution suggests five models to Sharia being a constitutional source.  The first 
group includes Israel, Lebanon and Turkey which are wholly secular.  The second group includes 
Algeria, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia limits Sharia’s role to be the religion of the State 
without referring to it as a source of law.  The third group includes Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, 
                                                 
35
 Riba refers to the charging of interest.  Sharia prohibits levying interest on loans.  However, many new Islamists 
jurists distinguish between interest and usury.  They argue that financial gain must be earned against taking risk.  
Their interpretation follows that interest presents a reward for taking risk, and Islam prohibits usury only.  This view 
does not gain much support however (Hamoudi, 2011, p. 508).  Gharar means deception, cheating, or risk.  It is a 
vague term that arises in the context of Islamic contractual obligations. 
36
 Gemmell (2006, p. 170) argues that history and religion are the keys to understanding commercial arbitration in 
the MENA and calls for foreign investors to consider the religious underpinnings supporting commercial arbitration 
in this region in investment decisions. 
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Palestine, Syria, Qatar and UAE recognises Sharia as a principal source of legislation.  The fourth 
group includes Egypt, Oman, Sudan and Yemen recognises Sharia as the principal source of 
legislation.  The fifth group includes Iran and Saudi Arabia recognises Sharia as the constitution.  
The groups are ranked from the lowest to highest influence of Sharia. 
Table  2.4 summarises the constitutional provisions and the Sharia score for each country.  The 
countries are presented in ascending order and colour-coded where the shades provide visual 
measure of the constitutional role of Sharia.  Light blue indicates no constitutional role and as the 
blue intensifies the constitutional role of Sharia increases.  The Sharia index is used as a variable 
reflecting the hybrid legal systems.  Sharia variable equals zero when Sharia plays no 
constitutional role (wholly secular constitution); one when the role of Sharia is limited to the 
identity of the state; two when Sharia is a main source of legislation; three when Sharia is the 
main source of legislation;
 
and four when Sharia is the constitution of the country.
37
  Appendix 2 
discusses the constitutional provisions that refer to the role of Sharia in finer detail. 
38 
  
                                                 
37
 The use of ‘the’ or ‘a’ gives different meanings in Arabic language.  The use of ‘the’ dictates the priority of Sharia 
above all other sources.  The use of ‘a’ indicates equal importance; that is one of the many sources. 
38
 Sharia is written differently in the constitutions.  The constitutional provisions are preserved as provided by the 
English version of the constitution and hence Sharia, Shari’a, Shari’ah, and Shariah refer to Islamic law. 
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Table  2.4 Constitutional role of Sharia 
Country Role of Sharia as stated in the constitution Score 
[0-5] 
Reference 
Israel Knesset (the Israeli house of representatives) states: “Israel does not have 
a written constitution, even though according to the Proclamation of 
Independence a constituent assembly should have prepared a constitution 
by October 1, 1948.  The delay in the preparation of a constitution 
resulted primarily from problems that emerged against the background of 
the alleged clash between a secular constitution and the Halacha (the 
Jewish religious law)”. 
0 State of Israel, 
(2005) 
Lebanon No reference to Islam or Sharia in the constitution. 0 Constitution of 
Lebanon (1926) 
Turkey Article 2 “[t]he Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social 
State governed by the rule of law”. 
0 Constitution of 
the Republic of 
Turkey (1982) 
Algeria Article 2 “Islam is the religion of the State”. 
Article 9 “[t]he institutions are not allowed ... practices that are contrary 
to the Islamic ethics and to the values of the November Revolution”. 
Article 178 “[a]ny constitutional revision cannot infringe on…Islam as 
the religion of the State”. 
1 Constitution of 
the People’s 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Algeria (1989) 
Jordan Article 2 “Islam is the religion of the State”. 1 Constitution of 
the Hashemite 
Kingdom of 
Jordan (1952) 
Libya Article 2 “Islam is the religion of the State”. 
Article 8 “[p]ublic ownership is the basis of the development of society, 
of its growth and of self-sufficiency in production.  Private ownership, if 
it is non-exploitative, is protected.* Expropriation will take place only in 
accordance with the law.  Inheritance is a right which will be governed 
by the Islamic Shari’a.” 
1 for 
2007-
2010  
Constitution 
Proclamation 
[Libya ] (1969) 
Article 1 “Islam is the Religion of the State and the principal source of 
legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence (Sharia)”. 
3 for 
2011-
2012 
Draft 
Constitutional 
Charter for the 
Transitional Stage 
(2011) 
Morocco Article 6 “Islam shall be the state religion.” 
Article 106 “[n]either the State system of monarchy nor the prescriptions 
related to the religion of Islam may be subject to a constitutional 
revision”. 
1 Constitution of 
the Kingdom of 
Morocco (1996) 
Tunisia Article 1 “Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign state.  Its religion 
is Islam, its language is Arabic and its type of government is the 
Republic.” 
1 Constitution of 
Tunisia (1959) 
Bahrain Article 1 “[t]he Kingdom of Bahrain is a fully sovereign, independent 
Islamic Arab state.” 
Article 2 “[t]he religion of the State is Islam.  The Islamic Shari’a is a 
principal source for legislation.” 
2 Constitution of 
the Kingdom of 
Bahrain (2002) 
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Country Role of Sharia as stated in the constitution Score 
[0-5] 
Reference 
Iraq Article 2 “Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation 
source of legislation: A.  No law may be enacted that contradicts the 
established provisions of Islam”. 
Article 92 “[t]he Federal Supreme Court shall be made up of a number of 
judges, experts in Islamic jurisprudence.” 
2 Constitution of 
the Republic of 
Iraq (2005) 
Kuwait Article 2 “[t]he religion of the State is Islam, and the Islamic Sharia shall 
be a main source of legislation”. 
2 Constitution of 
Kuwait (1962) 
Palestine Article 4 “Islam is the official religion in Palestine.  Respect for the 
sanctity of all other divine religions shall be maintained” and “[t]he 
principles of Islamic Sharia shall be a principal source of legislation”. 
2 Basic Law of 
Palestine (2003) 
Syria Article 3 “(1) The religion of the President of the Republic has to be 
Islam.  (2) Islamic jurisprudence is a main source of legislation.” 
2 Constitution of 
the Syrian Arab 
Republic (1973) 
Qatar Article 1 “Qatar is an independent sovereign Arab State.  Its religion is 
Islam and Shari’a law shall be a main source of its legislations.” 
2 Constitution of 
Qatar (2004) 
UAE Article 7 “Islam is the official religion of the Union.  The Islamic 
Shari’ah shall be a main source of legislation in the Union.” 
2 Constitution of 
the United Arab 
Emirates (1971) 
Egypt Article 2 “Islam is the Religion of the State.  Arabic is its official 
language, and the principal source of legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence 
(Sharia)”. 
3 Constitution of 
the Arab Republic 
of Egypt (1971)
39
 
Oman Article 2 “[t]he religion of the State is Islam and the Islamic Shariah is 
the basis of legislation”. 
3 Basic Law of the 
Sultanate of 
Oman (1996) 
Sudan Constitution pre 2005: Article 1 “… Islam is the religion of the majority 
of the population and Christianity and traditional religions have a large 
following”. 
Article 65 “[s]ource of Legislation: The Islamic Sharia and the national 
consent through voting, the Constitution and custom are the source of law 
and no law shall be enacted contrary to these sources, or without taking 
into account the nation’s public opinion, the efforts of the nation’s 
scientists, intellectuals and leaders”. 
Article 139 “[a]mendment of the Constitution: An amendment as 
stipulated in paragraph 2 will not enter into force if it amends the 
procedural rules or is contrary to the basic principles set out below unless 
it has been approved by a majority of the people of Sudan in a 
referendum held in accordance with the procedures stipulated by the 
Electoral Commission and the amendment is signed by the President of 
the Republic after it has been approved by the referendum.  The 
principles are: A: Sharia, then consensus of the people expressed through 
a referendum, the Constitution and custom are the sources of law”. 
3 Constitution of 
the Democratic 
Republic of the 
Sudan (1988)  
Sudan  “[s]ources of Legislation ... 
Article 5 (1) “[n]ationally enacted legislation having effect only in 
respect of the Northern states of the Sudan shall have as its sources of 
 Interim National 
Constitution of 
the Republic of 
                                                 
39
 The same provision remains in the post-revolution constitution of Egypt in 2014. 
 42 
Country Role of Sharia as stated in the constitution Score 
[0-5] 
Reference 
legislation Islamic Sharia and the consensus of the people”. 
Article 201(2) “[a] dual banking system shall be established, and shall 
consist of an Islamic banking system that shall operate in Northern Sudan 
and a conventional banking system to operate in southern Sudan.” 
the Sudan (2005) 
Yemen Article 2 “Islam is the religion of the state”. 
Article 3 “Islamic Shari’ah is the source of all legislation.” 
Article 7 “a.  Islamic social justice in economic relations which aims at 
developing and promoting production, achieving social integration and 
equilibrium, providing equal opportunities and promoting higher living 
standards in society”. 
3 Constitution of 
the Yemen 
Republic (2001) 
Iran Article 1 “[t]he form of government of Iran is that of an Islamic 
Republic, endorsed by the people of Iran on the basis of their 
longstanding belief in the sovereignty of truth and Koranic justice ... ”. 
Article 2 “[t]he Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in: 1) the 
One God (as stated in the phrase "There is no god except Allah"), His 
exclusive sovereignty and right to legislate, and the necessity of 
submission to His commands; 2) Divine revelation and its fundamental 
role in setting forth the laws; ...  4) the justice of God in creation and 
legislation”. 
Article 4 “[a]ll civil, penal financial, economic, administrative, cultural, 
military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on 
Islamic criteria.  This principle applies absolutely and generally to all 
articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, 
and the wise persons of the Guardian Council are judges in this matter.” 
4 Constitution of 
the Islamic 
Republic of Iran 
(1979) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Article 1 “[t]he Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic 
State.  Its religion is Islam.  Its constitution is Almighty God’s Book, The 
Holy Qur’an, and the Sunna (Traditions) of the Prophet (PBUH).” 
Article 46 “[t]he judicial authority is an independent power.  In 
discharging their duties, the judges bow to no authority other than that of 
Islamic Shari’ah.” 
Article 48 “[t]he Courts shall apply rules of the Islamic Sharia in cases 
that are brought before them, according to the Holy Qur’an and the 
Sunna, and according to laws which are decreed by the ruler in 
agreement with the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna.” 
4 Basic Law of 
Saudi Arabia 
(1993) (1412 H) 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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2.4.2.3. Islamic culture 
All MENA countries share common historical ties, except for Israel.  Their population is 
predominantly Muslim with a mainly Christian minority.  However, the Islamic culture varies 
from one country to another due to a wide range of overlapping factors such as political system, 
historical background and geopolitical variation.  For example, the degree of adherence to Islam 
in social life varies among countries; ranging from very strict adherence in Saudi Arabia and Iran 
to the least adherence in Lebanon.  While Dubai is more tolerant to alcohol and women can be 
unveiled, Saudi Arabia is far more conservative; it prohibits alcohol consumption and requires 
women to be veiled.  However, both countries prohibit eating in public during the fasting month 
of Ramadan. 
The common approaches used in the literature to operationalise culture are inadequate to measure 
the degree of Islamic culture in practice.  Religion as a common system of beliefs has been used 
as a proxy for culture.  Research operationalises culture via the dominant religion in three 
different ways.  First, as a continuous variable based on the percentage of population (See 
Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002; Kumar et al., 2011; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, et al., 1999).  Second, as a dummy variable based on the demographic 
profile of the country (Stulz and Williamson, 2003).  Third, as a categorical variable based on 
subjective assessment (McAndrew and Voas, 2011).  However, these approaches are inadequate 
to measure the degree to which Islam is applied in practice.  Achilov (2010) criticises how 
Islamic culture is measured and argues that these measurement methods are misleading, 
inaccurate, and inefficient to gauge the substantive role of Islam.  The first approach, the 
percentage of Muslim population as a continuous variable, is not useful as a measure for the 
cultural role of Islam.  To illustrate this point, in the case of Turkey with 99% Muslim population, 
the variable approaches a maximum of 0.99 even though it is a wholly secular country and Islam 
has no role in commercial or legislative matters.  The second approach that dichotomises Islam 
with dummy variables improperly categorise all MENA countries except Israel as Islamic, 
despite variation in the extent of Islamic culture within MENA.  For instance, even though the 
population of Saudi Arabia and Turkey are 99% Muslim, both countries would be classified in 
the same group.  Yet Islamic influence in Turkey is unquestionably different from that of Saudi 
Arabia.  Licht et al. (2005) argue against using dummy variables as a proxy for religion since it 
fails to capture the complexity of religious variation around the world and fails to detect the large 
differences in religious commitment within countries.  Consequently, variations in cultural 
differences are left undefined.  The third approach measures religiosity via surveys.  Measuring 
Islam attitudinally based on individual perception might provide insight however, Achilov (2010, 
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p. 20) argues that individual responses depend on the personal religiosity levels and present 
normative views, thus providing limited substantive manifestation of the role of Islam within a 
society. 
Culture is continuous and multidimensional and proper measurement of different religiosity 
levels between the MENA countries is missing in the literature.  In his thesis, Achilov (2010, pp. 
55-69) proposes an Islamic institutionalisation index (III) that is designed to quantitatively 
measure the substantive role of Islam thus captures the variation of Islamic factors across Muslim 
countries.  The index ranges from 0-12 where low score indicates low level of Islamic institutions 
and high score indicates highly functional Islamic institutions.  III is composed of three sub-
indices: Islamic political institutions (IPI); Islamic financial institutions (IFI); and, Islamic 
educational institutions (IEI) each component ranges from 0-4.
40
 
The IPI measures the level of active Islamic political parties, their experience in government, and 
the level of political restrictions in the system.  Islamic political parties' ideology holds that Islam 
should guide social, economic, political and personal life.  Islamic parties actively participate in 
the government and politics in some countries like Turkey and Iran.  However, they are either 
suppressed or legally banned to function in other countries like Saudi Arabia and Syria.  The IEI 
captures the level of Islamic education in tertiary educational systems.  Islamic education is an 
accredited Islamic university, entity, department or a structured program in Islamic studies, 
Sharia science and Islamic principles.  The IFI measures the level of Islamic financing services.  
The presence of Islamic finance and Islamic financial products is another financial manifestation 
of the Islamic culture in the MENA.  Islamic banks offer interest-free banking and profit sharing 
schemes that are compatible with Islamic values.  It is common that conventional commercial 
banks offer an Islamic banking window to cater for the specialised demand. 
The III and its sub-indices are used in this essay as a proxy for the cultural role of Islam in the 
MENA countries.  The scores for each MENA country are presented in Table  2.5.  The countries 
are listed in an ascending order with respect to III.  The shades provide visual measure of III 
intensity and the borderlines are subjectively determined.  Light blue represents countries with 
the lowest level of Islamic culture, blue represents countries with medium levels of Islamic 
culture and dark blue represents countries with high level of Islamic culture. 
                                                 
40
 The raw data for Islamic institutionalisation index were generously provided by Dilshod Achilov. 
 45 
Table  2.5 Islamic institutionalisation index 
 Country IPI† IFI§ IEI‡ III¤ 
L
o
w
 
Tunisia 1.00 2.00 0.67 3.67 
Libya 2.00 0.00 1.60 3.60 
Oman 0.00 2.00 0.57 2.57 
Syria 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.67 
Israel 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
M
ed
iu
m
 
Palestine 1.00 4.00 1.37 6.37 
Algeria 3.00 2.00 1.29 6.29 
Lebanon 3.00 2.00 0.83 5.83 
Saudi Arabia 0.00 3.00 2.59 5.59 
Egypt 1.00 4.00 0.56 5.56 
UAE 0.00 4.00 1.20 5.20 
Qatar 0.00 4.00 1.00 5.00 
Jordan 2.00 2.00 0.80 4.80 
Bahrain 1.00 3.00 0.00 4.00 
H
ig
h
 
Iran 3.00 3.00 3.64 9.64 
Turkey 3.00 4.00 1.65 8.65 
Sudan 2.00 4.00 2.50 8.50 
Iraq 3.00 3.00 1.57 7.57 
Morocco 3.00 3.00 1.56 7.56 
Yemen 2.00 4.00 1.33 7.33 
Kuwait 2.00 3.00 2.00 7.00 
Source: Achilov (2010) 
† Islamic political institutions index (IPI) is derived from the following indicators that are added together to reflect 
a final measure for the IPI: 1) number of Islamic parties: 0 (none), 1 (low), 2 (medium), 3 (high); 2) times elected to 
form a government: 0 (none), 2 (once), 3 (multiple); 3) levels of restrictions in political system: 4 (none), 2 
(medium), 0 (high).  The categorical classification of IPI based on raw scores is as follows: extremely low (0-3), 
emerging (4-6), some functional (7-10), functional (11-13), highly functional (14-16).  A score of 16 is then 
transformed into a 0-4 scale to count towards the III.  The categorical levels of IPI: 0 (extremely low); 1 (emerging); 
2 (some functional); 3 (functional); and, 4 (highly functional). 
§ Islamic financial institutions index (IFI) is a quantitative measure of 0-10 obtained by the total assets and 
deposits available in Islamic banks divided by the country’s work-force population.).  The categorical classification 
based on raw scores of IFI are as follows: extremely low (0-1), emerging (2-3), some functional (4-5), functional (6-
8), highly functional (9-10).  A score of 10 is then transformed into a 0-4 scale to count toward III.  The categorical 
levels of IFI: 0 (extremely low); 1 (emerging); 2 (some functional); 3 (functional); and, 4 (highly functional). 
‡ Islamic educational institutions index (IEI) capture the level of Islamic education in tertiary educational system.  
The opportunity level in tertiary education is measured by the number of higher educational institutions, which offer 
degrees or structured programs in Islamic studies divided by the total number of eligible institutions, which do not 
currently offer such programs.  A score of 100 is then transformed into a 0-4 scale to count toward the III.  The 
categorical levels of IEI: 0 (extremely low); 1 (emerging); 2 (some functional); 3 (functional); and, 4 (highly 
functional). 
¤ Islamic institutionalisation index (III) measures the substantive role of Islam across Muslim countries.  It is an 
aggregate of three indices; Islamic political institutions, Islamic educational institutions and Islamic financial 
institutions.  The index ranges from 0-12 where lower scores indicate low level of Islamic institutions and high score 
indicate highly functional Islamic institutions.  The categorical levels of III: 0-1 (extremely low); 2-4 (emerging); 5-7 
(some functional); 8- 10 (functional); and 11-12 (highly functional). 
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2.4.3. Model 
The literature commonly estimates the effects of legal rules on financial development using 
cross-country OLS regressions (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002; Djankov, La Porta, et 
al., 2008; Djankov et al., 2007; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Levine, 1998; Roe, 2006; Spamann, 
2010; Stulz and Williamson, 2003).  The small sample size of MENA presents a challenge when 
conducting cross-sectional analysis.  Consequently, this essay uses a panel data approach.  The 
larger sample size as a result of using panel data analysis provides for more informative data, 
more variability and more degrees of freedom, and hence yields more reliable statistical results 
for the effect of investor protection on financial market development.  Further, panel data tackles 
the consequences of legal reforms for financial development and eliminates some econometric 
concerns regarding cross-sectional analysis.  The generic regression equation is presented below: 
                             
                                                                    
                                                                     
                                        Equation 1 
This model is independently applied to both credit and stock markets.  Financial market 
development is a measure of credit/stock market development for country k at year t.  Legal 
origin is a dummy variable for country k.  Investor protection measures the attributes of legal 
rules related to creditor rights and shareholder rights.  Law enforcement measures the extent to 
which the legal rules are enforced.  Judicial efficiency measures the efficacy of the judicial 
system in resolving commercial disputes.  The inflation rate and GDP growth are control 
variables and εk,t is the error term.  All independent variables are for country k and lagged one 
year when appropriate.
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                                        Equation 2 
The model is adapted from equation 1 to test the prediction of the ‘Law and Finance’ theory in 
the MENA region taking into consideration the legal duality and Islamic culture as potential 
factors for market development.  To achieve this, two new variables are introduced into the 
model: the Sharia Index as a proxy for the dual legal systems in the MENA and the III as a 
composite index that reflects the prevailing Islamic culture.  This augmented model tests the 
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 Using lagged independent variables is a modest solution for endogeneity. 
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effect of the dual legal system and Islamic culture on financial market development in the 
MENA. 
2.4.4. Variables 
Empirical tests of the impact of the legal environment and culture on financial market 
development in the MENA region requires identifying and quantifying the following constructs: 
financial market development; investor protection; law enforcement; judicial efficiency; the 
hybrid legal system; and, Islamic culture in each MENA country. Figure  2.4 presents a visual 
illustration of the model framework and the variables. 
Figure  2.4 Financial market development framework 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
The grey shade represents financial market development for both credit and stock markets as the 
dependent variables.  The blue shade represents the legal environment in relation to investor 
protection for creditors and shareholders, judicial efficiency, law enforcement and legal origin.  
The yellow shade represents the Islamic culture and the green shade is for legal duality which 
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reflects a combination of legal and cultural elements.  The following sections discuss the 
variables used in this analysis, their definition, construction, coding and sources.  Detailed 
variable definitions are presented in Table  2.6 and Table  2.7 presents the sign predicted for each 
of the variables by the model specification. 
2.4.4.1. Financial market development 
Financial market development is measured through the credit markets (banking sector) and stock 
markets.  Kar, Nazlıoğlu, and Ağır (2011, p. 687) argue that measures of financial development 
should reflect the country’s ability to channel savings into investment efficiently and effectively.  
The financial development variables used in the prior ‘Law and Finance’ literature are listed in 
Panel A of Appendix 3.  This essay uses three variables to measure the credit market 
development: the natural logarithm of domestic credit to private sector in current USD; the 
natural logarithm of domestic credit to private sector in current USD to population; and, the ratio 
of domestic credit to private sector to GDP.
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  Stock market development is also measured using 
three variables: the natural logarithm of stock market capitalisation in current USD; the natural 
logarithm of stock market capitalisation in current USD to population; and, the ratio of stock 
market capitalisation to GDP.  The ‘Law and Finance’ literature, in particular the LLSV studies, 
commonly use the ratio of domestic credit and market capitalisation to GDP when measuring 
credit and stock market development (Beck et al., 2001; Beck et al., 2003b; Beck and Levine, 
2002; Djankov et al., 2007; Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2008; La Porta et al., 1997; La 
Porta et al., 2006; Levine et al., 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Spamann, 2010; Stulz and 
Williamson, 2003).  The rationale for using two different alternatives of credit and stock market 
development stems from the wide divergence of the economic development of the MENA 
countries.  While some MENA countries have huge endowments of oil and are very rich, others 
are among the world’s poorest countries.  Measuring financial market development as a ratio to 
GDP will distort the comparative figures.
43
  Hence financial market development as ratios to 
GDP is used for comparability purposes along with other forms in levels and as ratios to 
population. Despite substantial improvements, the quality and quantity of data from the MENA 
countries pose obstacles to advances in research in that some stock market data is unavailable 
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Kar et al. (2011, p. 687) argue that a bond and stock markets variable would be inappropriate measures for 
financial development in the MENA region given that the markets are still underdeveloped.  Kar et al. (2011, p. 688) 
favour the private credit as a measure of financial development for three reasons.  First, it is more appropriate given 
the bank-based nature of the MENA region’s economy.  Second, the credit provided to the private sector generates 
increases in investment and productivity more than credits to the public sector.  Third, loans to the private sector are 
provided more stringently and that the improved quality of investment emanating from financial intermediaries’ 
evaluation of project viability is more significant for private sector credits. 
43
 Market capitalisation to GDP looks misleadingly impressive for MENA countries because “it hides the fact that 
local markets are dominated by financial and infrastructure firms.  Financial institutions account for more than half 
of market capitalisation in the region, while the share of industry and services is only 20%” OECD (2012, p. 23). 
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such as initial public offers (IPOs), ownership structure and seasoned equity offers.  The list of 
financial development variables used in this essay and their definitions are presented in Panel A 
of Table  2.6. 
2.4.4.2. Legal environment 
Legal environment involves identifying the legal origin of each MENA country as determined 
from Reynolds and Flores (1989) and measurement of investor protection, law enforcement, 
judicial efficiency and the dual legal system. 
2.4.4.2.1. Investor protection 
As there are no direct quantitative measures available, the legal rules that are relevant for investor 
protection involve quantifying creditor and shareholder protection rights.  Creditor and 
shareholder protection variables used in the prior ‘Law and Finance’ literature are presented in 
Panels B and C of Appendix 3, respectively. 
In this research, two indices measuring the extent of creditor protection rights are used; the 
strength of legal rights and the depth of credit information.  Both indices are survey-based 
measures provided by the World Bank ‘Doing Business’ database.  The strength of legal rights 
index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers 
and lenders and thus facilitates lending.  The depth of credit information index measures rules 
and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available 
through either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau.  Two other information 
dissemination variables are used, public credit registry and private credit bureau, which collect 
information on credit history and current indebtedness of borrowers and share this information 
with the lenders.  The definition of creditor protection indices is presented in Panel B-1 of Table 
 2.6.
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Four indices measuring the extent of shareholder rights are used.  Three of which, the extent of 
disclosure index the extent of director liability index and the ease of shareholder suits index, are 
provided by the World Bank.  The fourth index, the anti-director rights index, is constructed in 
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 The Doing Business Project adopts the methodology from Djankov et al. (2007).  The data on the legal rights of 
borrowers and lenders are gathered through a questionnaire administered to financial lawyers and verified through 
analysis of laws and regulations as well as public sources of information on collateral and bankruptcy laws.  The 
questionnaire is built on a case with a set of assumptions which makes the scores comparable across countries.  The 
data on credit information sharing are built in two stages.  First, banking supervision authorities and public 
information sources are surveyed to confirm the presence of a public credit registry or private credit bureau.  Second, 
a detailed questionnaire on the public credit registry’s or private credit bureau’s structure, laws and associated rules 
is administered to the entity itself.  Questionnaire responses are verified through several rounds of follow-up 
communication with respondents as well as by contacting third parties and consulting public sources.  The 
questionnaire data are confirmed through teleconference calls or on-site visits in all economies (World Bank, 2014a). 
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this essay by direct reference to MENA countries corporate and commercial laws along Djankov, 
La Porta, et al., (2008) methodlology (See Section 2.4.2.1 and Appendix 1 for further details). 
The extent of disclosure index relates to the approval process and disclosure requirements for 
related party transactions.  The extent of director liability index measures the ability of minority 
shareholders to file a direct or directive lawsuit and hold relevant parties and members of the 
approving body liable for prejudicial related party transactions.  This index also considers the 
available legal remedies.  The ease of shareholder suits index quantifies shareholders’ ability to 
sue officers and directors for misconduct.  It relates to the ability to access internal corporate 
document and information during a trial.  The Doing Business Project adopted the methodology 
from Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008).  The data is collected from a questionnaire administered to 
corporate and securities lawyers and are based on securities regulations, company laws, civil 
procedure codes and court rules of evidence (World Bank, 2014a).  The case assumptions, the list 
of indices, the definitions and the coding are presented in Panel B-2 of Table  2.6. 
2.4.4.2.2. Law enforcement 
The presence of investor protection in the legal codes is incomplete unless the extent of law 
enforcement is considered.  This is because strong legal enforcement may substitute for weak 
legal rules.  Gupta et al. (2011, p. 10) argue that rights and remedies conferred in private 
contracts provide protection to the contracting parties, however, the value of these rights and 
remedies depend upon the extent to which they are enforced within the public domain.  The law 
enforcement variables used in prior literature are presented in Panel D of Appendix 3. 
In this research, law enforcement is measured by a survey-based indicator called the ‘rule of law’.  
The rule of law is based on the views and experiences of citizens, entrepreneurs and experts in the 
public, private and NGO sectors on the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi, 2013). 
2.4.4.2.3. Judicial efficiency 
An efficient judicial system can also substitute for weak legal rules.  The efficiency of the judicial 
system in resolving commercial disputes is measured by three indicators: time; cost; and, number 
of procedures required to enforce a contract through the courts.  The time indicator measures the 
calendar days to file the case, obtain trial, issue the judgement, and enforce the judgement.  The 
cost indicator measures the average attorney fees, court and enforcement costs.  The procedures 
indicator measures the number of steps required to file the case, obtain trial and judgement, and 
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then enforce the judgement.  The Doing Business Project adopted the methodology from 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003).  The data are built following the step-
by-step evolution of a commercial sale dispute before local courts and is collected by analysing 
the codes of civil procedure and other court regulations as well as questionnaires completed by 
local litigation lawyers and by judges (World Bank, 2014a).  The assumptions, the list of indices, 
the definitions and the coding are presented in Panel D of Table  2.6. 
2.4.4.2.4. Dual legal system 
The Sharia index measuring the constitutional role of Sharia is used as a proxy for the duality of 
the legal systems.  Sharia index is an innovation of this essay and is developed from the 
constitutional provisions for each MENA country (see Section 2.4.2.2). 
2.4.4.3. Culture 
Islamic institutionalisation index (III) of Achilov (2010) presented in Section 2.4.2.3 and its three 
sub-indices, Islamic political institutions (IPI), Islamic financial institutions (IFI) and Islamic 
educational institutions (IEI) are used as measures of Islamic culture in the MENA. 
2.4.4.4. Control variables 
The gross domestic product (GDP), measured in levels and as a growth rate, and the rate of 
inflation for each MENA country are used to control for the economic development.  The 
variables and the definitions are presented in Panel G of Table  2.6. 
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Table  2.6 List of variables for essay 1 
Panel A: Financial market development variables 
Panel A-1: Credit market development variables 
Domestic credit to private sector  The natural logarithm of the financial resources provided to the private sector by financial corporations via loans and purchases 
of non-equity securities, trade credits and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.  Measured in current 
USD. 
Domestic credit to population The natural logarithm of the domestic credit to private sector divided by population. 
Domestic credit to GDP Domestic credit to private sector divided by gross domestic product. 
Panel A-2: Stock market development variables 
Market capitalisation The natural logarithm of the share price times the number of shares outstanding of listed domestic firms measured in current 
USD.  Listed domestic firms are the incorporated firms listed on the country’s stock exchange at the end of the year. 
Market capitalisation to 
population 
The natural logarithm of the stock market capitalisation divided by population. 
Market capitalisation to GDP Stock market capitalisation divided by gross domestic product. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
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Table 2.6 List of variables for essay 1 
Panel B: Investor protection variables 
Panel B-1: Creditor protection variables 
Strength of 
legal rights 
index 
The strength of legal rights index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus 
facilitate lending.  The strength of legal rights index includes 8 aspects related to legal rights in collateral law and 2 aspects in bankruptcy law. 
Two case scenarios, case A and case B, are used to determine the scope of the secured transactions system.  The case scenarios involve a secured 
borrower, the incorporated company ABC, and a secured lender, BizBank.  In some economies, the legal framework for secured transactions will 
allow only case A or case B to apply (not both).  Both cases examine the same set of legal provisions relating to the use of movable collateral. 
Assumptions about the secured borrower and lender: 
 ABC is a domestically incorporated, limited liability company. 
 The company has up to 50 employees. 
 ABC has its headquarters and only base of operations in the economy’s largest business city. 
 Both ABC and BizBank are 100% domestically owned. 
Case assumptions: 
In case A, as collateral for the loan, ABC grants BizBank, a non-possessory security interest in one category of movable assets, for example, its 
machinery or its inventory.  ABC wants to keep both possession and ownership of the collateral.  In economies where the law does not allow non-
possessory security interests in movable property, ABC and BizBank use a fiduciary transfer-of-title arrangement (or a similar substitute for non-
possessory security interests).  The strength of legal rights index does not cover functional equivalents to security over movable assets. 
In case B, ABC grants BizBank a business charge, enterprise charge, floating charge or any charge that gives BizBank a security interest over 
ABC’s combined movable assets (or as much of ABC’s movable assets as possible).  ABC keeps ownership and possession of the assets.  A score of 
1 is assigned for each of the following features of the laws: 
 Any business may use movable assets as collateral while keeping possession of the assets, and any financial institution may accept such assets as 
collateral. 
 The law allows a business to grant a non-possessory security right in a single category of movable assets (such as accounts receivable or 
inventory), without requiring a specific description of the collateral. 
 The law allows a business to grant a non-possessory security right in substantially all its movable assets, without requiring a specific description 
of the collateral. 
 A security right may be given over future or after-acquired assets and may extend automatically to the products, proceeds or replacements of the 
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Table 2.6 List of variables for essay 1 
Panel B: Investor protection variables 
original assets. 
 A general description of debts and obligations is permitted in the collateral agreement and in registration documents; all types of debts and 
obligations can be secured between the parties, and the collateral agreement can include a maximum amount for which the assets are encumbered. 
 A collateral registry or registration institution for security interests over movable property is in operation, unified geographically and by asset 
type, with an electronic database indexed by debtors’ names. 
 Secured creditors are paid first (for example, before tax claims and employee claims) when a debtor defaults outside an insolvency procedure. 
 Secured creditors are paid first (for example, before tax claims and employee claims) when a business is liquidated. 
 Secured creditors either are not subject to an automatic stay or moratorium on enforcement procedures when a debtor enters a court-supervised 
reorganisation procedure, or the law provides secured creditors with grounds for relief from an automatic stay or moratorium (for example, if the 
movable property is in danger) or sets a time limit for the automatic stay. 
 The law allows parties to agree in a collateral agreement that the lender may enforce its security right out of court. 
The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit. 
Depth of 
credit 
information 
index 
Measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available through either a public credit registry or a 
private credit bureau.  A score of 1 is assigned for each of the following 6 features of the public credit registry or private credit bureau (or both): 
 Data on both firms and individuals are distributed. 
 Both positive credit information (for example, outstanding loan amounts and pattern of on-time repayments) and negative information (for 
example, late payments and the number and amount of defaults and bankruptcies) are distributed. 
 Data from retailers and utility companies as well as financial institutions are distributed. 
 More than 2 years of historical data are distributed.  Credit registries and bureaus that erase data on defaults as soon as they are repaid obtain a 
score of 0 for this indicator. 
 Data on loan amounts below 1% of income per capita are distributed.  Note that a credit registry or bureau must have a minimum coverage of 1% 
of the adult population to score a 1 on this indicator. 
 By law, borrowers have the right to access their data in the largest credit registry or bureau in the economy. 
The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information from either a public credit registry or a private 
credit bureau, to facilitate lending decisions.  If the credit registry or bureau is not operational or has coverage of less than 0.1% of the adult 
population, the score on the depth of credit information index is 0. 
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Table 2.6 List of variables for essay 1 
Panel B: Investor protection variables 
Private 
credit 
bureau 
coverage 
A private credit bureau is defined as a private firm or non-profit organisation that maintains a database on the creditworthiness of borrowers 
(individuals or firms) in the financial system and facilitates the exchange of credit information among creditors.  Credit investigative bureaus and 
credit reporting firms that do not directly facilitate information exchange among banks and other financial institutions are not considered.  If no 
private bureau operates, the coverage value is 0%.  Reports the number of individuals and firms listed by a private credit bureau’s database as of 
January each year, with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years.  The number is expressed as a percentage of the adult 
population. 
Public credit 
registry 
coverage 
A public credit registry is defined as a database managed by the public sector, usually by the central bank or the superintendent of banks, which 
collects information on the creditworthiness of borrowers (individuals or firms) in the financial system and facilitates the exchange of credit 
information among banks and other regulated financial institutions.  If no public registry operates, the coverage value is 0%.  Reports the number of 
individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry’s database as of January each year, with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 
years.  The number is expressed as a percentage of the adult population. 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business Report. 
Panel B-2: Shareholder protection variables 
To make the data comparable across economies, several assumptions about the business and the transaction are used. 
Assumptions about the business: 
The business (Buyer) 
 Is a publicly traded corporation listed on the economy’s most important stock exchange?  If the number of publicly traded companies listed on that exchange is 
less than 10, or if there is no stock exchange in the economy, it is assumed that Buyer is a large private company with multiple shareholders. 
 Has a board of directors and a chief executive officer (CEO) who may legally act on behalf of Buyer where permitted, even if this is not specifically required by 
law. 
 Has a supervisory board (applicable to economies with 2-tier board system) on which 60% of the shareholder-elected members have been appointed by Mr.  
James. 
 Is a manufacturing company. 
 Has its own distribution network. 
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Table 2.6 List of variables for essay 1 
Panel B: Investor protection variables 
Assumptions about the transaction: 
 Mr. James is Buyer’s controlling shareholder and a member of Buyer’s board of directors.  He owns 60% of Buyer and elected 2 directors to Buyer’s 5-member 
board. 
 Mr. James also owns 90% of Seller, a company that operates a chain of retail hardware stores.  Seller recently closed a large number of its stores. 
 Mr. James proposes that Buyer purchase Seller’s unused fleet of trucks to expand Buyer’s distribution of its food products, a proposal to which Buyer agrees.  
The price is equal to 10% of Buyer’s assets and is higher than the market value. 
 The proposed transaction is part of the company’s ordinary course of business and is not outside the authority of the company. 
 Buyer enters into the transaction.  All required approvals are obtained, and all required disclosures made (that is, the transaction is not fraudulent). 
The transaction causes damages to Buyer.  Shareholders sue Mr. James and the other parties that approved the transaction. 
Extent of 
disclosure 
index  
The extent of disclosure index has 5 components: 
 Which corporate body can provide legally sufficient approval for the transaction.  A score of 0 is assigned if it is the CEO or the managing 
director alone; 1 if the board of directors, the supervisory board or shareholders must vote and Mr. James is permitted to vote; 2 if the board of 
directors or the supervisory board must vote and Mr. James is not permitted to vote; 3 if shareholders must vote and Mr. James is not permitted to 
vote. 
 Whether immediate disclosure of the transaction to the public, the regulator or the shareholders is required.  A score of 0 is assigned if no 
disclosure is required; 1 if disclosure on the terms of the transaction is required but not on Mr. James’s conflict of interest; 2 if disclosure on both 
the terms and Mr. James’s conflict of interest is required. 
 Whether disclosure in the annual report is required.  A score of 0 is assigned if no disclosure on the transaction is required; 1 if disclosure on the 
terms of the transaction is required but not on Mr. James’s conflict of interest; 2 if disclosure on both the terms and Mr. James’s conflict of 
interest is required. 
 Whether disclosure by Mr. James to the board of directors or the supervisory board is required.  A score of 0 is assigned if no disclosure is 
required; 1 if a general disclosure of the existence of a conflict of interest is required without any specifics; 2 if full disclosure of all material facts 
relating to Mr. James’s interest in the Buyer-Seller transaction is required. 
 Whether it is required that an external body, for example, an external auditor, review the transaction before it takes place.  A score of 0 is 
assigned if no; 1 if yes. 
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Table 2.6 List of variables for essay 1 
Panel B: Investor protection variables 
The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater disclosure. 
Extent of 
director 
liability 
index 
The extent of director liability index has 7 components: 
 Whether a shareholder plaintiff is able to hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company.  A score of 0 
is assigned if Mr. James cannot be held liable or can be held liable only for fraud, bad faith or gross negligence; 1 if Mr. James can be held liable 
only if he influenced the approval of the transaction or was negligent; 2 if Mr. James can be held liable when the transaction is unfair or 
prejudicial to the other shareholders. 
 Whether a shareholder plaintiff is able to hold the approving body (the CEO, members of the board of directors, or members of the supervisory 
board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company.  A score of 0 is assigned if the approving body cannot be held liable or can be 
held liable only for fraud, bad faith, or gross negligence; 1 if the approving body can be held liable for negligence; 2 if the approving body can be 
held liable when the transaction is unfair or prejudicial to the other shareholders. 
 Whether a court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.  A score of 0 is assigned if rescission is unavailable 
or is available only in case of fraud, bad faith or gross negligence; 1 if rescission is available when the transaction is oppressive or prejudicial to 
the other shareholders; 2 if rescission is available when the transaction is unfair or entails a conflict of interest. 
 Whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff.  A score of 0 is 
assigned if no; 1 if yes. 
 Whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff.  A score of 0 is assigned if no; 
1 if yes. 
 Whether both fines and imprisonment can be applied against Mr. James.  A score of 0 is assigned if no; 1 if yes. 
 Whether shareholder plaintiffs are able to sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company.  A score of 0 is 
assigned if suits are unavailable or are available only for shareholders holding more than 10% of the company’s share capital; 1 if direct or 
derivative suits are available for shareholders holding 10% or less of share capital 
The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater liability of directors. 
Ease of 
shareholder 
suits index 
The ease of shareholder suits index has 6 components: 
 What range of documents is available to the shareholder plaintiff from the defendant and witnesses during trial.  A score of 1 is assigned for each 
of the following types of documents available: information that the defendant has indicated he intends to rely on for his defence; information that 
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Table 2.6 List of variables for essay 1 
Panel B: Investor protection variables 
directly proves specific facts in the plaintiff’s claim; any information relevant to the subject matter of the claim; and any information that may 
lead to the discovery of relevant information. 
 Whether the plaintiff can directly examine the defendant and witnesses during trial.  A score of 0 is assigned if no; 1 if yes, with prior approval of 
the questions by the judge; 2 if yes, without prior approval. 
 Whether the plaintiff can obtain categories of relevant documents from the defendant without identifying each document specifically.  A score of 
0 is assigned if no; 1 if yes. 
 Whether shareholders owning 10% or less of the company’s share capital can request that a government inspector investigate the Buyer-Seller 
transaction without filing suit in court.  A score of 0 is assigned if no; 1 if yes. 
 Whether shareholders owning 10% or less of the company’s share capital have the right to inspect the transaction documents before filing suit.  A 
score of 0 is assigned if no; 1 if yes. 
 Whether the standard of proof for civil suits is lower than that for a criminal case.  A score of 0 is assigned if no; 1 if yes. 
The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater powers of shareholders to challenge the transaction. 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business Report. 
Anti-
director 
rights index 
Aggregate index of shareholder rights formed by summing: a) vote by mail; b) shares not deposited; c) cumulative voting; d) oppressed minority; e) 
pre-emptive rights; and f) capital to call a meeting. 
Vote by mail: Equals 1 if the law explicitly mandates or sets as a default rule that: a) proxy solicitations paid by the firm include a proxy form 
allowing shareholders to vote on agenda items; or b) a proxy form to vote on the agenda items accompanies the meeting notice; or c) shareholders 
vote by mail on the agenda items (i.e., postal ballot); and equals 0 otherwise. 
Shares not deposited: Equals 1 if the company law or commercial code does not allow firms to require that shareholders deposit with the firm itself or 
another firm any of their shares prior to a general shareholders meeting, thus preventing them from selling those shares for a number of days, and 
equals 0 otherwise. 
Cumulative voting: Equals 1 if the law explicitly mandates or sets as a default rule that shareholders owning 10% or less of the capital can cast all 
their votes for one board of directors or supervisory board candidate (cumulative voting) or if the law explicitly mandates or sets as a default rule a 
mechanism of proportional representation in the board of directors or supervisory board by which shareholders owning 10% or less of the issued 
capital can name a proportional number of directors to the board; and equals 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2.6 List of variables for essay 1 
Panel B: Investor protection variables 
Oppressed minority: Index of the difficulty faced by minority shareholders in challenging (i.e., by either seeking damages or having the transaction 
rescinded) resolutions that benefit controlling shareholders and damage the firm.  Equals 1 if minority shareholders can challenge a resolution of both 
the shareholders and the board if it is unfair, prejudicial, oppressive, or abusive; equals 0.5 if shareholders are able to challenge either a resolution of 
the shareholders or of the board if it is unfair, prejudicial, or oppressive; and equals 0 otherwise. 
Pre-emptive rights: Equals 1 when the company law or commercial code grants shareholders the first opportunity to buy new issues of shares, and 
this right can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote; and equals 0 otherwise. 
Capital to call a meeting: The minimum percentage of share capital or voting power that the law mandates or sets as a default rule that entitles a 
single shareholder to call a shareholders’ meeting (directly or through the court).  Equals 1 when capital to call a meeting is less than or equal to 10%; 
and equals 0 otherwise. 
Source: Thesis analysis (Section 2.4.1 and Appendix 1). 
Panel C: Law enforcement 
Rule of law It is a proxy for law enforcement.  It captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.  It is 
measured in units of a standard normal distribution.  Higher values corresponding to better governance. 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2013) 
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Table 2.6 List of variables for essay 1 
Panel D: Efficiency of the judicial system 
Assumptions about the case 
 The value of the claim equals 200% of the economy’s income per capita. 
 The dispute concerns a lawful transaction between 2 businesses (Seller and Buyer), located in the economy’s largest business city.  Seller sells goods worth 
200% of the economy’s income per capita to Buyer.  After Seller delivers the goods to Buyer, Buyer refuses to pay for the goods on the grounds that the 
delivered goods were not of adequate quality. 
 Seller (the plaintiff) sues Buyer (the defendant) to recover the amount under the sales agreement (that is, 200% of the economy’s income per capita).  Buyer 
opposes Seller’s claim, saying that the quality of the goods is not adequate.  The claim is disputed on the merits.  The court cannot decide the case on the basis of 
documentary evidence or legal title alone. 
 A court in the economy’s largest business city with jurisdiction over commercial cases worth 200% of income per capita decides the dispute. 
 Seller attaches Buyer’s movable assets (for example, office equipment and vehicles) before obtaining a judgment because Seller fears that Buyer may become 
insolvent. 
 An expert opinion is given on the quality of the delivered goods.  If it is standard practice in the economy for each party to call its own expert witness, the parties 
each call one expert witness.  If it is standard practice for the judge to appoint an independent expert, the judge does so.  In this case, the judge does not allow 
opposing expert testimony. 
 The judgment is 100% in favour of Seller: the judge decides that the goods are of adequate quality and that Buyer must pay the agreed price. 
 Buyer does not appeal the judgment.  Seller decides to start enforcing the judgment as soon as the time allocated by law for appeal expires. 
Seller takes all required steps for prompt enforcement of the judgment.  The money is successfully collected through a public sale of Buyer’s movable assets (for 
example, office equipment and vehicles). 
Time Time is recorded in calendar days, counted from the moment the plaintiff decides to file the lawsuit in court until payment.  This includes both the 
days when actions take place and the waiting periods between.  The average duration of different stages of dispute resolution is recorded: the 
completion of service of process (time to file and serve the case); the issuance of judgment (time for the trial and obtaining the judgment); and, the 
moment of payment (time for enforcement of the judgment). 
Cost Cost is recorded as a percentage of the claim, assumed to be equivalent to 200% of income per capita.  No bribes are recorded.  Three types of costs 
are recorded: court costs; enforcement costs; and, average attorney fees.  Court costs include all court costs that Seller (plaintiff) must advance to the 
court, regardless of the final cost to Seller.  Enforcement costs are all costs that Seller (plaintiff) must advance to enforce the judgment through a 
public sale of Buyer’s movable assets, regardless of the final cost to Seller.  Average attorney fees are the fees that Seller (plaintiff) must advance to a 
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Table 2.6 List of variables for essay 1 
Panel D: Efficiency of the judicial system 
local attorney to represent Seller in the standardised case. 
Procedures The list of procedural steps compiled for each economy traces the chronology of a commercial dispute before the relevant court.  A procedure is 
defined as any interaction, required by law or commonly used in practice, between the parties or between them and the judge or court officer.  Other 
procedural steps internal to the court or between the parties and their counsel may be counted as well.  Procedural steps include: steps to file and 
serve the case; steps to assign the case to a judge; steps for trial and judgment; and, steps necessary to enforce the judgment.  To indicate overall 
efficiency, 1 procedure is subtracted from the total number for economies that have specialised commercial courts, and 1 procedure for economies 
that allow electronic filing of the initial complaint in court cases. 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business Report. 
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Table 2.6 List of variables for essay 1 
Panel E:Islamic culture 
Islamic 
Institutionali
sation Index 
(III) 
Measures the substantive role of Islam across Muslim countries.  It is an aggregate of three indices: Islamic political institutions; Islamic educational 
institutions; and, Islamic financial institutions.  The index ranges from 0-12 where lower scores indicate low level of Islamic institutions and high 
score indicate highly functional Islamic institutions.  The categorical levels of III: 0-1 (extremely low); 2-4 (emerging); 5-7 (some functional); 8- 10 
(functional); and 11-12 (highly functional). 
Islamic 
political 
institutions 
(IPI) 
It is derived from the following indicators that are added together to reflect a final measure for the IPI: 1) number of Islamic parties: 0 (none), 1 
(low), 2 (medium), 3 (high); 2) times elected to form a government: 0 (none), 2 (once), 3 (multiple); 3) levels of restrictions in political system: 4 
(none), 2 (medium), 0 (high).  The categorical classification of IPI, based on its raw scores, is as follows: extremely low (0-3), emerging (4-6), some 
functional (7-10), functional (11-13), highly functional (14-16).  A score of 16 is then transformed into a 0-4 scale to count toward the III.  The 
categorical levels of IPI: 0 (extremely low); 1 (emerging); 2 (some functional); 3 (functional); and, 4 (highly functional). 
Islamic 
financial 
institutions 
(IFI) 
A quantitative measure of 0-10 was obtained by the total assets and deposits available in Islamic banks divided by the country’s work-force 
population.).  The categorical classification based on raw scores of IFI are as follows: extremely low (0-1), emerging (2-3), some functional (4-5), 
functional (6-8), highly functional (9-10).  A score of 10 is then transformed into a 0-4 scale to count toward III.  The categorical levels of IFI: 0 
(extremely low); 1 (emerging); 2 (some functional); 3 (functional); and, 4 (highly functional). 
Islamic 
educational 
institutions 
(IEI) 
Captures the level of Islamic education in tertiary educational system.  The opportunity level in tertiary education is measured by the number of 
higher educational institutions, which offer degrees or structured programs in Islamic studies divided by the total number of eligible institutions, 
which do not currently offer such programs.  A score of 100 is then transformed into a 0-4 scale to count toward the III.  The categorical levels of 
IEI: 0 (extremely low); 1 (emerging); 2 (some functional); 3 (functional); and, 4 (highly functional). 
Source: Achilov (2010). 
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Table 2.6 List of variables for essay 1 
Panel F:Hybrid legal system 
Sharia Index It measures the constitutional role of Sharia.  Equals 0 when Sharia plays no constitutional role (wholly secular constitution); 1 when Sharia’ role is 
limited to the identity of the state; 2 when Sharia is a main source of legislation; 3 when Sharia is the main source of legislation; and 4 when Sharia is 
the constitution of the country. 
Source: Thesis analysis (Section 2.4.2.2). 
Panel G: Other variables 
Legal Origin Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country.  Equals 1 if the origin is English common law and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Reynolds and Flores (1989). 
GDP The natural logarithm of GDP in current USD. 
Real GDP 
growth 
Annual percentage growth rate of real GDP in USD, based on 2000 prices. 
Rate of 
inflation 
Annual percentage growth rate of consumer price index. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
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Table  2.7 A summary of the model for financial market development 
‘Law and Finance’ theory 
Explanation Variable (proxy) Predicted sign 
Legal origin Legal origin dummy + 
Creditor protection 
Strength of legal rights + 
Depth of credit information + 
Public credit registry coverage + 
Private credit bureau coverage + 
Shareholder protection 
Extent of disclosure index + 
Extent of director liability index + 
Ease of shareholder suit index + 
Anti-director rights index + 
Law enforcement Rule of law + 
Judicial efficiency 
Time - 
Procedures - 
Cost - 
Islamic culture 
Islamic Institutionalisation Index ? 
Islamic political institutions ? 
Islamic educational institutions ? 
Islamic financial institutions ? 
Duality of legal system Sharia Index ? 
Macro-economic variables 
GDP + 
Real GDP growth + 
Inflation - 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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2.4.5. Estimation 
The regression results are based on pooled OLS estimation with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
correction for standard errors that accommodates for heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and 
contemporaneous correlation.  Given the small sample size, the bootstrap method is also used as a 
robustness check.  The following paragraphs present the rationale for the method selection. 
OLS estimation produces the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) if the errors are independent 
of each other both serially and contemporaneously and homoskedastic across time and countries.  
Having data over time for the same cross-section countries makes these assumptions very 
restrictive for panel data.  When panel data is used, the error structure of the model is more 
complicated than is typical of either time-series or cross-sectional models.  Different assumptions 
about the error structure using panels lead to different models of estimation.  It is common for 
panel data errors to exhibit serial and contemporaneous correlation and panel-level 
heteroskedasticity (Petersen, 2009, p. 436).  Serial correlation arises as errors for a particular 
country at one period are related to errors for that country at other periods.  Whereas 
contemporaneous correlation exists when the errors for one country at time t relate to the errors 
for every other country at the same time.  Finally, heteroskedasticity is present when the cross-
sectional countries vary by size and exhibit unequal variation.  Estimating the coefficients using 
OLS in the presence of these violations produces consistent estimates but the standard errors are 
biased which leads to incorrect statistical inferences (Baltagi, 2008, pp. 87, 92).  The bias in the 
OLS standard error means that there is information in the residuals that can be used to improve 
the efficiency of the estimates.  Since the social norms and psychological behaviour patterns enter 
panel regressions as unobservable common factors, complex forms of contemporaneous and 
serial dependence arise especially when the sample is a selection of countries that belong to one 
region (Hoechle, 2007, p. 282).  Hence it is critical to select an estimation method that is capable 
to accommodate the complex error structure of panel data. 
The literature uses three different estimation methods for panel data.  One method is the error 
component model including the fixed and random effects models.  Another approach pools time-
series of cross-section including the Parks method and the panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE).  The third method uses an OLS estimator for coefficients but corrects the standard errors 
for possible violations (Baltagi, 2008, pp. 14, 17, 214, 216, 233; Petersen, 2009, p. 436). 
Error component models, fixed effects and random effects are inappropriate estimator for this 
essay.  Due to the presence of time invariant variables and that the key investor protection indices 
do not vary much over time, the fixed effects model is ruled out (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 326; Beck, 
2001, p. 285).  Further, the small sample size makes the estimation of fixed effects model less 
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feasible; it involves estimating too many parameters and hence loss of degrees of freedom 
(Baltagi, 2008, p. 17).  The random effects model is an appropriate specification if the sample is 
drawn randomly from a large population (Baltagi, 2008, p. 17).
45
  The MENA data is not a 
random sample of a larger population; it is fixed (N=21) and all inferences are conditioned on the 
observed countries.  Furthermore, the only way of re-sampling is by observing a new draw of 
MENA data for some year; N will always be 21 countries whereas T may vary.  Based on this 
analogy, the random effects model may not be appropriate. 
The most relaxed methods of pooling time series of cross-section data that accommodates error 
violations are the Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) estimator proposed by Parks (1967) 
and Kmenta (1986) and the PCSE proposed by Beck and Katz (1995) (Baltagi, 2008, pp. 214, 
233).  The FGLS is infeasible because the time dimension, T=6, is smaller than its cross-sectional 
dimension, N=21, making the variance-covariance matrix singular.
46
  Similarly, the PCSE is 
inappropriate.  Beck (2001, p. 274) notes that PCSE requires a reasonably large T that makes 
averages over the time periods for each country make sense.
47
  Driscoll and Kraay (1998) in 
Hoechle (2007, p. 284) point out that Beck and Katz (1995) PCSE method maybe problematic for 
medium panels; PCSE estimates the contemporaneous covariance matrix, and this estimate is 
imprecise if the ratio T to N is small.  Due to these data limitations both FGLS and PCSE are 
ruled out. 
Empirical finance research commonly uses OLS with robust standard errors to potentially 
unknown variance and covariance properties of the errors.  The most common approaches for 
estimating the standard errors in Finance panel data sets are: The Fama-McBeth procedure; 
clustered standard errors; heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (HC) of White (1980); 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors proposed by Newey and 
West (1987); and, HAC of cross-section averages proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998).  
Except for Driscoll and Kraay (1998), the standard error corrections listed above do not 
simultaneously correct for all possible dependencies in the data (Reed and Ye, 2009, p. 985).  
According to Petersen (2009) survey, a significant proportion (42%) of published articles in top 
Finance journals fails to appropriately adjust the standard errors for possible dependencies in the 
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 Beck (2001, p. 273) distinguishes between panel data and time-series-cross-section (TSCS) data.  Beck’s argument 
suggests that TSCS data are fixed and the researcher is not interested in extending inference to a larger hypothetical 
population of similar countries.  That is all inferences of interest are conditional on the observed countries.  
However, countries observed in panels are of no interest; all inferences of interest concern the underlying population 
that was sampled, rather than being conditional on the observed sample.  Beck (2001) argues that this distinction has 
theoretical implications.  While all asymptotics for TSCS data are in T, asymptotics for panel data are in N. 
46
 FGLS performs well in large sample since estimation of the residual covariance matrix improves as NT increases 
relative to the number of parameters in the error covariance matrix that must be estimated. 
47
 Beck (2001, p.274) note that one ought to be suspicious of PCSE and PARKS methods used for T<10. 
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errors.  While it is common for panel data estimation to correct for serial correlation, cross-
sectional correlation is not always addressed appropriately (Hoechle, 2007).  Baltagi (2008, p. 
216) argues that contemporaneous correlation is not critical in randomly drawn samples.  
However, when dealing with a cross-section of countries or regions, these aggregate units are 
expected to exhibit contemporaneous correlation that has to be dealt with.  Assuming that the 
residuals of a panel model are correlated within but uncorrelated between countries, often 
imposes an artificial and inappropriate constraint on empirical models (Hoechle, 2007, p. 282).  
Therefore, erroneously ignoring possible correlation of regression disturbances over time and 
between countries can lead to biased statistical inference.  Driscoll-Kraay standard errors tackle 
the complex error structure of the data by addressing heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and 
contemporaneous correlation. 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) propose estimating the panel regression by pooled OLS and use 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and general forms of contemporaneous and 
serial correlation.  Driscoll-Kraay approach is an extension of Newey and West's non-parametric 
variance-covariance estimator to the sequence of cross-sectional averages of the moment 
conditions.  Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are computed by taking cross-section averages of 
products of the moment conditions and then computing a HAC covariance matrix estimator with 
these cross-section averages.  As researchers often impose restrictions on the contemporaneous 
correlation matrix, Driscoll and Kraay (1998) advocate implementing non-parametric corrections 
for the contemporaneous dependence.  This non-parametric estimation of standard errors places 
no restrictions on the limiting behaviour of the number of panels and the size of the cross-
sectional dimension in finite samples.  It eliminates deficiencies of large-T consistent covariance 
matrix estimators of PCSE approach.  Further, it does not constitute a constraint on feasibility 
even if the number of panels is much larger than T (Hoechle, 2007, p. 284).  Adjusting the 
standard error estimates in this way guarantees that the covariance matrix estimator is consistent 
and independent of the cross-sectional dimension N. 
Bootstrap can be used as an alternative to asymptotic approximations for obtaining confidence 
intervals (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993, p. 169).  Gauss-Markov theorem holds that OLS estimators 
are normally distributed if the model’s errors are normally distributed.  The central limit theorem 
assures that this error is normal when the sample size is large.  If this parametric assumption 
holds, accurate confidence intervals for these coefficients can be developed using standard 
distribution tables.  However, this sort of distributional assumptions often violated, even the 
relatively weak assumption of symmetrically is often invalid (Efron, 1981, p. 151).  In such a 
case, parametric inferential statements about OLS estimators may be inaccurate (Mooney and 
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Duval, 1993, p. 15).  Asymptotic approximations may result in poor approximation to the 
distribution of the test statistics especially for small sample sizes (Wooldridge, 2010).  One 
situation where the errors in a regression model could be non-normal is when the dependent 
variable is highly skewed.  Because the independent variables in an OLS regression model are 
assumed to be fixed, the distribution of the error is entirely determined by the dependent variable.  
Therefore, if the dependent variable is highly skewed, the assumption of normal distribution is 
likely to be violated, at least in small sample (Mooney and Duval, 1993, p. 56). 
Given the small sample size of MENA, OLS results based on asymptotic approximations may not 
be accurate.  Bootstrap results that follow the probability distribution function of the data present 
a robustness check and give confidence to the OLS results. 
Bootstrapping is suggested as an appropriate means to obtaining confidence intervals when there 
is no readily available finite sample distribution of the statistics (Mooney and Duval, 1993, p. 55; 
Enders, 2004, p. 235).  The bootstrap is a re-sampling technique developed by Effron (1979).  It 
treats the original sample as the population and generates a number of pseudo-samples from the 
original sample.  For each pseudo-sample, the statistic of interest is calculated and the distribution 
of this statistic across pseudo-samples is used to infer the distribution of the original sample 
statistic.  Horowitz (1997, p. 188) argues that the bootstrap is often more accurate in finite 
samples than first-order asymptotic approximations.
48
 
The central limit theory suggests that as the sample size becomes larger, the bootstrap histogram 
will become normal shaped.  If the bootstrap distribution of the coefficients is normal, then the 
percentile intervals and the standard normal intervals will converge.  However, for small samples 
it may look non-normal and hence the percentile intervals will differ from the normal intervals 
(Efron and Tibshirani, 1993, p. 171).  It often suffices to choose a large number of bootstraps that 
further increases have no important effect (Horowitz, 2001, p. 3181).  Theoretically, an infinite 
number of replications is what the bootstrap requires.  The key to bootstrap usefulness is that it 
converges in terms of numbers of replications reasonably quickly, so running a finite number of 
replications is generally sufficient (Gould and Pitblado, 2010). Figure  2.5 shows that any number 
above 5,000 replications does not significantly increase the precisions.  Hence 5,000 replications 
are selected. 
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 Thanks to Gulasekaran Rajaguru, Tom Smith, and L opold Simar who provided insights for using bootstrap 
technique. 
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Figure  2.5 Bootstrap replications selection 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
The block bootstrap as suggested by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004, p. 265) with minor 
changes is applied. The pseudo-sample generation and bootstrap estimation are as follows: 
Step 1: Generating the bootstrap sample involves a random selection with replacement for 
pairs of blocks (Y, X).  In order to preserve the data generating process of the original 
sample (serial correlation structure of the error term), panels rather than individual 
observations are randomly selected.  The generation of the bootstrap sample involves two 
steps.  First, a random number between [1-18] for stock market and between [1-20] for 
credit market is generated for a given country selection.  Second, a random number 
between [1-4] is generated twice for year selection.  If the number equals 1, then years 2007 
to 2010 are selected as a block.  If the number equals 2, then years 2008 to 2011 are 
selected as a block.  If the number equals 3, then years 2009 to 2011 are selected as a bock.  
Finally, if the number equals 4, then years 2010 to 2012 are selected as a block.
49
  Step 1 is 
repeated 18 times for the stock market and 20 times for the credit market to generate a 
sample that mimics the original sample size. 
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 Another specification has been used which re-samples the whole block of each country for 6 years at once. 
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Step 2: Estimate the model using OLS and record the beta coefficient estimates. 
Step 3: Repeat steps 1 and 2, five thousand times. 
Step 4: Develop a distribution for the coefficients and specify the appropriate percentiles 
(0.5, 2.5, 5, 95, 97.5, 99.5) of these sampling distributions.  These represent the confidence 
intervals for the estimated coefficient.  If the confidence interval at 90%, 95% and 99% 
levels does not contain zero, the coefficient is statistically significant at each respective 
level.  Otherwise, the coefficient is statistically insignificant from zero. 
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2.5. Empirical analysis 
In Section 2.5.1, the distribution of the variables for the overall sample, the correlation between 
the variables, the comparative investor protection for each MENA country, the frequency of 
investor protection and Islamic culture by legal origin and tests of the differences in the mean 
(median) of variables by legal origin are described.  Then Section 2.5.2 presents the empirical 
results for the multivariate regressions that examine the impact of the legal environment and 
culture on financial market development.  Robustness analysis is discussed in Section 2.5.3 which 
reports the bootstrap results.  In all tables 
***
, 
**
 and 
*
 denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
2.5.1. Univariate and bivariate analysis 
Table  2.8 presents summary descriptive statistics for the whole sample.
50
  The mean (median) of 
domestic credit to private sector in the MENA is USD71.77 (USD30.44) billion over the period 
2007-2012.  The heterogeneity in the credit market development is evident from the standard 
deviation figures.  The minimum value of domestic credit to private sector is USD1.19 billion for 
Palestine in 2008 while the maximum value is USD429.32 billion for Turkey in 2012.  The 
skewness and kurtosis figures show that the credit market development variables are non-normal 
and exhibit positive skewness (1.73).  Kurtosis for the credit market is 2.84.  As this statistic is 
less than three, it indicates a platykurtic distribution where the probability for extreme values is 
less than for a normal distribution and the values are less clustered around the mean. 
The mean (median) market capitalisation in the MENA is USD80.74 (USD43.39) billion over the 
period 2007-2012.  The heterogeneity is evident where the lowest stock market capitalisation of 
USD90.06 million is for Algeria in 2009, while the largest market capitalisation of USD515.11 
billion is for Saudi Arabia in 2007.  The skewness and kurtosis figures show that stock market 
development variables are non-normal with positive skewness (1.83).  The kurtosis (3.58) for 
stock market is greater than three, indicating a leptokurtic distribution with high probability for 
extreme values. 
Creditor protection measured in terms of strength of legal rights and depth of credit information, 
ranges from 0 to 10 and from 0 to 6, respectively.  The mean (median) score for creditor 
protection in the MENA is 3.28 (3.00) when measured by the strength of legal rights index and 
2.78 (2.00) when measured by the depth of credit information index.  Figure  2.6 presents the 
comparative creditor protection by index for each MENA country.  The radii represent the 
MENA countries and each point on the circumferences represents the average creditor protection 
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 Due to the length of table, descriptive statistics by country is provided in Appendix 4. 
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for that particular country over the period 2006-2011.  The centroid represents the minimum 
score of zero and as the outline moves outward the level of creditor protection increases.  The 
figure reveals that the strength of legal rights is weakest in Palestine and Syria with a score of one 
and strongest in Israel with a score of nine.  The depth of the credit information is lowest in Iraq 
and Sudan with a score of zero and highest in Egypt and Saudi Arabia with a score of six.
51
 
Figure  2.6 Comparative creditor protection: (average 2006-2011) 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
The average percentage of individuals and firms listed by the private credit bureau (10.14) is 
higher than the average number listed in a public credit registry (4.24).  Only nine MENA 
countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and UAE) 
operate private credit bureaus whereas 15 MENA countries operate public credit registries. 
Shareholder protection measured in terms of the extent of disclosure, the extent of director 
liability and ease of shareholder suits, all range from 0 to 10 whereas the anti-director rights 
index ranges from 0 to 6.  The mean (median) score is 5.39 (5.00) for the extent of disclosure 
index, 5.03 (5.00) for the extent of director liability index, 3.22 (3.00) for the extent of 
shareholder suit index and 2.81 (2.50) for the anti-director rights index. Figure  2.7 presents the 
comparative shareholder protection by index for each MENA country respectively.  The extent of 
disclosure index varies widely across MENA.  Disclosure is lowest in Sudan and Tunisia with a 
score of zero and highest in Turkey and Lebanon with a score of nine.  The director liability 
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 The strength of legal rights and the depth of credit information are unavailable for Libya. 
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index is lowest in Lebanon with a score of one and highest in Israel and Kuwait with a score of 
nine.  The ease of shareholder suits index is lowest in Iran with a score of zero and highest in 
Israel with a score of nine.  A smaller range is evident for the anti-director rights index.  The 
lowest statistic is for Algeria, Jordan and Palestine with a score of 1.5 and the highest in Qatar 
(4.5). 
Figure  2.7 Comparative shareholder protection: (average 2006-2011) 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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There are substantial variations among countries in the efficiency of the judicial system.  On 
average, the time required to resolve a commercial dispute ranges from 420 days in Turkey to 
1,010 days in Egypt.  The cost to resolve a commercial dispute (as a percentage of the claim) 
ranges from 13.5% in Oman to 32.5% in Iraq.  The number of procedures required ranges 
between 35 in Israel to 55 in Syria.  Overall, the average time, cost and number of procedures 
required to resolve a commercial dispute in the MENA is 648 days, 24% of the claim and 43.85 
procedures respectively. 
Law enforcement, measured by the rule of law, is lowest in countries where there is war and 
conflict such as Iraq, Libya and Yemen and high in countries with stable governments.  For 
example, the lowest score of -1.92 is for Iraq in 2007 while the highest score of 1.01 is for Qatar 
in 2009. 
The extent of Islamic culture is captured by the three indices: IPI, IEI and IFI each ranging from 
0 to 4 and the aggregate index III ranging from 0 to 12. Figure  2.8 presents the comparative III 
and its sub-components for each MENA country respectively.  All GCC, except for Bahrain and 
Kuwait, have zero scores on the IPI where there are no active Islamic political parties.  
Significant number of countries ranks high (3) on the IPI such as Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Morocco and Turkey.  All these countries have active Islamic political parties with experience in 
government.  The level of Islamic education (IEI) is lowest in Bahrain (0) and highest in Iran 
(3.64).  Except for Syria, Libya and Israel, all MENA countries rank high in terms of IFI where 
Islamic banking venues are available.  Overall, Israel ranks the lowest (0) on III and both Iran and 
Turkey exhibit high Islamic culture measures with III scores of 9.6 and 8.7 respectively. 
The heterogeneity is evident in the economic activity especially between oil vs. non-oil producing 
countries.  Highest GDP figures are for Turkey (USD774.8 billion) and Saudi Arabia (USD669.5 
billion) in 2011, whereas the lowest GDP is for Palestine in 2006 (USD4.6 billion).  When the 
economic activity is measured as GDP per capita, the highest-ranking country is Qatar (USD91 
thousand) and the lowest ranking countries are Sudan (USD862) and Yemen (USD917).  GDP 
real growth ranges widely: Iraq revived from years of wars has grown at 39% in 2008 while other 
countries are struggling from wars and conflicts.  Libya’s GDP shrank 60% in 2011 due to 
political turmoil.  Iran, Iraq, Libya and Yemen have high inflation rates of over 20% per annum 
in some years.  During the war period Iraq experienced a 64.8% inflation rate in 2006, whereas 
Qatar experienced deflation of a -4.86% during the 2009. Descriptive statistics by country is 
provided in Appendix 4. 
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Figure  2.8 Comparative Islamic culture 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
The Sharia index, a proxy for the extent of duality of the legal system, ranges from zero for 
countries without any constitutional role of Sharia like Turkey and Israel, to four where Sharia is 
the constitution of the country like Saudi Arabia and Iran (Figure  2.9). 
Figure  2.9 Comparative Sharia index 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  2.8 Descriptive statistics for essay 1 
 
Variables # 
Obs 
Min Max Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Credit market 
development 
Domestic credit to private sector (million USD) 121 1,195.94  429,318.33  71,768.87  30,444.44  87,546.08  1.73  2.84  
Domestic credit to population 121 66.89  35,318.54  8,533.33  2,885.98  11,150.66  1.27  0.07  
Domestic credit to private sector to GDP 121 2.48  94.42  44.15  40.89  27.47  0.13  -1.26  
Stock market 
development 
Market capitalisation (million USD) 108 90.06  515,110.77  80,743.14  43,395.12  100,112.91  1.83  3.58  
Market capitalisation to population 108 2.48  82,855.49  11,221.37  2,830.79  17,775.78  2.28  4.92  
Market capitalisation to GDP 108 0.05  240.88  49.30  37.45  42.22  1.47  3.35  
Creditor 
protection 
rights 
Strength of legal rights index 116 1.00 9.00 3.28 3.00 1.62 2.03 6.02 
Depth of credit information index 116 0.00 6.00 2.78 2.00 1.90 0.02 -1.17 
Private bureau coverage  116 0.00 100 10.14 0.00 22.05 2.93 8.51 
Public registry coverage 116 0.00 31.3 4.24 0.25 6.91 1.82 2.57 
Shareholder 
protection 
rights 
Extent of disclosure index 116 0.00 9.00 5.39 5.00 2.29 -0.65 0.51 
Extent of director liability index 116 1.00 9.00 5.03 5.00 2.01 0.26 0.01 
Ease of shareholder suits index 116 0.00 9.00 3.22 3.00 2.04 1.01 1.25 
Anti-director rights index 108 1.50 4.50 2.86 2.50 0.89 0.16 -0.86 
Judicial 
efficiency 
Time (days) 116 420  1,010  648  630  149  0.85  0.01  
Cost (% of claim) 116 13.50  32.50  23.69  25.20  5.20  -0.20  -0.85  
Procedures (number) 116 35.00  55.00  43.85  43.00  6.16  0.26  -1.25  
Law 
enforcement 
Rule of law 126 -1.92  1.01  -0.21  -0.14  0.74  -0.30  -0.89  
Islamic 
culture 
Islamic political institutions (IPI) 126 0.00  3.00  1.57  2.00  1.14  -0.08  -1.41  
Islamic financial institutions (IFI) 126 0.00  4.00  2.67  3.00  1.33  -0.87  -0.23  
Islamic educational institutions (IEI) 126 0.00  3.64  1.30  1.29  0.86  0.85  0.84  
Islamic institutionalisation index (III) 126 0.00  9.64  5.54  5.59  2.35  -0.46  -0.14  
Duality of 
legal systems 
Sharia index 126 0.00 4.00 1.89 2.00 1.17 0.04 -0.76 
Macro-
economic 
variables 
GDP (million USD) 126 4,619.10  774,775.18  150,291.58  80,327.25  173,349.76  1.91  3.22  
GDP per capita (USD) 126 862.29  90,804.67  14,604.45  5,385.73  18,559.58  2.02  4.04  
GDP real growth 126 -60.41  38.78  6.61  8.73  14.50  -1.22  3.29  
Population (million) 126 0.95  79.39  22.54  10.38  23.81  1.22  0.33  
Rate of inflation 126 -4.86  64.82  7.27  5.14  7.63  3.85  25.41  
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Panel A of Table  2.9 reports Pearson correlation matrix for credit market development.  Creditor 
protection indices, the strength of legal rights and the depth of credit information are positively 
correlated with the credit market development variables as predicted by the model specification 
in Table  2.7.  Among the information dissemination variables, only private bureau coverage is 
positively associated with the credit market development variables as predicted.  However, public 
registry coverage is only positively correlated with the domestic credit to private sector when 
measured by level.  Among the judicial efficiency indicators, cost is negatively correlated with 
the domestic credit to population and procedures are negatively associated with domestic credit in 
levels and as a ratio to GDP.  Consistent with the model prediction, the rule of law is positively 
associated with credit market development.  IPI is negatively correlated with credit market 
development and with creditor protection indices.  Both IEI and III are negatively correlated with 
credit market development when measured in ratios.  Both IFI and III are negatively correlated 
with the strength of legal rights index.  The Sharia index is negatively associated with credit 
market development variables measured in ratios and negatively associated with creditor 
protection indices.  GDP is positively correlated with credit market development and creditor 
protection indices while inflation is negatively correlated with credit market development 
variables. 
The correlations of stock market development variables are reported in Panel B of Table  2.9.  As 
predicted, the extent of disclosure index and anti-director rights index are positively associated 
with market capitalisation and market capitalisation to population.  The extent of director liability 
index is positively associated with market capitalisation to population.  Inconsistent with 
prediction, the ease of shareholder suit index is marginally negatively correlated with market 
capitalisation and the market capitalisation to GDP.  Among the judicial efficiency variables, 
only procedures are negatively associated with stock market development variables.  Rule of law 
is positively correlated with stock market development variables as expected by the model 
specification in Table  2.7.  IPI is negatively associated with stock market development variables.  
IEI and III are negatively associated with stock market development when measured in ratios.  
GDP is positively associated with stock market development measured in levels while inflation is 
negatively associated with stock market development when measured in ratios.  The correlations 
between the rest of the variables are reported in Panel C of Table  2.9. 
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Table  2.9 Pearson correlation matrix 
Panel A 
Variables Domestic credit 
to private sector 
Domestic 
credit to 
population 
Domestic 
credit to 
GDP 
Strength of 
legal rights 
index 
Depth of 
credit 
information 
index 
Private 
bureau 
coverage 
Public 
registry 
coverage 
Domestic credit to private sector 1.00 
    
 
 
Domestic credit to population 0.72
***
 1.00 
   
 
 
Domestic credit to GDP 0.53
***
 0.76
***
 1.00 
  
 
 
Strength of legal rights index  0.56
***
 0.44
***
 0.37
***
 1.00 
 
 
 
Depth of credit information index 0.70
***
 0.60
***
 0.54
***
 0.39
***
 1.00  
 
Private bureau coverage  0.48
***
 0.47
***
 0.45
***
 0.81
***
 0.48
***
 1.00 
 
Public registry coverage 0.21
**
 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.25
***
 -0.12 1.00 
Time (days) -0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.20
**
 -0.35
***
 
Cost (% of claim) -0.07 -0.27
***
 0.02 -0.17
*
 0.02 0.02 -0.36
***
 
Procedures (number) -0.23
**
 -0.09 -0.36
***
 -0.27
***
 -0.49
***
 -0.33
***
 -0.20
**
 
Rule of law 0.60
***
 0.88
***
 0.71
***
 0.36
***
 0.51
***
 0.48
***
 0.04 
IPI -0.19
**
 -0.49
***
 -0.24
***
 -0.23
**
 -0.19
**
 -0.27
***
 0.09 
IEI 0.08 -0.29
***
 -0.45
***
 -0.10 -0.04 -0.28
***
 0.23
**
 
IFI -0.03 -0.15 -0.25
***
 -0.28
**
 -0.03 -0.37
***
 0.01 
III -0.09 -0.43
***
 -0.42
***
 -0.30
***
 -0.12 -0.42
***
 0.13 
Sharia index -0.14 -0.25
***
 -0.50
***
 -0.24
**
 -0.22
**
 -0.39
***
 0.09 
GDP 0.80
***
 0.29
***
 -0.02 0.50
***
 0.45
***
 0.35
***
 0.18
*
 
GDP real growth -0.03 0.13 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.18
**
 
Rate of inflation -0.19
**
 -0.38
***
 -0.38
***
 -0.04 -0.19
**
 -0.18
**
 0.12 
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Table 2.9 Pearson correlation matrix 
Panel B 
Variables Market 
capitalisation 
Market 
capitalisation 
to population 
Market 
capitalisation 
to GDP 
Extent of 
disclosure 
index 
Extent of 
director 
liability index 
Ease of 
shareholder 
suits index 
Anti-
director 
rights index 
Market capitalisation 1.00 
     
 
Market capitalisation to population 0.84
***
 1.00 
    
 
Market capitalisation to GDP 0.52
***
 0.66
***
 1.00 
   
 
Extent of disclosure index 0.28
***
 0.35
***
 0.12 1.00 
  
 
Extent of director liability index 0.14 0.22
**
 0.14 -0.16
*
 1.00 
 
 
Ease of shareholder suits index -0.18* -0.12 -0.19* 0.07 0.33
***
 1.00  
Anti-director rights index 0.46
***
 0.51
***
 0.09 0.30
***
 0.14 -0.15 1.00 
Time (days) -0.02 -0.01 0.14 -0.08 0.09 0.32
***
 -0.13 
Cost (% of claim) 0.07 -0.10 0.19* 0.14 -0.27
***
 0.20
**
 -0.17
*
 
Procedures (number) -0.36
***
 -0.21
**
 -0.27
***
 -0.30
***
 0.28
***
 -0.27
***
 0.24
**
 
Rule of law 0.59
***
 0.79
***
 0.60
***
 0.25
***
 0.36
***
 0.08 0.32
***
 
IPI -0.36
***
 -0.57
***
 -0.27
***
 -0.07 -0.48
***
 -0.20
**
 -0.38
***
 
IEI 0.07 -0.23
**
 -0.26
***
 -0.25
***
 0.08 -0.38
***
 -0.05 
IFI 0.09 -0.02 -0.16* -0.21
**
 -0.20
**
 -0.33
***
 0.21
**
 
III -0.12 -0.41
***
 -0.32
***
 -0.23
**
 -0.30
***
 -0.40
***
 -0.12 
Sharia index 0.11 0.00 -0.13 -0.20
**
 0.13 -0.50
***
 0.33
***
 
GDP 0.49
***
 0.08 -0.15 0.10 0.30
***
 -0.02 0.31
***
 
GDP real growth -0.00 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.16 
Rate of inflation -0.06 -0.22
**
 -0.23
**
 -0.19
**
 -0.10 -0.15
*
 0.02 
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Table 2.9 Pearson correlation matrix 
Panel C 
Variables Time (days) Cost of 
claim 
Procedures 
(number) 
Rule of law IPI IEI IFI III Sharia 
index 
Time (days) 1.00 
       
 
Cost (% of claim) 0.19
**
  1.00 
      
 
Procedures (number) 0.12  -0.34
***
  1.00 
     
 
Rule of law 0.06  -0.29
*** 
 -0.18
*
  1.00 
    
 
IPI -0.37
*** 
 0.29
*** 
 -0.18
*
  -0.64
*** 
 1.00 
   
 
IEI -0.41
*** 
 -0.15  0.09  -0.44
*** 
 0.41
*** 
 1.00 
  
 
IFI -0.37
*** 
 -0.21
** 
 -0.01  -0.04  0.06  0.33
*** 
 1.00 
 
 
III -0.51
*** 
 -0.02  -0.06  -0.49
*** 
 0.67
*** 
 0.75
*** 
 0.71
*** 
 1.00  
Sharia index 0.02 -0.37
***
 -0.39
***
 -0.21
**
 -0.25
***
 0.50
***
 0.35
***
 0.26
***
 1.00 
GDP -0.16
*
  -0.01  -0.07  0.16
*
  0.02  0.38
*** 
 0.08  0.19
**
  0.09 
GDP real growth 0.04  0.01  0.11  0.14  -0.13  -0.11  0.03  -0.08  -0.04 
Rate of inflation -0.01  0.04  0.07  -0.39
*** 
 0.21
**
  0.34
***
  0.16
*
  0.32
***
  0.32
***
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  2.10 reports a frequency for the creditor protection indices and the shareholder protection 
indices by legal origin.  79.55% and 70.45% of the scores on the strength of legal rights and the 
depth of credit information indices range between 0 to 3 in civil law countries compared to 32% 
and 46% in common law countries.  Only 21.59% of the scores on the disclosure index for civil 
law countries lie between 6 to 9 compared to 57.14% for common law countries.  Similarly, 
9.09% of the score for the extent of director liability in civil law countries lie between 6 to 9 
compared to 42.86% for common law.  In the case of the ease of shareholder suit index, no civil 
law country has a score higher than six, however, 21% of common law countries have a value 
higher than six.  The anti-director rights index scores do not differ by legal origin; 73% of the 
sample countries on the anti-director rights index range between 0 to 3 in civil law countries 
compared to 60% in common law countries.  Except for anti-director rights index, these results 
suggest that investor protection is stronger in common law countries compared to civil law 
countries.  Fisher’s exact test of independence for categorical variables yields p-values that are all 
below 5% level (Except for anti-director rights index), rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
association between the strength of investor protection and legal origin.
52
 
Table  2.11 reports the frequency for the Islamic culture and the hybrid legal system for the 21 
MENA countries.  Countries with common law legal origin have lower levels of Islamic culture 
than countries with French civil law legal origin.  80% of common law countries have extremely 
low or emerging IPI, where the scores are between 0-1 compared to only 37.5% for countries 
with French civil law legal origin.  Moreover, 80% of the countries with common law legal origin 
have highly functional IFI compared to 56.25% for countries with French civil law legal origin.  
However, 40% of the countries with common law legal origin have functional IEI whereas 
93.75% of the countries with French civil law have IEI at extremely low or emerging 
functionality.  Overall, 80% of common law countries have less Islamic endorsement in their 
institutions compared with 50% for countries with French civil law legal origin.  The distribution 
of the Sharia index is less divergent between the legal origins.  Fisher’s exact test of 
independence for categorical variables yields p-values that are all below 5% level, rejecting the 
null hypothesis of no association between both the Islamic culture/Sharia index and legal origin. 
                                                 
52
 Fisher’s exact test is a test of association between the row and column variables.  This test assumes that the row 
and column totals are fixed and uses the hyper-geometric distribution to compute probabilities of possible tables 
conditional on the observed row and column totals.  Fisher’s exact test does not depend on any large-sample 
distribution assumptions.  It is particularly appropriate when dealing with small samples (SAS Institute Inc, 2013, p. 
2708). 
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Table  2.10 Frequency table for investor protection by legal origin 
  
Creditor protection Shareholder protection 
Strength of legal 
rights index by legal 
origin 
Depth of credit 
information index 
by legal origin 
Extent of disclosure 
index by legal 
origin 
Extent of director 
liability index by 
legal origin 
Ease of shareholder 
suits index by legal 
origin 
Anti-director rights 
index by legal 
origin 
Legal origin Legal origin Legal origin Legal origin Legal origin Legal origin 
Range 
  
Civil 
law 
Common 
law 
Civil 
law 
Common 
law 
Civil 
law 
Common 
law 
Civil 
law 
Common 
law 
Civil 
law 
Common 
law 
Civil 
law 
Common 
law 
≤3 
Frequency 70 9 62 13 4 6 18 0 52 13 57 18 
Column % 79.55 32.14 70.45 46.43 4.55 21.43 20.45 0 59.09 46.43 73.08 60 
3-6 
Frequency 18 13 26 15 65 6 62 16 36 9 21 12 
Column % 20.45 46.43 29.55 53.57 73.86 21.43 70.45 57.14 40.91 32.14 26.92 40 
>6 
Frequency 0 6 
 
19 16 8 12 0 6 
 
Column % 0 21.43 21.59 57.14 9.09 42.86 0 21.43 
Total 
Frequency 88 28 88 28 88 28 88 28 88 28 78 30 
Row % 75.86 24.14 75.86 24.14 75.86 24.14 75.86 24.14 75.86 24.14 72.22 27.78 
P-value for Fisher’s 
exact test 
<0.0001 0.0249 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0003 0.2437 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  2.11 Frequency table for Islamic culture and Sharia index by legal origin 
 
Islamic culture Hybrid legal system 
 
IPI IFI IEI 
 
III 
 
Sharia index 
Legal origin Legal origin Legal origin Legal origin Legal origin 
 
Range 
Civil 
law 
Common 
law 
Civil 
law 
Common 
law 
Civil 
law 
Common 
law 
Range 
Civil 
law 
Common 
law 
Range 
Civil 
law 
Common 
law 
Frequency 
≤1 
6 4 2 1 7 2 
≤3 
2 1 
≤1 
7 1 
Column % 37.50 80.00 12.50 20.00 43.75 40.00 12.50 20.00 43.75 20.00 
Frequency 
1-2 
4 1 5 0 8 1 
 3-6 
6 3 
1-2 
5 2 
Column % 25.00 20.00 31.25 0 50.00 20.00 37.50 60.00 31.25 40.00 
Frequency 
2-3 
6 0 4 2 0 2 
 6-9 
7 1 
2-3 
3 1 
Column % 37.50 0 25.00 40.00 0 40.00 43.75 20.00 18.75 20.00 
Frequency 
>3 
0 0 5 2 1 0 
>9 
1 0 
>3 
1 1 
Column % 
 
0 31.25 40.00 6.25 0 6.25 0 6.25 20.00 
Frequency 
Total 
16 5 16 5 16 5 
Total 
16 5 
Total 
16 5 
Row % 76.19 23.81 76.19 23.81 76.19 23.81 76.19 23.81 76.19 23.81 
P-value for Fisher’s 
exact test 
<.0001 0.0007 <.0001 
 
0.0294  0.0466 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
 84 
Table  2.12 compares the differences in the characteristics of countries with French civil law legal 
origin against those with English common law legal origin using t-test and Wilcoxon test.
53
  
Panel A shows that the mean (median) of the credit market variables for countries with English 
common law legal origin are significantly higher than countries with French civil law legal 
origin.  Countries with English common law legal origin offer better protection for creditors as 
measured by the strength of legal rights and the depth of credit information.  Private bureau 
coverage is dominant form of information dissemination in countries with English common law 
legal origin while public registry coverage is dominant in countries with French civil law legal 
origin. 
Panel B reveals that the mean (median) of the stock market capitalisation for countries with 
English common law legal origin is significantly higher than the mean (median) for countries 
with French civil law legal origin.  Countries with English common law legal origin offer better 
protection for shareholders as measures by the director liability and ease of shareholder suit 
indices.  There are no significant differences between the countries in terms of disclosure index.  
The mean of the anti-director rights index is higher in common law countries compared to French 
civil law countries. 
In the case of judicial efficiency, Panel C indicates that countries with French civil law legal 
origin require less time to resolve a commercial dispute and incur higher claim costs than 
countries with English common law legal origin.  There are no significant statistical differences 
in the mean procedures number.  Hence, the dominance of British common law is not evident 
with respect to judicial efficiency.  The rule of law, however, is stronger in countries with 
common law legal origin. 
The Islamic culture is stronger in countries with French civil law legal origin when measured in 
IPI and the overall III.  This implies that countries with French law legal origin have an active 
presence of Islamic political parties compared to countries with common law legal origin.  
However, there are no significant differences between the two legal origins in terms of IEI and 
IFI.  Additionally, there are no significant differences in mean (median) of Sharia index between 
the two legal origins (Panel D). 
The univariate analysis highlights the existence of meaningful variation in financial market 
development, legal rules and culture across MENA countries and the bivariate analysis indicates 
                                                 
53
 The Wilcoxon test is valid for data from any distribution and is much less sensitive to outliers than the two-sample 
t-test.  Exact p-values are used for Wilcoxon test which is appropriate when a data set is small, sparse, skewed, or 
heavily clustered around the mean. 
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the presence of meaningful associations and patterns among the variables that warrant the 
multivariate regression analysis. 
 
Table  2.12 Testing the equality of mean and median for legal origin 
Panel A: Mean/median differences for credit market by legal origin 
 
Domestic 
credit 
(million USD) 
Domestic 
credit to 
population 
Domestic 
credit to GDP 
Strength of 
legal rights 
index 
Depth of credit 
information 
index 
Private 
bureau 
coverage† 
Public 
registry 
coverage† 
Mean 
53,384.85 6,337.71 40.32 2.79 2.56 4.35 5.28*** 
127,533.73***  15,193.39***  55.78*** 4.79*** 3.46** 28.34*** 0.97 
 
Median 
27,888.52 1,880.11 36.48 3.00 2.00 0.00 1.35*** 
172,571.19***  15,808.03***  63.24*** 4.00*** 5.00** 15.10*** 0.00 
Panel B: Mean/median differences for stock market by legal origin 
 
Market 
capitalisation 
(million USD) 
Market 
capitalisation 
to population 
Market 
capitalisation 
to GDP 
Extent of 
disclosure 
index 
Extent of 
director 
liability index 
Ease of 
shareholder 
suits index 
Anti-
director 
rights index 
Mean 
59,410.04 10,079.06 46.85 5.48 4.51 2.89 2.77 
136,209.21***  14,191.38 55.69 5.11 6.68*** 4.25** 3.10* 
 
Median 
31,364.62 1,943.94 34.22 5.00 4.00 2.00 2.50 
104,083.32***  13,233.57***  54.53** 7.00 6.00*** 4.00** 2.50 
Panel C: Mean/median differences for judicial efficiency, law enforcement and macro-economic variables by legal origin 
 
Time (days)† Cost 
(% of claim)† 
Procedures 
number† 
Rule of law GDP 
(million USD) 
GDP real 
growth 
Rate of 
inflation 
Mean 
630.13 24.28** 43.31 -0.32 131,433.43 6.5198 7.66 
706.14** 21.84 45.57* 0.13*** 210,637.63** 6.886 6.04 
 
Median 
598 25.20** 42.00 -0.32 70,887.60 7.80 5.99* 
635.00*** 19.8 48.00* 0.38*** 209,458.42** 11.73 3.96 
Panel D: Mean/median differences for Islamic culture and Sharia index by legal origin  
 IPI IEI† IFI III† Sharia index 
 
Mean 
1.88*** 1.32 2.63 5.82** 1.79 
0.60 1.26 2.80 4.66 2.20* 
 
Median 
2.00*** 1.31 3.00 6.06** 2.00 
0.00 1.20 3.00 5.20 2.00** 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
† Computation of exact tests was infeasible (require a large amount of time and memory).  Monte Carlo estimation 
of exact p-values is used instead. 
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2.5.2. Multivariate analysis 
Table  2.13 reports the results of the legal origin on financial market development.  The 
coefficients on legal origin are all consistently positive and statistically significant from zero at 
the 1% level for credit and stock market development regressions.  Consistent with the ‘Law and 
Finance’ literature, results indicate that MENA countries with common law legal origin operate 
more developed credit and stock markets.  This finding is consistent with the historical narrative 
that contract enforcement and private property rights are better protected under common law, thus 
promoting financial development (La Porta et al., 1997; Claessens and Laeven, 2003).  The effect 
of legal origin on financial market development is statistically significant and economically large.  
The estimated coefficient on legal origin in Regression 1 implies that the expected percent 
increase in geometric mean of domestic credit from common law countries to civil law countries 
is 39.0%, holding other variables constant.
54
  The coefficient on legal origin in Regression 2 
shows that the expected percent increase in the geometric mean of domestic credit per capita 
from common law countries to civil law countries is 153.3%, holding other variables constant.  
The coefficient on legal origin in Regression 3 shows that there is a 13.2 percentage point mean 
difference in domestic credit to GDP between countries with common law legal origin and those 
with civil law legal origin.  Similarly, the expected percent increase in geometric mean of market 
capitalisation from common law countries to civil law countries is 88.6%.  The expected percent 
increase in geometric mean of market capitalisation per capita from common law countries to 
civil law countries is 227.1%.  Finally, market capitalisation to GDP for countries with common 
law legal origin is 7.6 percentage point higher than those countries with civil law legal origin. 
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 Domestic credit, domestic credit to population, market capitalisation and market capitalisation to population are 
measured in natural logarithm.  Hence, the interpretation is performed on the exponential regression coefficients.  
For example, e
0.3290
=1.3896. 
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Table  2.13 OLS results for financial market development and legal origin 
Dependent variable Reg Legal origin Rate of inflation GDP GDP 
growth 
Constant N×T 
R
2 
Credit Market  
   
 
  
Domestic credit  (1) 0.3290*** -0.0495*** 1.0247***  -1.3553*** 121 
 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.29) 71.65% 
Domestic credit to population (2) 0.9296*** -0.0938*** 0.4366***  -2.6888*** 121 
 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.57) 30.16% 
Domestic credit GDP (3) 13.1739*** -1.3826*** 
 
-0.1851 52.2294*** 121 
 
 (2.64) (0.38) 
 
(0.19) (3.53) 19.67% 
Stock Market  
   
 
  
Market capitalisation (4) 0.6344*** -0.0285*** 0.8088***  3.5637*** 108 
 
 (0.08) (0.01) (0.04)  (0.97) 27.32% 
Market capitalisation to population (5) 1.1850*** -0.0693*** 0.1581***  3.8598*** 108 
 
 (0.11) (0.02) (0.05)  (1.06) 10.99% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (6) 7.6433*** -1.1478*** 
 
0.2363 53.3459*** 108 
 
 (1.52) (0.17) 
 
(0.24) (4.05) 6.38% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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The results of tests investigating the relationship between creditor protection and credit market 
development are presented in Table  2.14.  Creditor rights are considered in terms of the legal 
rights in bankruptcy and in terms of information sharing about borrowers.  The relationship 
between credit market development and the strength of legal rights is presented in Regressions 1-
3 of Table  2.14.  The coefficients on the strength of legal rights are positive and statistically 
significant from zero at 1% level implying that countries in which bankruptcy and collateral laws 
protecting the rights of both borrowers and creditors have deeper credit markets.  The finding is 
consistent with the power hypothesis of Djankov et al. (2007) where lenders extend credit if they 
can easily force repayment, grab collateral or gain control of the firm.  The estimated coefficients 
imply that a two standard deviation increase in the strength of legal rights index is associated with 
USD21.1 billion increase in domestic credit to private sector, a USD5,242 increase in the 
domestic credit per capita and a 19.3 percentage point increase in domestic credit to GDP. 
Regressions 4-6 of Table  2.14 report the relationship between credit market development and the 
depth of credit information.  The coefficients on the depth of credit information are all positive 
and statistically significant at 1% level.  The finding indicates that the availability of credit 
information about borrowers from either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau 
positively affects the MENA banks’ ability to satisfy the demand for private sector borrowing.  
This finding is consistent with the information hypothesis of Djankov et al. (2007) which 
suggests that when lenders know more about borrowers, their credit history or their other lenders, 
they extend more credit.  It is worth noting that banks are the principal source of financing in the 
MENA (Koldertsova, 2011, p. 2).  The estimated coefficients imply that a two standard deviation 
increase in the depth of credit information index is associated with USD62.0 billion increase in 
domestic credit to private sector, a USD10,692 increase in the domestic credit per capita and a 
26.8 percentage point increase in domestic credit to GDP. 
Information sharing is critical for bank lending to reduce the risk via screening potential 
borrowers.  The relationship between credit market development and public credit registry 
coverage is revealed in Regressions 7, 8 and 9 whereas the relationship between credit market 
development and private credit bureau coverage is presented in Regressions 10, 11 and 12 of 
Table  2.14.  The coefficients on the information sharing through public credit registry database 
and private credit bureau are both positive and statistically significant at 1% level.  These results 
are contrary to Djankov et al (2007) where both private and public credit registries were 
insignificant. Five MENA countries only (Iran, Egypt, Turkey, UAE and Saudi Arabia) report 
coverage through both public credit registry and private credit bureau and around 20% of the 
observations do not have either institution.  The estimated coefficients on the private credit 
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bureau coverage imply that a two standard deviation increase in the private credit bureau 
coverage is associated with USD21.1 billion increase in domestic credit to private sector, a 
USD5,075 increase in the domestic credit per capita and a 21.4 percentage point increase in 
domestic credit to GDP.  However, the estimated coefficients on the public credit registry 
coverage imply that a two standard deviation increase in the public credit registry coverage is 
associated with USD10.2 billion increase in domestic credit to private sector, a USD758 increase 
in the domestic credit per capita and a 3.5 percentage point increase in domestic credit to GDP. 
When the creditor protection and information sharing variables are combined, (Regressions 13, 
14 and 15 of Table  2.14) the coefficients on both strength of legal rights and depth of credit 
information are positive and statistically significant from zero indicating that creditor rights 
determine the banks’ willingness to extend credit. This is consistent with the literature (La Porta 
et al, 1997; Djankov et al., 2007) and with the model predictions.  The coverage ratios however 
lose their significance indicating that the practices used in collecting data on borrowers by the 
private bureau and public registry as depicted in the depth of credit information index is more 
important than the percentage of the adult population covered. 
Results investigating the relationship between shareholder protection and stock market 
development are presented in Table  2.15.  Shareholder protection rights are captured through the 
regulation of corporate self-dealing transactions along four dimensions: disclosure; director 
liability; facilitation of litigation when self-dealing arises; and, anti-director rights.  The extensive 
disclosure procedures and approval for self-dealing transactions discourage managers or major 
shareholders to act in their own interest and thus the extent of disclosure index is expected to 
positively affect equity investments.  Regressions 1-3 of Table  2.15 report positive and 
statistically significant coefficients at 1% level on the extent of disclosure index.  Results are 
consistent with La Porta et al (2006) and Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008, p. 445) where ex-ante 
private control and its sub-indices, approval by disinterested shareholder and ex-ante disclosure 
are positively associated with stock market capitalisation to GDP.  The estimated coefficients 
imply that a two standard deviation increase in the extent of disclosure index is associated with a 
USD25.9 billion increase in market capitalisation, a USD5,470 increase in the market 
capitalisation per capita and a 6.1 percentage point increase in market capitalisation to GDP.  
These results suggest that firms operating in countries with high disclosure requirements are 
valued higher by investors.  The more the disclosure the lower the monitoring costs for investors 
and thus the lower the required rate of return, which translates into lower cost of equity capital for 
these firms. 
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When shareholders can protect themselves from abuse or oppression by the majority using legal 
means, it is expected to increase investors’ willingness to supply equity capital.  Regressions 4-6 
of Table  2.15 report conflicting results on the impact of director liability index on stock market 
development.  The coefficient on the director liability index is negative and significant at 1% 
level when the stock market development is measured in levels.  However, it is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level when the market development is measured as a ratio to 
population and GDP.  The findings relate to Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008, p.445) finding that 
ex-post private control has a positive and significant impact on stock market capitalisation to 
GDP.  Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008, p.452) also find that the public enforcement and 
government’s power to impose fines and prison terms for self-dealing transactions (which is a 
sub-category of director liability index) does not benefit stock market development.  The 
estimated coefficients imply that a two standard deviation increase in the director liability index 
is associated with a USD1.3 billion decrease in market capitalisation, a USD2,259 increase in 
market capitalisation per capita and a 9.3 percentage point increase in market capitalisation to 
GDP. 
The ‘Law and Finance’ theory, which focuses on the supply side of the market, suggests that 
investors provide capital to firms if it is easy for shareholders to litigate when self-dealing arises.  
Regressions 7-9 of Table  2.15 report a negative and significant relationship between stock market 
development and the ease of shareholder suits at 1% level.  This curious result suggests that the 
ease of shareholder suits deters stock market development and is inconsistent with the ‘Law and 
Finance’ theory prediction and with Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008, 445) that finds this factor 
only has marginal positive impact on stock market development.  The negative association 
between the ease of shareholder suits and stock market development relates to Bruno and 
Claessens (2010, p. 463) argument that too stringent legal investor protection generates costs and 
harm managerial initiative and thus lead to lower returns and valuations.  The estimated 
coefficients imply that a two standard deviation increase in ease of shareholder suits index is 
associated with a USD10.4 billion decrease in market capitalisation, a USD956 decrease in 
market capitalisation per capita and an 18.1 percentage point decrease in market capitalisation to 
GDP.  The negative association may provide insights into the demand side of the stock market.  If 
it is relatively easy for shareholders to initiate legal suits against directors, this may discourage 
firms from raising equity capital, which also deters stock market development.
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 Cho, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Suh (2014) find that strong creditor rights are associated with low long-term 
leverage across countries.  The same rationale applies to stock market, strong shareholder protection when measured 
with the east of shareholder suit may discourage firms from raising equity capital. 
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The classic ‘Law and Finance’ measure of shareholder protection reflected in the anti-director 
rights index is tested and results are presented in Regressions 10-12 of Table  2.15.  A positive 
and significant relationship between stock market development and the degree of investor 
protection provided by the national statutory law against expropriation by managers or major 
shareholders is seen.  This result is consistent with the Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008) and La 
Porta et al. (1997, p. 1141).  The estimated coefficients imply that a two standard deviation 
increase in the anti-director rights index is associated with a USD67.6 billion increase in market 
capitalisation, a USD26,281 increase in market capitalisation per capita and a 7.15 percentage 
point increase in market capitalisation to GDP. 
Regressions 13-15 of Table  2.15 report the regression results when all four indices for 
shareholder protection are included.  The coefficients on both the extent of disclosure and the 
extent of director liability indices are positive and statistically significant at 1% level.  The 
coefficients on the ease of shareholder suit are negative and statistically significant at 1% level.  
The coefficients on the anti-director rights index are positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level when the stock market development is measured in levels and as a ratio to population and 
marginally negative when stock market development is measured relative to GDP.  Overall, the 
signs of the coefficients on the disclosure, director liability, and anti-director rights indices are 
consistent with the ‘Law and Finance’ theory; however, the sign of the coefficient on the ease of 
shareholder suit is contradictory to the theory's prediction. 
The regression results for investor protection rights suggest that the individual influences of 
investor protection indices contribute to our understanding to financial market development.  
Each index proxies for distinct elements of investor protection that capture how legal framework 
impacts upon the size of the financial market.  No effect of investor protection is subsumed by 
another which suggests that MENA countries proposing to establish and expand their financial 
markets could actively encourage a broad-brush approach to support the legal environment.  
Furthermore, the relationship between the legal rules protecting investors is stronger for MENA 
credit markets than for stock markets.  This is evident by the coefficient of determination R-
squared values in Table  2.14 and Table  2.15.  This finding reinforces the view that credit markets, 
in particular banks, are more important source of financing for MENA firms than stock markets.  
MENA firms typically raise equity capital through family groups and social ties thus legal 
protection of creditors is more important than improving other aspects of the legal environment 
since any substantial growth in external finance is likely to be via debt financing rather than 
equity. 
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Table  2.14 OLS results for credit market development and creditor protection 
Dependent variable Reg Strength of 
legal rights 
Depth of 
credit 
information 
Private 
bureau 
coverage 
Public 
registry 
coverage 
Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP 
growth 
Constant N×T 
R
2 
Domestic credit (1) 0.1625*** 
 
 
 
-0.0486
*** 0.9471***  0.1505 114 
 
 (0.01) 
 
 
 
(0.01) (0.02)  (0.50) 75.19% 
Domestic credit to population (2) 0.3625*** 
 
 
 
-0.0960
*** 0.3050***  -0.3958 114 
 
 (0.01) 
 
 
 
(0.03) (0.04)  (1.35) 37.07% 
Domestic credit to GDP (3) 5.9750*** 
 
 
 
-1.3622
*** 
 
-0.1552 35.7341*** 114 
 
 (0.58) 
 
 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.19) (4.45) 27.27% 
Domestic credit (4) 
 
0.2918
***  
 
-0.0345
*** 0.8417***  2.4249*** 114 
 
 
 
(0.01)  
 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.27) 83.03% 
Domestic credit to population (5) 
 
0.4506
***  
 
-0.0764
** 0.2192***  1.5605** 114 
 
 
 
(0.08)  
 
(0.03) (0.04)  (0.65) 45.96% 
Domestic credit to GDP (6) 
 
7.0481
***  
 
-1.0215
** 
 
-0.0098 32.3308*** 114 
 
 
 
(0.51)  
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.16) (2.65) 37.37% 
Domestic credit (10) 
  
0.0119
*** 
 
-0.0441
*** 0.9783***  -0.2513 114 
 
 
  
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) (0.03)  (0.79) 75.56% 
Domestic credit to population (11) 
  
0.0260
*** 
 
-0.0865
*** 0.3785***  -1.3821 114 
 
 
  
(0.00) 
 
(0.03) (0.06)  (1.70) 37.94% 
Domestic credit to GDP (12) 
  
0.4844
*** 
 
-1.1489
*** 
 
-0.1255 48.8147*** 114 
 
 
  
(0.03) 
 
(0.36) 
 
(0.17) (2.75) 29.91% 
Domestic credit (7) 
  
 0.0208*** -0.0534*** 1.0387***  -1.6708*** 114 
 
 
  
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.53) 73.86% 
Domestic credit to population (8) 
  
 0.0202*** -0.1044*** 0.5352***  -5.0189*** 114 
 
 
  
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.05)  (1.40) 30.05% 
Domestic credit to GDP (9) 
  
 0.2554*** -1.4372*** 
 
-0.1374 54.8657*** 114 
 
 
  
 (0.07) (0.41) 
 
(0.17) (2.73) 15.52% 
Domestic credit (13) 0.1444*** 0.2823*** -0.0035 0.0035 -0.0350*** 0.7696***  3.8131*** 114 
 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.29) 84.06% 
Domestic credit to population (14) 0.2967*** 0.4179*** -0.0018 -0.0037 -0.0737** 0.0549*  4.8221*** 114 
 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.56) 50.28% 
Domestic credit to GDP (15) 2.0496* 5.7894*** 0.1321 -0.1411 -0.9892** 
 
-0.0381 28.2717*** 114 
 
 (1.08) (0.57) (0.08) (0.15) (0.35) 
 
(0.16) (4.41) 41.37% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  2.15 OLS results for stock market development and shareholder protection 
Dependent variable Reg Extent of 
disclosure 
index 
Extent of 
director 
liability 
Ease of 
shareholder 
suits 
Anti-director 
rights index 
Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP 
growth 
Constant N×T 
R
2 
Market cap (1) 0.1679*** 
  
 -0.0222** 0.8304***  2.2099*** 104 
 
 (0.02) 
  
 (0.01) (0.02)  (0.49) 30.47% 
Market cap to population (2) 0.2932*** 
  
 -0.0606*** 0.2156***  1.0039* 104 
 
 (0.01) 
  
 (0.01) (0.02)  (0.56) 16.23% 
Market cap to GDP (3) 1.3301*** 
  
 -1.1382*** 
 
0.1130 47.3346*** 104 
 
 (0.43) 
  
 (0.14) 
 
(0.18) (4.05) 6.29% 
Market cap (4) 
 
-0.0148
*** 
 
 -0.0345*** 0.8928***  1.6808*** 104 
 
 
 
(0.00) 
 
 (0.01) (0.02)  (0.47) 26.83% 
Market cap to population (5) 
 
0.1986
*** 
 
 -0.0749*** 0.2081***  1.8336*** 104 
 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
 (0.02) (0.03)  (0.62) 10.99% 
Market cap to GDP (6) 
 
2.3021
*** 
 
 -1.1835*** 
 
0.0828 43.1876*** 104 
 
 
 
(0.64) 
 
 (0.14) 
 
(0.16) (1.95) 7.08% 
Market cap (7) 
  
-0.1553
***  -0.0395*** 0.8680***  2.7884*** 104 
 
 
  
(0.01)  (0.00) (0.02)  (0.61) 29.33% 
Market cap to population (8) 
  
-0.1735
***  -0.0874*** 0.2921***  1.3904** 104 
 
 
  
(0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.51) 10.50% 
Market cap to GDP (9) 
  
-4.4226
***  -1.3999*** 
 
0.0804 71.2649*** 104 
 
 
  
(0.70)  (0.16) 
 
(0.16) (6.67) 10.68% 
Market cap (10) 
   
0.7601
*** -0.0300*** 0.6750***  4.9549*** 108 
 
 
   
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.35) 35.65% 
Market cap to population (11) 
   
1.4385
*** -0.0720*** -0.0963***  6.5150*** 108 
 
 
   
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.24) 31.38% 
Market cap to GDP (12) 
   
4.0106
*** -1.2055*** 
 
0.1796 44.8138*** 108 
 
 
   
(0.53) (0.11) 
 
(0.24) (4.91) 6.41% 
Market cap (13) 0.1406*** 0.0731*** -0.1605*** 0.5652*** -0.0249* 0.6288***  6.0476*** 104 
 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.52) 38.84% 
Market cap to population (14) 0.2920*** 0.3588*** -0.2635*** 0.9856*** -0.0542*** -0.2694***  9.5133*** 104 
 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.18) 39.14% 
Market cap to GDP (15) 3.2501*** 5.3918*** -6.7363*** -6.2407* -1.1566*** 0.0840  50.1262*** 104 
 
 (0.22) (0.79) (0.82) (2.98) (0.16) (0.19)  (11.32) 17.62% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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The value of the legal protection conferred in private contracts depends on the extent to which 
they are enforced within the public domain. Table  2.16 presents the results for the effect of law 
enforcement on financial market development.  Regressions 1-3 for credit market and 
Regressions 7-9 for stock market report a positive and significant association between the rule of 
law and both credit and stock market development variables at 1% level.  The estimated 
coefficients on the credit market imply that a two standard deviation increase in the rule of law is 
associated with a USD86.7 billion increase in domestic credit to private sector, a USD45,846 
increase in domestic credit per capita and 36.3 percentage point increase in domestic credit to 
GDP.  Similarly, the estimated coefficients on the stock market imply that a two standard 
deviation increase in rule of law is associated with a USD202.5 billion increase in market 
capitalisation, a USD91,269 increase in market capitalisation per capita and 50.8 percentage point 
increase in market capitalisation to GDP.  When the legal origin and the rule of law are both 
included in regressions (Regressions 4-6 for credit market and Regressions 10-12 for stock 
market), the rule of law maintains its effect, sign and significance level in all cases.  Legal origin, 
however, loses significance when the financial development is measured in levels.  However, 
when the financial development is measured as a percentage to population, the coefficients on 
legal origin are positive and statistically significant at 1% level yet the size of the coefficients are 
less than what has been reported in Table  2.13.  This finding suggests that current legal 
enforcement is more relevant than historically based legal origin for financial market 
development. 
The quality of institutions is a necessary element for financial market development.  One 
important institution in the legal system is the judiciary and its efficiency in dispute resolution. 
Table  2.17 and Table  2.18 address the impact of the judicial system efficiency on financial 
market development.  Prior literature predicts a positive association between judicial efficiency 
and financial market development (Djankov et al., 2007).  Three indicators are used to measure 
the judicial efficiency: time; cost; and, the number of procedures to resolve a commercial dispute.  
The three indicators of judicial efficiency are expected to be negatively associated with financial 
market development. 
The results for credit market show that the coefficients on time in Regressions 1-3 in Table  2.17 
are positive and statistically significant at 1% level when the credit market development is 
measured in levels and as a ratio to GDP, but is insignificant when measured against domestic 
credit to population.  This is inconsistent with Djankov at al. (2007, p. 313-314) and Djankov, 
Hart, et al. (2008, p. 1145) where the contract enforcement days is found negatively associated 
with domestic credit to GDP for the whole sample and for the sub-sample of rich countries but is 
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insignificant for the sub-sample of poor countries.  The estimated coefficients imply that a two 
standard deviation increase in time is associated with a USD9.3 billion increase in domestic 
credit to private sector and a 5.3 percentage point increase in domestic credit to GDP.  The result 
shows that the duration to resolve commercial disputes does not influence credit market 
development. 
The coefficients on the cost in Regressions 4 and 5 are negative and statistically significant at 
10% and 1% levels for the domestic credit in levels and domestic credit to population 
respectively.  The cost coefficient is statistically insignificant in Regression 6 for domestic credit 
to GDP.  The estimated coefficients imply that a two standard deviation increase in cost is 
associated with a USD4.9 billion decrease in domestic credit to private sector and a USD1,407 
decrease in domestic credit per capita.  This result conforms to the notion that lower costs in 
resolving commercial disputes have positive impact on credit market development.  Unlike equity 
holders, creditors facing a commercial dispute cannot cash out easily and hence the cost 
efficiency of the judiciary system is an important factor to promote credit financing. 
The coefficients on the number of procedures in Regressions 7-9 are negative and statistically 
significant from zero.  The estimated coefficients imply that a two standard deviation increase in 
the number of procedures is associated with a USD11.6 billion decrease in domestic credit to 
private sector, a USD227 decrease in domestic credit per capita and an 18.5 percentage point 
decrease in domestic credit to GDP.  This result conforms to the notion that countries where the 
judiciary requires less number of procedures to resolve a conflict operate more developed credit 
markets. 
When all three variables of the judicial efficiency are included (Regressions 10-12), time is 
positively associated with credit market development while both cost and procedures are 
negatively associated with credit market development. 
The judicial efficiency effect on stock market is reported in Table  2.18.  These results show that 
the coefficients on time are positive and statistically significant at 1% level for the market 
capitalisation in levels and as a ratio to GDP (Regressions 1 and 3) and statistically insignificant 
for the market capitalisation to population (Regression 2).  Similar to credit market results, the 
result for the stock market does not conform to the notion that shorter time to resolve commercial 
disputes has positive impact on stock market development.  The estimated coefficients imply that 
a two standard deviation increase in time is associated with a USD8.3 billion increase in market 
capitalisation and a 12.8 percentage point increase in market capitalisation to GDP. 
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The results of the coefficients on cost are inconsistent across the dependent variable measures.  
Cost is not associated with market capitalisation in levels (Regression 4), negatively associated 
with market capitalisation to population (Regression 5) and positively associated with market 
capitalisation to GDP (Regression 6).  The estimated coefficients imply that a two standard 
deviation increase in the cost is associated with a USD700 decrease in market capitalisation per 
capita and a 15.8 percentage point increase in market capitalisation to GDP. 
Procedures are negatively associated with stock market development (Regressions 7-9).  The 
estimated coefficients imply that a two standard deviation increase in the number of procedures is 
associated with a USD15.7 billion decrease in market capitalisation, a USD1,076 decrease in 
market capitalisation per capita and a 23.1 percentage point decrease in market capitalisation to 
GDP.  Consequently, countries where the judiciary advocates a streamlined resolution process 
operate more developed stock markets. 
When all three variables of the judicial efficiency are included (Regressions 10-12), time is 
positively associated with market capitalisation and market capitalisation to GDP.  Cost is 
negatively associated with market capitalisation in levels and as a ratio to population whereas it is 
not associated with market capitalisation to GDP while procedures are negatively associated with 
stock market development. 
Overall, the judicial efficiency results show that more developed financial markets are associated 
with lower cost of claim and lower number of procedures to resolve a commercial dispute, which 
are predicted by the theory.  However, time is positively associated with both credit and stock 
market development implying more developed financial markets are associated with legal 
procedures that take longer time to resolve commercial disputes.  Despite that this result is 
inconsistent with the prediction of the ‘Law and Finance’ theory, developed financial markets are 
more complex and characterised by large number of firms and investors that require more 
professional assistance and time to resolve disputes. 
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Table  2.16 OLS results for financial market development and law enforcement 
Dependent variable Reg Rule of law Legal origin Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP 
growth 
Constant N×T 
R
2 
Credit Market  
 
 
  
 
  
Domestic credit (1) 0.9304***  -0.0138*** 0.9397***  0.7784*** 121 
 
 (0.03)  (0.00) (0.01)  (0.14) 88.08% 
Domestic credit to population (2) 2.0295***  -0.0173 0.2682***  1.6008*** 121 
 
 (0.08)  (0.02) (0.01)  (0.18) 80.91% 
Domestic credit to GDP (3) 24.6307***  -0.5046* 
 
-0.2173 53.9399*** 121 
 
 (1.76)  (0.25) 
 
(0.20) (2.45) 52.51% 
Domestic credit (4) 0.9251*** 0.0432 -0.0138*** 0.9369***  0.8372*** 121 
 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.12) 88.09% 
Domestic credit to population (5) 1.9904*** 0.3147*** -0.0169 0.2477***  2.0288*** 121 
 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.20) 81.43% 
Domestic credit to GDP (6) 23.9804*** 4.4147** -0.5048* 
 
-0.2105 52.6766*** 121 
 
 (1.59) (1.83) (0.25)   (0.21) (2.85) 52.97% 
Stock Market  
 
 
  
 
  
Market capitalisation (7) 1.6353***  0.0297** 0.7246***  5.6276*** 108 
 
 (0.06)  (0.01) (0.04)  (1.05) 55.56% 
Market capitalisation to population (8) 2.7327***  0.0274*** 0.0259  7.1326*** 108 
 
 (0.12)  (0.01) (0.05)  (1.27) 63.59% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (9) 34.4536***  0.0552 
 
0.2039 50.8437*** 108 
 
 (4.65)  (0.23) 
 
(0.25) (4.51) 36.58% 
Market capitalisation (10) 1.6106*** 0.2292* 0.0300*** 0.7108***  5.9063*** 108 
 
 (0.06) (0.13) (0.01) (0.05)  (1.21) 55.81% 
Market capitalisation to population (11) 2.6776*** 0.5114*** 0.0281*** -0.0047  7.7543*** 108 
 
 (0.11) (0.16) (0.01) (0.06)  (1.49) 64.42% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (12) 34.7134*** -2.1267* 0.0550 
 
0.2008 51.4853*** 108 
 
 (4.51) (1.14) (0.23) 
 
(0.26) (4.25) 36.63% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  2.17 OLS results for credit market development and judicial efficiency 
Dependent variable Reg Time Cost of claim Procedures Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP 
growth 
Constant N×T 
R
2 
Domestic credit (1) 0.0009*** 
  
-0.0515
*** 1.0772*** 
 
-3.1552
*** 114 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.01) (0.02) 
 
(0.63) 73.8% 
Domestic credit to population (2) 0.0004 
  
-0.1025
*** 0.5627*** 
 
-5.8853
*** 114 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
(1.03) 29.6% 
Domestic credit to GDP (3) 0.0178*** 
  
-1.4185
*** 
 
-0.1704 44.6042*** 114 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.41) 
 
(0.17) (2.33) 16.0% 
Domestic credit (4) 
 
-0.0172
* 
 
-0.0510
*** 1.0588*** 
 
-1.7016
*** 114 
   
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) 
 
(0.34) 73.3% 
Domestic credit to population (5) 
 
-0.0887
*** 
 
-0.1001
*** 0.5532*** 
 
-3.3223
*** 114 
   
(0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 
 
(1.06) 35.9% 
Domestic credit to GDP (6) 
 
0.2049 
 
-1.4246
*** 
 
-0.1628 51.2120*** 114 
   
(0.35) 
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.17) (6.97) 15.3% 
Domestic credit (7) 
  
-0.0390
*** -0.0491*** 1.0451*** 
 
-0.0709 114 
    
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
(0.46) 75.4% 
Domestic credit to population (8) 
  
-0.0102
* -0.1019*** 0.5514*** 
 
-4.9139
*** 114 
    
(0.01) (0.03) (0.05) 
 
(1.37) 29.6% 
Domestic credit to GDP (9) 
  
-1.4998
*** -1.2948** 
 
-0.0560 119.8676*** 114 
    
(0.08) (0.48) 
 
(0.11) (5.69) 25.7% 
Domestic credit (10) 0.0014*** -0.0502*** -0.0583*** -0.0466** 1.0640*** 
 
0.5729 114 
  
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.40) 78.8% 
Domestic credit to population (11) 0.0012* -0.1184*** -0.0524*** -0.0961** 0.5579*** 
 
-1.2788 114 
  
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(1.16) 38.9% 
Domestic credit to GDP (12) 0.0273*** -0.7567** -1.8111*** -1.2459** 
 
-0.0409 133.2386*** 114 
  
(0.00) (0.34) (0.13) (0.56) 
 
(0.11) (12.18) 28.7% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  2.18 OLS results for stock market development and judicial efficiency 
Dependent variable Reg Time Cost of claim Procedures Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP 
growth 
Constant N×T 
R
2 
Market capitalisation (1) 0.0011*** 
  
-0.0350
*** 0.9124*** 
 
0.3863
*** 104 
 
 (0.00) 
  
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.13) 27.43% 
Market capitalisation to population (2) 0.0004 
  
-0.0816
*** 0.3217*** 
 
-0.2587 104 
 
 (0.00) 
  
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.35) 8.31% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (3) 0.0427*** 
  
-1.2466
*** 
 
0.0958 27.8196*** 104 
 
 (0.01) 
  
(0.23) 
 
(0.16) (2.77) 7.94% 
Market capitalisation (4) 
 
0.0152 
 
-0.0341
*** 0.8812*** 
 
1.5448
*** 104 
 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) 
 
(0.43) 26.96% 
Market capitalisation to population (5) 
 
-0.0477
** 
 
-0.0809
*** 0.3238*** 
 
1.0687 104 
 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.64) 9.32% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (6) 
 
1.5175
** 
 
-1.2517
*** 
 
0.0843 20.1668 104 
 
 
 
(0.67) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.17) (12.11) 9.41% 
Market capitalisation (7) 
  
-0.1050
*** -0.0223*** 0.8195*** 
 
7.9620
*** 104 
 
 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
(0.72) 34.87% 
Market capitalisation to population (8) 
  
-0.0716
*** -0.0732*** 0.2665*** 
 
4.4875
*** 104 
 
 
  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
(1.16) 10.92% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (9) 
  
-1.8761
*** -1.0065*** 
 
0.2051 134.7534*** 104 
 
 
  
(0.19) (0.28) 
 
(0.24) (11.02) 11.95% 
Market capitalisation (10) 0.0008** -0.0552*** -0.1284*** -0.0200** 0.8383*** 
 
9.2643
*** 104 
 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.77) 36.54% 
Market capitalisation to population (11) 0.0005 -0.1144*** -0.1241*** -0.0669** 0.2747*** 
 
8.8897
*** 104 
 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
(1.33) 15.53% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (12) 0.0335*** 0.5855 -1.4986*** -1.0771*** 
 
0.1692 83.9077** 104 
 
 (0.01) (0.78) (0.26) (0.23) 
 
(0.20) (29.66) 13.85% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  2.19 and Table  2.20 report the results of the relationship between the prevailing Islamic 
culture in the MENA on the credit and stock market development respectively. Four variables 
measure the Islamic culture in the MENA: IPI, IEI, IFI and the aggregate of these three indices 
III. 
The coefficients on IPI in Regressions 1-3 of Table  2.19 and Table  2.20 are negative and 
statistically significant at 1% level for all credit and stock market development.  The estimated 
coefficients for the credit market imply that a two standard deviation increase in the IPI is 
associated with a USD11.3 billion decrease in domestic credit to private sector, a USD1,986 
decrease in domestic credit per capita and a 9.6 percentage point decrease in domestic credit to 
GDP.  The economic significance is larger for the stock market.  The corresponding figures 
reveal a USD17.3 billion decrease in market capitalisation, a USD1,919 decrease in market 
capitalisation per capita and a 18.2 percentage point decrease in market capitalisation to GDP. 
The coefficient on IFI is negative and statistically significant at 5% level for domestic credit in 
ratios (Regressions 5 and 6 of Table  2.19).  It is insignificant for domestic credit in levels 
(Regression 4).  The estimated coefficients for the credit market imply that a two standard 
deviation increase in the IFI is associated with a USD746 decrease in domestic credit per capita 
and an 11.0 percentage point decrease in domestic credit to GDP.  However, the coefficient on 
IFI is positive and statistically significant at 1% level for the market capitalisation in levels and at 
10% level for the market capitalisation to population (Regressions 4 and 5 of Table  2.20).  It is 
negative and statistically significant for the stock market capitalisation to GDP (Regressions 6 of 
Table  2.20).  The estimated coefficients for the stock market imply that a two standard deviation 
increase in the IFI is associated with a USD12.4 billion increase in market capitalisation, a 
USD286 increase in market capitalisation per capita and a 12.4 percentage point decrease in 
market capitalisation to GDP. 
The coefficients on IEI (Regressions 7-9) of Table  2.19 and Table  2.20 are negative and 
statistically significant at 1% level for the credit and stock market development variables.  The 
estimated coefficients for the credit market imply that a two standard deviation increase in the IEI 
is associated with a USD13.3 billion decrease in domestic credit to private sector, a USD1,841 
decrease in domestic credit per capita and a 20.0 percentage point decrease in domestic credit to 
GDP.  Similarly, the estimated coefficients for the stock market imply that a two standard 
deviation increase in the IEI is associated with a USD7.7 billion decrease in market capitalisation, 
a USD1,440 decrease in market capitalisation per capita and a 16.1 percentage point decrease in 
market capitalisation to GDP. 
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The aggregate index III is negatively associated with credit and stock market development at 1% 
level of significance in all the regressions (Regressions 10-12).  The estimated coefficients for the 
credit market imply that a two standard deviation increase in the III is associated with a USD12.5 
billion decrease in domestic credit to private sector, a USD2,041 decrease in domestic credit per 
capita and a 19.0 percentage point decrease in domestic credit to GDP.  Similarly, the estimated 
coefficients for the stock market imply that a two standard deviation increase in the III is 
associated with a USD14.3 billion decrease in market capitalisation, a USD2,020 decrease in 
market capitalisation per capita and a 23.9 percentage point decrease in market capitalisation to 
GDP. 
When the legal origin is included (Regressions 13-15), the coefficient on III is negative and 
statistically significant at 1% level.  The coefficients on the legal origin are positive and 
significant except for the stock market capitalisation to GDP.  However, the magnitude of the 
coefficients on legal origin is lower than what has been reported in Table  2.13. 
The results add value to the literature and emphasise the significance of the influence of Islamic 
culture on financial markets (Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Licht et al., 2005; Branson, 2001).  
The prior literature finds Islam as a religion of the majority in a country has a detrimental effect 
in financial markets.  The findings here imply that countries with active Islamic political parties 
operate less developed financial markets.  The presence of Islamic financial institutions has 
negative impact on credit market development.  However, the evidence is mixed for stock market 
development.  The existence of Islamic educational institutions is negatively associated with 
financial market development.  Overall, countries with high level of Islamic culture tend to 
operate less developed financial markets.  The results reinforce the view that culture is a very 
powerful impediment to change.  Islam prohibits dealing with interest, which is the core business 
operation of commercial banks.  Further Islam discourages speculative behaviour which some 
Islamic scholar extend to include stock trading.  The prohibition affects individual investor's 
behaviour, which eventually influences financial market development.
56
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 The Islamic values are less relevant for international investors. 
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Table  2.19 OLS results for credit market development and Islamic culture 
Dependent variable Reg IPI IFI IEI III Legal origin Rate of inflation GDP GDP growth Constant N×T 
R
2 
Domestic credit (1) -0.2079*** 
  
  -0.0447*** 1.0512***  -1.6492*** 121 
 
 (0.03) 
  
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.36) 73.29% 
Domestic credit to population (2) -0.6724*** 
  
  -0.0776*** 0.5117***  -3.4076*** 121 
 
 (0.05) 
  
  (0.03) (0.02)  (0.68) 43.17% 
Domestic credit to GDP (3) -4.2111*** 
  
  -1.3306*** 
 
-0.2385 62.1286*** 121 
 
 (1.17) 
  
  (0.37) 
 
(0.19) (2.26) 18.39% 
Domestic credit (4) 
 
-0.0408 
 
  -0.0503*** 1.0529***  -1.8644*** 121 
 
 
 
(0.05) 
 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.46) 70.89% 
Domestic credit to population (5) 
 
-0.1296
** 
 
  -0.0956*** 0.5170***  -4.1072*** 121 
 
 
 
(0.05) 
 
  (0.03) (0.02)  (0.83) 26.23% 
Domestic credit to GDP (6) 
 
-4.1331
** 
 
  -1.3341*** 
 
-0.2299 66.9552*** 121 
 
 
 
(1.69) 
 
  (0.30) 
 
(0.16) (6.74) 18.70% 
Domestic credit (7) 
  
-0.3404
***   -0.0390*** 1.1418***  -3.8484*** 121 
 
 
  
(0.03)   (0.01) (0.02)  (0.43) 73.73% 
Domestic credit to population (8) 
  
-0.7565
***   -0.0718*** 0.7127***  -8.5709*** 121 
 
 
  
(0.07)   (0.02) (0.04)  (0.98) 35.32% 
Domestic credit to GDP (9) 
  
-11.6898
***   -0.9947*** 
 
-0.2399
* 68.3952*** 121 
 
 
  
(0.48)   (0.24) 
 
(0.13) (2.05) 27.33% 
Domestic credit (10) 
   
-0.1119
***  -0.0403*** 1.0861***  -2.2517*** 121 
 
 
   
(0.02)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.36) 73.40% 
Domestic credit to population (11) 
   
-0.3192
***  -0.0674*** 0.6111***  -5.2306*** 121 
 
 
   
(0.01)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.73) 39.87% 
Domestic credit to GDP (12) 
   
-4.0440
***  -1.0553*** 
 
-0.2745
* 76.6669*** 121 
 
 
   
(0.34)  (0.24) 
 
(0.16) (3.67) 25.64% 
Domestic credit (13) 
   
-0.1018
*** 0.1845** -0.0401*** 1.0682***  -1.9045*** 121 
 
 
   
(0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.24) 73.65% 
Domestic credit to population (14) 
   
-0.2911
*** 0.5166*** -0.0670*** 0.5609***  -4.2586*** 121 
 
 
   
(0.01) (0.11) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.53) 41.20% 
Domestic credit to GDP (15) 
   
-3.6280
*** 8.8382** -1.0466*** 
 
-0.2544 71.9117*** 121 
 
       (0.39) (3.18) (0.26)   (0.17) (4.91) 27.45% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  2.20 OLS results for stock market development and Islamic culture 
Dependent variable Reg IPI IFI IEI III Legal 
origin 
Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP growth Constant N×T 
R
2 
Market cap (1) -0.6130*** 
  
  -0.0120** 0.8562*** 
 
3.3837
*** 108 
 
 (0.03) 
  
  (0.00) (0.03) 
 
(0.77) 38.60% 
Market cap to population (2) -1.0894*** 
  
  -0.0403*** 0.2463*** 
 
3.4587
*** 108 
 
 (0.06) 
  
  (0.01) (0.03) 
 
(0.73) 34.73% 
Market cap to GDP (3) -7.9756*** 
  
  -0.9441***  0.1534 67.0859*** 108 
 
 (1.27) 
  
  (0.14)  (0.23) (6.52) 10.73% 
Market cap (4) 
 
0.1668
*** 
 
  -0.0368*** 0.8457*** 
 
2.3852
*** 108 
 
 
 
(0.03) 
 
  (0.01) (0.03) 
 
(0.76) 26.10% 
Market cap to population (5) 
 
0.0486
* 
 
  -0.0772*** 0.2373*** 
 
2.1055
** 108 
 
 
 
(0.03) 
 
  (0.02) (0.03) 
 
(0.82) 6.42% 
Market cap to GDP (6) 
 
-4.6704
*** 
 
  -1.0393***  0.2362 68.2136*** 108 
 
 
 
(0.67) 
 
  (0.15)  (0.26) (6.30) 7.01% 
Market cap (7) 
  
-0.2370
***   -0.0231** 0.9157*** 
 
1.3167
* 108 
 
 
  
(0.06)   (0.01) (0.02) 
 
(0.70) 26.23% 
Market cap to population (8) 
  
-0.6747
***   -0.0504*** 0.4200*** 
 
-1.6612
*** 108 
 
 
  
(0.11)   (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.35) 11.11% 
Market cap to GDP (9) 
  
-9.4246
***   -0.7873***  0.1873 65.8081*** 108 
 
 
  
(2.47)   (0.10)  (0.25) (7.86) 9.28% 
Market cap (10) 
   
-0.1921
***  -0.0129 0.9125*** 
 
2.1233
** 108 
 
 
   
(0.02)  (0.01) (0.03) 
 
(0.79) 29.37% 
Market cap to population (11) 
   
-0.4369
***  -0.0324** 0.3762*** 
 
0.9478 108 
 
 
   
(0.03)  (0.01) (0.02) 
 
(0.68) 20.43% 
Market cap to GDP (12) 
   
-5.0911
***  -0.6613***  0.1705 81.9603*** 108 
 
 
   
(0.88)  (0.10)  (0.25) (9.64) 12.25% 
Market cap (13) 
   
-0.1657
*** 0.3665*** -0.0135 0.8791*** 
 
2.7153
** 108 
 
 
   
(0.02) (0.09) (0.01) (0.04) 
 
(0.95) 29.95% 
Market cap to population (14) 
   
-0.3978
*** 0.5419*** -0.0333** 0.3269*** 
 
1.8231
** 108 
 
 
   
(0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
(0.84) 21.28% 
Market cap to GDP (15) 
   
-5.0659
*** 0.3944 -0.6621***  0.1713 81.7044*** 108 
 
 
   
(0.86) (0.95) (0.10)  (0.25) (9.43) 12.25% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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The impact of the legal duality on financial market development is presented in Table  2.21.  
Sharia Index is used as a proxy for the duality of laws in MENA’s legal system.  The impact of 
the Sharia index on credit market development in Regressions 1-3 report negative and statistically 
significant coefficients.  The estimated coefficients for the credit market imply that a two 
standard deviation increase in the Sharia index is associated with a USD10.7 billion decrease in 
domestic credit to private sector, a USD1,155 decrease in the domestic credit per capita and a 
22.6 percentage point decrease in domestic credit to GDP.  When the legal origin is included 
(Regressions 4, 5 and 6) the coefficients on the legal origin are positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level, the size of the coefficients however are less than what has been reported 
in Table  2.13.  The impact of Sharia index is larger, negative and statistically significant at 1% 
level. 
The duality of the legal system has unclear impact on stock market development (Regressions 7-
9).  The coefficients on Sharia index are positive and statistically significant at 1% level when the 
stock market development is measured in levels or as a ratio to population.  However, the 
coefficient on Sharia index is negative and statistically significant at 1% for the market 
capitalisation to GDP.  The estimated coefficients for the stock market imply that a two standard 
deviation increase in Sharia index is associated with a USD8.9 billion increase in market 
capitalisation, a USD749 increase in the market capitalisation per capita and a 5.7 percentage 
point decrease in market capitalisation to GDP.  When the legal origin is included (Regressions 
10-12), the coefficients on the legal origin are positive and statistically significant at 1% level and 
the size of the coefficients are less than what has been reported in Table  2.13.  The impact of 
Sharia index is positive and statistically significant for the market capitalisation in level at 1% 
levels, insignificant for the market capitalisation to population and, negative and statistically 
significant at 1% levels for the market capitalisation to GDP.  These results imply that the duality 
of the legal system creates confusion for suppliers of credit capital and this deters credit market 
development.  The evidence is mixed for stock market development.  Further, the legal origin 
continues to be a determinant of financial market development. 
Table  2.22 and Table  2.23 reports the overall results where investor protection variables, legal 
origin, Islamic culture and Sharia index are collectively considered.  Findings from these tables 
show that legal origin is a predictor of credit and stock market development.  Further, Islamic 
culture and the duality of the legal systems in the MENA deter financial market development.  
The depth of credit information is the most important creditor protection factor for credit market 
development.  Three shareholder protection indices: disclosure; director liability; and, anti-
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director rights indices, positively affect stock market development whereas the ease of 
shareholder suit has negative effect on stock market development. 
The errors of all models are tested for stationarity using Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) unit root 
test for panel data.  The results indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected at 
1% level of significant indicating that there is a long-term relationship between the variables (co-
integrated) and the regression results are not spurious (Hill, Griffiths, and Lim, 2008, p. 334) 
(Enders, 2004, pp. 225-228).
57
 
The statistical significance of the impact of the legal environment has direct economic effects.  In 
a compact view, Table  2.24 summarises the economic significance that has been presented for the 
regressions earlier.  Economic significance is calculated based on a two standard deviations 
increase in the independent variables. 
Common law legal origin has a positive economic effect on both the credit and stock markets.  
However, particular legal rules protecting investors have profound higher economic impact on 
financial markets.  In the case of credit market, the depth of credit information index is by far the 
most economically significant variable that positively affects MENA credit market development.  
This variable is followed by the strength of legal rights, private credit bureau coverage, and 
public credit registry where all variables have a direct impact on credit market development.  
Anti-director rights followed by the extent of disclosure index have positive economic 
significance on stock market development.  Law enforcement is by far the most influential factor 
contributing to financial market development in MENA.  The evidence on judicial efficiency 
shows that cost and procedures have negative economic consequences on financial market 
development.  Further, Islamic culture has negative economic consequences on financial market 
development whereas legal duality has a negative economic consequence on credit market 
development but a positive economic consequence on the stock market development. 
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 Baltagi (2008, p. 1) and Greene (2012, p. 1010) argue that non-stationarity is not an issue for short panels. 
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Table  2.21 OLS results for financial market development and legal duality 
Dependent variable Reg Sharia index Legal origin Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP 
growth 
Constant N×T 
R
2 
Credit Market  
 
 
  
 
  
Domestic credit (1) -0.1876***  -0.0426*** 1.0629***  -1.9320*** 121 
 
 (0.04)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.32) 72.79% 
Domestic credit to population (3) -0.2612***  -0.0871*** 0.5275***  -4.3032*** 121 
 
 (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02)  (0.66) 28.11% 
Domestic credit to GDP (5) -9.6017***  -0.9802*** 
 
-0.1822
* 70.5846*** 121 
 
 (1.20)  (0.19) 
 
(0.10) (3.33) 30.94% 
Domestic credit (2) -0.2182*** 0.4376*** -0.0383*** 1.0298***  -1.1806*** 121 
 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.23) 74.28% 
Domestic credit to population (4) -0.3379*** 1.0978*** -0.0765** 0.4445***  -2.4183*** 121 
 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.45) 34.41% 
Domestic credit to GDP (6) -11.0216*** 18.8495*** -0.8030*** 
 
-0.1514 67.0692*** 121 
 
 (1.13) (2.24) (0.19)   (0.11) (3.57) 39.37% 
Stock Market  
 
 
  
 
  
Market capitalisation (7) 0.1379***  -0.0381*** 0.8363***  2.8593*** 108 
 
 (0.02)  (0.01) (0.03)  (0.82) 26.00% 
Market capitalisation to population (9) 0.1288***  -0.0815*** 0.2243***  2.3662*** 108 
 
 (0.04)  (0.02) (0.03)  (0.78) 6.75% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (11) -2.4285***  -1.0636*** 
 
0.2399 59.3135*** 108 
 
 (0.40)  (0.14) 
 
(0.26) (5.21) 6.16% 
Market capitalisation (8) 0.0927*** 0.5854*** -0.0329*** 0.8015***  3.6226*** 108 
 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.01) (0.04)  (0.96) 27.59% 
Market capitalisation to population (10) 0.0389 1.1645*** -0.0711** 0.1551***  3.8846*** 108 
 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.02) (0.04)  (1.02) 11.02% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (12) -3.2424*** 9.5046*** -0.9813*** 
 
0.2582 57.4615*** 108 
 
 (0.54) (1.83) (0.15) 
 
(0.26) (4.89) 7.13% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  2.22 OLS results for influences on credit market development 
Dependent 
variable 
Legal 
origin 
Strength of 
legal rights 
Depth of 
credit 
information 
Public 
registry 
coverage 
Private 
bureau 
coverage 
III Sharia index Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP 
growth 
Constant N×T 
R
2 
Domestic credit 
0.2757
***
 0.0533 0.2554
***
 0.0108
***
 -0.0086 -0.0860
***
 -0.1715
***
 -0.0233
***
 0.8901
***
  1.8450
***
 114 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)  (0.53) 86.21% 
Domestic credit 
to population 
0.6082
***
 0.0681 0.3683
***
 0.0131 -0.0098 -0.2421
***
 -0.1730
***
 -0.0507
**
 0.3117
***
  0.6663 114 
(0.06) (0.15) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)  (0.96) 57.48% 
Domestic credit 
to GDP 
11.9165
***
 0.9691 5.8883
***
 0.1410 -0.2252
***
 -3.0987
***
 -9.9444
***
 -0.3321
***
 
 
-0.0159 62.9222
***
 114 
(2.75) (1.64) (0.28) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12) (1.41) (0.08)   (0.07) (6.45) 59.64% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
 
Table  2.23 OLS results for influences on stock market development 
Dependent 
variable 
Legal 
origin 
Extent of 
disclosure 
index 
Extent of 
director 
liability 
Ease of 
shareholder 
suits 
Anti-
director 
rights 
III Sharia index Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP 
growth 
Constant N×T 
R
2 
Market 
capitalisation 
0.8285
***
 0.0948
***
 -0.0114 -0.3375
***
 0.5145
***
 -0.2065
***
 -0.2244
***
 -0.0028 0.7008
***
  6.8728
***
 104 
(0.21) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)   (1.27) 45.65% 
Market 
capitalisation to 
population 
1.1063
***
 0.1901
***
 0.2749
***
 -0.6198
***
 1.0175
***
 -0.3532
***
 -0.6097
***
 -0.0085 -0.1540
***
  11.2283
***
 104 
(0.22) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)   (1.01) 53.98% 
Market 
capitalisation to 
GDP 
8.8950
***
 1.0815
***
 5.1584
***
 -14.0516
***
 -3.5390 -7.7242
***
 -12.8616
***
 -0.1320 
 
0.0381 139.0969
***
 104 
(1.76) (0.24) (0.53) (2.13) (3.37) (1.52) (0.92) (0.19)   (0.16) (30.70) 37.69% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  2.24 Economic significance for influences on financial market development 
  Credit market development Stock market development 
 
Variables Domestic 
credit to 
private sector 
(billion USD) 
Domestic 
credit to 
population 
(USD per capita) 
Domestic 
credit to 
GDP 
(%) 
Market 
capitalisation 
(billion USD) 
Market 
capitalisation to 
population 
(USD per capita) 
Market 
capitalisation 
to GDP 
(%) 
Legal origin Legal origin 10.8 3,100 13.2 17.3 3,473 7.6 
Creditor protection 
rights 
Strength of legal rights index 21.1 5,242 19.3    
Depth of credit information 
index 
62.0 10,692 26.8    
Private credit bureau coverage 21.1 5,075 21.4    
Public credit registry coverage 10.2 758 3.5    
Shareholder 
protection rights 
Extent of disclosure index    25.9 5,470 6.1 
Extent of director liability index    1.3 2,259 9.3 
Ease of shareholder suits index    10.4 956 18.1 
Anti-director rights index    67.6 26,281 7.15 
Law enforcement Rule of law 86.7 45,846 36.3 202.5 91,269 50.8 
Judicial system 
efficiency 
Time (days) 9.3 - 5.3 8.3 - 12.8 
Cost (% of claim) 4.9 1,407 - - 700 15.8 
Procedures (number) 11.6 227 18.5 15.7 1,076 23.1 
Islamic culture 
Islamic political institutions 11.3 1,986 9.6 17.3 1,919 18.2 
Islamic financial institutions - 746 11.0 12.4 286 12.4 
Islamic educational institutions 13.3 1,841 20.0 7.7 1,440 16.1 
Islamic Institutionalisation Index 12.5 2,041 19.0 14.3 2,020 23.9 
Hybrid legal system Sharia Index 10.7 1,155 22.6 8.9 749 5.7 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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2.5.3. Robustness analysis 
As a small MENA sample is unlikely to produce normally distributed errors, inferences based on 
OLS estimator may be inaccurate.  Consequently, bootstrapping is used as an alternative to 
asymptotic approximations for obtaining confidence intervals (see Section 2.4.5).  The bootstrap 
is performed on the same models and results from these tests are presented in Appendix 5.  This 
section summarises the bootstrap findings. 
Legal origin is positively associated with credit market development.  The coefficients on the 
legal origin are weakly statistically significant at 10% when the credit market development is 
measured as a ratio but insignificant when the credit market development is measured in level.  
Contrary to the OLS results, the coefficients on the legal origin are statistically insignificant for 
the stock market development. 
Consistent with OLS, the strength of legal rights, the depth of credit information and private 
credit bureau are positively associated with credit market development.  Public registry coverage 
is positive and statistically significant at 10% when the credit market is measured in level; 
otherwise, it is statistically insignificant from zero. 
The bootstrap results for stock market development and shareholder protection rights are partially 
consistent with OLS.  The coefficients on the extent of disclosure index are positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level except for market capitalisation to GDP.  Unlike OLS results, 
the extent of director liability index and the ease of shareholder suit index are not associated with 
stock market development.  Anti-director rights index is positively associated with market 
capitalisation to population. 
Similar to OLS, the rule of law continues to be positively associated with financial market 
development where the coefficients on the rule of law are positive and statistically significant at 
1% level for the credit and stock market development. 
The impact of judicial efficiency on credit market development shows that time to resolve a 
commercial dispute is marginally associated with the credit market development in levels.  Cost 
is negatively associated and statistically significant at 5% level for the domestic credit to 
population, otherwise it is statistically insignificant.  The coefficients on the procedures are 
negative and statistically significant at 1% and 5% for the domestic credit in levels and domestic 
credit to GDP respectively.  The judicial efficiency on stock market development shows that the 
coefficients on time are marginally positive for the market capitalisation to GDP.  Cost is not 
associated with stock market development whereas procedures are negatively associated with 
stock market capitalisation in level and stock market capitalisation to GDP. 
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The bootstrap results for the relationship between credit market development and the prevalent 
Islamic culture in the MENA suggests that IPI is negatively associated with credit market in 
levels and as a ratio to population.  It is however, not associated with credit market development 
to GDP.  IFI is not associated with credit market development whereas IEI is negatively 
associated with the three measures of credit market development.  The coefficients on the 
aggregate index III are negative and statistically significant from zero regardless of legal origin 
inclusion.  Similar to the credit market, IPI is negatively associated with stock market 
development and IFI is not associated with stock market development.  IEI is negatively 
associated with the stock market capitalisation as ratios to population and GDP.  The coefficients 
on the aggregate index III are negative and statistically significant with and without legal origin 
inclusion. 
The duality of the legal system deters credit market development where all the coefficients of the 
Sharia index are negative and statistically significant from zero.  However, the duality of the legal 
system does not affect the stock market development.  The results are the same regardless of the 
inclusions of legal origin. 
Overall, when all the creditor protection variables, legal origin, Islamic culture and the duality of 
the legal system are included in the regressions, three variables show association with credit 
market development.  Depth of credit information is positively associated with credit market 
development.  However both III and the Sharia index are negatively associated with the credit 
market development.  Corresponding results for the stock market suggest that Islamic culture is 
negatively associated with stock market capitalisation to GDP.  The hybrid legal system is 
negatively associated with market capitalisation to population and as a ratio to GDP.  The ease of 
shareholder suit is negatively associated with the stock market development. 
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2.6. Conclusion 
2.6.1. Summary and implications 
The essay tests the impact of the legal environment and the role of culture on the financial market 
development in the MENA.  The motivation stems from the peculiarity of the MENA's legal 
systems and its unique cultural identity.  While the ‘Law and Finance’ literature considers the 
legal origin as a significant determinant of financial market development, the theory ignores how 
the transplanted legal rules interacted with the local traditions.  The legal systems in the MENA 
are hybrid in the sense that while the laws are Western in substance, Sharia plays a constitutional 
role where it may apply whenever there is a vacuum in the legal rules.  Moreover, while all 
MENA countries share common Islamic culture, the intensity of Islamic culture differs greatly 
between the countries.  The impact of the prevalent Islamic culture on financial market 
development is examined via Islamic indices reflecting the extent of political, financial and 
educational Islamic institutions within the MENA countries. 
This essay contributes to our understanding of the importance of the legal environment (investor 
protection, law enforcement, and judicial efficiency) and cultural values to the development of 
financial markets.  The essay develops the shareholder protection index for each MENA country 
following La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008) where the relevant legal 
provisions are extracted from the company law, securities laws; and, corporate governance codes.  
Moreover, the literature commonly measures Islamic culture using a religion dummy variable 
that does not reflect the variations among the MENA countries.  A multi-dimensional variable 
measuring Islamic culture is used that is better able to measure the extent of Islamisation and 
hence identifies which part of the Islamic culture is detrimental to financial market development.  
Finally, the dual legal system is measured through the construction of Sharia index that measures 
the constitutional role of Sharia in MENA's legal systems.  The role of Sharia is measured by 
reviewing and coding the constitution of each MENA country. 
Both credit and stock market development are analysed using domestic credit to private sector 
and market capitalisation respectively.  The legal environment considers the legal origin, investor 
protection rights, law enforcement and judicial efficiency in each MENA country.  The legal 
origin of the country is determined by the comparative law literature.  The investor protection 
indices, the creditor and shareholder protection rights, are adopted form the World Bank, Doing 
Business Report in addition to hand-collected data for the construction of the anti-director rights 
index.  The creditor protection is measured via two variables the strength of legal rights 
protecting creditors and borrowers and the depth of credit information.  Shareholder protection is 
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measured via four indices; the extent of disclosure index, the extent of director liability index, 
ease of shareholder suit and anti-director rights index.  The law enforcement is measured by the 
rule of law variable measuring the extent to which agents are perceived to abide by the rules and 
regulations of the country.  The judicial efficiency is measured in terms of the time, the cost and 
the number of procedures required to resolve a commercial dispute.  The Islamic culture is 
measured in terms of Islamic institutionalisation index adopted from Achilov (2010) that 
measures Islamic culture in terms of Islamic political institutions, Islamic financial institutions 
and Islamic educational institutions.  The legal duality is measured by the Sharia index that is 
constructed from the constitutional provisions. 
The sample includes 21 MENA countries for the period 2007-2012.  The essay uses OLS 
estimation with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors that accommodate the complex error structure of 
the panel data.  Further, due to the small sample size, bootstrap analysis is conducted as a 
robustness check.  The results of these two estimation procedures yield the same results on some 
relationships and different results on others.  The statistical significance translates into economic 
significance.  Several conclusions and implications emerge for the improvement of the legal 
environment that matters for investor protection.  The common robust findings are the basis of 
the conclusions and implications below. 
The robust results imply that the legal origin affects the development of credit market.  However, 
it has no impact on stock markets in MENA.  This finding is consistent with Roe (2006) and 
Siems (2007) argument that legal origin does not affect financial market devleopment becuase the 
legal rules are converging to the point where the legal origin does not make a difference.  Further, 
it shows that binary classification of legal origin fails to capture important features of the legal 
structure.  The quality of certain legal rules and the law enforcement are more important 
determinant of financial market development than the legal origin.  These findings reinforce La 
Porta et al. (1998), Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008) and Djankov et al. (2007) on the important 
role the legal rules and institutions play in the development of financial markets.  However, the 
findings also indicate that the quality of the legal environment that provides protection for 
suppliers is either advantageous or disadvantageous for financial market development. 
The results show that the availability of more credit information is critical for credit market 
development.  In practical implementation, the regulations need to enhance the rules and 
practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available through 
either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau.  Further, collateral and bankruptcy laws 
protect the rights of borrowers and lenders thus facilitate lending. 
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The results suggest that disclosure of self-dealing transactions benefits stock market 
development.  This has implications for MENA countries since significant number of firms are 
operating as business groups with individual firms controlled by the same family and trading 
separately on the stock exchange.  This structure encourages self-dealing where intra-group 
transactions are potentially conflicted.  To enhance shareholder protection, the law should oblige 
such intra-group transactions to be disclosed and approved by shareholders.  The results suggest 
that giving aggrieved shareholders the standing to sue for self-dealing transactions along with 
government’s power to impose fines and prison terms for self-dealing transactions does not affect 
stock market development.  However, providing access to information to examine self-dealing, 
and a low burden of proof deter stock market development.  This finding indicates that a balanced 
protection for both sides of financial markets (investors and firms) is required to promote 
financial market development.  Remedial shareholder protection mechanisms (litigation) for self-
dealing are not as effective as pre-emptive shareholder protection mechanisms (disclosure). 
Overall, investor protection effect is stronger for credit markets than for stock markets.  This 
reinforces the view that credit markets are more important source of financing for MENA firms.  
Hence, stronger legal protection of creditors is critical aspects of the legal environment since any 
substantial growth in external finance is likely to be via bank loans rather than equity capital. 
The evidence implies that law enforcement is a strong determinant of financial development.  
However, the judicial efficiency in resolving commercial disputes marginally benefits financial 
markets implying that institutional ‘red tape’ does not necessarily impair financial market 
development.  Time to resolve commercial disputes is not associated with financial market 
development.  However, lower cost and fewer number of procedures to resolve a commercial 
dispute is associated with more developed financial markets.  The results however are sensitive to 
the selection of the dependent variable.  This finding also reinforces the previous result that 
investors put more weight on the pre-emptive measures of investor protection rather than 
remedial measures of protection.  For example, to avoid self-dealing, it appears best to rely on 
extensive disclosure rather than increasing the judicial efficiency by reducing the time to resolve 
the self-dealing incident. 
The hybrid legal systems in the MENA deter financial market development.  The role of Sharia in 
the constitution and the ambiguity in Sharia application create investment uncertainty.  
Governments, legislative bodies, and the courts need to make explicit declaration as to when 
Sharia applies, when it may apply, and when it does not apply.  This knowledge provides 
confidence in the MENA financial markets.  Islamic culture has negative impact on financial 
market development.  This association has implications for firms, which are the demand side of 
  
114 
the financial market, and regulators.  The firms can play an important role to enhance the depth 
and breadth of financial markets by introducing innovative investment opportunities for investors.  
Given that culture is persistent and cultural changes occur gradually over a long period of time, 
firms may introduce innovative Islamic products and Islamic financial services that are 
compatible with prevailing cultural values.  The Islamic financial products are likely to be an 
appealing platform for a wider class of investors.  The regulatory role lies in the establishment of 
rules and regulations that facilitate the issuance and dealings of Islamic financial products.  In 
conclusion, the propositions of the ‘Law and Finance’ theory are incomplete without reflecting 
the distinctive characteristics of region’s Islamic cultural identity and the legal duality.  The 
cultural aspect of the region provides a finer and more detailed insight into the elements of the 
legal structure that would not be captured by the legal rules alone. 
2.6.2. Limitations 
Limitations of this research are associated with sample size, investor protection and financial 
market development data.  Additionally, endogeneity between financial market development and 
investor protection that has plagued previous research is also a concern for this essay. 
First, the small sample size of MENA presents challenges due to OLS assumptions; in particular 
the normality of error term.  Further, small sample size makes it more difficult to detect 
differences.  This limitation is not easily resolved.  The only way to increase the sample is by 
increasing the time dimension T since N is fixed (N=21 MENA countries).  However, the World 
Bank data for investor protection in the MENA is not available before 2006.  Hence it is 
impossible to increase the sample size at this point in time.  The bootstrap re-sampling technique 
attempts to address the small sample size concern.  While not perfect for small samples it 
increases the confidence of the results estimated using the real data. 
Second, investor protection indices are derived from the World Bank.  The data is collected 
through a questionnaire distributed to local lawyers, business consultants, accountants, 
government officials and other professionals advising on legal and regulatory requirements.  
Several methodical limitations exist.  First, the transactions described in a standardised case 
scenario refer to a specific set of issues and may not represent the full set of issues a business 
encounters.  Second, while the use of standardised case scenarios and assumptions ensure the 
comparability of the data, it comes at the expense of generality.  Third, collected data refer to 
businesses in the economy’s largest business city and may not be representative of regulation in 
other parts of the economy.  For example, the cost to resolve a commercial dispute represents the 
cost in the largest city which may be different in any other city in that same country.  Fourth, the 
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data focus on a limited liability company of a specified size which may not be representative of 
the regulation on other businesses.  Despite the fact that the limited liability company is the most 
prevalent business form in many economies, it ignores all other types of business operations.  
Fifth, the measures of some variables involve an element of judgment by the expert respondents 
(World Bank, 2014a). 
Further, the stock market development and domestic credit to private sector indicators may not 
fully reflect the financial development.  MENA are bank-based economies and most of the largest 
firms in MENA are unlisted.  The corporate sector in the MENA is dominated by family firms 
held as private firms and/or state-owned firms which mostly remain unlisted on the stock 
exchange.  For example, the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco), the world's most valuable 
firm, is not listed on the Saudi stock exchange.  According to OECD (2006) report the largest 20 
firms in Bahrain, Lebanon, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not 
exchange listed (OECD, 2006, p. 3).  The corporate sector in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman is 
dominated by state owned firms and family held private businesses. 
Finally, endogeneity between financial market development and investor protection is not 
completely resolved.  There is no identified valid instrument that can be used to solve the issue.  
Legal origin is an invalid instrument as it affects both financial market development and investor 
protection.  In this essay, a modest approach has been adopted to address endogeneity where 
lagged independent variables are used in multiple regression equations. 
2.6.3. Further research 
Several avenues for future research follow from the present study.  It may be insightful to analyse 
the impact of each element of investor protection by using the scores collected from the sub-
indices rather than the aggregate indices to isolate the specific elements that matter for financial 
market development.  However, the scores of the sub-indices are only presently available for 
2013. 
Another extension to this research is to link the impact of investor protection on the firm's cost of 
capital.  In countries where shareholder and creditor protection levels are high, the cost of equity 
and cost of debt is expected to be lower than countries with lower levels of investor protection. 
This research focus only on the supply side of the financial market, so a natural extension would 
be to consider the demand side of the market by analysing how firms make capital structure 
decisions given the level of shareholder and creditor protections. 
  
  
116 
CHAPTER 3  
Determinants of US mutual fund investment in MENA  
3.1. Introduction 
Portfolio theory suggests that spreading investment risk among different countries and firms 
maximises portfolio returns and minimises volatility.  Ideally, if mutual fund managers are mean-
variance optimisers in a perfect financial market, their portfolios should mimic the efficient 
market portfolio.  In reality, portfolio theory predictions are not strictly followed as mutual fund 
investment screening processes typically involve investment criteria beyond mean-variance 
optimisation (Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki, 2005; Celiker, Chowdhury, and Sonaer, 2015; 
Chan and Covrig, 2012; Chan, Covrig, and Ng, 2005; Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler, 2001). 
International investment portfolios, particularly those of US institutions, are increasingly 
weighted in emerging stock markets to enhance performance and diversification (Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008, p. 510).  Emerging markets are perceived as a different asset class with generally 
higher returns compared to developed markets, and, emerging market indices were also the best 
performers during the GFC (Berrill and Kearney, 2013, pp. 331, 337).  Further, US mutual funds 
that invest in emerging markets outperform those investing in either domestic or international 
stock markets (Bertin and Prather, 2011). 
Increased access to stock markets across the MENA has expanded opportunities for investors to 
diversify their investments as several MENA markets are partially segmented from the world’s 
financial markets (Méon and Sekkat, 2004).  Recent growth of market capitalisation in MENA 
stock markets has been more volatile than in developed stock markets, suggesting that both return 
and risk in MENA markets are substantial.  Furthermore, the insulation of the MENA markets 
from the GFC increased the importance of the region as a potential investment option, especially 
when portfolio diversification is a priority.  Despite high returns, the foreign investment into the 
MENA remains low at a global level (Onyeiwu, 2003; Mohamed and Sidiropoulos, 2010).  This 
may be the result of regional instability due to wars and political turmoil, which substantially 
increases investors’ risk perceptions.  Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2007) and Mansourfar, 
Mohamad, and Hassan (2010) report outstanding diversification benefits in the MENA region, 
particularly for the oil producing countries and expect MENA stock markets to attract greater 
portfolio fund investment in the future.  While statistics on foreign portfolio investment remain 
unpublished by many MENA stock markets, the general consensus is that MENA markets are 
under-estimated and under-investigated by foreign investors (Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey, 2007, 
p. 402) due to risk perceptions and institutional under-development (Girard et al., 2003, p. 286). 
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Publicly traded firms in MENA are characterised by high ownership concentration and 
prevalence of family businesses, business groups and government ownership (OECD, 2005, p. 7; 
OECD, 2012, p. 3).  These characteristics have substantial consequences for corporate 
governance practices.
58
  Ownership concentration of listed firms has a negative impact on 
disclosure where controlling shareholders face incentives to avoid pursuing corporate governance 
mechanisms that ultimately erode their control.  The prevalence of family business and groups in 
publicly traded firms in MENA also has implications on board structure.  Controlling 
shareholders through single family stakes and complex holding company structures may directly 
influence corporate decisions (OECD, 2005, p. 8).  Business transactions, financing arrangements 
and corporate governance are conducted among a group of economically and politically powerful 
controlling shareholders of individuals, families, government or financial institutions (Masulis, 
Pham, and Zein, 2011).  Consequently, many of the basic corporate control mechanisms relied 
upon in Western stock markets are dormant throughout the MENA region.  Understanding the 
complexity and the sophistication of these relationships and ownership structure requires local 
knowledge of social and political ties.  Consequently, information asymmetries are prevalent and 
the information costs that help outside investors assess investment risk in MENA is particularly 
high for foreign investors. 
Under such risky circumstances, minority shareholder protection is necessary for the creation of 
an investment environment that attracts foreign investment.  Poor shareholder protection places 
foreign investors at a relative disadvantage compared to local investors.  Research documents that 
the extent of information asymmetry is a critical factor for foreign investment, particularly in 
emerging markets (Brennan and Cao, 1997; and Bekaert, 1995).  In this context, minority 
shareholder protection mechanisms that facilitate external foreign financing by reducing the 
information asymmetry are essential to counterbalance the lack of information (La Porta et al., 
1998) and to promote foreign investment.  Minority shareholder protection is particularly 
influential on investors most affected by information costs, namely, foreign investors (Giofré, 
2014). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) identify two common corporate governance mechanisms that convey 
power to investors.  The first approach bestows investor power through the legal protection from 
expropriation by managers and controlling shareholders.  Protection of minority shareholder 
rights and legal prohibitions against managerial self-dealing are solid examples of such 
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 High ownership concentration and government ownership of listed firms, either directly or through sovereign 
investment funds, translates into a low ‘free float’ in MENA stock markets.  Unlike most developed markets where 
free float accounts for half of the market capitalisation, free float in most MENA markets is less than 50% of their 
market capitalisation.  Free float is lowest in Morocco at 20% and highest in Kuwait at 80% of market capitalisation 
(World Bank, 2011, p. 228). 
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mechanisms.  The second approach, concentrated ownership aligns cash flow with control rights 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 739).  While large investors still rely on the legal system, the size 
of their investment and direct input into decision making means that they do not need as many 
rights as the small investors to protect their interest.  Contextually, a case can be made that US 
mutual funds could be considered ‘minority shareholders’ in MENA markets, and require the 
legal system to protect their investments from expropriation. 
The ‘Law and Finance’ theory emphasises the role of the legal environment on the development 
of financial markets.  La Porta et al. (1997) argue that the legal rules protecting minority 
shareholders from expropriation by insiders increase the willingness of outside investors to 
provide capital to firms.  This theory is important to our understanding of US mutual fund 
investment in the MENA as it links the financing patterns for firms in a particular country with 
the country’s legal environment and financial development.  Consequently, investor protection 
and stock market development have implications for global investment.  The prediction of the 
‘Law and Finance’ theory is that the legal environment influences the equity investment, and 
thus, weak investor protection reduces the incentives to participate in the domestic stock market 
for both domestic and foreign investors.  This essay examines whether financial development and 
the legal environment are both tenets for investment selection by US mutual funds. 
3.1.1. Contributions and objectives 
This essay contributes to the literature on the determinants of foreign investment allocations in 
emerging markets in four ways. 
First, this research complements studies by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and La Porta et al. (2006) 
which focus on the legal underpinnings of finance.  For years, the ‘Law and Finance’ theory has 
remarked on the role of the legal rules for financial market development and attracting investment 
(Levine, 1998).  Several studies consider investor protection and financial market development as 
potential factors of capital flows and global investment decisions. However, this research 
explicitly models the joint impact of financial market development and legal environment in 
attracting foreign investment.  Further, given that MENA stock markets are considered as 
‘emerging’ or ‘frontier’ markets, country-level investor protection is critical for the investment 
decision.  This is because firms in countries with low financial development do not adopt good 
governance practices and the rights of minority shareholders are mostly determined at the country 
level (Doidge, Andrew Karolyi, and Stulz, 2007). 
Second, US mutual funds are among the largest groups of international equity investors in the 
world (see Table  3.1).  The worldwide importance of this investor class is substantial as US 
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mutual funds own half of the total world net assets (Investment Company Institute, 2014) and 
they also account for 30% of total foreign equity investment worldwide (US Department of the 
Treasury, 2012; International Monetary Fund, 2013).  Given the predominance of US mutual 
funds as a source of capital, emerging market countries have strong incentives to attract this 
investment pool to improve market liquidity and lower the cost of capital to MENA firms.  
Consequently, it is important to understand why US mutual funds invest unevenly in MENA 
countries and firms as well as identify the factors that enter into the investment screening process 
of mutual funds managers. 
Table  3.1 Morningstar® Principia® coverage 
Year Worldwide total 
net assets of 
mutual funds 
(billion USD) 
US total net assets 
of mutual funds 
(billion USD) 
US to worldwide 
total net assets of 
mutual funds 
Morningstar
® 
Principia
®
 total net 
assets of mutual 
funds 
(billion USD) 
Morningstar
®
 
coverage ratio 
2008 18,919 9,603 51% 3,912 41% 
2009 22,945 11,113 48% 5,193 47% 
2010 24,710 11,831 48% 5,826 49% 
2011 23,796 11,626 49% 5,682 49% 
2012 26,836 13,044 49% 6,457 50% 
Source: Worldwide total net assets of mutual funds and total net assets for the mutual funds are 
from 2014 Investment Company Fact Book available at http://www.icifactbook.org.  Net assets for 
the Morningstar
®
 data is from Morningstar
®
 Principia
®
 CDs (2008-2012). 
Third, this essay focuses on the investment decision of US mutual fund managers in the MENA 
stock markets.  Three advantages arise from this setting.  First, by considering the investment 
decision of a single class of investor, that is US mutual fund managers, the analysis controls 
directly for the level of financial sophistication (homogeneous investor type).  Second, by 
considering a single source of investment, US based investments, the analysis controls for source-
country-factors where the literature finds that the level of domestic investor protection affects 
foreign portfolio composition (Giofré, 2014).  Third, by focusing on MENA markets, familiarity 
factors that have been found in the literature to affect investments in foreign markets are 
controlled for (Ke, Ng, and Wang, 2010; Massa and Simonov, 2006) since US investor perceive 
MENA markets with the same level of unfamiliarity in terms of geographic proximity and spoken 
language.
59
 
                                                 
59
 Firms listed in Egypt and Jordan report their financial statements in Arabic.  English reporting is voluntary.  Firms 
listed in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and UAE report their financial statements in both Arabic and English.  Firms 
listed in Israel disclose their financial statements in Hebrew.  The English translation if available is not legally 
binding.  Firms listed in Morocco and Tunisia disclose their financial statements in French.  Firms listed in Turkey 
report their financial statements in Turkish.  Language is not tested in this thesis.  Further, Databases like Bloomberg 
and Reuters provide all the financial data in English which makes the language barrier less relevant in the current era. 
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Finally, the essay employs a rich dataset from Morningstar
®
 Principia
®
 that contains information 
on how US mutual funds allocate their portfolios domestically and internationally.  The dataset 
includes detailed individual mutual fund equity holdings from over 7,000 US mutual funds.  The 
data reports the quantity and market value of country-level and firm-level equity holdings for the 
years 2008-2012.  Such detailed statistics on foreign portfolio investment is unpublished by many 
MENA stock markets. Table  3.1 shows that the net assets of US mutual funds reporting to 
Morningstar
®
 in 2012 represent 50% of the total US mutual funds net assets.  Thus, US mutual 
fund investment is a reasonable proxy to directly measure the level of foreign investment in 
MENA. 
This research aims to: 
 document the US investment trends into the MENA stock markets via US mutual funds 
for the period 2008-2012. 
 establish whether US mutual funds follow sound and rational investment practices that 
are consistent with finance theory predictions. 
 identify which investor protection aspects matter most for attracting foreign investment. 
 examine whether firms can adopt discretionary policies to mitigate the shortcomings of 
the legal environment where they operate. 
3.1.2. Essay structure 
The essay proceeds as follows.  Section 3.2 discusses the literature on the importance of the 
country-level legal environment and financial market development in reducing the information 
asymmetries and attracting investment to emerging markets.  Additionally, the literature 
highlights the impact of firm-level discretionary policies on attracting foreign investment.  
Section 3.3 describes the adopted research design.  The data extraction process for the US mutual 
fund investments in MENA is introduced.  The models used to examine the prediction of the 
‘Law and Finance’ theory are then illustrated.  The variable definitions and sources are discussed 
and the estimation method is explained.  Section 3.4 documents the dollar value of US mutual 
fund investment and the number of funds investing in each MENA country over the sample 
period.  This section also outlines univariate and bivariate analysis including summary statistics 
to describe the sample, correlation, frequency tables and means test.  Multivariate regression 
results using both logistic and tobit estimation are then reported.  Section 3.5 provides a summary 
of the research findings, implications and limitations.  The scope for further research is also 
outlined. 
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3.2. Literature review 
The investment decision of mutual funds managers requires asset allocation and security selection 
decisions both of which are critical determinants of mutual fund returns.
60
  Ibbotson and Kaplan 
(2000) find that the difference in returns across funds is explained 60% by security selection and 
40% by asset allocation decisions.  Each mutual fund has its own distinctive investment 
philosophy, yet the common ultimate objective is to beat the market and generate excess positive 
returns (positive alphas).  Importantly, country and security selections are not independent 
screening processes.  While some funds focus on firm analysis when selecting investment 
securities (bottom-up), others further analyse the countries in which the firm operates (top-down) 
or adopt some hybrid selection process.
61
  The emerging market literature favours country 
selection arguing that portfolio returns are driven by country specific factors (Serra, 2000, p. 127; 
Kortas, L'Her, and Roberge, 2005, p. 2).  Stulz (2005) emphasises the significance of country 
attributes related to investor protection and government policies for investment decisions.  The 
following literature reviews the theories on the determinants of foreign portfolio investment, the 
impact of the country-level legal environment and financial market development on the 
investment decision and the effect of firm-level policies on attracting foreign investment. 
The traditional portfolio theory of Markowitz (1952) suggests that risk sharing is the main 
incentive of cross-border capital flow.  The international version of the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) model global portfolio diversification (Adler 
and Dumas, 1983).  These models assume that investors are risk averse with homogenous 
expectations about asset returns and that investor’s decisions are solely based on expected returns 
and the variances of asset returns.  Further, a risk free asset exists where investors can lend and 
borrow at the same rate and capital markets are complete, perfect and frictionless.  Under these 
restrictive assumptions, the theory predicts that investors optimise their portfolio returns by 
holding the world market portfolio of risky assets in proportion to their market capitalisation. 
                                                 
60
 Asset allocation means allocation among asset classes (equities, fixed income, and real assets) and allocation 
among countries (domestic and foreign). 
61
 For example, the objective statement in the prospectus of Blue Current Global Dividend Fund outlines the 
investment strategy as follows: 
"...  the Adviser applies fundamental, ‘bottom-up’ analysis when selecting investments for the Fund.  
This analysis focuses on the specific attributes of each company rather than the industry in which the 
company operates or the economy in general" (Blue Current Global Dividend Fund, 2014, p. 5). 
Whereas RBC BlueBay Emerging Market Select Bond Fund prospectus provides: 
"The Fund seeks to generate excess returns via superior country and issue selection through an in 
depth country and security selections process" (RBC Bluebay Emerging Market Select Bond Fund). 
Clearly, security analysis is the basis for selection for the Blue Current fund, while both country and security 
analyses are the basis for selection in the RBC BlueBay fund.  Hence, the mutual fund investment decision may take 
into account both country and firm levels characteristics to differing degrees. 
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In substantial contrast, the empirical evidence shows that investors do not fully exploit such 
diversification opportunities (under-diversified).  This is evident by the well documented ‘home-
bias’ puzzle where investors tend to over-invest in the local market. Under-diversification is 
prevalent despite the increased level of integration in global financial markets.  The home-bias 
puzzle has created an incentive for researchers to analyse the determinants of foreign investment 
explaining under-diversification. 
The home bias literature explains the apparent under-diversification behaviour in foreign markets 
on different grounds.  Some argue that the relative under-diversification in foreign markets is a 
rational response to market imperfections (Stulz, 1981) related to direct barriers such as foreign 
exchange controls and taxes, and indirect barriers to international investment such as political risk 
differences between domestic and foreign investors and information asymmetries (Kang and 
Stulz, 1997).  However, behavioural theories reject the full rational model of investor decision 
making and suggest that investors under-weigh the proportion of wealth invested in foreign 
equities due to a series of cognitive processes that influence their risk perception (French and 
Poterba, 1991).  The empirical evidence is mixed.  Ke, Ng, and Wang (2010, p. 961) find no 
evidence supporting the rational information-based explanation for US mutual funds holdings in 
non-US firms and conclude that the preference for geographically proximate investments is 
driven by psychological ‘familiarity’ issues.  Yet, Massa and Simonov (2006, p. 634) argue that 
familiarity-driven investment decisions are a rational response to information constraints and not 
a behavioural heuristic.  Sercu and Vanpee (2007) argue that neither rational nor behavioural 
factors fully explain the extent of global under-diversification. 
An information asymmetry argument between domestic and foreign investors is proposed to 
inhibit international portfolio investment where domestic investors have superior access to 
information about domestic firms’ payoffs and economic conditions.  Consequently, risk-averse 
investors prefer to invest in stocks where there is better quality information (domestic stocks) and 
perceive domestic stocks as less risky (Sercu and Vanpee, 2007, p. 21).  Brennan and Cao (1997) 
develop a model of global equity investment flows based on informational differences between 
foreign and domestic investors.  Their model conjectures that the purchase of foreign equities is a 
linear function of returns on foreign stock markets, since foreign investors are relatively less 
informed than domestic investors, and thus, foreign investors are inclined to pursue momentum 
strategies.  Using the equity flows between the US and 16 emerging markets, Brennan and Cao 
(1997) test their model and find that US purchases are positively associated with both the lagged 
and contemporaneous returns on the local market index.  This result is consistent with the notion 
that US investors are at an informational disadvantage relative to locals.  Other studies confirm 
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that foreign investors pursue momentum strategies, supporting the importance of the information 
asymmetry hypothesis as a determinant of foreign capital flow (Brennan, Henry Cao, Strong, and 
Xu, 2005; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Bohn and Tesar, 1996).  The asymmetric information is 
acute particularly in emerging markets where illiquidity (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003; and Berrill 
and Kearney, 2013) and lack of transparency as reflected by corporate information scarcity, lax 
disclosure requirements and overall weak regulations result in truncated fundamental information 
and hinder the flow of information (Blavy, 2002) cited in Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2008, p. 
95). 
3.2.1. Legal environment 
Information asymmetry theory is closely related to the quality of legal environment.  Poor 
minority shareholder rights increase the information asymmetry and consequently require higher 
monitoring costs for the investment decisions of foreign investors.  La Porta et al., (1997, 1998) 
argue that investors are often reluctant to invest in markets where their rights are unprotected.  
However, others argue that, from the perspective of partial equilibrium models, the probability of 
expropriation is fully discounted in the stock price.  That is, if investors knowingly invest in 
countries with poor investor protection, then the possibility of expropriation is fully discounted in 
the stock price and foreign investors have no reason to avoid poorly governed countries 
(Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2003, p. 89; Giannetti and Koskinen, 2010, p. 
136). 
The impact of the legal environment on mutual fund investment decisions has been tested in 
Aggarwal et al. (2005) and Chan et al. (2005).  Aggarwal et al. (2005, p. 2928) analyse the 
determinants of US mutual fund investment in 30 emerging markets by regressing fund deviation 
from investment allocations predicted by the international CAPM using two measures of legal 
environment: a broad measure for the adequacy of the legal framework (capturing market 
regulation, legal system and investor protection); and, shareholder rights (which reflect the 
adequacy of regulations protecting minority shareholders).  Both measures of the quality of the 
legal environment are positively related to US mutual funds foreign investment in emerging 
markets.  Chan et al. (2005) hypothesise that the deadweight cost for foreign investors in 
countries with poor investor protection is greater relative to that of domestic investors, thus 
foreign investors hold a lower proportion of local equities.  The study uses rule of law, risk of 
expropriation, anti-director rights and legal origin as measures of investor protection.  Chan’s 
results show that only rule of law and expropriation risk affect domestic and foreign bias, while 
both anti-director rights and legal origin are insignificant.  Rule of law is positively associated 
with both domestic and foreign bias indicating that when a country strongly enforces its law, the 
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confidence of domestic investors in the regulatory system is boosted and hence they are willing to 
invest more locally than overseas.  However, expropriation risk is positively related to foreign 
bias and negatively related to domestic bias indicating that when the expropriation risk is small, 
relatively more foreign investments are attracted to the local market.  Chan et al. (2005) conclude 
that foreign investors are more concerned about a country’s ability to offer better investor 
protection rights than domestic investors, and the greater the country’s protection of investors’ 
rights, the lower its foreign bias. 
While Essay 1 finds that certain shareholder protection rights are important for stock market 
development, a tension exists in the literature regarding the importance of shareholder protection 
for both local and foreign investors.  Roque and Cortez (2014) use the World Bank’s strength of 
investor protection index and finds that investor protection is key for the international equity 
investment decisions of OECD institutional investors.  However, contrary to the ‘Law and 
Finance’ theory prediction, (Ferreira and Matos, 2008, p. 510) find that the quality of a country’s 
legal environment is negatively (positively) related to the presence of foreign (domestic) 
institutional investors.  Ferreira and Matos (2008) attribute their finding to the notion that an 
investor’s decision to invest abroad balances strong investment prospects and perceived 
diversification benefits against weak shareholder protection.  They put forward this argument as 
reasoning for why US investors prefer emerging markets compared to well established European 
markets.  Giofré (2014) argues that investors benefiting from high levels of home protection are 
less demanding about foreign corporate governance when constructing their foreign portfolios. 
The literature highlights the importance of country-level legal environment for the foreign 
investment decision.  Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009) find that US investors hold fewer shares in 
firms with high levels of managerial and family control when these firms are domiciled in 
countries with weaker disclosure requirements, securities regulations, and minority shareholder 
rights.  In contrast, firms with substantial managerial and family control do not experience less 
foreign investment when they reside in countries with extensive disclosure requirements and 
strong investor protection.  Leuz et al. (2009) attribute the result to information asymmetries that 
give rise to an adverse selection problem and higher monitoring cost for the investment decisions 
of foreign investors. 
The ‘Law and Finance’ theory predicts that countries with English common law legal origin are 
able to attract more investment than French civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998).  This 
prediction is driven by the historical narrative and the empirical evidence that countries with 
common law legal origin provide better laws, promote the rule of law, protect property rights, 
enforce contracts, run efficient judicial systems and operate under market-oriented regulations.  
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Lee, Staats, and Biglaiser (2012) find that countries with common law legal origin attract more 
portfolio investment than civil or Islamic legal origin.  Poshakwale and Thapa (2011) find that 
common law countries attract higher levels of international equity investments.  In contrast, 
Pendle (2008) finds that Australian investors are more likely to invest in countries with a 
Scandinavian legal origin, followed by French, then German and are least likely to invest in 
countries with British common law which contradicts the ‘Law and Finance’ theory prediction. 
The importance of the laws and their enforcement in protecting minority shareholders is 
emphasised in Stulz (2005) argument that minority shareholders are not only expropriated by 
firm’s insiders seeking private benefits but also by governments that improve their welfare by 
reducing the return on corporate investments.  Stulz argues that a ‘twin agency’ problem feeds 
one another where the cost of extracting private benefits depends upon the rights granted to 
minority shareholders and the degree to which these rights are protected by government.  This 
result has consequences on foreign investment where countries with poor investor protection and 
high risk of expropriation have a smaller fraction of wealth owned by foreign investors (Stulz, 
2005, p. 1624).
62
  Giannetti and Simonov (2006) argue that the investment decision is driven by 
the fear of expropriation.  Using firm-level corporate governance of Swedish firms, Giannetti and 
Simonov (2006) find that investors (domestic individual, institutional or foreign investors) 
enjoying only security benefits are reluctant to invest in firms with poor corporate governance.  
However, insiders who can extract private benefit from the firm are not concerned about the weak 
corporate governance and are more likely to invest in firms where the controlling shareholder has 
strong incentives to extract private benefits.
63
 
The channel through which investor protection affects foreign holding is analysed from two 
perspectives.  Dahlquist et al. (2003) relate the impact of investor protection on foreign holding to 
the amount of free float available for investment while Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) link the 
impact to stock returns. 
Dahlquist et al. (2003) argue that US investors underweight foreign firms in countries with poor 
investor protection due to the prevalence of closely-held firms.  A large portion of the equity of 
firms with concentrated ownership structure is locked up and therefore unavailable for foreign 
investors.  Dahlquist et al. (2003) conduct country-level analysis and find that US investors have 
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 The literature provides evidence on the importance of the law enforcement on foreign investment: Daude and 
Fratzscher (2008) for international equity and debt portfolio investment; Mishra and Daly (2006) for Australia’s 
equity allocation; and Staats and Biglaiser (2011) for portfolio investment in developing countries. 
63
 Giannetti and Simonov (2006) finding provides only a lower bound for the influence of corporate governance on 
investment decisions since the analysis is based on investments in Sweden which is renowned for strong investor 
protection and high law enforcement.  The fear of expropriation is greater in countries with lower quality legal 
environments. 
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a lower portfolio share of countries with a larger fraction of shares that are closely held.  
However, anti-director rights, judicial efficiency and stock market development are found to be 
unrelated to the share of a country in US stock portfolios.  Dahlquist et al. (2003, p. 109) and 
Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (2009, p. 632) note that decentralised ownership is critical to overcome 
global under-diversification.  An improvement in investor protection does not necessarily lead to 
a greater portfolio share of that country or firm in the portfolio of US investors unless the share of 
a country or a firm in the float portfolio increases. 
Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) argue that concentrated ownership in firms operating in weak 
corporate governance environment leads to lower stock returns, which is another reason for 
under-diversification.  Their rationale is based on the fact that stock prices reflect the demand for 
equity by both controlling shareholders and ‘other’ minority investors.  Due to the high demand 
from controlling shareholders, the price of weak corporate governance stocks is not low enough 
to fully discount the extraction of private benefits.  Thus, stocks have lower expected returns 
when investor protection is weak and the lower expected returns lead to lower stock market 
participation rates. 
While several studies argue that it is corporate governance that affects foreign investment 
(Aggarwal et al., 2005; Leuz et al., 2009), Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) consider 
the role of foreign institutional investment as a channel for promoting better governance practices 
across countries.  Aggarwal et al. (2011) hypothesise that institutional investors affect firms 
internationally to adopt better governance practices by influencing the management and using 
voting rights or by their decisions to buy or threaten to sell their shares.  They identify a positive 
relationship running from institutional ownership to firm-level governance, and not vice versa.  
Furthermore, Aggarwal et al. (2011) find that independent institutions (mutual fund managers and 
investment advisers) that are unlikely to have business ties with the invested firm are the main 
drivers of governance improvement.  The role for institutional investors in corporate governance 
is confirmed by Bushee, Carter, and Gerakos (2014) findings that firms with higher ownership of 
‘governance-sensitive’ institutions exhibit significant future improvements in shareholder rights, 
consistent with an effect of ‘shareholder activism’.64 
3.2.2. Stock market development 
Well developed stock markets are more structured, have higher levels of liquidity and lower 
transaction costs relative to less developed markets.  Thus, stock prices in developed markets are 
more informative.  Berkel (2007, p. 6) notes that larger markets encourage arbitrage through 
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 Institutional investors are classified as ‘governance-sensitive’ if they significantly tilt their portfolio weights 
toward firms with better corporate governance as measured by board characteristics and shareholder rights. 
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liquidity, the existence of more substitutes to use as hedges for trading against mispriced 
securities and reduced transaction costs.  Under such circumstances, information asymmetry is 
expected to be lower for more developed stock markets and this attracts more equity investments 
than in less developed markets.  Several empirical studies show that the higher the financial 
sophistication and stock market development of the destination country, the greater the level of 
international portfolio investment.
65
  Ferreira and Matos (2008, p. 510) find that US institutions 
prefer less developed markets. 
Chan et al. (2005) use four variables to analyse the impact of stock market development on home 
and foreign bias for mutual funds: the size of the stock market as a percentage to GDP; turnover 
ratio; transaction cost; and, an emerging market dummy.  Chan et al. (2005, p. 1518) hypothesise 
that if stock market development lowers foreign investors’ cost more than domestic investors, 
foreign investors will be attracted into these stock markets and crowd out domestic investors.  
However, if stock market development lowers the cost for both domestic and foreign investors 
symmetrically, Chan et al. (2005) expect none of the stock market development measures to have 
a differential impact on the foreign and domestic biases.  The results on foreign bias show that 
mutual funds tend to invest in large and liquid developed markets that have lower trading costs. 
3.2.3. Firm’s discretionary policies 
Despite the notion that firm-level governance is largely driven by country characteristics (Ferreira 
and Matos, 2008), firms can distinguish themselves by adopting policies that make it easier for 
foreign investors to assess them as a potential investment destination.  The impact of two firm’s 
discretionary policies, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption and a big-
four auditor appointment, on attracting foreign investment is considered.
66
 
As financial statements convey information about the firm’s performance and operations, 
accounting standards that render the firm’s information interpretable are critical for investment 
decisions.  Bushman and Smith (2001) cited in Habib (2007, p. 5) posit that accounting standards 
play a role in corporate governance to discipline managers.  Further, the literature shows that 
accounting standards are a consequence of disclosure rules (Habib, 2007; Francis, Khurana, and 
Pereira, 2001) and that the quality of accounting standards is positively associated with the extent 
of shareholder protection (La Porta et al., 1998).  Further, the availability of quality and 
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 Several papers provide evidence supporting this claim: Portes and Rey (2005) for gross transaction equity flows; 
Aggarwal, Kearney, and Lucey (2012) for both debt and equity foreign portfolio investment; Kim and Wu (2008) in 
emerging markets; Pendle (2008) and Mishra and Daly (2006) for the Australian foreign portfolio; Vermeulen and de 
Haan (2014) for net equity and debt; Daude and Fratzscher (2008) for foreign equity and debt portfolio; and, Roque 
and Cortez (2014) for institutional and non-institutional investors. 
66
 Along the lines of Ross (1977) debt signalling theory, firms signal quality by voluntarily adopting IFRS and/or 
appointing a big-four auditor. 
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comparable financial statements is important for stock markets’ operations (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 1999, p. 31). 
Adopting IFRS brings informational change by reducing information processing costs and 
decreasing information uncertainty about the quality of financial reporting or the distribution of 
future cash flows (Beneish and Yohn, 2008, p. 434; Shima and Gordon, 2011, p. 481).  Reporting 
under IFRS makes financial statements more uniform, thus making it easier for foreign investors 
to interpret and compare the financial statements across firms listed in different countries.  
Consequently, foreign investors can more easily find investment opportunities in foreign stock 
markets previously considered less attractive.  Beneish, Miller, and Yohn (2012) argue that IFRS 
adoption reflects improved financial reporting quality rather than greater comparability because 
their findings show that the increase in foreign investment around the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS originates from non-adopting countries, the US, rather than other adopting countries.  
Gordon, Loeb, and Zhu (2012) find that IFRS adoption increases foreign investor confidence for 
firms in developing economies, but not for firms in developed economies. 
IFRS adoption, whether voluntary or mandatory, has consequences on foreign investment.  Using 
firm-level holdings of worldwide mutual funds Covring, Defond, and Hung (2007) provide 
evidence that voluntary IFRS adoption reduces home bias among foreign investors and thereby 
improves capital allocation efficiency.  Similarly, DeFond, Hu, Hung, and Li (2011) establish that 
firms experiencing larger increases in foreign mutual fund ownership when there is a credible 
increase in uniformity from mandatory IFRS adoption in the European Union.
67
 
The literature provides evidence of association between IFRS, foreign investment and legal 
environment.  Covring et al. (2007) show that IFRS adoption has the greatest impact on foreign 
investment in poor information environments and when there is low firm visibility.  This finding 
is consistent with the notion that firms adopt IFRS to provide more information and/or 
information in a more familiar form to foreign investors (Covring et al., 2007, p. 69).  Other 
studies however find that IFRS effect on foreign investment is limited to countries with strong 
legal environment.  Beneish et al. (2012) find that increases in foreign equity investment post 
2005 IFRS adoption are limited to countries with high governance quality.  Shima and Gordon 
(2011) find that increased US investment is associated with IFRS when it is combined with a 
strong regulatory environment.  Florou and Pope (2012) find similar results for institutional 
holdings. 
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 Other studies confirm the positive association between foreign holdings and accounting standards quality: 
Hamberg, Mavruk, and Sjögren (2013) for Swedish firms; Chan et al. (2005) for worldwide mutual funds holdings; 
Gelos and Wei (2005) for emerging mutual funds holdings; and, Mishra and Daly (2006) for Australia’s foreign 
equity investment. 
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Empirical evidence suggests that the countries that benefit the most from adopting IFRS are those 
where the differences between local accounting principles and IFRS are large (Florou and Pope, 
2012).  Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller (2004) examine the relationship between accounting 
method choice and investment by US institutional investors in non-US firms.  They hypothesise 
that US institutional investors exhibit a preference for firms using accounting methods that 
conform to US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as greater conformity with 
accounting practices familiar to foreign investors reduces information processing costs, which 
allows for more thorough analyses and increases the credibility of the financial information.  
Their results show that higher level of US institutional ownership in non-US firms that use a 
greater number of accounting methods conforming to US GAAP.  This association holds 
regardless of firm visibility but is significantly stronger for more visible firms. 
Firms signal the credibility of their financial statements and assure investors that the financial 
statements are free from material misstatements and fraud by subjecting them to independent 
audit (Barton, 2005, p. 553).  The larger the audit firm size, the greater the auditor’s 
independence (DeAngelo, 1981a).  Thus the auditor’s size influences the perceptions of 
independence and objectivity in reporting.  Further, to maintain their reputation, big auditors have 
the incentives and the sufficient resources to assure the integrity of disclosed information 
(DeAngelo, 1981b).  Accounting research also points out that the appointment of a big-four 
auditor reduces information asymmetries.  Farooq, Derrabi, and Naciri (2013) argue that big-four 
auditors are a reasonable proxy for reliable information, implying financial information audited 
by a big-four auditor reduces the uncertainty about the firm’s future cash flows and encourages 
investment (Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary, 2009). 
Audit quality plays an important role in the investment decisions of foreign investors.  Firms 
appointing big-four auditors attract greater foreign investment due to lower information 
processing costs.  Using equity holdings of mutual funds in developed and emerging markets, 
Chou et al. (2014) find that firms audited by big-four auditors attract greater foreign investment 
than those firms that do not.  The results also reveal that foreign mutual fund ownership increases 
(decreases) significantly in the year following an appointment (a drop) of a big-four auditor. 
Considering both IFRS and auditor, Aggarwal et al. (2005) emphasise the important role of 
voluntary disclosure choice (including internationally recognised accounting standards, auditor 
quality, auditor opinion and the use of consolidated financial statements) in mitigating emergent 
country institutional deficiencies to attract foreign institutional investment.  Results show that 
accounting quality attracts US mutual fund investment particularly in emerging countries with 
weak shareholder protection.  Aggarwal et al. (2005) conclude that country and firm level 
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characteristics are complementary and promoting improved accounting disclosures enhances 
foreign investment, even in countries with weak shareholder rights. 
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3.3. Research design 
This section identifies the sample, presents the model specification, discusses the variables and 
reviews the estimation method adopted. 
3.3.1. Sample 
US mutual funds portfolio holdings are obtained from Morningstar
®
 Principia
®
 2008-2012 CDs.
68
  
The investment holdings in a given year contain a single snap-shot of investment for a single 
month in the year and funds may report holdings on different dates.
69
  Non-equity investments are 
excluded as the analysis focuses on portfolio allocation decisions of US mutual funds in MENA 
stock markets.  Out of 21 MENA countries, mutual funds reporting to Morningstar
®
 report 
holdings in 11 MENA countries only.  The funds show no investments in Libya, Syria and 
Yemen as stock markets do not exist.  Additionally, US mutual funds reporting to Morningstar
®
 
do not disclose investments in Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Palestine and Sudan despite the existence of 
stock markets.  While Iran is not expected to have US mutual fund investment due to US 
sanctions, Algeria, Palestine, Iraq and Sudan markets are not closed to foreign portfolio 
investment, yet none of the US mutual funds report investment in these countries.  The potential 
reasons for the absence of declared investment in these countries are the political instability and 
war.  Consequently, these five markets are excluded from the analysis.  Presumably they are 
being filtered out in the early screening process of US mutual fund investment decision.  Despite 
the existence of a few funds with positive investment in Saudi Arabia, this country is excluded 
from the analysis because Saudi Arabia forbids direct foreign investment in the stock market, 
except for GCC citizens.  Only foreign investments via Saudi Bank mutual funds or through 
SWAP arrangements are allowed (Ramady, 2010, p. 149).  This data is unavailable, hence it is 
infeasible to identify Saudi firms with positive US investment. 
The present analysis also excludes any mutual fund investment in MENA firms that are listed or 
co-listed outside MENA markets.  As a result of this filter, Lebanon drops out of the sample.  The 
rationale for such exclusions is due to the fact that these firms must adhere to investor protection 
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 There is no geographic segmentation of US holdings prior to 2008. 
69
 The distribution of the fund reporting date is as follow: 
Year 2008   30-Jun-08 31-Jul-08 31-Aug-08 30-Sep-08 31-Oct-08 30-Nov-08 31-Dec-08 Total funds 
Count (%)   8 (5.1%) 6 (3.8%) 8 (5.1%) 72 (45.6%) 18 (11.4%) 42 (26.6%) 4 (2.5%) 158 (100.0%) 
Year 2009 
 
30-Jun-09 31-Jul-09 31-Aug-09 30-Sep-09 31-Oct-09 30-Nov-09 31-Dec-09 Total 
Count (%)   3 (2.4%) 2 (1.6%) 3 (2.4%) 65 (51.6%) 25 (19.8%) 23 (18.3%) 5 (4.0%) 126 (100.0%) 
Year 2010 31-Dec-09 30-Jun-10 31-Jul-10 31-Aug-10 30-Sep-10 31-Oct-10 30-Nov-10 31-Dec-10 Total 
Count (%) 3 (1.9%) 2 (1.2%) 3 (1.9%) 8 (4.9%) 73 (45.1%) 45 (27.8%) 19 (11.7%) 9 (5.6%) 162 (100.0%) 
Year 2011 
 
30-Jun-11 31-Jul-11 31-Aug-11 30-Sep-11 31-Oct-11 30-Nov-11 31-Dec-11 Total 
Count (%)   5 (2.1%) 6 (2.5%) 8 (3.4%) 98 (41.4%) 53 (22.4%) 66 (27.8%) 1 (0.4%) 237 (100.0%) 
Year 2012 
 
30-Jun-12 31-Jul-12 31-Aug-12 30-Sep-12 31-Oct-12 30-Nov-12 31-Dec-12 Total 
Count (%)   1 (0.4%) 8 (2.9%) 6 (2.2%) 99 (36.4%) 41 (15.1%) 83 (30.5%) 34 (12.5%) 272 (100.0%) 
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regulations in non-MENA markets and hence the local investor protection and security regulation 
in the MENA local markets becomes less relevant or its econometric impact is not clean.  The 
funds’ investment in each locally listed MENA firm is summed annually to obtain firm-year 
observation level data.  Figure  3.1 shows the filters applied to the Morningstar
® 
Principia
®
 dataset 
to reach out to the US mutual fund investment in firms that are only listed in MENA markets. 
Figure  3.1 Construction of the sample 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
Figure  3.2 MENA universe of investable firms 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
  
Observations for 
firms listed in 
MENA and non-
MENA markets  
792 
Firm-years with 
positive US mutual 
fund investment in 
MENA locally listed 
firms 
1,301 
Observations for 
MENA firms listed 
only outside MENA  
67 
Observations for 
unverified firms  
59 
Observations with 
missing X variables  
25 
Mutual fund 
investment =0 
6,685 
84% 
Mutual Funds 
investment > 0 
1,301 
16% 
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The universe of MENA investable firms is extracted from Bloomberg by identifying all primary 
MENA equity securities over the period 2008-2012 and deleting firms that are dual listed 
elsewhere.  Figure  3.2 shows that the final sample includes a panel of 7,986 firm-year 
observations, 16% of which (1,301 firm-year) have positive mutual funds investment in 11 
MENA countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, 
Turkey, and UAE) over the period 2008-2012.
70
 
3.3.2. Model 
This essay tests whether US mutual fund investment in MENA firms follow predictions of the 
‘Law and Finance’ theory by regressing measures of US mutual fund investment on legal 
environment and financial market development variables.  To investigate the determinants of US 
mutual fund investment in MENA firms, the following model is estimated: 
                                                                           
      
 
   
                              
 
   
                           
       
 
   
             
 
   
                
                                                 Equation 1 
 
The subscript j refers to MENA firm, the subscript k refers to MENA country and the subscript t 
refers to year. 
The dependent variable measures the mutual fund investment in MENA firm j at time t.  The 
legal environment variables capture attributes of legal rules related to minority shareholder rights, 
law enforcement and legal origin for MENA country k at time t-1.  The financial market 
development variable measures the dollar value of the stock market for MENA country k at time 
t-1.  Firm-level controls used include investment theory variables reflecting size, liquidity, return 
and leverage of MENA firm j at time t-1.  Country-level variables control for investment 
incentives or barriers that exist in MENA country k at time t-1.  In particular, the presence of 
double taxation treaty with the US, capital controls imposed and the foreign currency exchange 
regimes are captured for MENA country k at time t-1.  Time effects and industry effects based on 
a four digit GICS classification are included to account for possible heterogeneity in the data.  
Finally, εj,t is the error term. 
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 This data is the aggregation of 438 US mutual funds investing in 391 unique locally listed MENA firms. 
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Equation 2 analyses the joint impact of financial market development and shareholder protection 
on US mutual fund investment.  MENA firms are yearly classified according to their level of 
market development and shareholder protection, i.e., above or below the respective sample 
medians.  Four groups are created: firms listed in MENA countries with both high (above the 
median) levels of financial market development and shareholder protection (HiMktDevHiInvPro); 
firms listed in MENA countries with high market development but low (below the median) 
shareholder protection (HiMktDevLoInvPro); vice versa (LoMktDevHiInvPro) and, firms listed in MENA 
countries with low financial market development and low shareholder protection 
(LoMktDevLoInvPro).  These variables take a value of one if the firm belongs to the group, and zero 
otherwise.  Since the four groups are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, the 
estimated coefficients   ,    and    in equation 2 indicate the differences in the US mutual fund 
investment compared to the base case, LoMktDevHiInvPro that is excluded from the regression. 
                                                                 
                               
 
   
                        
      
 
   
                                  
 
   
      
       
 
   
                
                                                 Equation 2 
 
Equations 1 and 2 only consider the country-level environment of corporate governance through 
the legal environment protecting shareholders.  To examine if firms can adopt discretionary 
policies to signal their quality and overcome the legal environmental shortcomings at the country-
level, we examine two observable firm discretionary policies: the adoption of IFRS
71
 and the 
appointment of a ‘big-four’ auditor.  The effect of firm discretionary policies on US mutual fund 
investment is estimated in Equation 3.  The model is independently estimated for each 
discretionary policy.  Firm discretionary policy is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm adopts 
IFRS/appoints a big-four auditor, and 0 otherwise.  The coefficient    provides a test of whether 
the US mutual fund investment in firms adopting IFRS or appointing a big-four auditor is 
different from their investment in firms that do not adopt IFRS or appoint a big-four auditor.  The 
coefficient    indicates the shareholder protection effect for firms that do not adopt IFRS or 
appoint a big-four auditor.  The coefficient    indicates the incremental effect for firms that adopt 
                                                 
71
 IFRS analysis is applied to the sub-sample of countries where IFRS adoption is voluntary. 
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IFRS or appoint a big-four auditor.  The sum of the coefficients   and   indicates the total effect 
of country-level shareholder protection on attracting foreign investment. 
                                                                        
                                                       
      
 
   
                              
 
   
                           
       
 
   
             
 
   
                
                                                 Equation 3 
 
Independent variables are lagged one year when appropriate in all models. 
3.3.3. Variables 
Table  3.2 presents the list of variables, their scales, predicted signs and sources.  The dependent 
variable is measured using the US mutual fund investment in the MENA firm as a proxy for 
foreign investment.  Two forms of dependent variable are used.  A binary choice variable 
              which equals 1 if the MENA firm j has been selected by any US mutual fund in 
year t and zero in the absence of any investment.  Another specification for the dependent 
variable uses the level of investment by US mutual funds in MENA firm in nominal USD.  This 
specification is sensible given that the objective of the essay is to examine if the US mutual fund 
investment conforms to the ‘Law and Finance’ theory predictions.  More precisely, the dependent 
variable,                                    
   
    , is the log of the sum of dollars 
invested by US mutual funds in MENA firm j in year t and one is added in order to keep the 
observations that are zero. 
The independent variables include the ‘Law and Finance’ theory variables previously described 
in Essay 1 (Section 2.4.4).  The legal environment variables include shareholder protection, law 
enforcement and legal origin.  Four indices that address agency problems and information 
asymmetry are used to measure minority shareholder protection rights. The extent of disclosure 
index relates to the disclosure requirements for related party transactions. The extent of director 
liability index measures the ability of minority shareholders to file a lawsuit and hold relevant 
parties of the approving body liable for prejudicial related party transactions. The ease of 
shareholder suits index quantifies shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for 
misconduct. The anti-director rights index measures the overall minority shareholder protection 
as stated in the statutes of each MENA country (constructed in Section 2.4.2.1).  The first three 
indices are case-based survey measures of shareholder protection developed by the World Bank 
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and directed to financial lawyers.  Rule of law is used as a measure of law enforcement and legal 
origin is used as a proxy for the legal system inherited from the colonial powers.  Financial 
market development is measured using the logarithm of stock market capitalisation.  The detailed 
construction and definitions of these variables are also presented in Table  2.6.  Based on the ‘Law 
and Finance’ theory prediction, all of the variables are expected to be positively associated with 
US mutual fund investment. 
The two firm discretionary policies variables, IFRS adoption and big-four auditor appointment, 
are dummy variables that take a value of one if the firm choose to select the policy or zero 
otherwise. Both variables are expected to be positively associated with US mutual fund 
investment. 
Four firm-level control variables, derived from Bloomberg, relates to traditional investment 
theory are also included: size; liquidity; reward to risk; and, leverage.  US mutual funds are 
expected to prefer to invest in large and liquid firms that offer high returns and they avoid 
investing in highly levered firms (Kang and Stulz, 1997; Aggarwal et al., 2005; Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008; Bushee et al., 2014).  Large firms are better known internationally and information 
asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors are expected to be less important (Merton, 
1987).  Further, large firms’ shares are more liquid thus allowing investors to enter and exit the 
market at lower costs (Kang and Stulz, 1997, p. 5).  In this essay, the size of the firm is measured 
using the natural logarithm of firm’s assets.  Liquidity effects are acute in emerging markets 
(Bekaert and Harvey, 2003; Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey, 2008, p. 95) and poor liquidity in 
emerging markets is a major obstacle to foreign institutional investment (Berrill and Kearney, 
2013, p. 337).  Firm liquidity in the model is proxied by percentage trading measured as the 
number of days in which the trading volume for the security is greater than zero divided by the 
number of trading days for the market in which the security is traded.  The reward to risk ratio 
measures the risk-adjusted return the MENA firm offers and is based on the average monthly 
returns for the last 12 months divided by the standard deviation of these returns.  Monthly returns 
are used to avoid biases arising from non-trading days and non-synchronous trading hours and 
days among MENA markets and are measured in USD for comparability purposes.  Several 
papers use risk-adjusted returns (Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock, 2004; Pendle, 2008; 
Diyarbakirlioglu, 2011; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008) and find a positive association with 
foreign equity investment confirming the return chasing behaviour.  Finally, the debt to assets 
ratio is used as a proxy for leverage and is expected to be negatively associated with US 
investment because firms holding higher debt are perceived to be riskier. 
  
137 
Three country-level control variables are included that provide incentives or impose barriers to 
foreign investment in MENA.  These measures are expected to artificially improve or restrict 
investment but are not specifically related to ‘Law and Finance’ predictions.  Double taxation 
treaty is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the MENA country signed a double taxation treaty with 
the US, and zero otherwise.  (Kang and Stulz, 1997) argue that the lack of tax harmonisation 
means that foreign investors often find it difficult to get refunds or credits for taxes paid abroad.  
Hence, a double taxation treaty reduces uncertainty around taxation issues and is expected to be 
positively associated with US mutual fund investment.  Capital controls is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the MENA country imposes restrictions on foreign equity investment.  Capital 
controls is expected to be negatively associated with US mutual fund investment and is 
commonly used in the literature as a measure of a direct barrier to foreign investment (Ahearne et 
al., 2004; Berkel, 2007).  FOREX dummy equals 1 if the country operates a free float exchange 
rate regime, and zero otherwise.  The literature documents that foreign investors prefer investing 
in countries with floating exchange rate regimes to avoid exposure to large currency devaluations 
(Aggarwal et al., 2005).  Thus FOREX is expected to be positively associated with US mutual 
fund investment. 
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Table  3.2 List of variables for essay 2 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
 
Proxy for Variables Scale Expected 
sign (+/-) 
Source 
Dependent 
variable 
Foreign investment 
DInvestmentjt Dummy (0,1) 
 Morningstar
®
Principia
®
 (2008-2011) 
Investmentjt Censored (0, +) 
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d
ep
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v
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s 
‘L
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’ 
T
h
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ry
 
Shareholder protection 
Extent of disclosure index (0-10) + 
World Bank (2014a) Extent of director liability index (0-10) + 
Ease of shareholder suits index (0-10) + 
Anti-director rights index (0-6) + Developed in Essay 1, Section 2.4.2.1  
Law enforcement Rule of law (-2.5-2.5) + Kaufmann et al. (2013) 
Legal system Legal origin Dummy (0,1) + Zweigert and Kotz (1987) 
Financial market 
development 
Stock market capitalisation Continuous + World Bank (2014b) 
 Firm’s Discretionary 
policy 
IFRS Dummy (0,1) + 
Bloomberg (2015) 
Big-four auditor Dummy (0,1) + 
F
ir
m
-l
ev
el
 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 
Size Assets Continuous + 
Bloomberg (2015) 
Liquidity Percentage trading Continuous + 
Return Reward to risk Continuous + 
Leverage  Debt to assets Continuous - 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
-
le
v
el
 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 Taxation treaties Double taxation treaty Dummy (0,1) + Internal Revenue Service (2014) 
Capital controls Capital Controls Dummy (0,1) - 
International Monetary Fund (2007-2012) 
Foreign exchange FOREX Dummy (0,1) + 
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3.3.4. Estimation 
Logistic and tobit regressions are used to estimate the models.  Mutual funds investment is treated 
qualitatively as a binary choice variable indicating the presence or absence of mutual funds’ 
investment in MENA firms for the logistic regressions where the dependent variable takes a value 
of 1 or zero with probabilities   and     , respectively. 
              
 
 
 
 
                                
   
   
  
                               
   
   
  
  
                                         Equation 4 
 
The non-linear dependent variable, DInvestmentjt is transformed with respect to the natural 
logarithm of the odds ratio,            .  The logistic model uses the maximum likelihood 
method for estimation.  The general form of the logistic regression is                  
where   represents the vector of slope parameters of the independent variables vector   and   
represents the random error term. 
The slope coefficients in the logistic model measure the change of the log-odds,            , 
in favour of the occurrence of an event given a unit change in the value of the corresponding 
independent variable.  The sign of the coefficient indicates the direction of the change in the 
probability.  However, using the logistic model leads to information loss as it ignores the scale of 
the investment. 
Investment is observable only for mutual funds that have voluntarily reported to Moningstar
® 
Principia
®
.  The absence of any mutual fund investment transforms the dependent variable for 
those firm observations to zero.  The reported US mutual fund investment in MENA firms is 
observed to be positive in 16% of cases and zero with an 84% probability.  This type of data is 
censored from below.  Wooldridge (2010, p. 667) refers to this phenomenon as a ‘corner solution 
response’ where the corner in the essay data is set at zero.  Censoring may indicate a sample 
selection bias (Fu, Winship, and Mare, 2004, p. 410) where the observed zeros reflect both true 
zero values or censored data values.  In such circumstances, OLS estimation is inappropriate 
because the dependent variable of mutual fund investment in MENA has a continuous 
distribution over the strictly positive values, but heavy clustering at zero occurs due to the 
absence of observed investments.  Using OLS models for censored data produces biased and 
inefficient estimates and violates the BLUE conditions.  Greene (2012) advances that tobit 
estimates are more reliable than least squares estimates if censoring is a significant data issue.  As 
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the number of zeros relative to total sample increases, both bias and inefficiency in the OLS 
estimates increase.  Alternatively, the exclusion of zeros in the sample produces biases in the 
regression results because the sample is unrepresentative of the population and the excluded zero 
observations contain information as to why US mutual funds do not invest in such firms 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2010, p. 535).  To tackle this censoring problem, tobit models are used to 
estimate the determinants of US mutual fund investment into MENA stock markets.  Unlike the 
logistic regression which models the probability of investment, the tobit regression models the 
intensity of investment. 
The tobit model is a non-linear estimator that uses a mixture of a discrete distribution for the 
censored observations and a continuous distribution over the non-censored observations.
72
  The 
tobit model is a combination of two models: a probit model that considers the discrete decision of 
whether the firm is selected by any US mutual fund or not; and, the continuous decision related to 
investment value (Tobin, 1958, p. 25).  The tobit estimator yields unbiased coefficient estimates 
for corner solution outcomes.  Tobit model assumes that the same variables determine the 
discrete and continuous decision and takes the following form: 
              
            
                              
                                                                   
  
                                        Equation 5 
 
where Investmentjt is the dependent variable; Investment
*
jt is the latent variable (uncensored) of 
Investmentjt that is unobserved if           ;     is the vector of independent variables;   is a 
vector of estimated parameters; and,     is a random error term that is assumed to be 
independently and normally distributed with a mean of zero and constant variance (Breen, 1996).  
The tobit model is estimated using the maximum likelihood procedure.  The log-likelihood 
function for a tobit model with a zero threshold is: 
           
  
  
 
 
    
         
     
  
 
 
    
  
           Equation 6 
where      is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution and      is 
the probability density function of the standard normal distribution.  The log-likelihood function 
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 Several papers investigating determinants of investment and the home-bias puzzle use tobit estimation: Daude and 
Fratzscher (2008); Berkel (2007); Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010); Chou et al. (2014); Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008); 
Bushee et al. (2014); Giofré (2014); Leuz et al. (2009); Anwar and Sun (2015); Lemi, (2003); and, Beugelsdijk and 
Frijns (2010) among others. 
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is then maximised with respect to the parameters   and   (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 786; SAS 
Institute Inc).  In all the reported results, standard errors are adjusted to correct for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered to account for the correlation within firms. 
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3.4. Empirical analysis 
Section 3.4.1 documents US mutual fund investment in MENA, presents the summary statistics 
of the sample and the correlation structure between the variables.  Additionally, frequency tables 
for the US mutual fund investment by shareholder protection are reported.  Means tests for the 
US investment and firm characteristics for different combinations of financial development and 
shareholder protection are then described.  Section 3.4.2 presents the empirical results for the 
multivariate regressions that examine whether the US mutual fund investment follows predictions 
consistent with the ‘Law and Finance’ theory.  The multivariate regressions also illustrate the 
joint impact of shareholder protection and financial market development on US mutual fund 
investment.  Finally, the effect of firm discretionary policies in attracting US mutual funds is 
considered.  In all tables 
***
, 
**
 and 
*
 denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
3.4.1.1. US mutual fund investment in MENA 
This section documents the US mutual fund investing in MENA in terms of the types of mutual 
funds, the value of their investment and the number of funds investing in MENA countries and 
sectors over the period 2008-2012. Table  3.3 classifies the funds based on their prospectus 
objective.  There are 438 funds investing in MENA of which 24.89% are diversified emerging 
market funds and 24.43% are foreign stock funds.  Table  3.4 presents the distribution of the 
mutual funds based on the equity style box reported by Morningstar® Principia®.  Large MENA 
firms are attractive investments for US mutual funds where 68% of the US mutual funds 
investing in large MENA firms.  However, there is no clear preference for US mutual funds 
towards value or growth firms. 
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Table  3.3: Prospectus objective for the US mutual funds investing in MENA 
Prospectus objective Count Percent 
Diversified Emerging Markets 109 24.89 
Foreign Stock 107 24.43 
Growth 75 17.12 
World Stock 25 5.71 
Growth and Income 23 5.25 
Small Company 22 5.02 
Specialty-Real Estate 14 3.20 
Asset Allocation 10 2.28 
Balanced 7 1.60 
Equity Income 7 1.60 
Europe Stock 7 1.60 
Income 6 1.37 
Specialty-Natural Resources 6 1.37 
Specialty-Financial 5 1.14 
Aggressive Growth 3 0.68 
Multi-Asset Global 2 0.46 
Pacific Stock 2 0.46 
Specialty-Precious Metals 2 0.46 
Specialty-Unaligned 2 0.46 
Specialty-Utilities 2 0.46 
Specialty-Communication 1 0.23 
Specialty-Health 1 0.23 
Total 438  100  
Source: Thesis analysis. 
Table  3.4: Equity style box for the US mutual funds investing in MENA 
Equity style box Large Medium Small Count Percent 
Value 54 17 13 84 19.2% 
Blend 167 41 13 221 50.6% 
Growth 76 43 13 132 30.2% 
Count 297 101 39 437
†
 100.0% 
Percent 68.0% 23.1% 8.9% 100.0%   
Source: Thesis analysis. 
† 
Classification of one fund is missing. 
Panel A of Table  3.5 shows US mutual funds’ total investment value in locally listed firms for 
each MENA country for the sample period.  Over the five year period, investment grew at a 
compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 12% per annum.  The investment value dropped 
14% in 2009 but then surged 30% in 2010, as strong economic performance took hold in MENA 
countries.  Panel B of Table  3.5 shows the number of US mutual funds investing in each MENA 
country.  Over the same period, the number of funds investing grew at a CAGR of 10% per 
annum.  A small proportion of US mutual funds withdrew from MENA stock markets during the 
GFC, as the number of funds investing in 2009 is 6% lower than the prior year.  This observation 
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is similar to that reported for major emerging Asian and Latin American markets which received 
increasing portfolio flows prior to the GFC, however, the portfolio flows shrank at the onset of 
the crisis (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014, p. 224).  More recently, however, the trend of US mutual 
funds investing in MENA is on the rise, which reflects the importance of the region as a 
destination for foreign investment.  The percentage of US mutual fund investment in MENA is 
less than 1% of the market capitalisation of locally listed firms, which suggests that financial 
market development in MENA is driven by domestic prospects rather than by global trends 
(World Bank, 2011, p. 48). 
The quantum of US mutual fund investment and the number of funds investing in MENA are 
presented in Figure  3.3 and Figure  3.4, respectively.  There has been an increasing trend of US 
investment value in Turkey since 2008 with a profound increase in 2012 accompanying the 
promulgation of the new Turkish Commercial Code.  The US mutual fund investment in Turkey 
accounted for 36% of the overall investment in MENA in 2012.  Both Turkey and Israel are 
popular investment locations, as reflected by the number of funds investing there.  Investment in 
both UAE and Qatar accounted for 56% of total US investment in 2008.  Egypt witnessed a 
decline in US mutual fund investment in 2010 and 2012 which is expected due to political 
instability.  However, this decline in investment value is not accompanied with a decline in the 
number of funds investing in Egypt.  The rest of the US mutual fund investment in MENA 
countries shows an increasing value at a slow pace, except for Oman, with the number of funds 
investing being relatively flat.  Bahrain and Tunisia attracts the least funds in the region. 
Classification of US mutual fund investment by sector is presented in Table  3.6 and presented 
graphically in Figure  3.5 and Figure  3.6.  The financial sector attracts the highest US mutual fund 
interest measured by dollars invested and number of funds.  This is not surprising as the financial 
sector represents over 55% of the market capitalisation in the MENA region and accounts for 
40% of the total number of firms.  Additionally, the MENA banking sector was relatively 
resilient compared to other economies during the GFC and banking share of total capitalisation in 
MENA strengthened further during GFC (World Bank, 2011, p. 59).  Industrials and materials 
follow banking as second and third next attractive sectors for US mutual fund investment.  
Comparatively, health care and information technology attracts the least investment, both of 
which accounts for less than 3% in the total market capitalisation in the MENA. 
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Table  3.5 US mutual fund investment in MENA by country (2008-2012) 
 
Panel A: Value of US mutual fund investment (million USD)  Panel B: Number of US mutual funds
73
 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bahrain  0.77 0.47 0.48 1.65 0.95  6 3 2 3 2 
Egypt  221.27 322.38 295.73 403.14 248.27  155 176 218 234 199 
Israel  40.54 52.74 77.44 98.42 112.08  143 124 204 190 258 
Jordan  19.48 20.30 36.48 67.37 42.29  44 36 32 37 34 
Kuwait  48.00 32.26 87.43 108.83 129.98  54 66 92 101 112 
Morocco  27.16 35.07 64.14 65.76 65.27  76 68 79 77 86 
Oman  98.02 34.54 30.15 29.42 36.96  55 56 41 43 47 
Qatar  351.82 193.11 219.75 261.29 307.78  107 95 92 115 128 
Tunisia  0.77 0.06 - 5.86 -  2 1  5  
Turkey  104.32 174.97 313.68 377.98 714.16  292 249 344 442 562 
UAE  364.09 234.00 306.33 233.69 319.45  149 135 136 149 178 
Total 1,276.24 1,099.88 1,431.62 1,653.41 1,977.19  1,083 1,009 1,240 1,396 1,606 
Annual growth 
 
-14% 30% 15% 20%   -7% 23% 13% 15% 
CAGR 
 
12%   10% 
MENA market capitalisation
74
 424,172 508,541 568,888 474,008 515,149   
Annual growth  
 
20% 12% -17% 9%  
US mutual fund investment to market 
cap of locally listed MENA firms 
0.30% 0.22% 0.25% 0.35% 0.38%  
Source: Thesis analysis. 
                                                 
73
 The unit is fund-firm-year. 
74
 Market capitalisation for locally listed MENA firms only. 
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Figure  3.3 US mutual fund investment in MENA by country (2008-2012) 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
Figure  3.4 Number of US mutual funds in MENA by country (2008-2012) 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  3.6 US mutual fund investment in MENA by sector (2008-2012) 
 
Panel A: Value of US mutual fund investment (million USD)  Panel B: Number of US mutual funds
75
 
GICS Sector  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Consumer Discretionary 21.30 24.71 58.48 77.80 56.82 
 
92 67 107 102 97 
Consumer Staples 87.15 144.97 174.22 165.56 181.46 
 
71 68 91 112 141 
Energy 13.63 40.17 71.75 49.31 75.02 
 
53 75 91 67 84 
Financials 661.39 433.87 664.06 675.81 902.71 
 
418 418 525 598 717 
Health Care 4.88 5.79 14.70 89.14 15.09 
 
9 10 20 34 13 
Industrials 320.49 174.43 210.33 220.89 334.99 
 
184 129 140 157 198 
Information Technology 0.89 0.30 2.90 1.81 3.29 
 
2 3 12 6 13 
Materials 89.71 86.35 132.49 233.09 326.96 
 
174 154 180 237 277 
Telecommunication Services 49.64 164.84 71.95 98.14 54.71 
 
43 48 37 49 31 
Utilities 27.17 24.45 30.75 41.87 26.14 
 
37 37 37 34 35 
Total 1,276.24 1,099.88 1,431.62 1,653.41 1,977.19 
 
1,083 1,009 1,240 1,396 1,606 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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 Fund-firm-year. 
  
148 
Figure  3.5 US mutual fund investment in MENA by sector (2008-2012) 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
Figure  3.6 Number of US mutual funds in MENA by sector (2008-2012) 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  3.7 reports the number of potentially investable MENA firms that are locally listed in 
MENA stock markets relative to the number of firms that have attracted US mutual fund 
investment in each country each year.  The shades on the last column indicate whether there has 
been a decreasing (red) or increasing (green) trend between 2008 and 2012.  Over the years, the 
US mutual funds invest in 15%-17% of the locally listed MENA firms.  They invested in over 
55% of Qatari firms, 36% of Emirati firms and 30% of Turkish firms in 2012.  However, US 
mutual funds do not have investments reported by Morningstar
®
 in Tunisian firms and invested in 
only one firm, a widely acclaimed outlier, Ahli United Bank in Bahrain in 2012.
76
 
Figure  3.7 shows the risk and return profile for the locally listed MENA firms in 2012 relative to 
S&P500 index (shown as a blue square).  The graph reveals that MENA firms offer an array of 
investment opportunities for US mutual funds.  The observed US mutual fund investments in 
2012 (shown as red crosses) demonstrate that 67% of their investment generated positive returns 
in MENA firms. 
Figure  3.7 Risk and return profile for MENA firms 
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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 According to the Bank’s website, the bank earned several awards in 2012: ‘Best Bank in the Middle East’ and 
‘Best Private Bank in Bahrain’ from Euromoney, ‘Best Bank in Bahrain’ from Global Finance and Euromoney, 
‘Bank of the Year’ from The Banker, ‘Best Foreign Exchange Provider in the Middle East’ by Global Finance, ‘Elite 
Quality Recognition Award’ from JP Morgan Chase, and ‘STP Award’ from Commerzbank AG.  Further, 55% of 
Ahli United Bank’s shares are freely floated in 2012, which is considered relatively high percentage compared to 
other MENA firms (Bloomberg, 2015). 
  
 
1
5
0
 
 
Table  3.7 MENA firms and US mutual fund investment (2008-2012) 
Country 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
# 
investable 
firms 
Firms with 
positive 
investment 
% # investable 
firms 
Firms with 
positive 
investment 
% # 
investable 
firms 
Firms with 
positive 
investment 
% # 
investable 
firms 
Firms with 
positive 
investment 
% # 
investable 
firms 
Firms with 
positive 
investment 
% 
Bahrain 33 5 15% 28 3 11% 25 2 8% 23 2 9% 23 1 4% 
Egypt 152 30 20% 179 29 16% 166 31 19% 176 32 18% 185 29 16% 
Israel 513 45 9% 496 42 8% 469 39 8% 446 37 8% 433 40 9% 
Jordan 172 14 8% 180 14 8% 201 11 5% 207 13 6% 198 12 6% 
Kuwait 170 22 13% 168 26 15% 185 35 19% 170 37 22% 170 34 20% 
Morocco 66 17 26% 73 17 23% 72 17 24% 69 18 26% 70 19 27% 
Oman 101 19 19% 105 18 17% 98 14 14% 98 17 17% 94 17 18% 
Qatar 35 15 43% 41 19 46% 40 17 43% 40 19 48% 40 22 55% 
Tunisia 43 2 5% 47 1 2% 48 
  
44 1 2% 47 
  
Turkey 232 65 28% 232 46 20% 227 65 29% 232 67 29% 235 71 30% 
UAE 83 27 33% 78 26 33% 73 26 36% 77 26 34% 78 28 36% 
Total 1,600 261 16% 1,627 241 15% 1,604 257 16% 1,582 269 17% 1,573 273 17% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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3.4.1.2. Univariate analysis 
The descriptive statistics for the 7,986 MENA firm-year observations over the period 2008-2012 
are presented in Table  3.8.  The mean (median) US investment in MENA firms is USD0.93 
(USD0.00) million for the whole sample and USD5.71 (USD1.31) million for the sub-sample of 
positive US investment.  The wide range of investment value is evident from the standard 
deviation figures.  The skewness and kurtosis statistics show that the variable Investmentjt is non-
normal and exhibit positive skewness.  The kurtosis statistic for the variable Investmentjt for the 
entire sample is 224, indicating a tall and narrow distribution due to the clustering at zero.  The 
kurtosis for the variable Investmentjt for the positive sample is 36 indicating a leptokurtic 
distribution where observations are tightly clustered within a relatively narrow range of values. 
Shareholder protection indices measured in terms of the extent of disclosure, the extent of 
director liability and the ease of shareholder suits, all range from 0 to 10 whereas the anti-director 
rights index ranges from 0 to 6.  The mean (median) score is 5.95 (7.00) for the extent of 
disclosure index, 6.08 (5.00) for the extent of director liability index, 4.44 (3.00) for the extent of 
shareholder suit index and 2.76 (2.50) for the anti-director rights index.  The mean (median) of 
the law enforcement measured by the rule of law is 0.44 (0.51) with standard deviation of 0.39. 
Financial market development is diverse between MENA countries.  The mean (median) values 
of stock market capitalisation are USD127,243 (USD117,930) million with a standard deviation 
of USD81,357 million. 
The mean (median) size of MENA firms measured by firm assets is USD955 (99) million 
yielding a mean (median) reward to risk ratio of -0.09 (-0.05) during the period.  The mean 
(median) liquidity as measured by the percentage trading of the stock is 74% (89%).  The mean 
(median) debt level is 29% (17%) of assets. 
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Table  3.8 Descriptive statistics for essay 2 
 
Variables # Obs Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Foreign investment 
Investmentjt (million USD) (all sample) 7,986 0.93 0.00 6.45 13.60 224.89 
Investmentjt (million USD) (positive sample) 1,301 5.72 1.31 15.12 5.53 36.06 
L
eg
al
 
en
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t 
Investor protection 
Extent of disclosure index 7,918 5.95 7.00 1.91 -0.31 -0.25 
Extent of director liability index 7,918 6.08 5.00 2.57 0.08 -1.68 
Ease of shareholder suits index 7,918 4.44 3.00 3.16 0.56 -1.37 
Anti-director rights index 7,986 2.76 2.50 0.69 0.29 0.44 
Law enforcement Rule of law 7,986 0.44 0.51 0.39 -0.33 -1.11 
 Financial market development Stock market capitalisation (million USD) 7,986 127,243.35 117,929.86 81,356.82 0.37 -0.83 
Firm-level controls 
Assets (million USD) 7,986 955.41 98.65 4,267.26 10.28 134.11 
Percentage trading 7,986 0.74 0.89 0.31 -0.93 -0.50 
Reward to risk 7,986 -0.09 -0.05 1.83 -29.69 1,905.52 
Debt to assets 7,986 29.45 17.44 220.38 74.70 6,150.02 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Further descriptive statistics per country are presented in Table  3.9.  The mean for the total US 
mutual fund investment at the country level (Investmentkt) is highest in Egypt (USD298.16 
million) and UAE (USD291.51 million) and lowest in Bahrain (USD0.86 million).  The mean US 
mutual fund investment at the firm level (Investmentjt) is highest in Qatar (USD14.50 million) 
and UAE (USD10.96 million) and lowest in Tunisia (USD1.67 million) and Bahrain (USD0.33 
million). 
Investor protection figures show that Turkey dominates the list for the extent of disclosure with a 
mean score of 8.50 while Tunisia has the lowest mean score of 2.00.  When shareholder 
protection is measured relative to director liability index, both Kuwait and Israel top the list with 
a mean score of 9.00 while Morocco has the lowest mean score of 2.00.  Israel tops the list with 
respect to the ease of shareholder suits with a mean score of 9.00 whereas the GCC countries are 
at the bottom of the list with a mean score of 2.00.  Finally, anti-director rights index is highest in 
Qatar with a score of 4.50 and lowest in Jordan with a score of 1.50. 
The law enforcement variable shows that Israel dominates the countries in terms of the average 
rule of law (0.87) while Turkey has the lowest average score in the sample (0.08).  Three 
countries in the sample belong to common law legal origin: Bahrain; Israel; and, UAE.  The rest 
of the countries belong to French civil law legal origin.  Turkey and Israel are the most 
financially developed markets with average stock market capitalisation of USD227,743 million 
and USD183,189 million, respectively. 
IFRS is required for listed firms in Bahrain, Israel (except banking institutions), Jordan, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, and UAE.  The listed firms in Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia may use IFRS.  IFRS is 
permitted in Morocco but it is compulsory for banks and financial institutions 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014).  96% and 84% of the firms in Bahrain and UAE appoint a big-
four auditor whereas only 35% of the firms in Egypt do so. 
The average assets for MENA firms is the highest in UAE (USD5,688 million) and lowest in 
Oman (USD315 million).  Turkey and Qatar are the most liquid MENA markets with average 
percentage trading for firms listed in Istanbul and Qatar stock exchanges are 0.99 and 0.91, 
respectively.  The average reward to risk is highest in Qatar (0.09) and lowest in Morocco (-0.33).  
Israeli firms are the most levered firms in the region with debt to asset ratio of 51.30 whilst 
Jordanian and Egyptian firms are the least with debt to asset ratios of 13.9 and 12.79, 
respectively. 
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Five MENA countries signed a double taxation treaty with the US: Egypt since 1980; Israel since 
1975; Morocco since 1977; Tunisia since 1985; and, Turkey since 1996 (Internal Revenue 
Service, 2014). 
Capital controls are concentrated in the GCC countries.  According to the IMF’s Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, Bahraini law allows only the citizens of 
GCC countries to invest freely in the stock market; others may own up to 49%.  Kuwait capital 
controls apply to banks and financial institutions where non-Kuwaiti are not allowed to own more 
than 5% of the capital of any bank subject to Central Bank of Kuwait supervision.  In UAE, at 
least 51% of the shares of corporations must be held by UAE nationals or organisations.  Qatar 
limits foreign nationals’ ownership to 25%.  Oman laws require that foreign ownership of shares 
of Omani firms is generally limited to 70%.  A non-resident portfolio investor may not hold more 
than 10% of the shares in an Omani firm.  The rest of the MENA countries do not impose capital 
controls on foreign investment in their stock markets (International Monetary Fund, several 
editions 2007-2012). 
Only Israel and Turkey have free-floating currencies, the rest of the MENA countries operate on 
a pegged or managed exchange rate regime.  Tunisia dinar was classified by the IMF as floating 
in 2007-2009, then the IMF classification changed to peg regime (International Monetary Fund, 
several editions 2007-2012). 
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Table  3.9 Descriptive statistics by country 
Variables Bahrain Egypt Israel Jordan Kuwait Morocco Oman Qatar Tunisia Turkey UAE 
Investmentkt country-level (USD million) 0.86 298.16 76.24 37.18 81.30 51.48 45.82 266.75 1.34 337.02 291.51 
Investmentjt firm-level (USD million) 0.33 9.87 1.88 2.91 2.64 2.92 2.70 14.50 1.67 5.37 10.96 
Extent of disclosure index 8.00 4.60 7.00 4.00 4.00 5.20 8.00 5.00 2.00 8.60 4.00 
Extent of director liability index 4.00 3.00 9.00 4.00 9.00 2.00 5.00 6.00 5.40 4.00 6.00 
Ease of shareholder suits index 2.00 3.00 9.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 
Anti-director rights index 4.00 3.00 2.50 1.50 3.00 2.50 4.00 4.50 2.50 3.20 2.50 
Rule of law 0.51 0.17 0.87 0.33 0.61 0.22 0.61 0.84 0.10 0.08 0.44 
Legal origin 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Stock market capitalisation (USD million) 20,765 89,261 183,189 33,395 122,328 66,679 19,053 101,731 8,238 227,743 126,604 
IFRS 1.00 0.01 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.15 0.99 
Big-four auditor 0.96 0.35 0.72 0.39 0.57 0.65 0.71 0.87 0.38 0.48 0.84 
Assets (USD million) 2,089 492 453 402 1,629 922 315 3,952 712 383 5,688 
Percentage trading 0.41 0.84 0.68 0.73 0.65 0.70 0.47 0.91 0.82 0.99 0.68 
Reward to risk 0.02 -0.21 -0.03 -0.20 -0.17 -0.33 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.01 -0.11 
Debt to assets 14.07 12.79 51.30 13.90 25.94 26.34 25.95 17.57 26.80 24.06 15.99 
Double taxation treaty 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Capital controls 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
FOREX 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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3.4.1.3. Bivariate analysis 
Table  3.10 presents Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables.  As predicted by the 
model specification in Table  3.2, Investmentjt and DInvestmentjt are positively associated with the 
following country-level characteristics: extent of disclosure index; anti-director rights index; and, 
stock market capitalisation.  Further, both Investmentjt and DInvestmentjt are negatively 
associated with the extent of director liability index, the ease of shareholder suits index, legal 
origin and rule of law which is contrary to the model’s prediction. 
With respect to discretionary policies, the evidence is mixed.  Both Investmentjt and DInvestmentjt 
are positively associated with the presence of a big-four auditor but negatively associated with 
IFRS, which is inconsistent with the model prediction. 
Investmentjt and DInvestmentjt are both positively associated with the size and liquidity measured 
by the assets and the percentage trading, respectively.  The Investmentjt for the sub-sample of 
positive investment is positively associated with the reward to risk ratio and negatively associated 
with debt to assets.  The direction of the correlation is consistent with the classical investment 
theory prediction and emerging market literature.  Contrary to the model’s prediction, 
Investmentjt and DInvestmentjt are negatively associated with double taxation treaty and foreign 
exchange regime dummy and positively associated with capital controls. 
The frequency for the MENA firm-year observations by shareholder protection level (below and 
above the median) is presented in Table  3.11.  There are 1,301 firm-year observations with 
positive US mutual fund investment, 70% (917 firm-year) of which are in firms listed in MENA 
countries with high disclosure requirements, 58% (755 firm-year) in firms operating in MENA 
countries that make it easy for shareholders to hold directors liable for misconduct, 90% (1,168 
firm-year) in firms that trade in MENA countries with ease of litigation against directors and 62% 
(809 firm-year) in firms that operate in MENA countries characterised by high anti-director 
rights.  Overall, these observations reveal that US mutual fund investments are made more 
substantially in firms listed in MENA countries that offer better shareholder protection. 
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Table  3.10 Pearson correlation matrix 
Variables Investmentjt 
All sample 
(USD 
million) 
Investmentjt 
Positive 
sample 
(USD 
million) 
DInvestmentjt Extent of 
disclosure 
index 
Extent 
of 
director 
liability 
index 
Ease of 
shareholder 
suits index 
Anti-
director 
rights 
index 
Rule of 
law 
Legal 
origin 
Market 
capitalisation 
Investmentjt All sample (USD 
million) 
1.00  
 
       
Investmentjt Positive sample (USD 
million) 
- 1.00 
 
       
DInvestmentjt - - 1.00        
Extent of disclosure index 0.04
***
 -0.03 0.04
***
 1.00       
Extent of director liability index -0.10
***
 -0.17
***
 -0.09
***
 0.11
***
 1.00      
Ease of shareholder suits index -0.12
***
 -0.19
***
 -0.11
***
 0.44
***
 0.68
***
 1.00     
Anti-director rights index 0.16
***
 0.10
***
 0.15
***
 0.41
***
 -0.06
***
 -0.10
***
 1.00    
Rule of law -0.09
***
 -0.14
***
 -0.09
***
 0.19
***
 0.87
***
 0.60
***
 -0.03
**
 1.00   
Legal origin -0.09
***
 -0.10
***
 -0.08
***
 0.26
***
 0.68
***
 0.80
***
 -0.20
***
 0.69
***
 1.00  
Stock market capitalisation 0.07
***
 0.01 0.07
***
 0.45
***
 0.42
***
 0.50
***
 0.05
***
 0.23
***
 0.41
***
 1.00 
IFRS -0.05
***
 -0.11
***
 -0.04
***
 -0.07
***
 0.60
***
 0.16
***
 -0.21
***
 0.75
***
 0.44
***
 -0.03
**
 
Big-four auditor 0.14
***
 0.10
***
 0.13
***
 0.12
***
 0.20
***
 0.15
***
 0.11
***
 0.24
***
 0.24
***
 0.11
***
 
Assets 0.50
***
 0.37
***
 0.49
***
 -0.15
***
 0.03
***
 -0.16
***
 0.20
***
 -0.02
**
 -0.02
**
 0.03
***
 
Percentage Trading 0.30
***
 0.12
***
 0.30
***
 0.07
***
 -0.20
***
 -0.03
**
 0.01 -0.25
***
 -0.17
***
 0.17
***
 
Reward to risk 0.01 0.09
***
 0.01 0.03
***
 0.02 0.03
**
 0.03
***
 0.03
**
 0.02 -0.02 
Debt to assets -0.01 -0.07
**
 -0.01 0.03
***
 0.05
***
 0.06
***
 -0.01 0.05
***
 0.05
***
 0.03
**
 
Double taxation treaty -0.04
***
 -0.05
*
 -0.03
***
 0.44
***
 0.03
**
 0.68
***
 -0.01 -0.15
***
 0.31
***
 0.49
***
 
Capital controls 0.11
***
 0.06
**
 0.11
***
 -0.21
***
 0.20
***
 -0.45
***
 0.51
***
 0.24
***
 -0.14
***
 -0.22
***
 
FOREX -0.06
***
 -0.10
***
 -0.05
***
 0.63
***
 0.42
***
 0.84
***
 -0.05
***
 0.37
***
 0.54
***
 0.60
***
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table 3.8 Pearson correlation matrix 
Variables IFRS Big-four 
auditor 
Assets Percentage 
trading 
Reward to 
risk 
Debt to 
assets 
Double 
taxation 
treaty 
Capital 
controls 
IFRS 1.00  
 
 
    
Big-four auditor 0.19
***
 1.00 
 
 
    
Assets 0.02 0.29
***
 1.00  
    
Percentage trading -0.30
***
 -0.01 0.25
***
 1.00 
    
Reward to risk 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
**
 1.00 
   
Debt to assets 0.02
**
 0.01 -0.07
***
 -0.03
***
 0.00 1.00 
  
Double taxation treaty -0.51
***
 0.00 -0.16
***
 0.21
***
 0.01 0.03
***
 1.00 
 
Capital controls 0.39
***
 0.13
***
 0.33
***
 -0.22
***
 0.01 -0.02
*
 -0.76
***
 1.00 
FOREX -0.05
***
 0.10
***
 -0.18
***
 0.13
***
 0.04
***
 0.05
***
 0.72
***
 -0.54
***
 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
Table  3.11 Frequency table for investment by shareholder protection 
 
Low High Low High 
Extent of disclosure index Extent of director liability index 
Investmentjt=0 Count 
(percent) 
2,068 
(25.9) 
4,617 
(57.8) 
2,473 
(31.0) 
4,212 
(52.7) 
Investmentjt>0 
384 
(4.8) 
917 
(11.5) 
546 
(6.8) 
755 
(9.5) 
 Ease of shareholder suits index Anti-director rights index 
Investmentjt=0 Count 
(percent) 
1,105 
(13.8) 
5,580 
(69.9) 
3,791 
(47.5) 
2,894 
(36.2) 
Investmentjt>0 
133 
(1.7) 
1,168 
(14.6) 
492 
(6.2 ) 
809 
(10.1) 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  3.12 reports the results of the means test for the US mutual fund investment and firm 
characteristics for the four groups HiMktDevHiInvPro, HiMktDevLoInvPro, LoMktDevHiInvPro and 
LoMktDevLoInvPro.  As two investor protection proxies are adopted, the results from the extent of 
disclosure index and anti-director rights are presented in Panel A and Panel B respectively. 
Paired comparisons for the mean investment value in Panel A suggest that market development 
rather than shareholder protection attracting investment dollars and disclosure practices matter in 
least developed markets.  The evidence suggests that well established markets with high 
disclosure regimes can attract 2.17x more US mutual fund investment than less established low 
disclosure regimes as HiMktDevHiDisclosure attracted USD6,050,585 compared to USD2,787,246 for 
LoMktDevLoDisclosure which is statistically different at 1%.  The former is also statistically higher 
than intermediate sub-sample LoMktDevHiDisclosure attracting USD4,149,502 (1.458x) at 5% 
significance, but not statistically different from the mean investment value in HiMktDevLoDisclosure of 
USD6,578,329 (0.92x).  When comparing less developed markets and highlighting disclosure 
differences LoMktDevHiDisclosure attracts 48.9% more investment funds than LoMktDevLoDisclosure, 
reflecting a statistical difference in means at 1%.  Overall, these result show a greater flow of 
funds to well established markets with higher disclosure regimes and an implied ranking of 
HiMktDevHiDisclosure=HiMktDevLoDisclosure>LoMktDevHiDisclosure> LoMktDevLoDisclosure is identified. 
The mean number of funds investing in HiMktDevHiDisclosure is 5.608 which is significantly higher 
than the mean number of funds in all other sub-samples.  This result is not surprising if US 
mutual funds can identify quality, safe, high return investments, follow a ‘herd mentality’ or are 
affected by qualitatively similar variables when making MENA investment decisions.  It is also 
noteworthy that firms in HiMktDevHiDisclosure sub-sample generate the highest reward to risk ratio 
(0.029).  US mutual funds investment patterns also reveal that they select larger firms when 
investing in low disclosure regimes (HiMktDevLoDisclosure and LoMktDevLoDisclosure) and smaller firms 
when investing in high disclosure regimes (HiMktDevHiDisclosureand LoMktDevHiDisclosure).  Hence, 
mutual funds trade-off firm size and disclosure intensity when deciding to invest, and smaller 
firms are opportunities to invest once the basic barrier to information asymmetries is overcome.  
Further, in less developed stock markets (LoMktDevHiDisclosure and LoMktDevLoDisclosure), US mutual 
funds invest in lower leveraged firms.  Finally, investments are still made in LoMktDevLoDisclosure 
regimes but in such cases, US mutual funds select the most liquid investments. 
Qualitatively similar results are reported in Panel B.  The paired comparison demonstrates that 
market development and anti-director rights are complementary.  Mutual fund investment is 
larger among the HiMktDevHiAnti-director firms reporting a mean investment size of USD6,646,556 
compared to the LoMktDevLoInvPro firms reporting the lowest mean investment of USD2,784,364.  
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There is no statistical difference between the mean investment value in HiMktDevLoAnti-director 
(USD5,380,051) and LoMktDevHiAnti-director (USD4,896,563). 
Evidence of the quantum of investments held by US mutual funds across the four investment 
categories is consistent with the ‘Law and Finance’ theory as firms in the HiMktDevHiInvPro sub-
sample attract a higher dollar investments compared with those in the LoMktDevLoInvPro sub-sample.  
The two other sub-samples HiMktDevLoInvPro and LoMktDevHiInvPro still compete for investment 
dollars, indicating that financial market development and investor protection are complementary 
and both variables are important in securing foreign investments. 
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Table  3.12 Means test for financial market development and shareholder protection 
 
Investmentjt Number of funds Assets Debt to assets Percentage trading Reward to risk 
Panel A: Extent of disclosure index 
      
High Mkt Dev High Disclosure 6,050,585 5.608
*** 2,381 23.58 0.98*** 0.029*** 
High Mkt Dev Low Disclosure 6,578,329 4.186 8,289
*** 22.57 0.93 -0.121 
High Mkt Dev High Disclosure 6,050,585
** 5.608*** 2,381 23.58*** 0.98*** 0.029*** 
Low Mkt Dev High Disclosure 4,149,502 4.010 2,416 19.68 0.87 -0.081 
High Mkt Dev High Disclosure 6,050,585
*** 5.608*** 2,381 23.58*** 0.98 0.029*** 
Low Mkt Dev Low Disclosure 2,787,246 2.776 4,350
* 18.10 0.96 -0.088 
High Mkt Dev Low Disclosure 6,578,329
** 4.186 8,289*** 22.57** 0.93*** -0.121 
Low Mkt Dev High Disclosure 4,149,502 4.010 2,416 19.68 0.87 -0.081 
High Mkt Dev Low Disclosure 6,578,329
*** 4.186*** 8,289*** 22.57*** 0.93 -0.121 
Low Mkt Dev Low Disclosure 2,787,246 2.776 4,350 18.10 0.96
** -0.088 
Low Mkt Dev High Disclosure 4,149,502
* 4.010*** 2,416 19.68 0.87 -0.081 
Low Mkt Dev Low Disclosure 2,787,246 2.776 4,350
* 18.10 0.96*** -0.088 
Panel B: Anti-director rights index 
      
High Mkt Dev High Anti-director 6,646,556
* 5.300 3,232 20.72 0.96 0.002** 
High Mkt Dev Low Anti-director 5,380,051 4.924 6,038
*** 28.15*** 0.96 -0.053 
High Mkt Dev High Anti-director 6,646,556
* 5.300*** 3,232** 20.72 0.96*** 0.002*** 
Low Mkt Dev High Anti-director 4,896,563 3.785 2,367 18.50 0.88 -0.126 
High Mkt Dev High Anti-director 6,646,556
*** 5.300*** 3,232 20.72 0.96*** 0.002* 
Low Mkt Dev Low Anti-director 2,784,364 3.623 3,401 20.02 0.90 -0.042 
High Mkt Dev Low Anti-director 5,380,051 4.924
*** 6,038*** 28.15*** 0.96*** -0.053* 
Low Mkt Dev High Anti-director 4,896,563 3.785 2,367 18.50 0.88 -0.126 
High Mkt Dev Low Anti-director 5,380,051
*** 4.924*** 6,038*** 28.15*** 0.96*** -0.053 
Low Mkt Dev Low Anti-director 2,784,364 3.623 3,401 20.02 0.90 -0.042 
Low Mkt Dev High Anti-director 4,896,563
** 3.785 2,367 18.50 0.88 -0.126 
Low Mkt Dev Low Anti-director 2,784,364 3.623 3,401 20.02 0.90 -0.042
* 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Panels A and B of Table  3.13 show the distribution of MENA firm-year observations with respect 
to two discretionary policies, the adoption of IFRS and the selection of a big-four auditor, 
respectively.  There are 5,514 firm-year observations (69% of the sample) reporting under IFRS 
while the rest of the sample report according to their respective local accounting standards.  64% 
(838 of 1,301 firm-years) of US mutual fund investment is weighted towards firms adopting 
IFRS. 
Seven MENA countries: Bahrain; Israel; Jordan; Kuwait; Oman; Qatar; and, UAE mandatorily 
require that all publicly traded firms report their financial statements according to IFRS.  As a 
result, adopting IFRS in these countries is not a firm discretionary policy and are therefore 
excluded from further analysis.  The second part of Panel A reports firms operating in Egypt; 
Morocco; Tunisia; and, Turkey where IFRS adoption is voluntary.  There are 261 firm-year 
observations reporting under IFRS and US mutual funds invest in 43% (111 firm-years) of those 
observations. 
Table  3.13 Frequency table for investment by discretionary policies 
Panel A: IFRS 
 
All sample Investmentjt>0 Percent Voluntary IFRS Investmentjt>0 Percent 
Discretionary policy=0 2,388 449 19% 2,298 435 19% 
Discretionary policy=1 5,514 838 15% 261 111 43% 
Missing 84 14 17% 36 11 31% 
Total 7,986 1,301 16% 2,595 557 21% 
Panel B: Big-four auditor 
 
All sample Investmentjt>0 Percent 
Discretionary policy=0 2,887 298 10% 
Discretionary policy=1 4,235 856 20% 
Missing 864 147 17% 
Total 7,986 1,301 16% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
Panel B of Table  3.13 reports the frequency of firm-year observations by big-four auditor 
appointment.  The figures in panel B reveal that 59% of the sample appoints a big-four auditor.  
The frequency of firm-years with positive US mutual fund investment (856 out of 1,301 firm-
years) indicates a preference towards firms selecting a big-four auditor.  It is worthy to note that 
the auditor’s name for 11% (864 out of 7,986 firm-years) of the sample is missing. 
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3.4.2. Regression analysis 
The logistic regression results examining the relationship between US mutual fund investment in 
MENA firms and the legal environment are presented in Table  3.14.  In all cases, the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the logistic regression are jointly equal to zero is rejected on 
the basis of the chi-squared goodness to fit test-statistic. 
Logit models 1-4 in Table  3.14 regress each shareholder protection index along with the rest of 
the variables on the US mutual fund investment dummy in MENA firms.  The logistic regression 
results show that the coefficients on both disclosure (Logit 1) and anti-director rights (Logit 4) 
indices are positive and statistically significant at 1% level.  However, the coefficients on both 
the extent of director liability (Logit 2) and the ease of shareholder suits (Logit 3) are negative 
and statistically significant at 1% level.  Consistent with the model predictions, the exponential 
coefficients on shareholder protection variables suggest that, all other things equal, for a one-unit 
increase in the extent of disclosure and anti-director rights indices, the odds of a firm being 
selected by any US mutual fund increases by 43% and 54%, respectively.
77
  However, the odds of 
the firm being selected by any US mutual fund decreases by 23% and 36% for a unit increase in 
the extent of director liability and the ease of shareholder suits indices, respectively, which is 
contrary to the ‘Law and Finance’ theory predictions.  When all shareholder protection indices 
are regressed together (Logit 5-6), only the extent of disclosure index is positive and statistically 
significant at 1%.  The positive association between the extent of disclosure index and US mutual 
fund investment decision is consistent with the prior literature (Aggarwal et al., 2005; Leuz et al., 
2009; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal, Kearney, and Lucey, 2012) and reveals that 
information asymmetry in MENA countries is an important determinant in the investment 
decision of US mutual fund managers.  Disclosure of self-dealing transactions is particularly 
important in MENA firms given the concentrated ownership structure and the prevalence of 
family business and family groups that creates an environment conducive to the agency problem.  
Hence, MENA countries that mitigate the information asymmetry for foreign investors via a high 
level of corporate disclosure are able to attract more US mutual fund investments.  Further, the 
quality of the legal rules protecting minority shareholder rights as stated in the legislation is also 
an important determinant of US mutual fund investment. 
Law enforcement as measured by the rule of law is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level except when combined with the extent of disclosure index and anti-director rights index 
(Logit 1 and 4).  When the overall ‘Law and Finance’ theory variables are considered collectively 
                                                 
77
 (e
0.3560
-1)*100=43% for the extent of disclosure index and (e
0.4331
-1)*100=54% for anti-director rights index. 
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(Logit 6) the exponential coefficients on the rule of law suggest that for a one-unit increase in the 
rule of law, the odds of the firm being selected by any US mutual fund increases by 431%.  The 
result is consistent with the model predictions and also consistent with Chan et al. (2005) and 
Staats and Biglaiser (2011) but contrary to Ferreira and Matos (2008) finding that law and its 
enforcement are negatively related to attracting foreign institutions.  The effect of law 
enforcement on US mutual fund investment decision highlights the fact that the quality of the law 
alone is insufficient to attract foreign investment unless it is empowered by enforcement that 
constrains corporate conduct (Testy, 1997). 
The legal origin variable is statistically insignificant from zero in all cases but Logit 2, which is 
also contrary to the model predictions.  Given that US mutual funds derive from an English 
common law legal origin, the theory predicts that US mutual funds tend to invest more in 
countries with the same legal origin.  The irrelevance of the legal origin in MENA countries can 
be explained on two grounds.  Legal origin is an imprecise measure reflecting history but no 
longer relevant as laws become more internationally standardised (Roe, 2006; Siems, 2007).  
Contemporary laws in MENA countries are able to overcome the colonial heritage of the legal 
origin and legislate to attract foreign investment due to the harmonisation of corporate 
governance practices pursued by the OECD and the World Bank.  Further, should US mutual 
fund managers prefer common law legal origin, considering their investment in MENA only will 
not detect this preference since most MENA countries belong to French civil law legal origin. 
Financial market development measured by the stock market capitalisation is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level (Logit 1 and 2) and at 5% level (Logit 4).  The average 
marginal effect for the stock market capitalisation is 0.023 where all covariates are at their 
observed values in the estimation sample, indicating that for each 10% increase in the stock 
market capitalisation, the probability that a US mutual fund invests increases by 23%.
78
  When all 
the ‘Law and Finance’ variables are regressed together (Logit 5 and 6), the coefficient on the 
stock market capitalisation loses significance.  The positive association between stock market 
development and the probability of foreign investment is consistent with Portes and Rey (2005), 
Aggarwal et al. (2012), Kim and Wu (2008), Daude and Fratzscher (2008) and Roque and Cortez 
(2014).  The higher the depth and breadth of stock markets, the greater the choices available for 
foreign investors to diversify their portfolios.  Further, developed stock markets operate at a low 
transaction cost and provide high liquidity which makes it easy to enter and exit the market. 
The firm-level controls show that US mutual funds are more likely to invest in large and liquid 
MENA firms that generate positive returns and hold less debt.  This result is consistent with the 
                                                 
78
                               .  The results are based on Logit 1 coefficients. 
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classic investment theory and emerging market literature (Kang and Stulz, 1997; Berrill and 
Kearney, 2013).  This reveals that the reported Morningstar
®
 Principia
®
 data on US mutual fund 
investment focuses on stocks that clearly are easily traded, avoiding concerns about US mutual 
funds being ‘locked-into’ international share registries, and they can utilise with relative ease an 
‘exit’ strategy if required. 
Country-level controls show that the presence of a double taxation treaty with the US is not 
associated with US mutual fund investment in MENA.  This result contradicts Kang and Stulz 
(1997) argument that foreign investors would find it difficult to get refunds for taxes paid abroad.  
The capital controls have no significant effect on US mutual fund investment, which is consistent 
with Ahearne et al. (2004) where barriers to capital inflows are diminishing in the world financial 
markets.  The coefficient on the variable FOREX indicates that US mutual funds invest in firms 
that operate in countries with a pegged exchange rate regime, which is contrary to Aggarwal et al. 
(2005) who find that US mutual funds invest more in emerging markets with floating exchange 
rate regimes. 
The tobit regression results for the effect of legal environment and financial market development 
on US mutual fund investment in MENA firms are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the 
logistic regression results (see Appendix 6). 
The interpretation of the logistic coefficients is not intuitive since the dependent variable is the 
log odds ratio.  The effects of the independent variables on the probabilities are more informative 
than the logistic regression coefficients (Pampel, 2000, p. 19). Figure  3.8 shows the average 
predictive margins for shareholder protection indices estimated in Logit 1-4 in Table  3.14.  The 
graphs in Figure  3.8 show how the probability of US mutual funds investing in MENA firms 
changes by each shareholder protection index.  The top left and bottom right graphs show that 
firms operating in countries with low disclosure and anti-director rights indices with a score of 1 
have a 6.6% and 10.8% probability of being a destination for US mutual fund investment, 
respectively.  However, as the scores of the extent of disclosure and the anti-director rights 
indices increase, the predicted probability of investment rises.  When the extent of disclosure and 
anti-director rights indices are at the maximum (10 and 6), the predicted probabilities of 
investment are 28.4% and 28.3%, respectively.  In contrast, the top right and bottom left figures 
show that as the extent of director liability and the ease of shareholder suits indices increase the 
probability of the firm being a destination for US mutual fund investment decreases. 
Figure  3.9 considers the average marginal effect for the interaction between shareholder 
protection and legal origin on US mutual fund investment.  The blue line presents the effect of 
shareholder protection in MENA countries with civil law legal origin while the red line presents 
  
166 
the effect of shareholder protection on US mutual fund investment in MENA countries with 
common law legal origin. 
The top left graph shows that the extent of disclosure index is important for US mutual fund 
investment decision particularly in MENA countries with French civil law legal origin.  Below a 
certain threshold of 3.5 for the extent of disclosure index, US mutual funds are almost indifferent 
about the legal origin.  However, when the extent of disclosure index increases above 3.5 the 
probability of investing in a country with French civil law legal origin increases more than the 
increase in the probability for countries with common law legal origin.  The top right graph 
shows that the extent of director liability index has an opposite effect on the US mutual fund 
investment decisions by legal origin.  The probability of a firm being selected by a US mutual 
fund is positively associated with the extent of director liability index in countries with common 
law legal origin.  The opposite is true for MENA countries with French civil law legal origin.  
The graph on the bottom left indicates that the ease of shareholder suits index is almost irrelevant 
for US mutual fund investment decision in countries with common law legal origin.  However, 
the probability of a firm being selected decreases as the score for the ease of shareholder suits 
index increases in countries with French civil law legal origin.  Finally, the bottom right graph 
shows that the probability of a firm being selected by US mutual funds increases as the anti-
director rights index increases in countries with French civil law legal origin, but it stays 
relatively flat for MENA countries with common law legal origin. 
These graphical relationships indicate that US mutual funds consider pre-emptive rights more 
important when investing in French civil law legal origin countries and remedial rights more 
important when investing in English common law legal origin countries.  The difference can be 
reconciled due to the prevailing dominance of common law in terms of law enforcement and the 
quality of legal rules protecting investors.  Common law operates on a shareholder-governance 
model where information asymmetry between corporate manager and shareholders is resolved 
primarily through public disclosure of financial information.  In contrast, the French civil law 
countries establish an informal network of relationships to perform the enforcement tasks in lieu 
of formal institutional arrangements (Habib, 2007, p. 2). 
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Table  3.14 Logistic results for investment, legal environment and financial market development 
Dependent variable: DInvestmentjt Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3 Logit 4 Logit 5 Logit 6 
‘Law and Finance’ theory 
Extent of disclosure index 0.3560*** 
   
0.3133*** 0.3545*** 
 
(0.062) 
   
(0.063) (0.077) 
Extent of director liability index 
 
-0.2560*** 
  
0.0245 -0.1640 
  
(0.057) 
  
(0.104) (0.186) 
Ease of shareholder suits index 
  
-0.4441*** 
 
-0.2761 -0.0603 
   
(0.111) 
 
(0.202) (0.237) 
Anti-director rights index 
   
0.4331*** 
 
-0.5465 
    
(0.153) 
 
(0.367) 
Rule of law 0.3260 1.4556*** 1.9336*** -0.1538 1.3344** 1.6693*** 
 
(0.355) (0.451) (0.535) (0.338) (0.539) (0.633) 
Legal origin -0.4129 -0.5995** 0.0047 -0.2140 -0.0707 -0.7768 
 
(0.267) (0.265) (0.305) (0.258) (0.393) (0.729) 
Stock market capitalisation 0.3153*** 0.3825*** 0.1102 0.2941** 0.1691 0.2950 
 
(0.112) (0.114) (0.126) (0.118) (0.154) (0.216) 
Firm-level controls 
Assets 1.1614*** 1.1153*** 1.1041*** 1.1222*** 1.1520*** 1.1563*** 
 
(0.070) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.070) (0.095) 
Percentage trading 4.7101*** 4.6288*** 4.8726*** 4.6276*** 4.8159*** 4.8141*** 
 
(0.569) (0.561) (0.557) (0.565) (0.558) (1.083) 
Reward to risk 0.0924*** 0.0727 0.0809** 0.0864*** 0.0867*** 0.0880** 
 
(0.028) (0.044) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033) (0.040) 
Debt to assets -0.0166*** -0.0144*** -0.0160*** -0.0153*** -0.0165*** -0.0163*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Country-level controls 
Double taxation treaty -0.4109 0.1377 1.5890*** -0.9285** 0.7349 0.9568** 
 
(0.426) (0.429) (0.602) (0.468) (0.807) (0.413) 
Capital controls -0.5854 0.2492 -0.1018 -0.9128* -0.5536 0.7265 
 
(0.400) (0.395) (0.389) (0.490) (0.437) (0.924) 
FOREX -1.0113*** 0.1611 0.6453** 0.2169 -0.5968 -0.8693*** 
 
(0.377) (0.270) (0.294) (0.276) (0.396) (0.301) 
 
Constant -21.1958*** -20.4363*** -14.5856*** -19.4253*** -17.6008*** -19.6409*** 
 
(2.999) (2.953) (3.287) (3.054) (3.781) (4.322) 
Industry and Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
N 7,918 7,918 7,918 7,986 7,918 7,918 
 
Pseudo R-squared 46.43% 45.74% 45.63% 45.57% 46.57% 46.68% 
 
Log likelihood -1877.41 -1901.53 -1905.44 -1932.01 -1872.55 -1868.75 
 
Chi-squared 454.13*** 452.49*** 485.23*** 444.27*** 486.27*** 435.14*** 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Figure  3.8 Predictive margins for shareholder protection indices 
  
  
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Figure  3.9 Predictive margins for shareholder protection indices by legal origin 
  
  
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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The logistic regression results for the joint effect of financial market development and 
shareholder protection are presented in Table  3.15.  These tests establish whether the US mutual 
funds follow investment practices according to ‘Law and Finance’ prediction and also identify 
which of the two aspects (financial market development vs. investor protection) matters most for 
the investment decision. Logit 1-3 are based on the extent of disclosure index whereas Logit 4-6 
are based on the anti-director rights index as the basis for shareholder protection. 
Logit 1-3 identify a ‘priority’ of preferred investment strategy. US mutual funds invest more 
frequently in well established markets with high disclosure regimes (HiMktDevHiInvPro) and also in 
well established markets with low disclosure regimes (HiMktDevLoInvPro), followed by less 
established markets with high disclosure regimes (LoMktDevHiInvPro) and have the lowest 
investment likelihood in less established markets with low disclosure regimes (LoMktDevLoInvPro). 
This ranking is derived from coefficient comparison and the Wald test results. In Logit 3, the 
coefficients on HiMktDevHiInvPro, HiMktDevLoInvPro and LoMktDevLoInvPro are statistically different from 
the base case LoMktDevHiInvPro. The signs of the coefficients in the first two cases are both positive 
and significant at 1% and 5 % which suggest that the joint effect of stock market development 
and disclosure leads to enhanced mutual fund investment. However, the impact of the negative 
coefficient in the lowest market and disclosure regime (significant at 1%) suggests that poor 
investment environments actively dissuade foreign investment in MENA stock markets 
The Wald test result for the null hypothesis   =   is not rejected, which indicates that the 
likelihood of US mutual funds investing in firms listed in countries with well established markets 
with high disclosure regimes (HiMktDevHiInvPro) is not statistically different from the likelihood of 
investing in firms listed in well established markets with low disclosure regimes 
(HiMktDevLoInvPro).  The equality of the coefficients on HiMktDevHiInvPro and HiMktDevLoInvPro indicates 
that financial market development is more important than shareholder protection in attracting US 
mutual fund investment.  However, the coefficients on LoMktDevLoInvPro being lower than 
LoMktDevHiInvPro indicate that disclosure matters particularly in less established MENA stock 
markets.  The findings identify that financial market development and shareholder protection 
mechanisms are complementary factors. 
Using anti-director rights index as the basis for shareholder protection in Logit 4-6, the likelihood 
of US mutual fund investment in MENA firms follows the following behaviour, 
HiMktDevHiInvPro=LoMktDevHiInvPro=HiMktDevLoInvPro>LoMktDevLoInvPro for Logit 5 and 6. This result 
suggests that countries operating least developed markets and offering low minority shareholder 
rights (measured by the anti-director rights) attract the least foreign investment relative to the 
other groups. 
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Table  3.15 Logistic results for investment and the interaction between shareholder protection and financial market development 
  
Extent of disclosure index  Anti-director rights index 
Dependent variable: DInvestmentjt Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3  Logit 4 Logit 5 Logit 6 
‘Law and Finance’ theory 
HiMktDevHiInvPro (β1) -0.0451 0.3853* 0.7877***  0.2991 -0.0159 0.3481 
 
(0.219) (0.224) (0.212)  (0.286) (0.281) (0.288) 
HiMktDevLoInvPro (β2) -0.5116* 0.3312 0.6162**  -0.7805** 0.4115 0.7255* 
 
(0.297) (0.274) (0.284)  (0.317) (0.367) (0.403) 
LoMktDevLoInvPro (β3) -2.7268*** -2.5513*** -2.1629***  -0.9824** -1.2403*** -1.2455*** 
 
(0.740) (0.738) (0.722)  (0.425) (0.418) (0.412) 
Legal origin 
 
-1.1945*** -0.9861***  
 
-1.6220*** -1.3768*** 
  
(0.297) (0.300)  
 
(0.365) (0.374) 
Rule of law 
  
-1.2721***  
  
-1.3760*** 
   
(0.384)  
  
(0.390) 
Firm-level controls 
Size 1.1061*** 1.1633*** 1.1625***  1.1566*** 1.1806*** 1.1832*** 
 
(0.066) (0.069) (0.070)  (0.069) (0.070) (0.071) 
Percentage trading 5.1565*** 5.0704*** 5.1323***  5.1643*** 5.0393*** 5.1212*** 
 
(0.561) (0.572) (0.568)  (0.576) (0.564) (0.561) 
Return to risk 0.0933*** 0.0813* 0.0783  0.0823** 0.0606 0.0569 
 
(0.026) (0.043) (0.059)  (0.040) (0.082) (0.103) 
Debt to assets -0.0183*** -0.0195*** -0.0183***  -0.0189*** -0.0191*** -0.0180*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Country-level controls 
Double taxation treaties -2.6461*** -2.1440** -2.2444***  -0.1888 -0.2721 -0.7605 
 
(0.833) (0.839) (0.839)  (0.489) (0.491) (0.495) 
Country capital controls -2.2044*** -1.6581** -0.8281  -0.1003 -0.0296 0.4357 
 
(0.840) (0.841) (0.843)  (0.523) (0.533) (0.558) 
FOREX 0.3316 0.6323** 1.0372***  0.2699 0.4772* 0.9757*** 
 
(0.243) (0.259) (0.306)  (0.235) (0.248) (0.303) 
Free trade agreements 0.0808 0.9653*** 1.4785***  1.0093*** 1.0153*** 1.5909*** 
 
(0.193) (0.275) (0.297)  (0.286) (0.288) (0.294) 
 
Constant -9.3888*** -10.6253*** -11.2741***  -12.5111*** -12.1312*** -12.4677*** 
 
(1.288) (1.260) (1.286)  (1.118) (1.090) (1.129) 
Industry and time effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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Extent of disclosure index  Anti-director rights index 
Dependent variable: DInvestmentjt Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3  Logit 4 Logit 5 Logit 6 
 
N 7,986 7,986 7,986  7,986 7,986 7,986 
Pseudo R-squared 45.36% 46.28% 46.65%  45.92% 46.34% 46.78% 
Log likelihood -1939.27 -1906.77 -1893.68  -1919.55 -1904.50 -1888.92 
Chi-squared 466.76*** 494.12*** 481.69***  483.05*** 480.28*** 465.82*** 
Wald test 
β1=β2 Chi-squared 3.65** 0.06 0.58  11.44*** 1.13 0.86 
β1=β3 Chi-squared 14.58*** 16.91*** 17.16***  12.36*** 10.41*** 21.21*** 
β2=β3 Chi-squared 9.13*** 
 
14.98*** 14.09***  0.31 17.45*** 23.11*** 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Tobit regression results for the joint effect of financial market development and shareholder 
protection in Appendix 6 are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the logistic results. 
In summary, the fact that the coefficients on LoMktDevLoInvPro being the lowest is consistent with 
the ‘Law and Finance’ theory whereas the fact that the coefficients on HiMktDevHiInvPro are not 
always the largest coefficients of all is contradictory to the theory’s prediction.  The joint effect 
of financial market development and the extent of disclosure index shows that financial market 
development is the most important factor to attract foreign investment followed by the extent of 
disclosure index.  The anti-director rights index results show that US mutual funds avoid 
investing in countries operating least developed stock markets and offering the lowest minority 
shareholder protection. However, the investment is equally likely in all other groups. 
The importance of disclosure for the investment decision poses the question whether firms 
operating in poor shareholder protection countries can adopt policies that signal their 
commitment to higher disclosure practices and attract foreign investment that ultimately lowers 
their cost of capital.  The logistic regression results for two firm discretionary policies, adopting 
IFRS (Table  3.16) and selecting a big-four auditor (Table  3.17). 
In terms of IFRS adoption, Logit 1 shows that the coefficient on IFRS is positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level.  When the firm size is added into the regression (Logit 2), the coefficient 
on IFRS is positive and significant at 10% level.  The loss of significance is expected because 
large firms are more likely to also adopt IFRS.  These results indicate that the odds of a US 
mutual fund investing increases by 164% and 58% for MENA firms adopting IFRS.  The 
adoption of IFRS provides reassurance of a common framework for accounting and financial 
disclosure which is valued by US mutual fund managers. 
Logit 3 and 4 indicate the incremental effect for adopting IFRS.  In Logit 3, the coefficient on the 
extent of disclosure index is positive and statistically significant at 1% level indicating a positive 
disclosure effect on the likelihood of investment for MENA firms that do not adopt IFRS.  The 
coefficient on the interaction term IFRS_disclosure is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level, indicating that IFRS provides a positive signal of quality and disclosure which in turn 
increases the likelihood of US investment in MENA firms.  The sum of the two coefficients on 
the extent of disclosure index and IFRS_disclosure indicates the total effect of extent of 
disclosure index on the likelihood of US investment for firms adopting IFRS.  The incremental 
effect is statistically insignificant from zero in Logit 4 due to the inclusion of firm size. 
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Logit 5 and 6 examine whether adopting IFRS in countries with high disclosure requirements 
affect the likelihood of US mutual funds investing in MENA firms.
79
  The Wald test results in 
Logit 5 indicate that firms adopting IFRS and listed in countries with high disclosure requirement 
enhances the prospect of US mutual fund investment to a greater extent than firms that fail to 
adopt IFRS and still operate under the same disclosure environment.  The IFRS effect disappears 
once the size of the firm is included in the regression (Logit 6). 
Overall, foreign investor uncertainty about investment risk diminishes with IFRS adoption as 
financial reporting quality is enhanced and comparability of reports improves, which in turn 
substantially reduce the private costs of information processing for foreign investors.  This result 
is consistent with Aggarwal et al. (2005) and Covring et al. (2007) findings that mutual fund 
ownership is higher in counties that voluntarily adopt IFRS but are contrary to Beneish, Miller, 
and Yohn (2010) and Beneish and Yohn (2008) findings that IFRS adoption does not affect 
investment in foreign equities. 
The logistic regression results for the impact of selecting a big-four auditor on the investment 
decision is presented in Table  3.17.  The coefficient on big-four is positive and statistically 
significant from zero at 1% level in Logit 1.  However, the coefficient on big-four loses 
significance when the firm size is included in the regression (Logit 2).  This is hardly surprising 
that since large firms are more likely to appoint a big-four auditor.  The exponential coefficient 
on the big-4 dummy in Logit 1 is 3.00 suggesting that the odds of US mutual fund investing 
increases by 200% for firms choosing a big-four auditor. 
Logit 3 and 4 show the incremental effect for selecting a big-four auditor.  In Logit 3, the 
coefficient on the extent of disclosure index is statistically insignificant from zero indicating that 
disclosure does not affect the likelihood of investment for MENA firms that do not select a big-
four auditor.  This result is contrary to the previous results and also counterintuitive.  The 
coefficient on the interaction term big-four_disclosure is positive and statistically significant at 
1% level, indicating a 17% incremental effect on the likelihood of US investment for MENA 
firms selecting a big-four auditor.  Once the firm size is included in the regression (Logit 4), the 
coefficient on the extent of disclosure index is positive and statistically significant from zero at 
1% level indicating that disclosure positively affects the likelihood of investment for MENA 
firms that do not select a big-four auditor.  However, the coefficient on big-four_disclosure effect 
is statistically insignificant from zero with firm size included. 
                                                 
79
 There are not enough firms in the sub-sample to test whether IFRS adoption is important in poor disclosure 
environment because this section uses only a sub-sample of MENA firms that operate in countries in which IFRS 
adopting is voluntary.  The analysis excludes firms listed in countries where IFRS is compulsory as IFRS adoption in 
these countries is not a true choice. 
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Logit 5 and 6 show the effect of selecting a big-four auditor while operating in a country with a 
high disclosure requirement.  The Wald test results indicate that selecting a big-four auditor in 
countries with a high disclosure requirement positively affirms the likelihood of investment.  
Logit 7 and 8 show the effect of selecting a big-four auditor while operating in a country with a 
low disclosure requirement.  Logit 7 reveals that adopting a big-four auditor is advantageous for 
attracting foreign investment, but when firm size is controlled for in Logit 8, the effect of 
appointing a big-four auditor disappears. 
These results are consistent with prior literature where big-four auditor appointment is associated 
with increased levels of mutual fund investment (Chou et al., 2014).  Big-four auditor 
appointment is perceived as a solid mechanism to reduce agency problems as big-four auditors 
lend their internationally recognised reputation capital thereby protecting and signalling quality 
accounting disclosures.  Consequently, the financial statements audited by the big-four are 
regarded as more reliable by investors.  Thus, the appointment of a big-four auditor is interpreted 
by foreign investors as a signal of firm quality. 
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Table  3.16 Logistic results for investment and accounting standards selection 
Dependent variable: DInvestmentjt Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3 Logit 4 Logit 5 Logit 6 
Firm discretionary policy 
IFRS  0.9707*** 0.4543* 
    
 
(0.215) (0.255) 
    
Extent of disclosure index  
  
0.2838*** 0.4640*** 
  
   
(0.070) (0.077) 
  
IFRS_disclosure  
  
0.0978*** 0.0252 
  
   
(0.025) (0.030) 
  
IFRS_Hi Disclosure (β1)     
1.3389*** 1.0738** 
     
(0.354) (0.431) 
No IFRS-Hi Disclosure (β2)     
0.2266 0.8197*** 
     
(0.192) (0.251) 
Firm-level controls 
Size 
 
1.0975*** 
 
1.1911*** 
 
1.1280*** 
  
(0.105) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.109) 
Percentage trading 2.7969*** 1.8836*** 2.4979*** 1.5061** 2.7028*** 1.6840*** 
 
(0.649) (0.609) (0.628) (0.602) (0.665) (0.612) 
Return to risk 0.1013 0.0154 0.1618 0.0453 0.0935 0.0243 
 
(0.207) (0.021) (0.210) (0.108) (0.216) (0.028) 
Debt to assets -0.0064* -0.0165*** -0.0061* -0.0190*** -0.0065* -0.0166*** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Country-level controls 
FOREX 0.2184 0.8594*** -0.7936** -0.6188* 0.2676 0.8026*** 
  (0.233) (0.273) (0.335) (0.366) (0.228) (0.271) 
Free trade agreements 0.8517** 0.5665 0.7821** 0.3726 0.7151* 0.4574 
  (0.361) (0.399) (0.352) (0.390) (0.375) (0.412) 
 
Constant -3.1993** -8.8439*** -3.6496*** -10.6964*** -3.1064** -9.2267*** 
  
(1.386) (1.212) (1.325) (1.416) (1.394) (1.260) 
 
Industry and time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
N 2,559 2,559 2,559 2,559 2,435 2,435 
 
Pseudo R-squared 10.83% 34.92% 11.73% 38.00% 10.50% 35.06% 
 
Log likelihood -1182.82 -863.31 -1170.96 -822.45 -1156.58 -839.17 
 
Chi-squared 113.20*** 209.16*** 115.60*** 202.19*** 94.00*** 184.90*** 
Wald test β1=β2 Chi-squared     
14.11*** 0.50 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Table  3.17 Logistic results for investment and auditor selection 
Dependent variable: DInvestmentjt Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3 Logit 4 Logit 5 Logit 6 Logit 7 Logit 8 
Firm 
discretionary 
policy 
Big-four 1.1001*** 0.0538 
     
  
 
(0.136) (0.165) 
     
  
Extent of disclosure index 
  
0.0759 0.3641*** 
   
  
   
(0.052) (0.061) 
   
  
Big-four_disclosure 
  
0.1553*** -0.0166 
   
  
   
(0.023) (0.025) 
   
  
Big-four_Hi disclosure (β1)     
0.6981*** 0.5359** 
 
  
     
(0.177) (0.217) 
 
  
Nobig-four_Hi disclosure 
(β2) 
    
-0.4898** 0.2669 
 
  
     
(0.198) (0.232) 
 
  
Big-four_Lo disclosure (β3)       
0.1920 -0.5083** 
       
(0.186) (0.235) 
Nobig-four_Lo disclosure 
(β4) 
      
-0.9716*** -0.3295 
       
(0.222) (0.236) 
Firm-level 
controls 
Size 
 
1.0868*** 
 
1.1445*** 
 
1.0992*** 
 
1.1201*** 
  
(0.069) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.068) 
Percentage trading 6.0538*** 5.1385*** 5.8707*** 5.0153*** 5.8677*** 5.1285*** 5.9432*** 5.0996*** 
 
(0.532) (0.540) (0.526) (0.556) (0.541) (0.558) (0.545) (0.560) 
Return to risk 0.0948*** 0.0895*** 0.0922*** 0.0888*** 0.4524*** 0.1937 0.5522*** 0.2046 
 
(0.025) (0.028) (0.024) (0.033) (0.135) (0.173) (0.134) (0.172) 
Debt to assets -0.0012 -0.0175*** -0.0006 -0.0173*** 0.0001 -0.0163*** 0.0001 -0.0163*** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) 
Country-level 
controls 
FOREX -0.5833*** 0.0590 -1.0334*** -0.8173*** -0.7799*** -0.3217 -0.7327*** -0.2964 
 
(0.139) (0.172) (0.193) (0.214) (0.168) (0.197) (0.163) (0.196) 
Free trade agreements -0.3947*** 0.2549 -0.4613*** 0.1749 -0.4927*** 0.2215 -0.1636 0.2787 
 
(0.138) (0.169) (0.140) (0.171) (0.143) (0.177) (0.141) (0.170) 
 
Constant -6.0853*** -11.9586*** -5.9638*** -13.8379*** -5.0969*** -12.1515*** -5.0186*** -11.8090*** 
  
(0.728) (1.011) (0.735) (1.159) (0.700) (1.017) (0.757) (1.027) 
 
Industry and time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Dependent variable: DInvestmentjt Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3 Logit 4 Logit 5 Logit 6 Logit 7 Logit 8 
 
N 7,122 7,122 7,072 7,072 6,584 6,584 6,584 6,584 
 
Pseudo R-squared 23.81% 44.90% 23.55% 46.28% 23.46% 45.97% 22.56% 45.91% 
 
Log likelihood -2403.89 -1738.53 -2380.16 -1672.47 -2234.08 -1577.17 -2260.40 -1578.73 
 
Chi-squared 304.96*** 418.84*** 316.64*** 405.00*** 293.38*** 442.33*** 288.25*** 430.22*** 
Wald test β1=β2 Chi-squared     
42.56*** 1.70* 26.63*** 0.49 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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3.5. Conclusion 
3.5.1. Summary and implications 
This research tests whether the US mutual fund investment in the MENA stock markets is driven 
by financial market development and shareholder protection concerns as the ‘Law and Finance’ 
theory predicts.  Additionally, the research examines whether firms can signal their quality by 
adopting IFRS and appointing a big-four auditor despite the legal shortcomings in the country of 
listing.  The research question is largely motivated by the characteristics of the MENA stock 
markets where ownership concentration, state ownership, and the dominance of family business 
and business groups have consequences on the substantive corporate governance practices.  Such 
circumstances increase the information asymmetry particularly to foreign investors where the role 
of minority shareholder protection is needed the most.  Corporate governance is particularly 
important in MENA since these countries do not have long-established financial institutional 
infrastructures (Braendle, 2012, p. 1).  The essay complements studies of La Porta et al. (1997, 
1998) by modelling the joint impact of financial market development and legal environment in 
drawing foreign investment into emerging stock markets. 
The sample includes firms that are only locally listed in 11 MENA stock markets for 2008-2012.  
The investment by the US mutual funds is derived from Morningstar
® 
Principia
®
.  The models are 
estimated using both logistic and tobit regressions models where the later used to deal with biases 
that may arise due to sample selection. 
Results indicate that US mutual fund investment is positively associated with both financial 
market development and particular legal rules protecting minority shareholders in the destination 
MENA country.  Deficiencies in the rule of law in the region seriously affect the prospects for 
foreign investments. 
There are certain legal rules protecting minority shareholders rights in MENA investment 
situations that matter for US mutual funds.  Among the four measures of minority shareholder 
protection mechanisms studied, the country-level disclosure standards in relation to anti self-
dealing transactions are critical.  Firms listed in countries with poor disclosure practices usually 
experience lower levels of foreign investment.  It is also observed that the probability of US 
mutual fund investment increases as disclosure levels increase.  The results imply that poor 
disclosure practices increase information asymmetries, particularly for foreign investors.  
Therefore, foreign investors refrain from investments that provide little information about the 
firm’s transactions and dealings and shun countries that do not focus on legal environment 
conducive towards disclosures that a foreign investor requires. 
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The ability to hold directors liable for misconduct and the ease of litigation are both unexpectedly 
negatively associated with the US mutual fund investment decision whereas the provisions of the 
statutory law that grant protection for minority shareholders as measured in the anti-director 
rights index is positively associated with US investment. 
It appears that US mutual funds perceive the pre-emptive shareholder rights as more important 
determinants of investment decision making than remedial rights, particularly in MENA countries 
with French civil law legal origin.  In other words, it is an important screening process for US 
mutual funds to access relevant information prior to investment.  If self-dealing occurred and US 
mutual funds were unable to protect their investments, US mutual funds will exit from the 
investment by liquidating their investment holdings rather than seek remedial action via litigation 
in a foreign legal jurisdiction. 
This new evidence reinforces the importance of high-quality disclosure allowing foreign 
investors to monitor and protect their investments and efficiently allocate capital.  These results 
have policy implications and show how countries and firms can create improvements to the 
investment environment that support enhanced foreign institutional investment in the MENA 
region.  Given that US mutual funds constitute the largest source of equity capital in the world, 
MENA countries have strong incentives to attract this investment pool to improve market 
liquidity by enhancing dissemination of quality information for listed firms.  As MENA stock 
markets are open to greater foreign participation, the demand for greater transparency is 
inevitable (Stovall, 2000, p. 844).  Additionally, the resulting foreign demand for MENA firms 
lowers their cost of capital thus allowing them to compete more effectively in the global 
marketplace.  MENA firms seeking to expand their shareholder base and attract foreign 
investment, but are listed in countries with poor disclosure quality can attempt to reduce the 
concentrated ownership patterns thereby improving the free float or overcome the disclosure 
shortcomings by cross listing the firm’s securities in stock markets with improved disclosure 
requirements.  The adoption of IFRS and appointing a big-four auditor will also positively attract 
foreign shareholders. 
3.5.2. Limitations 
The period of analysis includes two important events; the GFC and the Arab Spring.  Both of 
which are expected to affect the foreign portfolio investment in the MENA region.  The MENA 
stock markets remained reasonably insulated from the worst effects of the GFC (World Bank, 
2011).  The regional turbulence in 2011 and beyond and the political instability that resulted in 
the fall of the regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya affected the MENA stock markets more than 
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the GFC.  The events of the Arab Spring have increased the uncertainty and negatively affected 
investors’ confidence and resulted in large losses for virtually all MENA markets in 2011, 
especially in Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria (OECD, 2012, p. 9; World Bank, 2011, p. 50).  Ahmed 
and Zlate (2014) and Ahmed and Mmolainyane (2014, p. 222) report that significant changes in 
the behaviour of net inflows in emerging markets from before GFC to the post-crisis period, 
especially for portfolio investment.  Additionally, the unconventional US monetary expansion 
positively affected total and portfolio inflows.  Morningstar
®
 Principia
®
 provides no data on the 
country allocation before 2008 hence it is infeasible to assess how much US mutual fund 
investments allocation change pre and post crisis as well as their sensitivity to the political 
regional turmoil. 
As MENA stock markets are characterised by varying degrees of illiquidity and thin trading, the 
monthly returns and the standard deviations used in the calculation of the reward to risk ratio may 
produce biased coefficients.  Thin trading adjustment of Maynes and Rumsey (1993) is ultimately 
required to fine tune this analysis. 
As US mutual funds voluntarily report to Morningstar
®
 Principia
®
, sample selection bias was 
considered and was addressed by estimating Tobit regressions.  Alternatively, Heckman selection 
model for sample selection bias can be used. 
An important concern is that US mutual fund investment is endogenously determined.  A firm/ 
country with good governance may be more likely to attract foreign institutional investors.  
Moreover, a firm/country with expected future governance improvements is also more likely to 
attract foreign institutional investors.  Alternatively, it is foreign investment that induces changes 
in governance.  This endogeneity plagues all corporate governance studies and thus cautious 
interpretation of the economic consequences is warranted (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003, p. 8). 
3.5.3. Further research 
The essay sample excludes all MENA firms that have securities listed outside MENA stock 
markets to properly measure the impact of national laws on attracting foreign investment.  A 
natural extension is to compare and contrast the characteristics of both solely listed and dual 
listed MENA firms.  In undertaking such analysis, the role of signalling quality in listing 
elsewhere is considered.  The cross-listing decision is another discretionary choice, and further 
research can establish if cross listed firms are different from those who are listed at home.  
Distinguishing these effects has important economic implications.  The salient differences in 
regulatory framework for the cross-listed securities must also be mapped along the lines 
considered in this thesis for MENA countries.  Another extension to this research is to analyse the 
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firm's cost of capital as a consequence of the level of foreign share ownership. Well-diversified 
and foreign shareholders are expected to lower the firm’s cost of equity capital and allow the firm 
to gain global competitive advantages in financing structure. 
Fund-level data is available in the database but the details were not considered in this thesis.  
Analysis of fund level choices opens up further research possibilities that take into consideration 
the fund objectives and identify the benefit of diversification for each fund based on its reported 
and specific yearly portfolio holdings.  Instead of firm-level analysis, the determinants of the 
mutual fund investment in MENA can be analysed by considering the percentage of the fund 
portfolio invested in a specific MENA country. 
The present research is merely a beginning point.  An attempt has been made to dig a little deeper 
into the factors that seem to matter to US mutual funds when investing in MENA.  In so doing, a 
more detailed analysis of the legal environment and voluntary choice variables of IFRS and 
auditor choice have been considered.  It is reasonable to conclude that both shareholder 
protection and the level of financial market development matter to US mutual funds when 
considering investment in listed MENA firms. 
  
  
183 
CHAPTER 4  
Final remarks  
The thesis includes two essays that highlight the integral role of both legal rules and culture to 
financial market development and global investment decisions.  The first essay examines the 
impact of the legal rules protecting creditors and shareholders and culture on the development of 
credit and stock markets in MENA.  The second essay extends the analysis by considering how 
the stock market development and the legal environment protecting minority shareholders affect 
US mutual fund investments in MENA firms.  The conceptual framework of the ‘Law and 
Finance’ theory, developed by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV) and 
subsequent critiques have shaped and informed this thesis in three ways by: 
▪ broadening the legal origin framework to account for legal hegemony in a more realistic 
setting.  While the laws of the former colonisers have roots in the legal rules of MENA 
countries, the region provides a unique setting of hybrid legal systems.  The contemporary 
MENA laws are developed to reconcile the differences between Islamic traditions and 
Western transplanted laws.  Further, Islamic traditions in the MENA integrate both religion 
and state so that the impact of Islam is pervasive in both religious practice and enshrined in 
the constitution as a legislative source.  Thus, the dichotomous classification of countries 
into common and civil legal origins is not sufficient to capture the interaction of legal 
traditions in MENA.  A Sharia index for each MENA country is constructed that captures 
the extent of legal duality by reference to the constitutional role of Sharia.  This index 
construction involves reviewing the constitution and then coding the provisions that refer to 
the role of Sharia in country level legislation.  The inclusion of the Sharia index in the 
analysis demonstrates that the legal origin of LLSV alone does not sufficiently reflect the 
complexity of the legal systems in countries with mixed traditions like MENA.  Analysing 
financial market development requires a tentative approach that reflects the local historical 
narrative of how the legal traditions of the Europeans mixed with local Islamic legal 
traditions. 
▪ recognising the specific role of culture.  Legal rules reflect cultural values and both are so 
well blended that they cannot be viewed independently.  The Islamic culture has economic 
consequences because it forbids interest dealings and speculative behaviour, both of these 
activities are essential for the development of credit and stock markets.  Despite the fact 
that MENA countries share common language, religion and historical ties, they exhibit 
varying degrees of Islamic culture.  The thesis uses a multi-dimensional variable measuring 
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the degree of political, educational and financial Islamic culture in MENA countries 
(adopted from Achilov (2010)).  The thesis results reinforce the view that infusion of 
cultural variables influences the emergence of distinctive regional features that shape 
financial market development. 
▪ developing an anti-director rights index for each MENA country that measures the extent to 
which minority shareholder rights are protected by country level legislation.  The index 
construction involves hand-collecting the MENA laws, extracting the legal provisions that 
are relevant for minority shareholder rights, and then, coding these provision following 
Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008) methodology.  Unlike the prior literature which constructs 
the index with reference to legal provisions from company law, this thesis augments the 
development of the anti-director rights index to include also corporate governance codes, 
securities law, executive regulations and ministerial decisions.  Thus, the anti-director 
rights index codes reflect any relevant legal reforms that took place during the period of the 
study.  The index construction process involved translation from Arabic, French, Farsi, 
Hebrew and Turkish languages into English. 
Results highlight the factors that influence credit and stock market development.  The availability 
of borrower credit information and the legal protection provided to borrowers and lenders via 
collateral and bankruptcy laws are important for the development of credit markets.  
Transparency and disclosure practices and the legal protection provided to minority shareholders 
are critical for the development of MENA stock markets.  Not only does the quality of the law 
matter for financial market development, but also the extent of its enforcement.  Additionally, the 
prevalent Islamic culture and the legal duality that arises from the constitutional role of Sharia 
hinder financial markets.  Furthermore, the US mutual fund investment pattern in MENA follows 
‘Law and Finance’ predictions that financial market development, disclosure practices and law 
enforcement positively influence fund investments.  Finally, firms that voluntarily choose to 
subject their financial statements to independent audits conducted by a 'big-four' auditor and 
voluntarily report under IFRS signal their quality and attract foreign capital despite the country-
level legal environmental shortcomings. 
The thesis ‘connects the dots’ and examines a fine gradation of the legal environment that is 
relevant for both the development of financial markets and global investments in emerging 
markets.  The results demonstrate that certain aspects of the law, particularly disclosure and 
minority shareholder protections, positively affect both stock market development and the US 
mutual fund investment in MENA.  This triangular relationship has insightful policy implications.  
Subjecting listed firms to high disclosure requirements and raising the legal protection standards 
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for minority shareholders increase US mutual fund willingness to hold equity capital in MENA 
firms.  The inflow of investment, particularly foreign investment, increases the market liquidity.  
Further, due to the fact that the required rate of return for well-diversified institutional investors is 
relatively low, enhanced foreign investment reduces the cost of capital to MENA firms.  This in 
turn, assists MENA firms to compete globally, increases the competitiveness among the local 
MENA firms, and induces other entrepreneurs to go public to raise new funds in order to 
compete.  Raising the legal standards for both disclosure requirements and the legal protection for 
minority shareholder rights increases the depth and breadth of MENA markets. 
Due to institutional underdevelopment and the lack of legal rules protecting minority shareholder 
rights in MENA, entrepreneurs choose to operate their firms with high ownership concentration 
to protect their investment.  Hence, information asymmetry between controlling and minority 
shareholders widens.  The gap is even larger for minority foreign investors.  Not only does this 
class of foreign investors face the challenges of domestic minority shareholders but also other 
barriers in the form of differences in language, culture, financial reporting standards, and the lack 
of knowledge of domestic ties and relationships.  Under such circumstances, even the most 
sophisticated investors are like ‘fish out of water’ when investing in MENA markets.  
Consequently, apart from risk, return and liquidity determinants of the traditional finance theory, 
other country and firms attributes matter for the global investment decisions in emerging MENA 
markets.  At the country-level, the degree of stock market development, disclosure requirements 
and law enforcement are critical factors for foreign investors in emerging MENA markets.  At the 
firm-level, financial statement quality measured in terms of independent appointment of an 
internationally recognised ‘big-four’ auditor and voluntarily reporting under the international 
financial standards rather than local accounting standards alleviates investment ambiguity for 
foreign investors.  International reporting brings uniformity and comparability thus making it 
easier to make informed investment decisions in a foreign market. 
Despite the fact that MENA countries belong to the same geographic location with common 
historical ties, the extent of diversity between the countries is large in terms of economic wealth, 
natural endowment of resources, and political stability.  Adopting a wholly US centric framework 
when analysing the financial market development in the MENA region is inappropriate.  Such 
adoption fails to reflect the fine differential characteristics between MENA countries, 
particularly, the substantial Islamic cultural diversity and extent of Islamic influence on legal 
environment.  As cultural elements are particularly integrated into the local legal environment, 
culture cannot be purposefully separated from the stated local legal provisions, particularly where 
investor protection rights are concerned.  The ‘Law and Finance’ theory of La Porta, Lopez-De-
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Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny is deficient in that both cultural elements and the duality of the legal 
system must be taken into account when analysing financial market development in complex and 
internationally isolated regions like the MENA. 
While each essay in this thesis has discussed the avenues for future research (see Sections 2.6.3 
and 3.5.3) there is a need to expand the research on the under-investigated MENA financial 
markets.  Such sentiments are wholly consistent with the recent strong and motivated call by the 
Financial Economic Network to invigorate further research in Islamic banking and Finance.  
Through this thesis, I am pleased to have made a unique contribution to this emergent literature. 
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Appendix 1 Shareholder protection in MENA countries 
1.  Vote by mail  
Country Code Law / 
Regulation 
Legal provision 
Algeria 1 Algerian Code 
of Commerce, 
Ordinance No. 
(75-59) of 
1975 
Article 602 Shareholders have the right to vote themselves or via a proxy in 
accordance with Article 603...  
Bahrain 1 Commercial 
Companies 
Law Decree 
Law No. (21) 
of 2001 
Article 203 Each shareholder, regardless of the number of the shares he 
owns, shall have the right to attend the general assembly, and shall have a 
number of votes equal to the number of shares he owns in the company.  
Any provision or decision to the contrary shall be null and void.  Any 
shareholder may delegate a person, from among the shareholders or from 
among non-shareholders to attend the general assembly on his behalf, 
provided that this person shall not be the chairman of the board or from 
among the members of the board of directors or from among the members 
of the company’s staff.  However, this shall not prejudice the right to 
delegate a first-degree relative.  The company shall prepare a special written 
form for this purpose.  The delegate shall not represent in this capacity a 
number of votes exceeding 5% of the issued capital in the general assembly 
meetings. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code 2011 
7.1 Conduct of shareholders’ meetings.  The board shall observe both the 
letter and the intent of the Company Law’s requirements for shareholder 
meetings.  Among other things:... 
 notices of meetings should encourage shareholders to participate by 
proxy and should refer to procedures for appointing a proxy and for 
directing the proxy how to vote on a particular resolution.  The proxy 
agreement shall list the agenda items and shall specify the vote (such as 
“yes,” “no” or “abstain),... 
Egypt 1 Companies 
Law No. (159) 
of 1981 
Article 59 Every shareholder is entitled to attend the general assembly, 
personally or by proxy.  No shareholder, other than members of the board of 
directors, is allowed to mandate any member of the board of directors to 
represent him in the general assemblies.  Attendance by proxy is valid only 
if it is confirmed in a written power of attorney, and that the mandated 
person be a shareholder. 
Decree No. 
(96) of 1982.  
Executive 
Regulations for 
Companies 
Law No. (159) 
of 1981 
Article 208 Shareholders can attend the general assembly in person or via a 
proxy.  Attendance by proxy is valid if it is confirmed in a written power of 
attorney.  The mandated person must be a shareholder.  No shareholder 
other than members of the board of directors is allowed to mandate any 
member of the board of directors to replace him in the attendance of general 
assemblies. 
Capital Market 
Law No. (95) 
of 1992 
Article 9 A shareholder cannot represent in the general assembly of the 
company, by way of proxy, a number of votes more than the limit stipulated 
in the executive regulations. 
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Decree No. 
(135) of 1993.  
Executive 
Regulations of 
Capital Market 
Law No. (95) 
of 1992 
Article 8 The shareholder shall not represent in the company’s general 
assembly meeting by way of proxy, more than ten percent of the total 
nominal shares of the company and not more than twenty percent of the 
shares present in the meeting. 
Egypt Code of 
Corporate 
Governance 
2005 and 2011 
2.1.  in Corporate Governance Code (2005) and 1.1.5 in Corporate 
Governance Code 2011 The general assembly is composed of all 
corporation shareholders pro-rata to the percentage of shares held by each.  
Although the articles of association of a corporation may stipulate that no 
shareholders possessing less than a specific percentage of shares may attend 
the general assembly meeting, such a provision should be deemed an 
exception to the rule that entitles all shareholders to attend the meeting 
unless their number exceeds the capacity by which the corporation can 
provide a meeting place, in which case the stipulation may be resorted to; it 
should also not be a means to exclude and overrule small shareholders. 
Iran 1 Commercial 
Code of Iran as 
ratified on 
Esfand 1347 
(March 1969) 
Article 102 In all general meetings, the attendance of the attorney or legal 
representative of a shareholder and in the same manner the attendance of the 
representative or representatives of a legal entity, provided they produce 
documentary evidence establishing their position as proxy or representative, 
will be considered as the attendance of the shareholder. 
Iraq 1 Companies 
Law No. (21) 
of 1997 
Article 91 
First: The member may, under a certified power of attorney, appoint a proxy 
to attend, speak, and vote on his behalf in the meetings of the general 
assembly.  He can also appoint another member for this purpose. 
Second: The registrar shall issue guidelines specifying the form to be used 
for the power of attorney, its contents, and the method of its preparation. 
Third: In the case of the joint-stock company: ... 
2.  The representational power of attorney must be deposited at the 
company’s administrative office at least three days before the meeting.  The 
company’s administrative office shall check them to make sure that they are 
correct.  The power of attorney will remain valid for any other meeting to 
which the first is adjourned. 
Israel 1 Companies 
Law No. 
(5759) of 1999 
Part III: Structure of the company 
Chapter 2: The general meeting 
Article F: Voting at general meeting 
The Manner of voting at meeting 83 
(a) A shareholder in a public company may vote by himself or by a proxy, 
as well as by way of a voting paper under Article G. 
(b) A shareholder in a private company may vote by himself or by proxy, 
unless otherwise provided in the articles of association. 
(c) A shareholder in a private company may vote by voting paper if there are 
provisions to that effect in its articles of association. 
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Article G Voting by voting paper and statement of position 
Voting at general meeting by written vote 87 ... 
(b) A voting paper shall be sent by the company to every shareholder; a 
shareholder may indicate his vote on the voting paper and send it to the 
company. 
Jordan 1 Jordanian 
Companies 
Law No. (22) 
of 1997 
Article 179 Granting proxy to attend meetings 
a) A shareholder in a public shareholding company shall have the right to 
give a proxy to another shareholder to attend any meeting of the company 
general assembly.  The proxy shall be in writing, on a special form prepared 
by the company board of directors for this purpose with the approval of the 
controller.  Proxies must be deposited at the company headquarters at least 
three days before the date set for the meeting of the general assembly.  The 
controller, or any person delegated by him, shall examine the said proxies.  
The shareholder may also give a proxy to another person by virtue of a 
judicial power of attorney to attend the meeting on his behalf. 
b) The proxy shall be valid for the attendance of the representative of any 
other meeting to which the general assembly meeting was postponed. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code for 
Shareholding 
Companies 
Listed on the 
Amman Stock 
Exchange, 
2008 
Chapter three: General assembly meetings 
7.  A shareholder may deputise another shareholder to attend the general 
assembly meeting in his place, by means of a written proxy authorisation, or 
to deputise another person by means of a judicial proxy in accordance with 
the legislations in force. 
Chapter four: The company shall take appropriate measures to ensure that 
shareholders enjoy their rights in a manner that would achieve justice and 
equality without discrimination.  These rights include mainly: 
Section one: General rights 
5.  Participating and voting in general assembly meetings in person or by 
proxy with a number of votes equal to the number of shares that he holds in 
the company. 
Jordanian 
Corporate 
Governance 
[Private 
shareholding 
companies, 
limited liability 
companies, 
Non-listed 
public 
shareholding 
companies] 
2012 
2.3 Effective participation 
The organisation should have or establish appropriate systems that will 
enable the increased involvement of shareholders to participate effectively 
and vote in the shareholders’ meetings.  Those shareholders who are not 
present should be able to vote in absentia, such as by proxy voting.  
Kuwait 1 Commercial 
Companies 
Article 155 The general assembly meeting chaired by the chairman or his 
deputy or his delegate to the board of directors.  The general assembly 
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Law No. (15) 
of 1960 
meeting shall not be deemed valid unless attended by the shareholders who 
represent more than half of the shares.  Should such quorum fail to be 
constituted, the assembly shall be invited for a second meeting.  The second 
meeting shall be deemed valid regardless the number of the attendees.  
Attendance of this meeting may be by proxy. 
  Kuwait 
Companies 
Law No. (25) 
of 2012 
Article 239 Every shareholder, regardless of the number of his shares, shall 
have the right to attend the general assembly and shall have a number of 
votes equivalent to the number of votes decided for the same class of shares.  
The shareholder shall not have the right to vote for himself or for his 
representative in the matters related to his interest, or related to a dispute 
arising between him and the company.  Any condition or decision 
stipulating otherwise shall be considered null and void.  The shareholder 
may appoint others to represent him in the attendance, by virtue of a special 
power of attorney or authorisation prepared by the company for this 
purpose. 
Lebanon 1 Lebanon on the 
Land 
Commerce, 
Decision No. 
(304) of 1942 
Article 181 Shareholders who cannot attend the general assembly may 
delegate others to represent them under the condition that the 
representatives are shareholders themselves.  An exception is the legitimate 
representatives of the incompetent. 
Lebanon 
Corporate 
Governance 
Guidelines for 
Listed 
Companies 
(2010) 
Article 5 Shareholders’ rights with regards to Shareholders’ meetings 
g) The company shall not take any measure of which the object or the effect 
would result in affecting the voting rights of the shareholders, which can be 
cast whether in person or by proxy.  Subject to applicable laws and 
regulations, shareholders should be allowed to cast their vote electronically 
provided secure methods are used. 
Morocco 1 Companies 
Law No. (17) 
of 1995 
Article 131 A shareholder may be represented by another shareholder, his 
spouse, an ascendant or descendant.  In public companies, a shareholder can 
also be represented by any legal person where the corporate purpose is to 
manage securities portfolios. 
Any shareholder may represent other shareholders at the meeting without 
limiting the number of representations or the votes that one person can hold, 
whether in his name or by proxy, unless this number is specified in the 
articles of association. 
Unless otherwise provided by the articles of association, when a proxy for a 
shareholder addressed to the company without indicating a representative, 
the president of the general assembly shall vote in favour of the adoption of 
the draft resolutions presented or approved by the board of directors or the 
supervisory board, and against the adoption of any other draft resolutions.  
For any other vote, the shareholder must choose an agent who agrees to vote 
in the direction indicated by the principal.  The clauses incompatible with 
the first two paragraphs are deemed unwritten. 
Article 131 (bis) The articles of association may provide that any 
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shareholder may vote by mail using a form.  Forms without giving a vote or 
express an abstention will not be considered for the calculation of the 
majority. 
The voting form by mail sent to the company for a meeting shall be valid for 
successive meetings convened with the same agenda. 
As the invitation of the meeting commences, a form for voting by mail and 
its attachments shall be delivered or sent at the expense of the company, to 
any shareholder who requests so, by all means provided by the articles or 
the meeting invitation.  The company must respond to any application filed 
or received at the registered office no later than ten days before the meeting 
date.  This period is reduced to six days for companies that are not public. 
Moroccan 
Code of Good 
Corporate 
Governance 
Practices 
(2008) 
II- Rights of shareholders and partners and their equitable treatment 
1.7) The firm shall encourage methods for distance voting and recommend 
the use of systems which are simultaneously reliable and rapid, but also 
secure for the shareholder in terms of confidentiality.  Similarly, the 
enterprise shall authorise the exercise of proxy voting without restriction. 
1.8) It is recommended to provide for the right to postal vote in the charter. 
Oman 1 Commercial 
Companies 
Law No. (4) of 
1974 
Article 115 Each shareholder shall have the right to attend general meeting 
and shall have one vote against each share held by him, even if such share is 
represented by a provisional certificate.  A shareholder may give a written 
proxy to another person to attend the general meeting and vote on its 
resolutions.  The shareholder may revoke such proxy at any time.  The 
representative need not be a shareholder unless the company’s articles of 
association so ordains. 
Article 75 All shares of a joint-stock company shall enjoy equal and 
inherent rights in the ownership thereof, namely, the right to receive 
dividends declared by the general meeting, the pre-emptive right of 
subscribing for new shares, the right to share in the distribution of the 
company’s assets on liquidation, the right to transfer shares in pursuance of 
the Law, the right to view the company’s balance sheet, the profit and loss 
of account and the shareholder registers, the right to be notified of the 
meetings of the general meeting and to participate and vote in such meetings 
personally or by proxy, the right to apply for annulment of any decision 
made by the general meeting or the board of directors if such decision is 
contrary to the Law, or the company’s articles of association or the 
Company’s internal regulations, and the right to sue directors and the 
auditors of the company on behalf of the share holders or on behalf of the 
company pursuant to Article 110. 
Palestine 1 Company Law 
No. (12) of 
1964
80
 
Article 161 Power of attorney to attend the general assembly meetings 
1) A proxy for another shareholder to attend the general assembly meetings 
is permitted. 
2) The proxy forms to attend and vote at the general meeting are special 
                                                 
80
 Firms operating in West Bank are governed by the Jordanian Companies Law No.  12 of 1964.  Firms doing 
business in non-autonomous areas of the West Bank are governed by the Israeli Military Order of 1970.  Firms 
operating in Gaza are governed by the British Mandatory Companies Law of 1929. 
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forms prepared by the company for this purpose with the approval of the 
controller and this form is sent to each shareholder with the invitation to 
attend the general assembly meeting. 
3) In no case shall the number of shares held by the agent be more than five 
percent (5%) of the paid-up capital of the company. 
Company Law 
of 1929 
Article 66 Types of decisions 
1) The decisions taken at the meeting assembly meeting are ordinary, 
extraordinary or private. 
2) The decision is considered ordinary if it is approved by a small majority 
of the members who have the right to vote and vote either personally or by 
their representatives, if proxy voting is permissible in a general meeting. 
Qatar 1 Qatar 
Commercial 
Companies Act 
No. (5) of 2002  
Article 128 
3.  The authorisation to attend the general assembly meeting is allowed 
provided that the agent should be a shareholder and the authorisation should 
be special for this purpose and in writing.  The shareholder is not allowed to 
authorise one of the board members to attend the meeting of the general 
assembly on his behalf.  In all cases the number of the shares held by the 
agent in this capacity should not be more than 5% of the capital of the 
company. 
4.  Excluding the legal persons, no shareholder whether in his original 
capacity or his capacity as the representative is allowed to represent the 
votes exceeding 25% percent votes prescribed for the shares represented in 
the meeting. 
Corporate 
Governance 
2009  
25.2 Proxy voting is permitted in compliance with related laws and 
regulations. 
Saudi 
Arabia 
1 Companies 
Regulations, 
Royal Decree 
M/6 of 1385 
Hijri 
Article 83 The bylaws of the company shall specify the classes of 
stockholders entitled to attend general meetings.  Nevertheless, every 
stockholder who holds 20 shares shall have the right to attend, even if the 
bylaws of the company provide otherwise.  A stockholder may, in writing, 
give proxy to another stockholder other than a director to attend the general 
meeting on his behalf.  The Ministry of Commerce may delegate one or 
more representatives to attend the general meetings as observers. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Regulations, 
Resolution No.  
1/212/2006 
dated 
21/10/1427AH
. 
Article 6 (c) A shareholder may, in writing, appoint any other shareholder 
who is not a board member and who is not an employee of the company to 
attend the general assembly on his behalf. 
Sudan 1 Sudan 
Companies Act 
First Schedule, Table A, Rules for managing joint-stock companies 
64 Voting in the ballot may either be in person or through a proxy.  It is not 
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of 1925 permissible for any company to vote through a proxy if its board of directors 
has not issued a resolution in that matter in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 73 of this Law. 
Tunisia 1 Tunisia 
Companies 
Law No. (93) 
of 2000 
Chapter 11 ...  The shareholder votes in person or through an agent 
representing all the shares and the agent cannot be appointed to vote using a 
portion of the shares ... 
Chapter 278 ...  The decisions of the general assembly are to be taken by the 
absolute majority of the votes represented in the meeting in person or by a 
proxy.  Each shareholder may vote by correspondence or by any person with 
a special power of attorney ... 
Tunisia Code 
of Best 
Practice of 
Corporate 
Governance 
(2008) 
1.4.3 Voting in absentia 
- encourage shareholders to take part in the general meeting and allow those 
of them who cannot attend that meeting to vote in absentia either by 
correspondence or by certified proxy. 
- provide shareholders with the necessary documents to vote by 
correspondence or by proxy within a deadline distant enough from the date 
of the general meeting, 30 days before it takes place, so that they can 
undertake the necessary procedures.  These documents could also be 
diffused through telematic solutions. 
Turkey 1 Turkish 
Commercial 
Law No. 
(6102) of 2011 
Article 425 (1) A shareholder shall be entitled to appoint a proxy among 
shareholders or real persons to exercise the rights in the general assembly 
which are conferred upon him by the shares he owns in the company or he 
himself shall participate in the general assembly.  Any provision in the 
articles of association stipulates nomination of a proxy among shareholders 
shall be null and void. 
Article 617 (3)...Each shareholder shall be entitled to get himself 
represented in the general assembly through a person who is or is not a 
shareholder. 
Article 1527 (2) Provided that it is stipulated in the company charters or 
Articles of Association, participation, expressing opinions and voting in the 
general assembly of limited liability companies and joint stock companies 
may be held by electronic means... 
Corporate 
Governance 
Principles of 
Turkey (2003 
Amended, 
February 2005)  
Part I Shareholders 
3.2.7.  Prior to the meeting, proxy forms should be announced for those who 
will appoint a proxy for the meeting.  These forms should also be open to 
use by shareholders in electronic media. 
4.6.  Provisions that may prevent voting by use of a proxy who is not a 
shareholder should not be included in the articles of association of the 
company. 
4.6.1.  A shareholder can vote either personally or by appointing a third 
person as his/her representative, regardless of whether this third person is a 
shareholder or not. 
  
195 
Appendix 1 Shareholder protection in MENA countries 
1.  Vote by mail  
Country Code Law / 
Regulation 
Legal provision 
UAE 1 Commercial 
Companies law 
No. (8) of 1984 
Article 126 Whoever is entitled to attend the general meeting may appoint a 
proxy other than the directorate-members.  Such appointment shall be made 
in writing.  In such capacity no authorised proxy may hold more than 5% of 
the company capital.  Persons of incomplete or non-legal capacity shall be 
represented by their legal representatives. 
Decision No. 
(32\R) of 2007 
Concerning on 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code for Joint-
Stock 
Companies and 
Institutional 
Discipline 
Criteria.  and 
Ministerial 
Resolution No. 
(518) of 2009 
Concerning 
Governance 
Rules and 
Corporate 
Discipline 
Standards 
Article 12 (4) Members of the board of directors may not get proxies from 
shareholders to attend on their behalf in the general assembly meetings; 
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Algeria 0  No provision 
Bahrain 0  No provision  
Egypt 0 Companies 
Law No. 
(159) of 1981 
Article 61 The general assembly is to be convoked by an invitation from the 
chairman of the board of directors at the time and place designated by the 
statute of the company.  The general assembly should be held at least once a 
year, within six months after the end of the financial year for the company.  
The board of directors may decide to call for the general assembly meeting 
whenever a necessity arises.  The board of director should convoke the 
ordinary general assembly meeting if the auditor demands, or a number of 
shareholders representing at least 5% of the capital of the company, provided 
that they express the motives behind demand, and that they deposit their 
shares in the headquarters of the company or at one of the approved banks; 
and such shares are not to be withdrawn except after dissolution of the general 
assembly. 
Article 70 The provisions relating to the ordinary general assembly are 
applicable to the extraordinary general assembly, with observance of the 
following: 
(a) The extraordinary general assembly meets upon an invitation of the board 
of directors.  The board should address the invitation if it is asked by a 
number of shareholders representing at least one tenth of the capital, for 
serious reasons, and subject to the applicants depositing their shares at the 
head office of the company or in any approved bank.  The shares should not 
be withdrawn except after dismissal of the assembly.  If the board does not 
convoke the assembly during one month from the date of the request, the 
applicants may have recourse to the relevant administrative authority which 
will assume addressing the invitation. 
  Decree No. 
(96) of 1982.  
Executive 
Regulations 
for 
Companies 
Law No. 
(159) of 1981 
Article 205 Shares are blocked from trading from the date of the notice of the 
meeting or from the date the notice has been sent until the dismissal of the 
general assembly meeting. 
  Decree No. 
(135) of 
1993.  
Executive 
Regulations 
of Capital 
Market Law 
No. (95) of 
1992 
Article 14 ...The holder of bearer shares who wishes to attend the general 
assembly meeting should deposit his shares according to the rules of 
depositing the nominal shares, either in the company or in one of the banks, or 
in any of the companies that is licensed by Authority for this purpose. 
Formats for the statute of the company: General assembly: 
Article 40 Shareholders wishing to attend the general assembly meeting 
should prove that they had deposited their shares either in the company’s 
headquarters or in one of the approved banks, or in any of the financial 
companies that is licensed by Authority for this purpose at least three days 
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prior to the meeting.  This rule applies to nominal shares and bearer shares. 
Iran 0  No provision 
Iraq 0  No Provision 
Israel 0  No provision 
Jordan 0  No provision 
Kuwait 0  No provision 
Lebanon 0  No Provision 
Morocco 0 Companies 
Law No. (17) 
of 1995 
Article 130 The articles of association may make participation or 
representation at meetings subject to, either the registration of the shareholder 
in the share register of the company, or the deposit of bearer shares or a 
certificate of deposit issued by the depositary institution at the place indicated 
in the notice.  The period during which these formalities must be completed 
shall be fixed by the articles of association.  It cannot be earlier than five days 
before the date of meeting of the assembly. 
Moroccan 
Code of 
Good 
Corporate 
Governance 
Practices 
(2008) 
II- Rights of shareholders and partners and their equitable treatment 
1) Participation at the general meeting 
1.9) For non-residents, the enterprise takes into consideration the specifics of 
exercising voting rights, notably by reducing the period during which shares 
or partnership shares are blocked. 
Oman 0  No provision 
Palestine 0  No provision 
Qatar 1 Qatar 
Commercial 
Companies 
Act No. (5) 
of 2002 
Article 167 The statute of the company can stipulate any restrictions related to 
the share trading provided that such restrictions should not prohibit the share 
trading. 
Saudi 
Arabia 
1 Companies 
Regulations, 
Royal Decree 
M/6 of 1385 
Hijri 
Article 101 The bylaws of the company can stipulate restrictions related to the 
share trading provided that such restrictions should not prohibit trading. 
Sudan 0  No provision 
Tunisia 0  No provision 
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Turkey 0 pre 
2011 
and 1 
post 
2011 
Turkish 
Commercial 
Law No. 
(6102) of 
2011
81
 
Article 415 (4) The right to attend general assembly and to vote cannot be 
stipulated to deposit the documents or share certificates, which prove that the 
shareholder owns the shares, to a financial establishment or another place. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Principles of 
Turkey (2003 
Amended, 
February 
2005) 
Part I Shareholders 
3.  The right to participate in the general shareholders’ meeting 
3.1 Within a reasonable period prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, 
holders of registered shares should be recorded in the company’s share ledger 
by also taking into consideration the records of institutions operating for the 
record keeping and safekeeping of shares in order to ensure attendance of real 
shareholders at the general shareholders’ meeting. 
7.  Transfer of shares: Practices that would hinder shareholders to freely 
transfer their shares should be avoided.  The articles of association should not 
contain provisions to impede the transfer of shares. 
UAE 0  No provision  
                                                 
81
 Under the old Commercial Code No. (6762) of 1956, shareholders exercising the proxy right must obtain a 
certificate of ownership from TAKASBANK through his/her custodian.  TAKASBANK will block the subject shares 
until one business day after the meeting. 
  
199 
Appendix 1 Shareholder protection in MENA countries 
3.  Cumulative voting 
Country Code Law/ 
Regulation 
Legal provision 
Algeria 0 Algerian Code 
of Commerce, 
Ordinance No. 
(75-59) of 
1975 
Article 619 The board of directors must hold a number of shares 
representing at least twenty percent (20%) of the share capital.  The 
minimum number of shares held by each director is set by the company’s 
memorandum ... 
Bahrain 0 Commercial 
Companies 
Law Decree 
Law No. (21) 
of 2001 
Article 175 Anyone who owns 10% or more of the capital shall appoint a 
person to represent him on the board of directors for the same percentage of 
the number of the board members.  If he exercises this right, he shall loose 
his right to voting for the percentage for which he appointed a proxy.  If the 
remaining percentage is not enough to appoint another member, he may use 
this percentage in voting.  In all cases the number of board members shall be 
subject to the company’s articles of association and the rules and procedures 
decreed by the Minister of Commerce and Industry. 
Article 176 The general assembly shall elect the board members by secret 
ballot and they shall be selected by relative majority of the valid votes. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code 2011 
Principle 1 The company shall be headed by an effective, collegial and 
informed board 
1.4 The board’s representation of all shareholders. 
Each director should consider himself as representing all shareholders and 
should act accordingly.  The board should avoid having representatives of 
specific groups or interests within its membership and should not allow 
itself to become a battleground of vested interests.  If the company has a 
controlling shareholder (or a controlling group of shareholders acting in 
concert), the latter should recognise its or their specific responsibility to the 
other shareholders, which is direct and is separate from that of the board of 
directors.  In companies with a controlling shareholder, at least one-third of 
the board should be independent directors.  Minority shareholders should 
generally look to independent directors’ diligent regard for their interests, in 
preference to seeking specific representation on the board. 
Recommendation: In companies with a controlling shareholder, both 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders should be aware of controlling 
shareholders’ specific responsibilities regarding their duty of loyalty to the 
company and conflicts of interest and also of rights that minority 
shareholders may have to elect specific directors under the Company Law or 
if the company has adopted cumulative voting for directors.  The chairman 
of the board should take the lead in explaining this with the help of 
company lawyers. 
Egypt 0 Egypt Code of 
Corporate 
Governance 
2005 and 2011 
Corporate Governance Code (2005) 3.3 and Corporate Governance Code 
(2011) 3.2.5 
Egyptian laws stipulate that the board of directors shall be nominated for the 
purpose of representing the shareholders and the formation of the board 
should be representative of capital distribution.  However, the rules 
governing voting enable the general assembly majority group to designate 
the entire board via voting for each nominee separately; accordingly, 
corporate governance necessitates that other ways, such as accumulative 
  
200 
Appendix 1 Shareholder protection in MENA countries 
3.  Cumulative voting 
Country Code Law/ 
Regulation 
Legal provision 
voting, be adopted in voting for board of directors members, or any other 
method that considers the capital distribution should be considered, so that 
the final result can be a reflection of the proportional representation of 
shareholders on the board. 
Iran 1 Commercial 
Code of Iran as 
ratified on 
Esfand 1347 
(March 1969) 
Article 88 At a general meeting, all resolutions will be passed by the 
affirmative vote of fifty per centum plus one vote of those present at the 
meeting, except for the election of directors and inspectors for which a 
simple majority plurality shall be sufficient.  In the case of election of the 
directors the number of votes of each voter shall be multiplied by the 
number of directors intended to be elected and the voting rights of each 
voter shall be the result gained from such multiplication.  The voter may 
assign all his votes to one person or segregate that same between a number 
of persons.  The articles of association may not include provisions 
contradictory to the above arrangement. 
Iraq 0  No provision 
Israel 0 Companies 
Law No. 
(5759) of 1999 
Part VI: Office holders in a company 
Chapter 1: Directors’ appointment and term of office 
Article E: Outside director duty to appoint 
Article 239 
(a) Two outside directors shall hold office in a public company. 
(b) The outside directors shall be appointed by the general meeting, 
provided that one of the following conditions prevails: 
(1) in counting the votes of the majority at the general meeting at least 
one-third of all the votes of shareholders who are not holders of control 
in the company or representatives of such persons, present at the time of 
voting are included; in counting the total votes of such shareholders, 
abstentions shall not be taken into account; 
(2) the total number of votes opposing the appointment from among the 
shareholders referred to in paragraph (1) shall be no greater than one 
percent of the total voting rights in the company. 
(c) The Minister may prescribe different rates from the rate provided in 
subsection (b)(2). 
(d) In a company in which, on the date of appointment of an outside 
director, all members of the board of directors of the company are of one 
gender, the outside director appointed shall be of the other gender. 
Jordan 0 Corporate 
Governance 
Code for 
Shareholding 
Companies 
Listed on the 
Amman Stock 
Exchange, 
2008 
Chapter two: The board of directors of a shareholding company 
1.  The administration of the company is entrusted to a board of directors 
whose members shall be not less than five and not more than thirteen, as 
determined by the company’s memorandum of association.  Principles of 
good corporate governance require that board members be elected by the 
company’s general assembly in a secret ballot, by means of cumulative 
voting system, provided that at least one third of the board members are 
independent members.  If the result in calculating the above- mentioned 
third is with a fraction, the fraction is removed by rounding the result to the 
next figure. 
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Kuwait 0 pre 
2012 
and 1 
post 
Commercial 
Companies 
Law No. (15) 
of 1960 
Article 142 Any shareholder may appoint representatives at the board of 
directors of the company proportionately to the shares he owns therein if his 
shareholding percentage allows him to do so.  Shareholder may not dispose 
of these shares for the duration of membership for his representatives in the 
board of directors.  The number of the board members selected in this way 
shall be deducted from the total elected members of the board.  The 
shareholders having representatives in the board of directors shall not 
participate with other shareholders in electing the remaining members of the 
board. These representatives shall have the same rights and obligations of 
the elected members.  The shareholder shall be responsible for the acts of 
his representatives towards the company, its creditors and shareholders. 
Kuwait 
Companies 
Law No. (25) 
of 2012 
Article 219 Any shareholder whether a natural or legal person, may appoint 
representatives at the board of directors of the company proportionately to 
the shares he owns therein.  The number of the board members selected in 
this way shall be deducted from the total elected members of the board.  The 
shareholders having representatives in the board of directors shall not 
participate with the other shareholders in electing the remaining members of 
the board, unless within the excess of the rate used in the appointment of 
their representatives in the board of directors.  A group of shareholders may 
cooperate to appoint one or more representatives in the board of directors, at 
their combined ownership rate.  These representatives shall have the same 
rights and obligations of the elected members.  The shareholder shall be 
responsible for the acts of his representatives towards the company, its 
creditors and shareholders. 
Article 240 Voting for the candidates for the board membership of public 
joint stock companies shall be subject to the cumulative voting system, 
granting each shareholder a voting ability equivalent to the number of shares 
owned thereby, so he is entitled to vote for one candidate or distribute his 
votes among the candidates he selects without repetition of these votes. 
Lebanon 0 Lebanon on the 
Land 
Commerce, 
Decision No. 
(304) of 1942 
Article 147.  The general assembly elects the members of the board of 
directors from shareholders who own a minimum number of shares 
determined by the company’s memorandum.  These shares remain nominal 
and stamped to refer to the inadmissibility of transfer of these shares and 
deposited in the company to guarantee the responsibility of directors 
towards the administrative mistakes, whether personal or collective. 
The Lebanese 
Code of 
Corporate 
Governance 
(2006) 
D.  The protection of minority shareholders in board composition 
Minority shareholders should be able to ensure election of an appropriate 
number of board members of their choice. 
III.  Board of directors: Structure, responsibilities, and prerogatives 
1.4 Every group of shareholders representing 10% of the company’s share 
capital should be entitled to be represented by a board member of their 
choice. 
Lebanon 
Corporate 
Article 7 Protection of minority shareholders 
c) Voting procedures for nomination of directors on the board should 
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Governance 
Guidelines for 
Listed 
Companies 
(2010) 
provide shareholders representing a specific minority percentage of the 
company’s share capital with the right to have a representative on the board. 
Morocco 0  No provision 
Oman 1 Rules and 
Conditions for 
the Elections 
of Directors of 
Public joint 
stock 
companies and 
their 
Responsibilitie
s (2002) 
Article 4 The directors shall be elected by direct secret ballot by the 
shareholders.  Each shareholder shall have a number of votes equal to that 
of the shares held by him.  A shareholder shall have the right to use the 
entirety of his votes in support of one nominee or divide his shares among 
other nominees of his choice through the voting card.  It follows that the 
total number of votes given to the nominees by one shareholder must be 
equal to the number of shares owned by him. 
Palestine 0 Company Law 
No.(12) of 
1964 
Article 106 Nominations for membership of the board of directors 
(1) The memorandum of the company determines the number of shares 
required for any shareholder to be eligible as a nominee for the membership 
of the board of directors.  The Minister may estimate this number based on 
the status of the company to ensure its interests and the interests of 
shareholders. 
(2) No candidate should be elected for membership if he does not have this 
number of shares. 
(3) The membership status is automatically cancelled if, during the term of 
membership, the number of shares held by that member falls below the 
required number of shares. 
Corporate 
Governance 
code 2009 
3.  Company management 
First: The board of directors 
20.  The public shareholding company must be administered by a board of 
directors whose members must not be less than 5 and not more than 11 
members.  It is preferable that the board reflects the composition of the 
shareholders and the distribution ratio of capital.  Small shareholders who 
hold 10% of the company’s shares may elect their representative in the 
board of directors provided they nominate a number of candidates to this 
position ... 
24.  Protection of minority shareholders: It is preferable to use cumulative 
voting at the polling station in order to choose board nominees by offering 
each shareholder a number of votes equal to his total shares multiplied by 
the number of board members.  The shareholder may not give all his votes 
to one nominee or he may distribute his votes amongst the candidates as he 
wishes.  It is preferable that all candidates to the board membership give the 
shareholder their C.Vs before election and voting at the General Assembly 
meeting in order to enable the shareholder to choose the right persons for 
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the company. 
Qatar 0 Corporate 
Governance 
2009 
26.2 Shareholders shall have the right to cast their votes for board member’s 
election by cumulative voting. 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Corporate 
Governance 
Regulations 
Resolution No.  
1/212/2006 
dated 
21/10/1427AH 
Article 6 (b) In voting in the general assembly for the nomination to the 
board members, the accumulative voting method shall be applied. 
Sudan 0  No provision 
Tunisia 0 Tunisia 
Companies 
Law No. (93) 
of 2000 
Chapter 189 The company is managed by board of directors composed of at 
least three members and at most twelve members.  There is no requirement 
for a member of the board of directors to be from shareholders unless the 
provisions of the company’s memorandum indicate otherwise. 
Tunisia Code 
of Best 
Practice of 
Corporate 
Governance 
(2008) 
2.1.3 The representation of minority shareholders 
The appointment of independent directors is a pledge for impartiality and 
for safeguarding minority shareholders’ interests. 
Turkey 0 Turkish 
Commercial 
Law No. 
(6102) of 2011 
Article 434(4) The Ministry of Customs and Trade shall be authorised to 
regulate cumulative voting in non-public joint-stock company. 
Article 360 (1) Certain groups of shareholders and minorities shall be 
entitled to be presented in the board of directors if provided by the articles 
of association.  In this context, members of the board of directors shall be 
elected among various groups of shareholders or minorities and groups of 
shareholders or minorities shall be granted the right to nominate members 
for the board.  Except in cases based on justified grounds, it is a must to 
elect the candidate proposed by the general assembly or a shareholder 
belonging to a group of shareholders or minorities.  In joint stock 
companies, the right of representation to be acquired in this manner shall not 
exceed two thirds of the number of members of the board of directors. 
(2) The shares entitled to be represented in the board of directors in 
accordance with the provisions of this article, shall be considered as 
privileged shares. 
Communiqué 
on Principles 
Regarding 
Cumulative 
Voting at 
Article 3 To adopt cumulative voting regime, an explicit provision in the 
Articles of Association of the corporation is required.  Cumulative voting is 
mandatory for corporations whose shares are not traded in the exchanges 
and whose total number of shareholders is determined to exceed 500 
continuously for the last two years and these corporations are entitled to 
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Shareholders 
Meetings of 
Joint Stock 
Corporations 
Subject to 
Capital Market 
Law, No: 
25024, Official 
Gazette (18 
February 2003 
) 
state this regime in their articles of association.  The mentioned corporations 
are obliged to amend their articles of association to include provisions of 
cumulative voting in the next ordinary shareholders meeting following the 
occurrence of the stated condition.  Cumulative voting is permissive for 
other corporations. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Principles of 
Turkey (2003 
Amended, 
February 2005) 
Part I Shareholders 
5.  Minority rights: Utmost care should be given to the exercise of minority 
rights. 
- The cumulative voting procedure should be adopted so as to ascertain that 
minority shareholders send their representatives to the board of directors. 
Part IV Board of directors 
3.4.  Priority should be given to the use of cumulative voting in the election 
of the board of directors. 
Within the framework of the legislation, the procedure for the adoption of 
cumulative voting should be incorporated in the articles of association of the 
company.  The board of directors should inform the shareholders about the 
cumulative voting system.  The cumulative voting system should be used in 
line with its objective and members of the board should act duly sensitively 
in this subject. 
UAE 0 Decision No. 
(32\R) of 2007 
Concerning on 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code for Joint-
Stock 
Companies and 
Institutional 
Discipline 
Criteria and 
Ministerial 
Resolution No. 
(518) of 2009 
Concerning 
Governance 
Rules and 
Corporate 
Discipline 
Standards 
Article 12 (2) A Company’s articles of association and internal regulations 
shall include necessary procedures and rules to ensure the exercise by all 
shareholders of all their regulatory rights including: ... c. provision of a 
biography of nominees to the membership of the board of directors before 
voting, including giving shareholders a clear idea of the practical experience 
and academic qualifications of nominees and the selection of members shall 
be made by cumulative voting. 
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Algeria 0.5 Algerian 
Code of 
Commerce, 
Ordinance 
No. (75-59) 
of 1975 
Article 715 (bis) 24 In addition to the action for damages suffered personally, 
shareholders may, either individually or as a group, file a lawsuit against the 
directors.  The plaintiffs are entitled to pursue compensation for all damages 
suffered by the company, to which, if any, damages are awarded. 
Article 715 (bis) 25 it is deemed void, any provision in the company’s 
memorandum to make the exercise of filing a lawsuit conditioned on the 
notification notice or approval of the general meeting or waiving in advanced 
the filing of a lawsuit ... 
Bahrain 1 Commercial 
Companies 
Law Decree 
Law No. (21) 
of 2001 
Article 168 The shares shall confer equal rights and obligations.  The member 
shall in particular have the following rights: 
v- Filing lawsuits to invalidate any resolution issued by the general assembly 
or by the board of directors in contravention of the law, the public order or the 
memorandum or the articles of association. 
Article 215 Without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties, any 
resolution passed by the general assembly in contravention of the provisions 
of the law, the company’s memorandum of association or articles of 
association shall be null and void.  The court may overrule any resolution 
passed to the advantage or disadvantage of a certain class of shareholders or 
to the benefit of the members of the board of directors or others without 
taking the company’s interests into account.  In this case, only those 
shareholders whose objection to the resolution has been put in the meeting’s 
minutes or failed to attend the meeting for acceptable reasons may file the 
nullity action.  The Ministry of Commerce and Industry may act on behalf of 
the said shareholders in filing the nullity action if serious reasons are given.  
A resolution adjudged by the court as null and void shall be deemed inexistent 
for all the shareholders, and the board of directors shall publish the judgment 
in a daily local newspaper.  Filing the nullity action shall not entail suspension 
of the implementation of the resolution unless otherwise ordered by the court.  
A nullity action shall be barred after the lapse of one year from the date of the 
resolution. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code 2011 
Bahrain Courts.  Court litigation is often a last resort, but it is available and it 
can be effective in enforcing the Company Law or this Code.  Litigation could 
take many forms including a lawsuit by shareholders against a company or its 
directors, a lawsuit by a company (or shareholders acting in its name under 
the Company Law) against one or more directors, or a lawsuit by the MOIC, 
the CBB, the BSE or other agencies to enforce orders.  In any such case, the 
court should take account of how well the parties have complied with this 
Code. 
Egypt 1 Companies 
Law No. 
(159) of 1981 
Article 76 Without prejudice to the rights of bona fide parties, any decision of 
the general assembly issued in contravention to the provisions of the law or 
the statutes of the company will be void.  Likewise any decision issued in 
favour of a certain group of the shareholders, or in their prejudice, may be 
nullified, or if it aims at procuring special advantage to the members of the 
board of directors or others, disregarding to the interests of the company.  The 
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demand of nullification in this case can only be made by shareholders who 
had protested against the decision in the minutes of the meeting.  The relevant 
administrative authority may act on shareholders’ behalf in the application for 
nullification, if they invoke substantive reasons.  The decision of nullification 
involves the consideration of the decision as inexistent with respect to all 
shareholders.  The board of directors shall publicise the decision of 
nullification in one of the daily newspapers and in the paper of the companies.  
The action for nullification will be foreclosed by the lapse of one year after 
the decision was made.  The bringing of a law suit does not entail stoppage of 
the execution of the decision unless this is ordered by the Court. 
Capital 
Market Law 
No. (95) of 
1992 
Article 10 The Board of the Capital Market Authority, upon a petition on 
substantive reasons by a number of shareholders who own no less than five 
percent of the company shares, may suspend, after verification, the decisions 
of the general assembly of the company that are taken unfairly in favour of a 
specific group of shareholders, or causing harm to them, or unfairly bringing 
about a benefit to the members of the board of directors or others. 
Decree No. 
(135) of 
1993.  
Executive 
Regulations 
of Capital 
Market Law 
No. (95) of 
1992 
Formats for the Statute of the Company: General Assembly: 
Article 48 ...The Board of the Capital Market Authority, upon a petition on 
substantive reasons by a number of shareholders who own no less than five 
percent of the company nominal shares, after verification, suspend the 
decisions of the general assembly of the company that are taken unfairly in 
favour of a specific group of shareholders, or causing harm to them, or 
unfairly bringing about a benefit to the members of the board of directors or 
others. 
Article 51...  Each shareholder can apply to nullify any decision made by the 
general assembly or the board of directors in favour of a specific group of 
shareholders, or causing harm to them, or unfairly bringing about a benefit to 
the members of the board of directors or others, disregarding to the interests 
of the company. 
Iran 0.5 Commercial 
Code of Iran 
as ratified on 
Esfand 1347 
(March 1969) 
Article 276 An individual or individuals who hold at least one-fifth of the 
total shares of the company may sue the chairman, directors or the managing 
director of the company at their own expense and demand indemnity for the 
losses which have incurred on the grounds of infringement or fault on the part 
of the said chairman, directors or managing director.  If the chairman or any 
of the directors or the managing director are held responsible by the court, 
they will be bound to indemnify the company and pay the legal expenses to 
the company.  The charges borne by the claimant shall be refunded out of the 
amounts adjudged in favour of the company.  If the claimants lose their case, 
then they shall be held responsible for the payment of legal expenses. 
Article 277 The provisions of the articles of association and the resolution of 
general meetings shall not impose restrictions on the shareholders in bringing 
legal proceedings against the directors. 
Iraq 0.5 Companies Article 100 Holders of five percent of the shares of the company can object to 
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Law No. (21) 
of 1997 
the general assembly's decisions before the Registrar within seven days from 
their adoption.  The Registrar shall issue his decision 15 days from the 
submission of the objection.  His decision can be contested before the 
competent district court within seven days from the date of notification.  The 
court must examine such objections urgently, and its decision on them shall 
be final. 
Israel 0.5 Companies 
Law No. 
(5759) of 
1999 
Part V: The shareholder 
Chapter 2: Rights and obligations of shareholders 
Rights in cases of discrimination 191 
(a) Where the company’s business is run in a way that constitutes 
discrimination against all or some of its shareholders, or in a way that gives 
rise to a real apprehension that the company’s business will be run in such a 
way, the court may, at the request of a shareholder, give such instructions at it 
sees fit to remove or prevent such discrimination, including instructions for 
running the company’s business in the future, or instructions to the 
shareholders of the company under which either they or the company itself is 
to purchase its shares, subject to the provisions of section 301. 
(b) Where the court rules as provided in subsection (a), appropriate alterations 
shall be made in the company’s articles of association and in its resolutions, 
as the court may determine, and such alterations shall be considered to have 
been lawfully made by the company; a copy of the resolution shall be sent to 
the Companies Registrar, and if the company is a public company, to the 
Securities Authority. 
Jordan 0.5 Jordanian 
Companies 
Law No. (22) 
of 1997 
Article 157 The violation of company bylaws by the chairman and the 
members of the board of directors 
a) The chairman and the members of the public shareholding company board 
of directors shall be held responsible towards the company, shareholders and 
others for every violation committed by any of them or all of them of the laws 
and regulations in force and of the company memorandum of association and 
for any error in the management of the company.  The consent of the general 
assembly for absolving the board from its responsibility shall not prevent 
legal recourse against the chairman and the board of directors. 
b) The liability stipulated in paragraph (a) of this Article shall be either 
personal, borne by one or more member of the board of directors, or 
collective, borne by the chairman and the members of the board of directors, 
and in such a case, they shall be jointly and severally liable for compensating 
the damage that results from the said violation or mistake.  A member who 
has already objected to the decision containing the violation or mistake in the 
minutes of the meeting shall not be liable for such compensation.  In all cases, 
the claim regarding this responsibility shall cease after the lapse of five years 
from the date the general assembly meeting during which the company annual 
balance sheet and its final accounts were approved. 
Article 159 Responsibility of the company chairman, board of directors’ 
members, for default and negligence in the management of the company. 
The public shareholding company chairman and the board of directors’ 
members shall be jointly and severally responsible towards shareholders for 
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any default or negligence in the management of the company.  However, upon 
the liquidation of the company and the appearance of a deficit in its assets, in 
a manner that renders the company unable to meet its obligations, and should 
the reason for such a deficit be the default or negligence of the chairman and 
members of the board or its general manager or auditors, the court shall have 
the right to hold any of the aforesaid persons liable for the debts of the 
company in full or in part, as the case may be.  The court shall determine the 
amounts the said persons are liable for and whether they are jointly liable in 
the loss or not. 
Article 160 The right to file a court action 
The Controller, the company and any shareholder therein shall have the right 
to file a case with the court in accordance with the provisions of Articles 157, 
158 and 159 of this Law. 
Article 183 The binding power of the general assembly decisions and the 
ability to contest 
a) Decisions issued by the general assembly of a public shareholding 
company at any of its meeting that convenes with the presence of a legal 
quorum, shall be binding upon the board of directors and all shareholders, 
whether they attended the said meeting or not, provided that these decisions 
have been adopted in accordance with the provisions of this Law and the 
regulations issued in pursuance. 
b) The Court shall have jurisdiction to look into and settle any case that may 
be presented for the purpose of contesting the legality of any of the meetings 
of the general assembly, or contesting the decisions issued at any one of these 
meetings.  Such contesting shall not halt the implementation of any decision 
of the general assembly unless the Court decides otherwise.  Such a case shall 
not be considered after the lapse of three months from the date of the meeting. 
  Corporate 
Governance 
Code for 
Shareholding 
Companies 
Listed on the 
Amman 
Stock 
Exchange, 
2008 
Chapter Four: Shareholders’ rights 
The company shall take appropriate measures to ensure that shareholders 
enjoy their rights in a manner that would achieve justice and equality without 
discrimination.  These rights include mainly: 
Section one: general Rights 
8.  Filing a lawsuit against the board of directors or any of its members 
claiming compensation for damages incurred as a result of a violation of the 
legislations in force or of the company’s memorandum of association or any 
mistake or negligence in administering the company, or of disclosure of 
company secrets. 
9.  Filing a lawsuit against the company’s general manager or any of the 
company’s employees claiming compensation for damages incurred as a 
result of disclosing the company’s secrets. 
13.  Filing a lawsuit to contest the legality of any general assembly meeting or 
to contest the decisions taken in that meeting within three months of the 
meeting. 
Kuwait 1 Commercial 
Companies 
Law No. (15) 
Article 131 A shareholder shall, particularly, benefit of the following rights: 
Fifth- Proceeding an action of invalidity of each decision, issued by the 
general assembly or the board of directors, violating the law, public order, the 
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of 1960 article of incorporations or the policy. 
Article 133 The general assembly should not ...  Fourth, restrict the 
shareholder’s right to seek remedy for the damages he suffered against the 
board of directors whether the violation has been done collectively by the 
directors or individually by a single director ... 
Article 136 Shareholders representing 15% of the nominal capital, and who 
have not approved the decision in the extraordinary general assembly in 
Article 135, are permitted to file a lawsuit against the decision rendered 
prejudice to their rights within thirty days from the date of the decision ... 
Kuwait 
Companies 
Law No. (25) 
of 2012 
Article 234 The company may bring liability lawsuit against the members of 
the board because of the mistakes resulting into damage to the company.  
Should the company be under liquidation, the liquidator shall take charge of 
bringing the lawsuit. 
Article 235 Every shareholder may bring liability lawsuit alone on behalf of 
the company in case the said company fails to do so.  In such event, the 
company shall be contesting in the lawsuit to be granted compensation, if 
necessary.  The shareholder may bring his personal lawsuit claiming 
compensation in case the mistake caused damage thereto.  Any condition in 
the memorandum of the company stipulating otherwise shall be null and void. 
Article 251 Every shareholder may bring an action of nullity against any 
decision that is issued by the board of directors, the ordinary or extraordinary 
general assembly and violating the Law or the memorandum of the company 
or was intended to damage the company’s interests, and may claim 
compensation when appropriate.  The action of nullity shall abate after two 
months from the date of issuance of the assembly’s decision or the knowledge 
of the shareholder of the board’s decision.  The decisions of the ordinary and 
extraordinary general assembly causing prejudice to the rights of the minority 
may be appealed by a number of shareholders owning fifteen percent of the 
company’s issued capital and they shall not be among the shareholders who 
approved such decisions.  This action shall abate after two months from the 
date of the assembly’s decision.  In such event, the Court may support, amend 
or cancel the decisions or postpone their implementation until the proper 
settlement for the purchase of the objectors’ shares, provided that these shares 
are not purchased from the company’s capital. 
Lebanon 0.5 Lebanon on 
the Land 
Commerce, 
Decision No. 
(304) of 1942 
Article 166 The members of the board of directors are responsible, even 
towards third parties, for all acts of fraud and for each violation of the law and 
the company’s memorandum.  The aggrieved is entitled to bring a lawsuit 
individually and the lawsuit should not be dropped even if shareholders vote 
of the general assembly to discharge the members of the board. 
Article 167 The member of the board of directors are also responsible towards 
the shareholders for the administrative mistake.  And in general the members 
of the board of directors are not responsible towards third parties for 
administrative mistake... 
Article 168 The company has the right to file a lawsuit against the members 
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of the board of directors on the basis of the first paragraph of the previous 
article.  If the company fails to do so each shareholder is entitled to act on its 
behalf proportional to his shareholding percentage in the company. 
The 
Lebanese 
Code of 
Corporate 
Governance 
(2006) 
III.  Board of directors: Structure, responsibilities, and prerogatives 
The board of directors is entrusted with the duty of ensuring the proper 
management of the company in the best interest of the company and all 
shareholders in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.  This duty 
may not be delegated and is proper to the board who shall assume the final 
responsibility to the company and its shareholders regardless of whether the 
board constitutes special committees or authorises other persons or entities to 
undertake specific operations.  The board is responsible for setting the 
strategic direction and conducting managerial oversight, including day to day 
operations.  Failure to comply with the fiduciary duties mandated herein 
should subject the board and individual board members to liability to any 
aggrieved shareholder. 
Lebanon 
Corporate 
Governance 
Guidelines 
for Listed 
Companies 
(2010) 
Article 7 Protection of minority shareholders 
b) The board must ensure, whenever there is a majority shareholder, that his 
strategy is coherent and in the interests of the company and all shareholders.  
Minority shareholders should be protected from direct or indirect abusive 
action by or in the interests of controlling shareholders. 
d) Dissenting minority Shareholders with regards to decisions adopted at a 
large majority at the shareholders’ assembly with regards to (i) mergers or 
demergers, (ii) right to dividends, and (iii) modification of voting rights 
should be given a right to withdraw from the company at a fair market price 
pursuant to a procedure that should be consecrated in the company’s bylaws. 
Part 3 Board of directors 
Article 8: General responsibilities of the board 
e) Failure to comply with the duties mandated herein should subject the board 
and/or individual board members, as the case may be, to liability to any 
aggrieved shareholder. 
Morocco 0.5 Companies 
Law No. (17) 
of 1995 
Article 352 Directors, the CEO and, where appropriate, the chief operating 
officer or board members are responsible, individually or jointly, as 
appropriate, to the company or to third parties, for offenses against laws or 
regulations applicable to corporations, or violations of articles of association 
or mistakes in their management. ... 
Shareholders, on the basis of the first paragraph, who intend to apply for 
compensation for the damage they have suffered personally due to acts of 
directors, board members or the CEO and, deputy CEO, may give one or 
more of them a mandate to act on their behalf before the competent court ... 
Article 353 In addition to action for damages suffered personally, 
shareholders may, either individually or as a group bring action for damages 
in the name of the company against the directors, the CEO and, where 
appropriate, the deputy CEO or members of the executive board.  The 
plaintiffs are entitled to pursue compensation for all damages suffered by the 
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company, to which, if any, damages are awarded ... 
Oman 1 Commercial 
Companies 
Law No. (4) 
of 1974 
Article 10 No case shall be filed for claims arising under the provisions of this 
Law against or among partners of commercial companies regarding the 
company’s memorandum or articles of association or the company’s acts, or 
against the company’s managers, directors, auditors or liquidators, or against 
the heirs or successors of any of them for the acts they performed during the 
exercise of their functions, unless such case is filed within a period of five 
years effective as from the most recent of the following dates: 
a) The date of the act or negligence forming the basis of complaint. 
b) The date of the general meeting at which the board of directors presented 
the financial statements of the company for the period that includes the act or 
the negligence forming the basis of the case filed against the directors of a 
joint stock company. 
Article 75 All shares of a joint stock company shall enjoy equal and inherent 
rights in the ownership thereof, namely, the right to receive dividends 
declared by the general meeting, the pre-emptive right of subscribing for new 
shares, the right to share in the distribution of the company’s assets on 
liquidation, the right to transfer shares in pursuance of the Law, the right to 
view the company’s balance sheet, the profit and loss accounts and the 
shareholder registers, the right to be notified of the meetings of the general 
meeting and to participate and vote in such meetings personally or by proxy, 
the right to apply for annulment of any decision made by the general meeting 
or the board of directors if such decision is contrary to the Law, or the 
company’s articles of association or the company’s internal regulations, and 
the right to sue directors and the auditors of the company on behalf of the 
share holders or on behalf of the company pursuant to Article 110. 
Article 110 The company may institute an action against any director of the 
company it deems liable for damages that have come upon it under the 
provisions of the preceding Article.  The board of directors or the ordinary 
general meeting shall take a decision appointing a person to pursue the case 
on behalf of the company and authorising him to pay the costs of the case 
from the funds of the company.  However, if the company is under 
liquidation, the decision to file the case shall rest with the liquidator of the 
company.  Any shareholder may propose suing the members of the board of 
directors, and if the ordinary general meeting does not adopt his proposal, he 
may himself file the case on behalf of the company.  And if the case is 
successful, such shareholder shall be reimbursed the costs and expenses of the 
case out of the sums adjudged and the balance shall be paid to the company. 
Article 126 The resolutions of the general meeting duly adopted pursuant to 
the provisions of the Law and the company’s articles of association, if any, 
shall be binding to the company and each of its shareholders, but shall not 
affect the rights of third parties except to the extent provided by this Law.  
Any shareholder or any other interested person may, within five years from 
the date of the general meeting, apply to the competent court to decide the 
annulment of any resolution if adopted by such general meeting in violation 
of the Law or the provisions of the company’s articles of association or its 
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regulations, if any, or if adopted by fraud or abuse of authority by any person. 
Oman 
Capital 
Market Law, 
Royal Decree 
No. (80) of 
1998 
Article 8 The Authority’s board of directors may, upon material reasons 
raised by shareholders who own at least 5% of the company’s shares, suspend 
the resolutions of the general meetings which are made in favour of a certain 
category of shareholders or against a certain category of shareholders, or in 
the interest of the members of the board of directors or others.  The parties 
concerned may request the Appeals Committee specified in this Law within 
15 days from the date on which the resolution of suspension was passed, to 
invalidate the resolutions made by the general assembly.  The Committee’s 
decision shall in such case be final.  Should such period lapse without any 
measures being taken thereon, then the decision of suspension shall be null 
and void. 
Palestine 0.5 Company 
Law No.(12) 
of 1964 
Article 128 The responsibility of the chairman and board of directors for 
violations 
(1) The chairman and the board of directors are responsible for all violations 
committed against the laws, regulations and general instructions or the 
company’s memorandum. 
(2) The lawsuit brought by the plaintiff is personal.  Discharging the board of 
directors by the general assembly does not preclude the establishment of the 
lawsuit by the shareholders. 
Article 130 The right to bring a lawsuit against the chairman and the members 
of the board of directors 
The company has the right to bring a lawsuit under the preceding two articles.  
If the company does not exercise this right, every shareholder has the right to 
bring a lawsuit on behalf of the company to the extent of his shareholding in 
the company. 
Corporate 
Governance 
code 2009 
3.  Company management 
First: The board of directors  
22.  The director and/or board members are responsible towards the 
shareholders in the event of any intentional and severe negligence unless they 
prove that they have cared for the management of the company.  The 
disadvantaged shareholder may sue the director and the members of the board 
for the violation committed against the law, regulations, instructions or the 
statute of the company. 
Qatar 0.5 Qatar 
Commercial 
Companies 
Act No. (5) 
of 2002 
Article 114 The company can file the case of responsibility against the board 
members for the mistakes causing damages for a group of shareholders within 
five years from the occurrence of the mistake or negligence.  The ordinary 
meeting of the general assembly will take the decision regarding this case and 
appoint a representative of the company to run the case.  If the company is 
under liquidation, the liquidator will undertake filing the case based on the 
decision from the general assembly. 
Article 115 Every shareholder can file the case independently if the company 
fails to file the case, if the mistake has caused personal damage for him as a 
shareholder, provided that he should inform the company of his intention to 
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file the case.  Any condition in contrary to this provision in the statute of the 
company will be null and void. 
Article 136 Without prejudice to the rights of bona fide parties all decisions 
issued in violation to the provisions of this Law or the statute of the company 
will be invalidated. ...Any decision issued to protect the interest of a particular 
group of the shareholders or damaging them or bringing any special benefit 
for the board members or others without considering the interest of the 
company may be invalidated.  The invalidation judgement of a decision 
makes it as it was never issued.  The board of directors should publish the 
invalidated decision in two local newspapers published in Arabic.  The 
invalidation claim will not be considered after passing one year on the issue of 
the challenged decision.  The filing of the case will not cause for the 
suspension of the decision unless the court orders otherwise.  The invalidation 
claim will not be filed except by the shareholders who opposed the decision 
and established their objection in the report of the meeting or those who were 
absent in the meeting for any acceptable reason. 
Saudi 
Arabia 
1 Companies 
Regulations, 
Royal Decree 
M/6 of 1385 
Hijri 
Article 77 The company may file a liability claim against directors for 
wrongful acts that cause prejudice to the body of stockholders.  The resolution 
to file this claim shall be made by the regular general meeting, which shall 
appoint a person to pursue the claim on behalf of the company.  If the 
company is adjudged bankrupt, the right to file the claim shall transfer to the 
bankruptcy trustee, and upon the dissolution of the company, the liquidator 
shall pursue the claim after obtaining the approval of the regular general 
meeting. 
Article 78 Every stockholder shall have the right to file a liability claim 
against directors on behalf of the company if the wrongful act committed by 
them is of a nature to cause him personal prejudice.  However, the stockholder 
may file such claim only if the company’s right to file it is still valid and after 
notifying the company of his intention to do so.  If a stockholder files such 
claim, he shall be adjudged compensation only to the extent of the prejudice 
caused to him. 
Article 108 (1) The shareholder is confirmed to have all the rights related to 
the share, and in particular the right to receive a portion of the profits 
determined to be distributed, the right to receive a portion of the company’s  
assets upon liquidation, the right to attend the assemblies of shareholders and 
participate in its deliberations and vote on decisions, the right to dispose of 
shares, the right to request access on the company’s books and documents, 
and to monitor the work of the board of directors and bring a claim of liability 
against the members of the board and appeal the invalidity of the decisions of 
the shareholders’ assemblies.  All this shall be conducted according to the 
conditions and restrictions contained in this regulation or in the company’s 
regulation. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Resolution 
Article 3 A Shareholder shall be entitled to all rights attached to the share, in 
particular, the right to a share of the distributable profits, the right to a share 
of the company’s assets upon liquidation; the right to attend the general 
  
214 
Appendix 1 Shareholder protection in MENA countries 
4.  Oppressed minority 
Country Code Law/ 
Regulation 
Legal provision 
No.  
1/212/2006 
dated 
21/10/1427A
H 
assembly and participate in deliberations and vote on relevant decisions; the 
right of disposition with respect to shares; the right to supervise the board of 
directors activities, and file responsibility claims against board members; the 
right to inquire and have access to information without prejudice to the 
company’s interests and in a manner that does not contradict the Capital 
Market Law and the Implementing Rules. 
Sudan 0.5 Sudan 
Companies 
Act of 1925 
131 (1) The Registrar may, at the request of at least a hundred shareholders or 
shareholders representing at least ten per cent of the number of issued shares 
for any of the companies, appoint one or more qualified inspectors to inspect 
the company’s operations and to report thereon in the manner specified by 
Registrar. 
(2) Evidence supporting the request must be presented to the Registrar for the 
purpose of proving that the applicants have reasonable grounds to demand the 
inspection. 
132.  without prejudice to the powers of the Registrar under the provisions of 
Article 131: 
(A) The Registrar must appoint one or more competent inspectors to examine 
the operations of the company and to report thereon in the manner specified 
by the Registrar, if requested by: 
(I) the company, in a special resolution, or 
(II) the court order that the company’s operations should be examined by an 
inspector appointed by the Registrar, 
(B) The Registrar may take such action: 
(I) If the information and explanations required to be submitted to the 
Registrar under the provisions of Article 130 are not provided within the 
period specified, or if the Registrar after reading the document referred to in 
that article reveals unsatisfactory matters in the affairs of the company or that 
it does not show adequate and acceptable clarification for the matter to which 
it relates, or 
(II) If it appears to the Registrar that there are circumstances to suggest that:  
- The company’s operations are managed or were managed with the intention 
to cheat on creditors or shareholders or any other person or for the purpose of 
fraud or illegal purpose, or in a manner prejudicial to any of the group 
members of the company, or that the company has been established for the 
purpose of fraud or illegal purpose, or 
- People who established or managed the company had been convicted in 
relation to that establishment or management or fraud or deviation in their 
behaviour or convicted of disgraceful behaviour towards the company or to its 
members, or  
- The shareholders of the company have not been informed about all the 
information related to the company’s operations, which was reasonable to 
expect shareholders to receive. 
Tunisia 0.5 Tunisia 
Companies 
Law No. (93) 
of 2000 
Chapter 220 The company files a lawsuit against the members of the board of 
directors based on a decision of the general assembly, which could be taken if 
it is not listed on its agenda ... 
Each shareholder/s has/have at least five percent of the company’s capital for 
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a private company or three percent for a public company or if the 
shareholder/s capital is not less than one million dinars and he/they is/are not 
members of the board of directors, has/have the right to file a lawsuit, in the 
context of common interest, against the members of the board of directors for 
wrongdoing in exercising their functions.  The general assembly cannot take a 
decision to give up the case.  Any provision contrary to the company’s 
memorandum shall be void ...  The foregoing shall not preclude the 
shareholders to intimate lawsuit by himself and in his own name. 
Article 290 Shareholders holding at least ten percent of the share capital may 
request to cancel decisions contrary to the company’s memorandum or 
adversely affects the interests of the company, and in favour of the interests of 
one or a few shareholders or for the benefit of a third party ... 
Turkey 1 Turkish 
Commercial 
Law No. 
(6102) of 
2011 
Article 391 (1) Application may be made to the court for invalidation of the 
board of director resolutions.  Especially, those; 
a) Contrary to equity principle, 
b) Ignoring fundamentals of joint stock company or the principle stipulating 
protection of the capital,  
c) Infringing vested rights of the shareholders or restricting use of these rights, 
d) Interfering other organs’ non-transferable powers and related to transfer of 
these powers, 
shall be null and void. 
G) Annulment of resolutions passed by the general assembly 
I-Causes of Annulment 
Article 445 (1) The persons listed in Article 446 shall be entitled to file a suit 
of nullity, within three months as of the date of resolution, in the basic 
commercial court at the place where company’s head office is domiciled, 
against the resolutions passed by the general Assembly contrary to the 
provisions of the law and articles of association and rule of honesty. 
II- Persons entitled to file suit of nullity 
Article 446-(1) 
a) Those who are present in the meeting and casting vote against the 
resolution and confirming this opposition in the minutes of meeting, 
b) Irrespective of the fact whether or not attended to the meeting, or casted 
voted against the resolution; those who declare the procedure adopted during 
announcement of the call or preparation of agenda improper; or allege 
participation of unauthorised persons in the general assembly meeting in such 
a way to affect the resolutions, 
c) Board of directors, 
d) Each one of directors, in cases where enforcement of resolution brings 
extra burden for the board members, 
shall be entitled to file a suit of nullity. 
Capital 
Markets Law 
No. (2499) of 
1981 
Article 12 ...  In the circumstances enumerated in the first subparagraph of 
Article 381 of the Turkish Commercial Code, members of the board of 
directors, auditors and shareholders whose rights have been violated by 
decisions of the board of directors pursuant to this article may, open a suit in 
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annulment case within thirty days following the announcement of the decision 
at the commercial court at the location of the headquarters of the corporation.  
In this case, the provisions of Articles 382, 383 and 384 of the Turkish 
Commercial Code related to the annulment of general assembly decisions are 
applied. 
UAE 0.5 Commercial 
Companies 
law No. (8) 
of 1984 
Article 113 The company shall have the right to institute an action against the 
board of directors due to such defaults as would cause damages to all 
shareholders.  A general assembly’s resolution shall be required assigning the 
body who would institute the action in the company’s name.  If the company 
is in the state of liquidation, then the liquidator shall undertake the action after 
a general assembly’s resolution. 
Article 114 In the event of an act causing particular damage to a shareholder, 
he, in his capacity as a shareholder, may institute an  action in his own right if 
the company failed to redress the same, provided that he had notified the 
company of his intent to do so.  Any provision in the company articles of 
association to the contrary shall be hereby revoked. 
Article 136 Without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties, any 
resolutions made inconsistent with the provisions of this law or articles of 
association shall be null and void.  Any resolution, made in favour of or 
causing damage to, a particular group of shareholders or that may afford a 
special privilege to the board members or others regardless of the company’s 
interests shall be abrogated.  In the event of abrogation of a resolution, such 
resolution shall be deemed not existing with regard to all the shareholders.  
The board should publish the abrogation in two Arabic daily local news 
papers. ... 
  
217 
Appendix 1 Shareholder protection in MENA countries 
5.  Pre-emptive rights  
Country Code Law/ 
Regulation 
Legal provision 
Algeria 0 Algerian 
Code of 
Commerce, 
Ordinance 
No. (75-59) 
of 1975 
Article 694 The shares carry a preferential right to subscribe to capital 
increases.  The shareholders, in proportion to their shares, have a preferential 
right to subscribe for cash shares issued to increase the capital.  Any provision 
to the contrary is void.  During the term of the subscription, rights may be 
traded when the title is detached from the shares themselves; otherwise, it is 
transferable under the same conditions as for the share itself.  Shareholders 
may individually waive their preferential right. 
Article 697 (bis) The general meeting that decides the capital increase may 
cancel the preferential subscription rights. ... 
Article 700 The extraordinary general Meeting which decides the capital 
increase in favour of one or more persons, may cancel the preferential 
subscription rights of shareholders ... 
Article 715 (bis 44) Ordinary registered shares may, at the will of the 
constituent general meeting, be divided into two categories: 
- The first category with superior voting rights to the number of shares held. 
- The second category with a priority subscription of new shares or bonds. 
Bahrain 1 Commercial 
Companies 
Law Decree 
Law No. (21) 
of 2001 
Article 128 (i) The shareholders shall have priority right to subscribe for the 
new shares, and any condition to the contrary shall be deemed non-existent. 
Article 150 The company’s shareholders shall have the priority right to 
subscribe for the convertible bonds if they express their desire to do so within 
a period not exceeding fifteen days from the date of calling them to use such 
right.  The shareholder may use his priority right to subscribe for bonds in 
excess of his share in the company’s capital if the offered bonds allow this. 
Egypt 0 Decree No. 
(135) of 
1993.  
Executive 
Regulations 
of Capital 
Market Law 
No. (95) of 
1992 
Article 30 The statute of the company may include a stipulation regarding the 
extent of the pre-emptive rights of the present shareholders to subscribe in the 
shares of capital increase by cash nominal shares and by observing the 
privileges determined for them in accordance with provisions of Article 9 
hereof.  The statute may not include a stipulation limiting this right to certain 
shareholders than others, and without prejudice to the rights that could be 
specified for the preferred shares. ... 
Article 32 By resolution of the extra ordinary general assembly upon the 
request of the board of directors or ...  all or part of the shares issued for 
capital increase may be directly offered to public subscription without 
application of the priority rights specified for the shareholders by the 
company statute. 
Formats for the statute of the company: General assembly: Capital 
Article 18 Existing shareholders have the right to subscribe to any capital 
increase by cash nominal shares on a pro rata basis. 
Decree No. 
(96) of 1982.  
Executive 
Regulations 
for 
Article 96 The statute of the company should stipulate the extent of the pre-
emptive rights of the present shareholders to subscribe in the shares of capital 
increase by cash nominal shares.  The statute may not include a stipulation 
limiting this right to certain shareholders than others, and without prejudice to 
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Companies 
Law No. 
(159) of 1981 
the rights that could be specified for the preferred shares. 
Article 98 By resolution of the extra ordinary general assembly upon the 
request of the board of directors ...  all or part of the shares issued for capital 
increase may be directly offered to public subscription without application of 
the priority rights specified for the shareholders by the company statute. 
Iran 0 Commercial 
Code of Iran 
as ratified on 
Esfand 1347 
(March 1969) 
Article 167 An extraordinary general meeting which approves an increase of 
capital by issuing new shares or authorises the board of directors to do so may 
at same time rescind the pre-emptive right of the shareholders in subscribing 
the whole or a portion of new shares provided, however, that such decision is 
taken after having reviewed the report of board of directors and that of the 
inspector or inspectors; otherwise such decision is rendered as null and void. 
NOTE: The report of the board of directors mentioned in this article shall 
contain the reasons for the increase of capital, depriving the shareholders from 
their pre-emptive rights, introducing the new person or persons to whom the 
new shares are to be allotted, the number and value of such shares, and the 
factors taken into consideration in arriving at such decisions. 
Iraq 1 Companies 
Law No. (21) 
of 1997 
Article 56 (3) Every shareholder has the priority to buy shares at the 
subscription price proportional to the number of the shares he owns.  
Shareholders shall be allowed to exercise this right within a period of 15 days 
from the date they are invited to do so.  The invitation must state the 
beginning and end of the subscription period and the nominal value of the 
shares.  If some shares are not subscribed after the period stipulated in the first 
paragraph of this Article, the board of directors may place the shares for sale 
in the Baghdad Stock Exchange market in the manner it deems suitable. 
Fourth.  In the case of banks increasing capital by a sale of shares for cash, the 
company may issue shares without public subscription and/or without offering 
existing shareholders the right to participate, provided the following 
conditions are met: 
1.  The issuance is approved by a majority of the votes of the subscribed 
shares whose due installments have been paid; and 
2.  The Central Bank of Iraq concurs that the sale is for fair value, in view of 
all the circumstances, and is fair to shareholders not entitled to participate, in 
view of the benefit to the company as whole. 
Israel 0 Companies 
Law No. 
(5759) of 
1999 
Part VII: Capital of the company 
Chapter 1: Securities and transactions therein 
Article C: Issue of securities 
Entitlement to participate in future allotments 290 
(a) In a private company, the issued capital of which contains one class of 
shares, shares shall be offered to each shareholder in accordance with the 
proportion of each shareholder’s holding of the issued share capital; the board 
of directors may offer another person the shares that a shareholder refused to 
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purchase or did not accept a tender offer before the final date fixed for such in 
the offer, unless otherwise prescribed in the articles of association.
82
 
Jordan 0 Jordanian 
Companies 
Law No. (22) 
of 1997 
Article 92 Registration of the company 
b) The shareholding company’s articles of association and memorandum of 
association should include the following information: ...  
-Whether the shareholders and the holders of convertible bonds hold pre-
emptive right to subscribe for any new issues to be made by the Company. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code for 
Shareholding 
Companies 
Listed on the 
Amman 
Stock 
Exchange, 
2008 
Chapter Four: Shareholders’ rights 
Section one: General rights 
The company shall take appropriate measures to ensure that shareholders 
enjoy their rights in a manner that would achieve justice and equality without 
discrimination.  These rights include mainly:... 
7.  Priority to subscribe in any new share issuance by the company, before 
these shares are offered to other investors. 
Kuwait 0 Commercial 
Companies 
Law No. (15) 
of 1960 
Article 111 Every shareholder has the priority to subscribe to new shares 
proportionately to the shares owned by each one of them; a time-limit, not 
less than fifteen days, shall be granted for the exercise of the said priority 
right from the date of notifying the shareholders.  The memorandum of the 
company may include a provision requiring the shareholders to waive their 
priority right to subscription or limit this right. 
Article 131 A member shall, particularly, benefit of the following rights: 
Sixth: Disposition of the shares owned by him and the priority in subscription 
in the new shares, in accordance with the provisions of the law. 
Kuwait 
Companies 
Law No. (25) 
of 2012 
Article 160 Should the capital increase be decided by offering shares for 
public subscription, the shareholders shall have the priority to subscribe to 
new shares proportionately to the shares owned by each one of them, within 
fifteen days from the date of notifying them thereof, unless the memorandum 
of the company includes a provision requiring the shareholders to waive their 
priority right to subscription. 
The shareholder may assign his priority right to another shareholder or to 
third parties against a fee or free of charge according to what has been agreed 
upon between the shareholder and assignee. 
Lebanon 1 Lebanon on 
the Land 
Commerce, 
Decision No. 
(304) of 1942 
Article 105 The share entitles its owner certain inherent rights, the right to 
share dividends, and the priority right to subscribe in the capital increase, and 
the right to recover the par value, and the right to share the company’s assets, 
and the right to vote in the general assembly, and the right to transfer his 
share. 
Article 112 Shareholders of all classes have the priority right to subscribe in 
                                                 
82
 Shareholders of listed firms in Israel do not have pre-emptive rights. 
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new share offering to increase the company’s capital proportional to the 
percentage of old shares owned without diminution.  And the extraordinary 
general meeting which approved the capital increase takes all measures to 
distribute the excess shares. 
Article 113 The extraordinary general assembly cannot prevent or limit or 
change the proportion of the priority right of current shareholders to subscribe 
in the new share capital ... 
The 
Lebanese 
Code of 
Corporate 
Governance 
(2006) 
II.  Shareholders’ rights and obligations 
A.  General rights of shareholders and key ownership functions 1.  General 
principle 
Shareholders enjoy all rights conferred upon them by the Lebanese Code of 
Commerce including the right to vote at assemblies, the right to dividends, the 
right to transfer their shares, the preferential right to subscribe to capital 
increases, the right to vote on major transactions as well as all rights described 
in this Code. 
Lebanon 
Corporate 
Governance 
Guidelines 
for Listed 
Companies 
(2010) 
PART 2 Rights of the shareholders 
Article 3: General rights of the shareholders 
Shareholders enjoy all rights conferred upon them by the Lebanese Code of 
Commerce, the by-laws of the Beirut Stock Exchange and all applicable laws 
and regulations, including (i) the right to participate and vote at assemblies, 
(ii) the right to dividends and the right to a share in the profits of the 
company, (iii) the right, subject to the provisions of the bylaws, to convey or 
transfer their shares, (iv) the preferential right to subscribe to capital 
increases, (v) the right to elect and dismiss members of the board, (vi) the 
right to approve on major transactions, (vii) the right to inquire and have 
access to relevant information on the company, and (viii) all rights described 
in these Guidelines. 
Morocco 0 Companies 
Law No. (17) 
of 1995 
Article 189 The shareholders have a preferential right to subscribe for new 
shares in proportion to the number of shares they own.  Anything to the 
contrary is void.  During the subscription period, this right is tradable or 
transferable under the same conditions applicable to the share itself.  
Shareholders may individually waive their preferential rights. 
Article 192 The meeting which decides or authorises a capital increase may 
cancel the preferential subscription rights for the entire capital increase or for 
one or more tranches of the increase ...  The report of the board of directors or 
management must indicate the reasons for the proposed waiver of that right. 
Article 193 The general meeting which decides on capital increase may, in 
favour of one or more persons, cancel the preferential subscription rights. 
Moroccan 
Code of 
Good 
Corporate 
Governance 
6) Vigilance on special operations 
The enterprise shall, with complete transparency, announce the impact of 
operations which might call into question the equitable treatment of 
shareholders.  In particular, this refers to the dilution effect which might 
reduce certain shareholders’ percentage of corporate capital (following a 
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Practices 
(2008) 
capital increase, merger, partial incorporation of assets, etc.) as well as the 
potential cost to shareholders of option grants, or share purchases, and 
debt/equity conversions. 
Oman 1 Commercial 
Companies 
Law No. (4) 
of 1974 
Article 75 All shares of a joint stock company shall enjoy equal and inherent 
rights in the ownership thereof, namely, the right to receive dividends 
declared by the general meeting, the pre-emptive right of subscribing for new 
shares, the right to share in the distribution of the company’s assets on 
liquidation, the right to transfer shares in pursuance of the Law, the right to 
view the company’s balance sheet, the profit and loss accounts and the 
shareholder registers, the right to be notified of the meetings of the general 
meeting and to participate and vote in such meetings personally or by proxy, 
the right to apply for annulment of any decision made by the general meeting 
or the board of directors if such decision is contrary to the Law, or the 
company’s articles of association or the Company’s internal regulations, and 
the right to sue directors and the auditors of the company on behalf of the 
shareholders or on behalf of the company pursuant to Article 110. 
Article 76 Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the 
company’s articles of association may provide the division of the capital of 
the company, into shares of different categories in order to give the 
shareholders of each category the right to elect, by majority of their votes, a 
certain member of proportion of the members of the board of directors.  If the 
company has different categories of shares, then every increase in the capital 
shall lead to a proportionate increase in the number of the shares of each 
category unless a special meeting of each category and an extraordinary 
general meeting of all the shareholders approve an unequal issue or the 
creation of a new category of shares.  No decision made by the general 
meeting shall affect the rights of any category unless such a decision is 
approved by such class in a special meeting.  The special meetings of each 
class shall be held by the members of the concerned class in accordance with 
the rules that govern extraordinary general meetings.  Shareholders of a 
certain category shall have the pre-emptive right of subscribing only for the 
new shares of the same category. 
Article 83 Each shareholder has a pre-emptive right, in case of offering shares 
for public subscription, to subscribe for a number of new shares in proportion 
to the number of shares owned by him.  Written notice of such pre-emptive 
right shall be sent to each shareholder at his address recorded on the 
Shareholders’ Register along with a copy of the prospectus approved by the 
Capital Market Authority.  This notice shall also be published in at least two 
daily newspapers, on two consecutive days, after the notice has been first 
approved by the concerned authority, specifying the period during which the 
pre-emptive right may be exercised, which shall not be less than fifteen days 
from the date of publication thereof.  Any shareholder may, in accordance 
with the procedures and the provisions issued by the Minister of Commerce 
and Industry, waive its above mentioned pre-emptive right.  If the offered 
shares or part of them were not subscribed for by the shareholders during the 
specified period, such shares shall be offered for public subscription in 
accordance with the procedures of subscription for the capital of a joint stock 
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company under incorporation, provided such procedures are carried out by the 
board of directors of the company.  The board may, in lieu thereof, reduce the 
increase in the share capital to the extent equivalent to the value of shares 
which has not been subscribed for. 
Palestine 0 Company 
Law No.(12) 
of 1964 
Article 81 Capital increase (6) the initial public offering rules should apply to 
the new share offering. 
Corporate 
Governance 
code 2009 
2.  Equal shareholder rights 
19.  The board of directors will guarantee for each shareholder including 
small shareholders and shareholders who live outside Palestine all rights 
conferred upon them by law, regulations, the applicable instructions in force 
and in accordance with this Code and company bylaws which are :...The 
priority right to subscribe in any new company’s publication each as per his 
percentage of the shares. 
Qatar 1 Qatar 
Commercial 
Companies 
Act No. (5) 
of 2002 
Article 193 The shareholders have the priority of underwriting in the new 
shares.  A shareholder is not allowed to withdraw from his right of priority in 
favour of specific individuals. 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 Companies 
Regulations, 
Royal Decree 
M/6 of 1385 
Hijri 
Article 136 The shareholders have the priority to underwrite the new cash 
shares unless the regulation of the company includes giving up or restricting 
this right.  The Council of Ministers may, upon the proposal of the Minister of 
Commerce after the agreement with the Minister of Finance and National 
Economy, cancel or restrict the right of priority for the following companies: 
A) Concessionaire 
B) That manages a public utility 
C) That is provided a subsidy by the government 
D) That is joined with the country 
E) That is engaged in banking business 
The provision of this paragraph applies to companies even if they were 
formed before it came into force.  This article does not apply to the oil and 
mineral companies that work under special agreements issued by royal 
decrees.  And the shareholders shall be informed by publication in a daily 
newspaper of the decision of increasing the capital and underwriting 
requirements.  And it would be sufficient to notify them with this statement 
by registered letters if all the shares of the company are nominal.  Each 
shareholder shows his desire in writing to use his right to priority within 
fifteen days from the date of publication or the notification referred to in the 
preceding paragraph. 
Those shares shall be distributed to the original shareholders who have asked 
for underwriting by what they have of the original shares provided that what 
they get does not exceed what they asked of the new shares.  And the rest of 
the new shares shall be distributed to the original shareholders who have 
requested more than their portion by what they have of original shares 
provided that what they get does not exceed what they asked of the new 
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shares.  And the remaining new shares shall be floated for public underwriting 
and in this IPO (Initial Public Offering) the provisions related to underwriting 
by the capital of the company under foundation shall be followed. ... 
Sudan 0 Sudan 
Companies 
Act of 1925 
First schedule, Table A, Rules for managing joint stock companies 
42 Before issuance, all the new shares must be offered to people, who at the 
time of the offering have the right to receive announcements from the 
company to attend the annual general meeting, proportional to the shares held 
and as far as circumstances permit, taking into consideration any instructions 
different than the above stipulated in the resolution which declares the capital 
increase.  The offer should declare the number of shares offered and 
determines the period during which the offer should be exercised.  After the 
expiration of such period or upon receiving a rejection notification from the 
person who was offered the new shares, the board of directors may dispose of 
the shares in the manner it deems more beneficial to the company.  The board 
of directors may act in the same way in any new shares that cannot be easily 
offered in the manner set forth in this article because of the ratio of new 
shares to the shares held by persons who have the right to be offered the new 
shares. 
Tunisia 0 Tunisia 
Companies 
Law, No. 
(93) of 2000 
Article 296 The shareholders, in proportion to their shares, have a preferential 
right to subscribe in cash shares issued to increase the capital.  Any clause 
contrary to this shall be void.  During the subscription period, the preferential 
subscription right is negotiable when it is detached from the shares which are 
themselves tradable.  Otherwise, the preferential right shall be transferable in 
the same conditions for the share itself.  Shareholders may individually waive 
their preferential subscription rights. 
Article 300 The extraordinary general meeting which decides or authorises a 
capital increase may cancel the preferential subscription rights for the entire 
capital increase or any part or parts of this increase... 
Turkey 0 Turkish 
Commercial 
Law No. 
(6102) of 
2011 
Article 461 
(1) Each shareholder shall be entitled to acquire new shares in proportion of 
the shares owned in the company’s capital. 
(2) The resolution of the board of directors related to capital increase and pre-
emptive right of a shareholder shall only be limited on justified grounds and 
by the affirmative vote of the shareholders representing sixty percent of the 
basic capital.  Especially, transfer of enterprise, sections of a plant and other 
similar assignments and participation of workers in the company shall be 
considered legitimate reasons.  It shall not be allowed to cause damage or to 
secure benefit to any one through limitation or restriction of pre-emptive 
rights. 
(3) The board of directors shall assign the principles for exercising the rights 
in acquisition of new shares and grant to the shareholders at least fifteen days 
period.  Registry of resolution shall be announced in the gazette pursuant to 
article 35.  Besides it shall be published on the website. 
(4) Pre-emptive rights shall be transferable. 
(5) The company shall not hinder exercise of pre-emptive rights by the 
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shareholders by stating that the transfer of registered shares are limited in the 
articles of association. 
Capital 
Markets Law 
No. (2499) of 
1981
83
 
Registered capital 
Article 12 ...  In order for the board of directors to adopt resolutions to issue 
privileged shares and shares with a premium over their nominal value or to 
limit shareholders’ pre-emptive rights, or to restrict the rights of holders of 
privileged shares, the articles of association must authorise such actions. 
UAE 1 Commercial 
Companies 
law No. (8) 
of 1984 
Article 204 The shareholders shall have priority to subscribe in new shares.  
Any term in articles of association or the resolution for increasing the capital 
stating otherwise shall be hereby revoked. 
                                                 
83
 Turkish Capital Markets Law allows the board of firms in the ‘registered capital system’ to issue new shares up to 
the authorized capital limit, without abiding by the provisions of the Code regarding capital increases. 
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Algeria 0 Algerian 
Code of 
Commerce, 
Ordinance 
No. (75-59) 
of 1975 
Article 676 The ordinary general meeting is held at least once a year, within 
six months of the closing of the financial year, the deadline is subject to 
extension at the request of the board of directors or the management board, as 
the case may be, by order of the competent court on request.  This ordinance 
is not subject to any appeal. 
Bahrain 1 Commercial 
Companies 
Law Decree 
Law No. (21) 
of 2001 
Article 198...The board of directors may invite the ordinary general assembly 
to convene upon a justified request by the auditor or by a number of 
shareholders representing at least 10% of the company’s capital.  The auditor 
may invite the ordinary general assembly to convene in the cases specified in 
article 218 of this law. 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry may invite the general assembly to 
convene if a period of one month has lapsed from the date appointed for its 
meeting without it convening, or if the number of the board members 
becomes less than the minimum number required for the meeting to be valid, 
or if a number of shareholders representing at least 10% of the company’s 
capital so requests for serious reasons. 
Article 211 The extraordinary general assembly shall convene at an invitation 
by the board of directors or a written request to the board of directors by a 
number of shareholders representing 10% at least of the company’s shares. 
Egypt 1 Companies 
Law No. 
(159) of 1981 
Article 61 The general assembly is to be convoked by an invitation from the 
chairman of the board of directors at the time and place designated by the 
statute of the company.  The general assembly should be held at least once a 
year, within six months after the end of the financial year for the company.  
The board of directors may decide to call for the general assembly meeting 
whenever a necessity arises.  The board of director should convoke the 
ordinary general assembly meeting if the auditor demands, or a number of 
shareholders representing at least 5% of the capital of the company, provided 
that they express the motives behind demand, and that they deposit their 
shares in the headquarters of the company or at one of the approved banks; 
and such shares are not to be withdrawn except after dissolution of the general 
assembly. 
Article 70 The provisions relating to the ordinary general assembly are 
applicable to the extraordinary general assembly, with observance of the 
following: 
(a) The extraordinary general assembly meets upon an invitation of the board 
of administration.  The board should address the invitation if it is asked by a 
number of shareholders representing one tenth of the capital at least, for 
serious reasons, and subject to the applicants depositing their shares at the 
head quarters of the company or in any approved bank.  The shares should not 
be withdrawn except after dismissal of the assembly.  If the board does not 
convoke the assembly during one month from the date of presentation of the 
demand, the applicants may have recourse to the relevant administrative 
authority which will assume addressing the invitation. 
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Decree No. 
(96) of 1982.  
Executive 
Regulations 
for 
Companies 
Law No. 
(159) of 1981 
Article 215 The following has the right to call the general shareholders’ 
meeting...shareholders representing 5% of the capital. 
Article 226 The board of directors should call an extraordinary shareholders' 
meeting upon the request of shareholders representing at least 10% of the 
capital... 
Decree No. 
(135) of 
1993.  
Executive 
Regulations 
of Capital 
Market Law 
No. (95) of 
1992 
Article 41 …The board of directors convokes the general assembly meeting 
upon the request of the auditor or shareholders representing at least 5% of the 
nominal shares … 
Article 47 ...the extra ordinary general meeting is to be convoked by an 
invitation from the board of directors.  The board of director should convoke 
the extraordinary ordinary general assembly meeting upon a petition on 
substantive reasons by shareholders representing at least 10% of the nominal 
capital of the company provided that they deposit their shares in the 
headquarters of the company or at one of the approved banks; and such shares 
are not to be withdrawn except after dissolution of the general assembly.  If 
the board of directors do not convoke the meeting within one month, 
shareholders can request the Capital Market Authority to convoke the 
meeting. 
Iran 0 Commercial 
Code of Iran 
as ratified on 
Esfand 1347 
(March 1969) 
Article 95.  Shareholders who hold at least one-fifth of the shares of a 
company are entitled to request the board of directors to call a general 
meeting.  The board of directors shall be bound to call a general meeting 
within twenty days at the latest with due observance of the formalities.  If this 
is not done, the said applicants may ask the inspector or inspectors of the 
company to make such a call.  The inspector or inspectors must call a meeting 
within ten days otherwise such shareholders shall be allowed to call general 
meeting directly, provided that they have performed all the formalities 
pertaining to the call.  The notice of the call should include a statement to the 
effect that their request was not met by the board of directors and inspectors. 
Iraq 1 Companies 
Law No. (21) 
of 1997 
Article 87 The invitation to a meeting of the general assembly shall be issued 
by one of the following bodies or persons: 
Second: The chairman of the board of directors of the joint stock company 
under a decision by the board, and the managing director in other companies; 
or at the request of company members who own not less than 10 percent of its 
paid-up capital. 
Israel 1 Companies 
Law No. 
(5759) of 
1999 
Part III: Structure of the company 
Chapter 2: The General meeting 
Article B: Annual general meeting and special general meeting 
Convening of special general meeting 63 
(a) The board of directors of a private company may resolve to convene a 
special general meeting, and shall so convene at the demand of any one of the 
following: 
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(1) one director; 
(2) one or more shareholders holding at least ten percent of the issued capital 
and at least one percent of the voting rights in the company, or one or more 
shareholders with at least ten percent of the voting rights in the company. 
(b) The board of directors of a public company may resolve to convene a 
special general meeting, and shall so convene at the demand of any of the 
following: 
(1) two directors or one-quarter of the directors in office; 
(2) one or more shareholders with at least five percent of the issued share 
capital and at least one percent of the voting rights in the company, or one or 
more shareholders with at least five percent of the voting rights in the 
company. 
Jordan 0 Jordanian 
Companies 
Law No. (22) 
of 1997 
Article 169 The date of the ordinary general assembly meeting 
The general assembly of a public shareholding Company shall hold at least 
one ordinary meeting per year inside the Kingdom, upon the invitation of its 
board of directors, on the date set by the board in agreement with the 
Controller, provided that this meeting shall be held within the four months 
following the end of the fiscal year of the company. 
Article 172 Invitation of the general assembly to an extraordinary meeting 
a) The general assembly of a public shareholding company shall hold an 
extraordinary meeting inside the Kingdom upon the invitation of the board of 
directors, or upon a written request submitted to the board from shareholders 
holding not less than one-quarter of the company subscribed shares, or upon a 
written request submitted by the company auditors or the Controller, should 
shareholders holding in person not less than 15% of the company subscribed 
shares request such a meeting. 
b) The board of directors shall invite the general assembly to the 
extraordinary meeting which the shareholders, the company auditors or the 
Controller has requested to be convened in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (a) of this Article, within a period not exceeding fifteen days from 
the date the board has been notified of that request.  Should the board fail to 
direct such an invitation or refused to respond to the request, the Controller 
shall invite the general assembly to convene at the expense of the company. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code for 
Shareholding 
Companies 
Listed on the 
Amman 
Stock 
Exchange, 
2008 
Chapter three: General assembly meetings 
2.  The general assembly shall hold an ordinary meeting at least once a year, 
provided that it takes place within the four months following the end of the 
company’s fiscal year.  The general assembly may also hold an extraordinary 
meeting at any time in accordance with the legislations in force. 
Chapter four: Shareholders’ rights 
The company shall take appropriate measures to ensure that shareholders 
enjoy their rights in a manner that would achieve justice and equality without 
discrimination.  These rights include mainly: 
Section one: General rights 
10.  Requesting an extraordinary general assembly meeting by shareholders 
who hold 10% of the company’s subscribed shares. 
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Kuwait 1 Commercial 
Companies 
Law No. (15) 
of 1960 
Article 154 The general assembly is held once a year in the time and place 
specified in the memorandum of the company.  The board of directors may 
decide to call for the general assembly meeting whenever a necessity arises.  
The board of director should convoke the ordinary general assembly meeting 
if the auditor demands, or a number of shareholders representing at least 10% 
of the capital of the company,... 
Kuwait 
Companies 
Law No. (25) 
of 2012 
Article 237 The annual ordinary general assembly shall hold a meeting at the 
invitation of the board of directors within three months following the end of 
the fiscal year, in the time and place specified in the memorandum of the 
company.  The board may invite the assembly for a meeting whenever 
necessary and it may hold the meeting upon a justified request of a number of 
shareholders owning ten percent of the company’s capital, or at the request of 
the auditor, within fifteen days from the date of request.  The authority 
convening the meeting shall prepare the agenda.  The provisions related to the 
constituent assembly shall be applied on the procedures of invitation to the 
Assembly, the attendance quorum and the voting. 
Lebanon 0 Lebanon on 
the Land 
Commerce, 
Decision No. 
(304) of 1942 
Article 164 The members of the board of directors are responsible to convene 
the general assemblies. 
Article 176 The Commissioners should convene the general assembly each 
time the board of directors fails to do so in the cases specified in the law or in 
the company’s memorandum.  The Commissioners also have the right to 
convene the general assembly when necessary and if requested by a group of 
shareholders representing one-fifth of the capital of the company. 
The 
Lebanese 
Code of 
Corporate 
Governance 
(2006) 
B.  The rights of shareholders with regard to shareholders’ meetings 
1.  The right to call shareholders’ meetings 
1.3 Shareholders representing 10% of the company’s share capital may 
request the Board to call the assembly to resolve upon the issues proposed by 
the said shareholders. 
1.5 Any shareholder evidencing a legitimate interest may file an application 
with the court requesting the appointment of a court representative to call the 
general assembly to resolve upon the issues proposed by the applicant 
shareholder. 
Lebanon 
Corporate 
Governance 
Guidelines 
for Listed 
Companies 
(2010) 
Article 5 Shareholders’ rights with regards to shareholders’ meetings 
b) The shareholders’ assembly convenes upon notice of the board.  Subject to 
applicable laws and regulations, the auditor or shareholders representing 5% 
of the company’s share capital may request from the board to convene a 
shareholders’ assembly, on a specified issue proposed by the auditor or by the 
said shareholders. 
Morocco 1 Companies 
Law No. (17) 
of 1995 
Article 116 The general meeting is convened by the board of directors or the 
supervisory board, otherwise it may also be called in case of emergency by: 1) 
the auditors or 2) a representative appointed by the president of the court 
ruling at the request of either any interested party in an emergency, or one or 
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more shareholders representing at least one tenth of the share capital, 3) the 
liquidators.  and 4) the majority of the capital or voting rights of shareholders 
following a public purchase offer or exchange or after a sale of a block of 
shares changing control of the company... 
Oman 0 Commercial 
Companies 
Law No. (4) 
of 1974 
Article 116 The board of directors may convene the general meeting at any 
time and such meeting shall be convened whenever required by the Law or 
the company’s articles of association, or upon request of one or more 
shareholders who represent at least 25% of the capital of the company.  If the 
board of directors fails to convene the general meeting’s meeting, then the 
auditors shall do so ... 
Palestine 0 for 
WB 
and 1 
for 
Gaza 
Company 
Law No.(12) 
of 1964 
Article 149 The ordinary general assembly meetings 
Ordinary general assembly shall meet at least once a year, at the invitation of 
the board of directors on the date specified on the company’s memorandum 
that does not exceed four months following the end of the company’s 
financial year and may also call at the conditions stipulated in this law. 
Company 
Law of 1929 
Article 61 Annual general meeting 
(1) Each company holds a general meeting at least once in every calendar year 
and not later than fifteen months from the date of the previous general 
meeting.  If the meeting is not held accordingly, the company or each member 
of the board of directors or the chief director who was informed and 
participate in this violation are fined fifty pounds. 
(2) If the company does not hold the meeting according to the provisions of 
this article, the court, at the request of any member of the company, may ask 
the company to convene the general meeting or to order the meeting to 
convene. 
Article 64 (1) Companies apply the following provisions wherever the 
company’s memorandum does not include provisions similar nature. ... 
(C) Two or more members holding not less than ten percent of the issued 
capital may call for a general assembly meeting and if the company has no 
capital shares the general assembly meeting may convene at the request of a 
number of members not less than five per cent of the total number of 
members of the company. 
Corporate 
Governance 
code 2009 
1.  Public assembly meeting 
11.  The invitation to the ordinary or extraordinary public assembly meeting 
can be sent by the board of directors or upon the request of the auditor or by 
the company controller or the shareholders who hold at least one quarter of 
the company’s shares.  Shareholders who hold 15% of the company’s shares 
have the right to ask the company controller or the external auditor to request 
the board of directors for an extraordinary meeting of the public assembly. 
Qatar 1 Qatar 
Commercial 
Companies 
Act No. (5) 
Article 124 The board of directors should invite the general assembly to hold 
whenever the auditor demands.  If the board fails to address the invitation 
within fifteen days from the date of request the auditor is entitled to address 
the invitation directly after the approval of the Ministry.  The board should 
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of 2002 also address the invitation for meeting when it is requested by one or more 
shareholders who own minimum 10% of the capital for serious reasons, 
within fifteen days from the date of request, otherwise, the Ministry based on 
the request of these shareholders will address the invitation on behalf of the 
company.  The agenda in this case will be limited to the subject of the request. 
Article 139 The extraordinary meeting will be held only by an invitation from 
the board of directors.  The board should direct this invitation if a number of 
shareholders representing minimum 25% of the capital demand the same.  If 
the board fails to hold the meeting within fifteen days from the date of 
submitting this demand, shareholders can request from the Ministry to address 
the invitation at the expense of the company. 
Saudi 
Arabia 
1 Companies 
Regulations, 
Royal Decree 
M/6 of 1385 
Hijri 
Article 87 Stockholders’ general or special meetings shall be convened at the 
summons of the board of directors in the manner prescribed in the bylaws of 
the company.  The board of directors must call for a regular general meeting, 
if so requested by the auditor or by a number of stockholders representing at 
least 5% of the capital.  The General Department of Companies may, at the 
request of a number of stockholders representing at least 2% of the capital or 
pursuant to a decision by the Minister of Commerce, call for a general 
meeting if such a meeting is not called within one month from the date set 
therefore. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Resolution 
No.  
1/212/2006 
dated 
21/10/1427A
H 
Article 5: b) The general assembly shall convene upon a request of the board 
of directors.  The board of directors shall invite a General Assembly to 
convene pursuant to a request of the auditor or a number of shareholders 
whose shareholdings represent at least 5% of the equity share capital. 
Sudan 1 Sudan 
Companies 
Act of 1925 
69 (2) If the annual general meeting is not held according to the provisions 
stipulated in this section, the court can, at the request of any member of the 
company, call or order the annual general meeting to convene. 
71 (1) Notwithstanding any provision in the company’s memorandum, the 
board of directors shall proceed immediately to convene an extraordinary 
general meeting as soon as requested by a number of shareholders holding not 
less than one-tenth of the issued share capital of the company and who paid 
the value of all the premiums and all other amounts. 
First Schedule, Table A, Rules for managing joint stock companies 
46.  A general meeting must be held once a year at the time and place 
determined by the company and the meeting should convene not later than 
fifteen months from the last general meeting.  If the company did not specify 
the time and the venue the meeting is held in the month following the month 
in which the company was found and in the place designated by the board of 
directors, if the general meeting is not held as specified above then the 
meeting must be held in the month following that month and any two 
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members of the company may invite the meeting to convene following as 
closely as possible the same procedure in which the board of directors call for 
general meetings. 
48.  The board of directors may convene an extraordinary general meeting as 
it deems appropriate and may also convene extraordinary general meetings at 
the request submitted under the provisions of Article 71 of this law, if the 
meeting is not held the parties referred to in that article can call the meeting to 
convene.  If the number of the board members present in Sudan is insufficient 
to form a quorum, any board member or any two members of the company 
may invite the extraordinary general meeting to convene following as closely 
as possible the same procedure in which the board of directors call for general 
meetings. 
Tunisia 1 Tunisia 
Companies 
Law, No. 
(93) of 2000 
Article 277 The general meeting is convened by the board or by the executive 
board.  If necessary, it can be called by: 
1) The statutory auditors. 
2) An attorney appointed by the court on application by any interested person 
in an emergency or at the request of one or more shareholders holding at least 
five per cent stake in the company stock when it is not a public company or 
three percent when it is a public company... 
Turkey 1 Turkish 
Commercial 
Law No. 
(6102) of 
2011 
Article 411 
(1) The shareholders representing at least one tenth and one twentieth of the 
capital in the companies open to public, shall be entitled to request from the 
board of directors to call the general assembly for a meeting by giving reasons 
and to determine the agenda of the meeting; if the general assembly is to be 
convened in any case, the board shall be asked to specify the subjects of 
resolution.  The shareholders holding less number of shares shall be entitled to 
call for a meeting if provided by the articles of association. 
(4) If the call is accepted by the board of directors, the general assembly shall 
be called for a meeting to be held latest within forty-five days; otherwise, the 
call shall be made by the shareholders willing to convene the meeting. 
Consent of the court 
Article 412 (1) If the request of the shareholders related to call and agenda is 
rejected by the board of directors, or no response is given to the request within 
seven business days, then the decision for call shall be rendered by the 
commercial court of first instance at the place where the company’s head 
office is domiciled, upon application of the same shareholders.  If the court 
approves convening of a meeting, then an administrator shall be appointed to 
prepare the agenda and to make the call according to the provisions of the 
Law.  In the same decision, the court shall define the functions and powers of 
the administrator related to preparation of necessary documents for the 
meeting.  As long as there is no obligation, the court shall pass decision upon 
review of the file.  The decision of the court shall be final. 
UAE 0 Commercial 
Companies 
law No. (8) 
Article 121 If at least ten shareholders representing at least 30% of the capital 
should for serious reasons request the general meeting to convene, the board 
shall act accordingly and shall, within fifteen days from the date of such 
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of 1984 request, send invitations for that purpose.  In case the board fails to do so, the 
Ministry, after consultations with the concerned authority, may, within fifteen 
days of the date of the application send such invitations at the request of the 
said shareholders or at the request of a lesser number of shareholders 
representing at least 30% of the share capital. 
Article 139 The extraordinary general meeting shall convene only at the 
invitation of the board of directors.  The board shall extend such invitation, if 
so requested by a number of shareholders representing at least 40% of the 
company’s capital.  In the event of the board’s failure to do so within fifteen 
days as of this request, the applicants may request the Ministry to send the 
same invitation.  The Ministry, after consultation with the concerned 
authority, shall send the invitations.  Both the Ministry and the concerned 
authority may delegate one or more representatives to attend the meeting with 
no right to vote, and their presence shall be recorded in the minutes of the 
meeting. 
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MENA’s legal systems are recognised as hybrid legal systems where the Western transplanted 
laws operate alongside Sharia.  One way to analyse the extent to which Sharia applies to the laws 
of MENA is to classify countries according to the Sharia’s role in the constitution.  Hence, the 
constitutional role of Sharia is used as a proxy for the existence of hybrid legal systems in the 
MENA. (Foster, 2010, p. 7) argues that Islamic law is different from the state law of Muslim 
jurisdictions; some jurisdictions have a provision in their constitution that Islamic law is ‘a’ or 
‘the’ principal source of law and other Jurisdictions enact statutes based on Islamic law.  In either 
case, Islamic law is not the statute law where the ultimate authority is not to God but to state. 
Reviewing the provisions of the MENA countries’ constitution suggests five groups to Sharia 
being a constitutional source; 1) Sharia plays no role in the constitution; 2) Sharia is the religion 
of the state and the people and or the nation are the source of all power; 3) Sharia represents a 
legislative source in the constitution; 4) Sharia is the principal source of legislation; and 5) Sharia 
is an overall constitutional source (Al-Rimawi, 2012) (Elsaman, 2011, p. 10).  The groups are 
ranked from low role of Sharia for group 1 to high role of Sharia for group 5. 
The first group includes countries where Sharia plays no constitutional role at all.  This is 
common in countries that attempt to secularise the society such as Israel, Lebanon and Turkey.  
Israel is formally recognised as a secular country despite the absence of a written constitutional 
declaration.  The Knesset (the Israeli house of representatives) states: 
“Israel does not have a written constitution, ….The delay in the preparation of a 
constitution resulted primarily from problems that emerged against the background 
of the alleged clash between a secular constitution and the Halacha (the Jewish 
religious law)” (State of Israel, 2005). 
Lebanon’s constitution does not mention Sharia or Islam at all.  It has distanced itself from 
nominating Sharia as the religion of the state; and emphasises that authority and sovereignty rest 
with the people.  Lebanon’s constitution as amended in 1996 states: “[t]he people are the source 
of authority and sovereignty” (Constitution of Lebanon, 1926).  Moreover, Article 9 addresses the 
absolute freedom of conscience as opposed to referring to a particular religion; it states: 
“[T]here shall be absolute freedom of conscience.  The state in rendering homage to 
the Most High shall respect all religions and creeds and guarantees, under its 
protection, the free exercise of all religious rites provided that public order is not 
disturbed” (Constitution of Lebanon, 1926). 
Turkey, since its establishment in 1923, represents a unique example of a secular country that is 
predominantly comprised of a Muslim population.  Article 2 of Turkey’s 1982 constitution states 
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“[t]he Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social State governed by the rule of law” 
(Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1982). 
The second group includes countries where Sharia plays a limited constitutional role as the 
identity of the state. (Al-Rimawi, 2012, p. 107) calls these countries semi-secular.  This group 
includes Algeria, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.  Article 2 of Algeria’s constitution of 
1989 states: “Islam is the religion of the State” (Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic 
of Algeria, 1989).  There is no indication of any legislative role of Sharia in the rest of the 
constitution.  Similarly, Jordan’s constitution of 1952 states: “Islam is the religion of the State”.  
Moreover, Article 24 states: “[t]he Nation is the source of all powers” (Constitution of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1952). (Al-Rimawi, 2012, p. 108) describes the Jordanian 
constitution as “a political rope between secularism and Islamism”.  Under Gaddafi regime in 
Libya, Sharia has non-legislative role in the constitution.  Article 2 of Libya’s 1969 constitution 
states: “Islam is the religion of the State” (Libya: Constitution Proclamation, 1969).  However, 
following the 2011 revolution, a new constitution has been drafted which reinstated the role of 
Islam in the constitution.  Article 1 states: “Islam is the religion of the State and the principal 
source of legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence (Shariah)”.  Hence, pre-revolution, Libya belonged 
to the second group, where Islam acts as the identity of the state.  However, post-revolution Libya 
belongs to the fourth group, where Sharia is the main source of legislation.  Article 6 of 
Morocco’s constitution states: “Islam shall be the state religion.  The state shall guarantee 
freedom of worship for all” Yet Article 4 provides: “[t]he law shall be the supreme expression of 
the will of the Nation.  All shall abide by it.  The law shall have no retroactive effect” 
(Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, 1996).  Similarly, Article 1 of Tunisia’s Constitution 
states: “Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign state.  Its religion is Islam, its language is 
Arabic and its type of government is the Republic”.  Article 3 of Tunisia Constitution emphasises 
that the power belongs to the people “[s]overeignty belongs to the Tunisian people, who exercise 
it in accordance with the Constitution” (Constitution of Tunisia, 1959).  These provisions indicate 
that Sharia has no role in the constitution other than being the religion of the state. 
The third group includes those countries which designate Sharia as ‘a’ main source of legislation.  
Seven countries that regard Islam a source among other sources of legislation include: Bahrain; 
Iraq; Kuwait; Palestine; Qatar; Syria; and, UAE.  Article 2 of Bahrain’s 2002 constitution states: 
“[t]he religion of the State is Islam.  The Islamic Sharia is a principal source for legislation” 
(Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 2002).  Since the removal of the old regime, Iraq joined 
this group where Article 2 of the Iraq 2005 constitution states: “Islam is the official religion of 
the State and is a foundation source of legislation: A.  No law may be enacted that contradicts the 
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established provisions of Islam”.  Further, Article 92 states: “[t]he Federal Supreme Court shall 
be made up of a number of judges, experts in Islamic jurisprudence” (Constitution of the 
Republic of Iraq, 2005).  Article 2 of Kuwait’s constitution of 1962 indicates that “[t]he religion 
of the State is Islam, and the Islamic Sharia shall be a main source of legislation” (Constitution of 
Kuwait, 1962).  The contradiction is again evident in the civil code of Kuwait where Article 547 
states that: “[L]oans shall be without interest.  Any condition to the contrary shall be void without 
prejudice to the loan agreement” (1980).  Yet the Commercial Code of Kuwait which is 
considered a ‘special law’ stipulates that: "[t]he creditor shall be entitled to an interest in a 
commercial loan unless otherwise is agreed upon” (1980, p. Article 102). (Ballantyne, 1985, p. 5) 
note that the Kuwaiti Commercial Code preserves commercial transactions to a large extent from 
incursions of the Sharia.  There have been several attempts by the Islamic movement to 
emphasise the role of Sharia in Kuwait’s constitution but it has failed.  Further, there have also 
been attempts to challenge Articles (110) and (113) of Kuwait’s Commercial Act on grounds that 
these articles permit interest and are contradictory to Article (2) of the Kuwaiti Constitution.  
These claims were rejected by Kuwait Constitutional Court Decision of 28 November 1992 (Al-
Rimawi, 2012, p. 112).  The court held that Articles 110 and 113 of the Kuwaiti Commercial 
Code are constitutionally valid.  The rationale of the decision is that Article 2 of the Constitution 
guides the legislator to resort to Sharia as a source among other sources for legislation.  The 
decision also recognises that the legislators have the capacity to extract principles of law from 
other sources.  Prior to 1996, Article 1 of the Kuwaiti Civil Code stated: 
“[I]f there is no legislative provision, the judge gives judgment in accordance with 
Custom.  If there is no Custom, the judge deduces his opinion taking guidance from 
the dictates of the Islamic jurisprudence most in accord with the reality and interests 
of the country” (Civil Code of Kuwait, 1980) 
In 1996, the Islamic Jurisprudence became the second source of judgement while custom is 
recognised last.  Palestine’s legal system is complicated because several authorities have ruled 
over the country.  Accordingly, multiple legal systems have affected the political and legal 
structures in Palestine.  The contemporary Basic law of Palestine (2003) emphasises that Sharia is 
a principle source of legislation.  Similarly, Article 1 of Qatar’s constitution of 2004 states: 
“Qatar is an independent sovereign Arab State.  Its religion is Islam and Shari’a law shall be a 
main source of its legislations” (Constitution of Qatar, 2004).  Despite the socialist orientation of 
the country, Article 3(2) of Syria’s 1973 constitution states: “Islamic jurisprudence is a main 
source of legislation” (Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic, 1973).  Finally, the Constitution 
of the UAE of 1971 Article 7 states: “Islam is the official religion of the Union.  The Islamic 
Shariah shall be a main source of legislation in the Union” (Constitution of the United Arab 
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Emirates, 1971).  The same contradiction as in Kuwait exists in UAE civil and commercial codes.  
This is evident in the precedents established by UAE courts in respect of calculation and 
application of interest.  The Federal Supreme Court of UAE in its interpretation Decision No.  
14/9 issued in 1981 held that Articles 61 and 62 of Abu Dhabi Code of Civil Procedures of 1970 
permitting interest are constitutional.  In another contradictory ruling, the Court of First Instance 
and the Court of Appeal held that the interest charged by the bank is invalid since it contradicts 
Sharia and against the constitution.  The bank appealed to the Federal Court against the decision 
of the lower court.  The Federal Supreme Court held that Sharia prohibited interest, but at the 
same time made exceptions to the prohibition by the application of the Sharia principle of 
“[n]ecessity permits what would be otherwise forbidden” (Tamimi, 2002, p. 50) (Majid and 
Majid, 2003, p. 192) (Mahmoud, 2005). (Ballantyne, 1985, p. 12) argues that it is very hard to 
identify the exact role of Sharia.  Ballantyne provides an example where the Constitution of UAE 
recognises the Sharia as a principal source of law.  However, he also acknowledges the Law 
setting up the Supreme Court provides priority to Sharia as the principal source.  Article 75 of the 
Federal Supreme Court regulations in UAE states: 
“[t]he Supreme Court shall apply the provisions of the Islamic Sharia, the federal 
laws, and the other laws in force in the Emirates, that are members of the federation, 
and which are consistent with the provisions of the Islamic Sharia”. 
The fourth group includes those countries where Sharia is ‘the’ main source of legislation. (Majid 
and Majid, 2003) suggest that if the constitution describes Sharia as ‘the’ principal source of 
legislation, the hierarchy implies that all other laws and statutes must comply with the principles 
of Sharia.  Four countries, Egypt, Oman, Sudan, and Yemen give strong commitment to Sharia 
constitutionally.  The Egyptian Constitution of 1971 was less committed to Sharia.  However, as 
a result of Islamist group pressure, Article 2 of the constitution was amended in 1980 to exalt 
Sharia as the main of constitution rather than a source of legislation (Carballo, 2007, p. 101).  
Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1980 states “Islam is the Religion of the State.  Arabic is 
its official language, and the principal source of legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence (Sharia)” 
(Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1971).  This change in the constitution had 
commercial impact where the Islamist group demanded to annul unconstitutional provision of 
Article 226 of the Egyptian Civil Code of 1948 that permit interest.  In a landmark decision, the 
Supreme Court held that the change in Article 2 of the Constitution had no retroactive effect, and 
hence did not affect existing legislation.  However, the Supreme Court claimed that Article 2 
imposed an obligation on the legislative to bring all future laws in conformity with the Sharia 
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("Shari'a and Riba: Decision in Case no.  20 of Judicial Year no.  1," 1985).
84
  Despite the fact 
that the logic behind the decision of the Egyptian court is different from the Kuwaiti case, both 
have concluded that interest is legitimate.  The Supreme Court’s decision was highly criticised.  
Saad (1986) cited in (Majid and Majid, 2003) argues that the decision is poor, not convincing, 
and the prohibition of interest should be applied (at least) from the date of the enactment in 1980.  
(Ballantyne, 1985, p. 5) criticised the Supreme Court’s decision pointing out that if the basic law 
is changed, then it is assumed that the amendment was intended to produce some effect.  Unlike 
Egypt, Pakistani’s Supreme Court decision in December 1999 ruled that interest-based banking is 
contrary to Islamic law.  Consequently, provisions related to interest in twenty-two Pakistani 
statutes were void (Stovall, 2000, p. 841).  Similarly, Oman adopted a strong role of Sharia in its 
constitution.  Article 2 of Oman’s Basic Law of 1996 states: “[t]he religion of the State is Islam 
and the Islamic Shariah is the basis of legislation” (Basic Law of the Sultanate of Oman, 1996).  
Likewise, Sudan has shown strong commitment to Sharia under its 1988 constitution, where.  
Article 65 Source of Legislation states: 
“[T]he Islamic Sharia and the national consent through voting, the Constitution and 
custom are the source of law and no law shall be enacted contrary to these sources, 
or without taking into account the nation’s public opinion, the efforts of the nation’s 
scientists, intellectuals and leaders” (Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the 
Sudan, 1988). 
However, after the division of Sudan in 2003, the interim constitution of 2005 indicates that 
Sharia was limited to Northern Sudan.  Furthermore, Article 201 (2) of the Interim National 
Constitution of Sudan of 2005 states: “[a] dual banking system shall be established, and shall 
consist of an Islamic banking system that shall operate in Northern Sudan and a conventional 
banking system to operate in southern Sudan” (Interim National Constitution of the Republic of 
the Sudan, 2005).  It is worth noting that Sudan’s Banking Sector Regulation of 2003 and the 
Securities Law of 1994 define ‘finance’ and ‘financial securities’ in terms of Islamic concepts.  
Yemen directly references Islam constitutionally.  Article 2 of the Yemen Constitution of 2001 
states: “Islam is the religion of the country and Arabic is its official language.”  Article 3 regards 
Islamic law as the main source of legislation and further Article 7 considers that “[t]he national 
economy is based on freedom in economic activities and in accordance with the Islamic social 
justice” (Constitution of the Yemen Republic, 2001). 
                                                 
84
 Constitutional Court of Egypt-Decision of 4 May 1985.  The case was Rector of Al Azhar vs. President of the 
Republic and others.  In 1985 the rector of Al Azhar (a high profile Islamic institution) brought a case against the 
president, the Egyptian parliament and others.  Al Azhar contended that the provisions of the Civil Code granting 
interest such as Article 226 of the Egyptian Civil Code became unconstitutional in view of the amended Article 2 of 
the Constitution, which adopted Sharia as ‘the’ main source of legislation. 
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The fifth group includes Iran and Saudi Arabia where Islamic law itself is the constitution of the 
country.  The strong commitment to Sharia is evident in Article 2 of Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran of 1979: 
“[T]he Islamic Republic is a system based on the belief in: 1.  the One God (as stated 
in the phrase "There is no god except Allah"), His exclusive sovereignty and the right 
to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His commands; 2.  Divine revelation 
and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws; 3.  The return to God in the 
Hereafter, and the constructive role of this belief in the course of man’s ascent 
towards God; 4.  The justice of God in creation and legislation”. 
Further, Article 4 states 
“[A]ll civil, penal financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, 
and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria.  This principle 
applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all 
other laws and regulations, and the fuqaha’ of the Guardian Council are judges in 
this matter” (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979). 
Saudi Arabia also belongs to the fifth group where Islamic law is the law of the land and it is 
supplemented by several government-enacted regulations.  Article 1 of the Basic Law of Saudi 
Arabia of 1993 states: 
“[T]he Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State.  Its religion is 
Islam and its constitution is Almighty God’s Book, The Holy Qur’an, and the Sunna 
(Traditions) of the Prophet” (Basic Law of Saudi Arabia, 1993 (1412 H)). 
Moreover, Article 23 of the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia of 1993 states “[t]he State shall protect 
the Islamic Creed and shall cater to the application of Shariah.  The State ...  shall undertake the 
duties of the call to Islam”.  There is parallel body of secular regulations in Saudi Arabia which 
would be considered void if it contradicts with the provisions of Sharia (Ballantyne, 1985, p. 4).  
This commitment can be contrasted with a lower level of commitment to Sharia as a legislative 
source by the rest of the MENA countries. 
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Appendix 3 List of variables used in the ‘Law and Finance’ literature 
Panel A: Financial market development variables 
Variable Definition Used in 
Private credit to GNP The sum of bank debt of the private sector and outstanding non-financial bonds to GNP in a given year. La Porta et al. (1997); Levine et al 
(2000); Beck et al. (2001); Beck 
and Levine (2002); Stulz and 
Williamson (2003); Beck et al., 
2003; and, Djankov et al. (2007). 
Liquid liabilities Liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-
bank financial intermediaries) to GDP in a given year. 
Levine et al (2000); Beck et al. 
(2001); Beck et al. (2003b); and, 
Rajan and Zingales (2003). 
Market capitalisation to 
GDP 
Average of the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP (or GNP) for sample period. La Porta et al. (1997); Beck et al. 
(2001); Rajan and Zingales (2003); 
Beck et al. (2003b); Stulz and 
Williamson (2003); La Porta et al. 
(2006); Djankov, La Porta, et al. 
(2008); and, Spamann (2010). 
Number of firms to 
population 
The number of listed domestic firms to population in a given year.  Or, logarithm of the average ratio of the 
number of domestic listed firms to population for sample period. 
La Porta et al. (1997); Rajan and 
Zingales (2003); La Porta et al. 
(2006); Djankov, La Porta, et al. 
(2008); and, Spamann (2010). 
IPOs to population The number of initial public offerings of equity to population for sample period. La Porta et al. (1997) and Spamann 
(2010). 
IPOs to GDP Average of the ratio of the equity issued by newly-listed firms divided by GDP over sample period. La Porta et al. (2006) and Djankov, 
La Porta, et al. (2008). 
Equity issues to GDP The ratio of funds raised by domestic firms through public equity offerings to GDP (both initial public offerings 
and seasoned equity issues) in a given year. 
 
Beck et al. (2000); Stulz and 
Williamson (2003); and, Rajan and 
Zingales (2003). 
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Appendix 3 List of variables used in the ‘Law and Finance’ literature 
Panel A: Financial market development variables 
Variable Definition Used in 
Value traded to GDP Average of the total value of stocks traded to GDP for sample period. Beck and Levine (2002); Beck et 
al. (2003b); and, La Porta et al. 
(2006). 
Turnover ratio Total value of shares traded on the stock market exchange to total market capitalisation. Beck et al. (2001). 
Ownership concentration Average percentage of common shares owned by the top three shareholders in the top ten non-financial, 
privately-owned domestic firms.  A firm is considered privately-owned when the state is not a known 
shareholder. 
Beck (2001); La Porta et al (2006); 
Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008); 
and, Spamann (2010). 
Panel B: Creditor protection variables 
Variable Definition Used in 
Creditor rights An index aggregating different creditor rights.  The index is formed by adding 1 when: a) the country imposes 
restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganisation; b) secured creditors are 
able to gain possession of their security once the reorganisation petition has been approved (no automatic stay); 
c) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the 
assets of a bankrupt firm; d) and the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending.  The index 
value ranges from 0-4. 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); Beck et al. (2001); 
Levine et al. (2000); Stulz and 
Williamson (2003); Lich et al. 
(2005); Djankov et al. (2007); and, 
Spamann (2010). 
Restrictions for going into 
reorganisation 
Equals 1 if the reorganisation procedure imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent to file for reorganisation; 
and equals 0 if there are no such restrictions. 
La Porta et al. (1997); and La Porta 
et al. (1998); Stulz and Williamson 
(2003); and, Djankov et al. (2007). 
No automatic stay on 
secured asset 
Automatic stay prevents secured creditors from gaining possession of their security.  Equals 1 if the 
reorganisation procedure does not impose an automatic stay on the assets of the firm on filing the reorganisation 
petition; and equals 0 if such a restriction does exist in the law. 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); Stulz and Williamson 
(2003); Levine et al. (2000); and, 
Djankov et al. (2007). 
Secured creditors first Equals 1 if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of 
the assets of a bankrupt firm; and equals 0 if non-secured creditors, such as the government and workers, are 
given absolute priority. 
 
 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); Stulz and Williamson 
(2003); Levine et al. (2000); and, 
Djankov et al. (2007). 
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Appendix 3 List of variables used in the ‘Law and Finance’ literature 
Panel A: Financial market development variables 
Variable Definition Used in 
Management does not stay Equals 1 when an official appointed by the court, or by the creditors, is responsible for the operation of the 
business during reorganisation; equivalently, this variable equals 1 if the debtor does not keep the administration 
of its property pending the resolution of the reorganisation process; and equals 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); Stulz and Williamson 
(2003); Levine et al. (2000); and, 
Djankov et al. (2007). 
Public registry A public registry is defined as a database owned by public authorities (usually the central bank or banking 
supervisory authority) that collects information on the standing of borrowers in the financial system and makes it 
available to financial institutions.  Equals 1 if a public credit registry operates in the country; and equals 0 
otherwise. 
Djankov et al. (2007). 
Private bureau A private bureau is defined as a private commercial firm or non-profit organisation that maintains a database on 
the standing of borrowers in the financial system, and its primary role is to facilitate exchange of information 
amongst banks and financial institutions.  Private credit reporting firms, which collect information from public 
sources but not banks and financial institutions, operate in several other countries but are not considered here.  
Equals 1 if a private credit bureau operates in the country; and 0 otherwise. 
Djankov et al. (2007). 
Information sharing Equals 1 if either a public registry or a private bureau operates in the country; and 0 otherwise. Djankov et al. (2007). 
Contract enforcement days The number of calendar days to enforce a contract of unpaid debt worth 50% of the country’s GDP per capita 
through courts. 
Djankov et al. (2007). 
Legal reserve The minimum percentage of total share capital mandated by corporate law to avoid the dissolution of an existing 
firm.  Equals 1 for countries with such a restriction; and equals 0 for countries without. 
La Porta et al. (1998); Stulz and 
Williamson (2003); and, Spamann 
(2010). 
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Appendix 3 List of variables used in the ‘Law and Finance’ literature 
Panel C: Shareholder protection variables 
Variable Definition Used in 
Anti-director rights index Index aggregating the shareholder rights.  Formed by adding 1 when: a) the country allows shareholders to mail 
their proxy vote to the firm; b) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general 
shareholders’ meeting; c) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors 
is allowed; d) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; e) the minimum percentage of share capital that 
entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10%; or f) 
shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote.  The index ranges from 0 
to 6. 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); Beck et al. (2001); La 
Porta et al. (2002); Lich et al. 
(2005); La Porta et al. (2006); Stulz 
and Williamson (2003); and, 
Spamann (2010). 
Adjusted Anti-director 
rights index 
Aggregate index of shareholder rights.  Formed by summing: a) vote by mail; b) shares not deposited; c) 
cumulative voting; d) oppressed minority; e) pre-emptive rights; and f) capital to call a meeting. 
Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008) 
and Spamann (2010). 
Proxy by mail allowed Equals 1 if the company law or commercial code allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; equals 
0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); and, Stulz and 
Williamson (2003). 
Vote by mail Equals 1 if the law explicitly mandates or sets as a default rule that: a) proxy solicitations paid by the firm 
include a proxy form allowing shareholders to vote on agenda items; or b) a proxy form to vote on the agenda 
items accompanies the meeting notice; or c) shareholders vote by mail on the agenda items (i.e., postal ballot); 
and equals 0 otherwise. 
Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008) 
Shares not deposited  Equals 1 if the company law or commercial code does not allow firms to require that shareholders deposit with 
the firm itself or another firm any of their shares prior to a general shareholders meeting, thus preventing them 
from selling those shares for a number of days, and equals 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); Stulz and Williamson 
(2003); and, Djankov, La Porta, et 
al. (2008). 
Cumulative voting or 
proportional representation 
Equals 1 if the company law allows shareholders to cast all their votes for one candidate standing for election to 
the board of directors (cumulative voting) or if the company law or commercial code allows a mechanism of 
proportional board representation by which minority interests may name a proportional number of directors to 
the board; and equals 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); and, Stulz and 
Williamson (2003). 
Cumulative voting Equals 1 if the law explicitly mandates or sets as a default rule that shareholders owning 10% or less of the 
capital can cast all their votes for one board of directors or supervisory board candidate (cumulative voting) or if 
the law explicitly mandates or sets as a default rule a mechanism of proportional representation in the board of 
directors or supervisory board by which shareholders owning 10% or less of the issued capital can name a 
proportional number of directors to the board; and equals 0 otherwise. 
Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008) 
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Appendix 3 List of variables used in the ‘Law and Finance’ literature 
Panel C: Shareholder protection variables 
Variable Definition Used in 
Oppressed minorities 
mechanism 
The proxy ‘minority shareholders’ is defined as shareholders who own 10% or less of share capital.  Equals 1 if 
the company law grants minority shareholders either a judicial venue to challenge the decisions of management 
or of the assembly or the right to step out of the firm by requiring the firm to purchase their shares when they 
object to certain fundamental changes, such as mergers, asset dispositions, and changes in the articles of 
incorporation; and equals 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); and, Stulz and 
Williamson (2003). 
Oppressed minority Index of the difficulty faced by minority shareholders in challenging (i.e., by either seeking damages or having 
the transaction rescinded) resolutions that benefit controlling shareholders and damage the firm.  Equals 1 if 
minority shareholders can challenge a resolution of both the shareholders and the board if it is unfair, prejudicial, 
oppressive, or abusive; equals 0.5 if shareholders are able to challenge either a resolution of the shareholders or 
of the board if it is unfair, prejudicial, or oppressive; and equals 0 otherwise. 
Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008) 
Pre-emptive rights Equals 1 when the company law or commercial code grants shareholders the first opportunity to buy new issues 
of shares, and this right can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote; and equals 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); Stulz and Williamson 
(2003); and, Djankov, La Porta, et 
al. (2008). 
Percentage of share capital 
to call an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting 
The minimum percentage of ownership of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting. 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); and, Stulz and 
Williamson (2003). 
Capital to call a meeting The minimum percentage of share capital or voting power that the law mandates or sets as a default rule that 
entitles a single shareholder to call a shareholders’ meeting (directly or through the court).  Equals 1 when capital 
to call a meeting is less than or equal to 10%; and equals 0 otherwise. 
Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008). 
One share–one vote Equals 1 if company law requires that ordinary shares carry one vote per share, equals 0 otherwise.  Equivalently, 
this variable equals 1 when the law prohibits the existence of both multiple-voting and non-voting ordinary 
shares and does not allow firms to set a maximum number of votes per shareholder irrespective of the number of 
shares owned; and equals 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); Stulz and Williamson 
(2003); and, Spamann (2010). 
Mandatory dividend Equals the percentage of net income that the company law or commercial code requires firms to distribute as 
dividends among ordinary stockholders.  Equals 0 for countries without a restriction. 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); Stulz and Williamson 
(2003); and, Spamann (2010). 
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Appendix 3 List of variables used in the ‘Law and Finance’ literature 
Panel C: Shareholder protection variables 
Variable Definition Used in 
Anti-self-dealing index Attorney based survey.  Average of ex ante and ex post private control of self-dealing. Djankov, La Porta, et al. (2008). 
Ex ante private control of 
self-dealing 
Index of ex ante control of self-dealing transactions.  Average of approval by disinterested shareholders and ex-
ante disclosure. 
Approval by disinterested 
shareholders 
Equals 1 if the transaction must be approved by disinterested shareholders; and equals 0 otherwise. 
Ex ante disclosure Average of the disclosures by Buyer, disclosures by Mr.  James and independent review. 
Disclosures by Buyer Index of disclosures that Buyer must make before the transaction can be approved.  Ranges from 0 to 1.  Equals 
0.33 for each of the following disclosures: (1) Mr.  James owns 60% of Buyer; (2) Mr.  James owns 90% of 
Seller; and (3) all material facts or the following three items: (a) description of the assets, (b) nature and amount 
of consideration, and (c) explanation of the price. 
Disclosures by Mr.  James Index of disclosures that Mr.  James must make before the transaction can be approved.  Ranges from 0 to 1.  
Equals 1 if all material facts must be disclosed; equals 0.5 if only the existence of a conflict of interest must be 
disclosed, without details; and equals 0 if no disclosure is required 
Independent review Equals 1 if a positive review is required (e.g., by a financial expert or independent auditor) before the transaction 
can be approved; and equals 0 otherwise. 
Ex post private control of 
self-dealing 
Index of ex post control over self-dealing transactions.  Average of disclosure in periodic filings and ease of 
proving wrongdoing.  Ranges from zero to one. 
Disclosure in periodic 
filings 
Index of disclosures required in periodic disclosures (e.g., annual reports).  Ranges from 0 to 1.  Equals 0.20 for 
each of the following disclosures: (1) Mr.  James owns 60% of stake in Buyer; (2) Mr.  James owns 90% of 
Seller; (3) shares held beneficially by Mr.  James (i.e., shares held and/or managed via a nominee account, trust, 
brokerage firm or bank); (4) shares held indirectly by Mr.  James (e.g., via a subsidiary company or holding); and 
(5) all material facts about the transaction or the following three items: (a) description of the assets; (b) nature 
and amount of consideration; and (c) explanation for the price. 
Ease in proving 
wrongdoing 
Average of standing to sue, rescission, ease of holding Mr.  James civilly liable, ease of holding the approving 
body civilly liable, and Access to evidence. 
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Appendix 3 List of variables used in the ‘Law and Finance’ literature 
Panel C: Shareholder protection variables 
Variable Definition Used in 
Standing to sue Equals 1 if a 10% shareholder can sue derivatively either Mr.  James or the approving bodies or both for damages 
that the firm suffered as a result of the transaction; and equals 0 otherwise. 
Rescission Index of the ease in rescinding the transaction.  Ranges from 0 to 1.  Equals 1 when rescission is available when 
the transaction is unfair or entails a conflict of interest; equals 0.5 when rescission is available when the 
transaction is oppressive or prejudicial; and equals 0 when rescission is unavailable or only available when there 
is bad faith or when the transaction is unreasonable or causes disproportionate damage. 
 
Ease of holding Mr.  
James civilly liable 
Ranges from 0 to 1.  Equals 1 if the interested director is liable if the transaction is unfair, oppressive, or 
prejudicial; equals 0.5 when the interested director is liable if he either influenced the approval or was negligent; 
and equals 0 when the interested director is either not liable or liable only in cases of bad faith, intent, or gross 
negligence. 
 
Ease of holding the 
approving body civilly 
liable 
Ranges from 0 to 1.  Equals 1 if members of the approving body are liable if the transaction is unfair, oppressive, 
or prejudicial; equals 0.5 when members of the approving body are liable if they act negligently; and equals 0 
when members of the approving body are either not liable or liable in only cases of intent, bad faith, or gross 
negligence. 
 
Access to evidence Ranges from 0 to 1.  Equals 0.25 for each of the following: 1) a shareholder owning at least 10% of the shares 
can request that the Court appoint an inspector to investigate Buyer’s affairs; 2) the plaintiff can request any 
documents relevant to the case from the defendant (without specifying which ones); 3) the plaintiff can examine 
the defendant without the Court approving the questions in advance; and 4) the plaintiff can examine non-parties 
without the Court approving the questions in advance.  Equals 0.125 for each of the following: 1) the plaintiff 
can examine the defendant but questions require prior Court approval; and 2) the plaintiff can examine directly 
the non-parties but questions require prior Court approval. 
 
Prospectus disclosure Attorney based survey.  Adopts six measures for specific disclosure requirements for IPOs.  The index is an 
arithmetic mean of a) prospectus; b) compensation; c) shareholders; d) inside ownership; e) contracts irregular; 
and f) transactions.  
La Porta et al. (2006). 
Prospectus Equals 1 if the law prohibits selling securities to be listed on the largest stock exchange of the country without 
delivering a prospectus to potential investors; and equals 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 3 List of variables used in the ‘Law and Finance’ literature 
Panel C: Shareholder protection variables 
Variable Definition Used in 
Compensation An index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the compensation of the issuer’s directors and key 
officers.  Equals 1 if the law or the listing rules require that the compensation of each director and key officer be 
reported in the prospectus of a newly listed firm; equals 0.5 if only the aggregate compensation of directors and 
key officers must be reported in the prospectus of a newly listed firm; and equals 0 when there is no requirement 
to disclose the compensation of directors and key officers in the prospectus for a newly listed firm. 
 
Shareholders An index of disclosure requirements regarding the issuer’s equity ownership structure.  Equals 1 if the law or the 
listing rules require disclosing the name and ownership stake of each shareholder who, directly or indirectly, 
controls 10% or more of the issuer’s voting securities; equals 0.5 if reporting requirements for the issuer’s 10% 
shareholders do not include indirect ownership or if only their aggregate ownership needs to be disclosed; and 
equals 0 when the law does not require disclosing the name and ownership stake of the issuer’s 10% 
shareholders. 
 
Inside ownership An index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the equity ownership of the issuer’s shares by its 
directors and key officers.  Equals 1 if the law or the listing rules require that the ownership of the Issuer’s shares 
by each of its director and key officers be disclosed in the prospectus; equals 0.5 if only the aggregate number of 
the issuer’s shares owned by its directors and key officers must be disclosed in the prospectus; and equals 0 when 
the ownership of the issuer’s shares by its directors and key officers need not be disclosed in the prospectus. 
 
Irregular contracts An index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the issuer’s contracts outside the ordinary course of 
business.  Equals 1 if the law or the listing rules require that the terms of material contracts made by the issuer 
outside the ordinary course of its business be disclosed in the prospectus; equals 0.5 if the terms of only some 
material contracts made outside the ordinary course of business must be disclosed; and equals 0 otherwise. 
 
Transactions An index of the prospectus disclosure requirements regarding transaction between the issuer and its directors, 
officers, or large shareholders.  Equals 1 if the law or the listing rules require that all transactions in which related 
parties have, or will have, an interest be disclosed in the prospectus; equals 0.5 if only some transactions between 
the issuer and related parties must be disclosed in the prospectus; and equals 0 if transactions between the issuer 
and related parties need not be disclosed in the prospectus. 
 
Prospectus liability Survey based.  Adopts three liability standards for IPOs.  The index of prospectus liability standards equals the 
arithmetic mean of a) liability standard for the issuer and its directors; b) liability standard for distributors; and c) 
liability standard for accountants. 
La Porta et al. (2006). 
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Appendix 3 List of variables used in the ‘Law and Finance’ literature 
Panel C: Shareholder protection variables 
Variable Definition Used in 
Liability standard for the 
issuer and its directors 
Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the issuer and its directors in a civil liability case for 
losses due to misleading statements in the prospectus.  La Porta et al. (2006) first code separately the liability 
standard applicable to the issuer and its directors and then average the two of them.  Equals 1 when investors are 
only required to prove that the prospectus contains a misleading statement; equals 2/3 when investors must also 
prove that they relied on the prospectus and/or that their loss was caused by the misleading statement; equals 1/3 
when investors must also prove that the director acted with negligence; and equals 0 if restitution from directors 
is either unavailable or the liability standard is intent or gross negligence. 
 
Liability standard for 
distributors 
Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the distributor in a civil liability case for losses due to 
misleading statements in the prospectus.  Equals 1 when investors are only required to prove that the prospectus 
contains a misleading statement; equals 2/3 when investors must also prove that they relied on the prospectus 
and/or that their loss was caused by the misleading statement; equals 1/3 when investors must also prove that the 
distributor acted with negligence; and equals 0 if restitution from the distributor is either unavailable or the 
liability standard is intent or gross negligence. 
 
Liability standard for 
accountants 
Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the accountant in a civil liability case for losses due 
to misleading statements in the audited financial information accompanying the prospectus.  Equals 1 when 
investors are only required to prove that the audited financial information accompanying the prospectus contains 
a misleading statement; equals 2/3 when investors must also prove that they relied on the prospectus and/or that 
their loss was caused by the misleading accounting information; equals 1/3 when investors must also prove that 
the accountant acted with negligence; and equals 0 if restitution from the accountant is either unavailable or the 
liability standard is intent or gross negligence. 
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Appendix 3 List of variables used in the ‘Law and Finance’ literature 
Panel D: Law enforcement variables 
Variable Definition Used in 
Efficiency of judicial 
system 
International Corp assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, 
particularly foreign firms.  It represents investors’ assessments of conditions in the country in question.  Scale 
from 0 to 10; lower scores for lower efficiency levels. 
La Porta et al. (1998); Stulz and 
Williamson (2003); La Porta 
(2006); and, Beck and Levine 
(2002). 
Rule of law International Country Risk (ICR ) assessment of the law and order tradition in the country.  Scale from 0 to 10, 
lower scores for less tradition for law and order. 
La Porta et al. (1998); La Porta et 
al. (1997); Levine et al (2000); 
Beck et al. (2001); Stulz and 
Williamson (2003); Beck et al. 
(2003b); and, Spamann (2010). 
Corruption ICR’s assessment of the corruption in government.  Lower scores indicate that high government officials are 
likely to demand special payments and illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of 
government in the form of bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, 
policy protection, or loans.  Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for higher levels of corruption. 
La Porta et al. (1998); Levine et al. 
(2000); and, Stulz and Williamson 
(2003). 
Risk of expropriation ICR’s assessment of the risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalisation.  Scale from 0 to 10, with lower 
scores for higher risk. 
La Porta et al. (1998); Levine et al. 
(2000); and, Stulz and Williamson 
(2003). 
Repudiation of contracts 
by government 
ICR’s assessment of the risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or 
scaling down due to budget cutbacks, indigenisation pressure, a change in government, or a change in 
government economic and social priorities.  Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for higher risks. 
La Porta et al. (1998); Levine et al. 
(2000); Beck et al. (2001); and, 
Stulz and Williamson (2003). 
Property rights Index of the degree to which the legal system protects private property.  Scale from 1 to 5 where lower scores for 
weak property rights protection. 
La Porta et al. (1999); Levine et al. 
(2000); Beck et al. (2001); and, 
Beck et al. (2003b). 
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Appendix 3 List of variables used in the ‘Law and Finance’ literature 
Panel E: Control variables 
Variable Definition Used in 
Legal origin Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country.  Equals 1 if the origin is 
English common law, and equals 0 if the origins the French commercial code. 
La Porta et al. (1997); La Porta et 
al. (1998); Levine et al. (2000); 
Beck et al. (2001); Beck et al. 
(2003b); Lich et al. (2005); La 
Porta et al. (2006); Djankov et al. 
(2007); and, Djankov, La Porta, et 
al. (2008). 
Ethnic fractionalisation Average value of five different indices of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation: a) index of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation that measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not 
belong to the same ethno-linguistic group; b) probability of two randomly selected individuals speaking different 
languages; c) probability of two randomly selected individuals do not speak the same language; d) percent of the 
population not speaking the official language; and e) percent of the population not speaking the most widely used 
language.  Scale from 0 to 1. 
La Porta et al. (1999); Levine et al. 
(2000); and, Beck et al. (2003b). 
Religion Equal the fraction of the population that is Catholic, Muslim, or Protestant.  Or, the dummy variables Protestant, 
Catholic, Muslim and Buddhist equals 1 if the name of the variable describes the primary religion; or equals 0 
otherwise.  The primary religion of a country is the religion practiced by the largest fraction of the population. 
La Porta (1999); Levine et al. 
(2000); Beck et al. (2001); Stulz 
and Williamson (2003); Beck et al. 
(2003b); and, Djankov et al. 
(2007). 
Year of independence Calculated as the percentage of years since 1776 that a country has been independent. Beck at el. (2001) and Beck et al. 
(2003b). 
Language The dummy variables English and Spanish equals 1 if the name of the variable describes the primary language of 
the country; or equals 0 otherwise.  The primary language of a country is the language spoken by the largest 
fraction of the population. 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) and 
Siems (2007). 
Openness Natural openness measured using the 1985 actual openness adjusted for geography as in Frankel and Romer 
(1999).  Calculated as exports plus imports to GDP. 
Beck et al. (2001) and Stulz and 
Williamson (2003). 
Latitude The value of the latitude of the country normalised.  Scale from 0 and 1. Beck et al. (2003b) and La Porta et 
al. (1999). 
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Variable Country N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
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Skewness Kurtosis 
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Algeria 6 18,139.24 29,930.23 24,411.14 23,997.88 4,212.63 -0.19 -0.38 
Bahrain 6 13,578.29 21,261.42 18,516.60 19,418.74 2,721.30 -1.43 2.17 
Egypt 6 59,387.27 76,515.87 69,951.97 71,036.68 5,941.87 -1.20 1.90 
Iran 6 58,022.02 121,346.11 88,245.68 86,354.28 28,881.25 0.07 -2.95 
Iraq 6 2,199.45 12,936.97 6,735.59 5,844.85 4,176.46 0.55 -1.26 
Israel 6 162,845.93 231,009.65 198,133.35 202,328.69 23,288.05 -0.27 0.39 
Jordan 6 15,678.65 22,608.80 19,098.35 18,662.62 2,510.06 0.17 -0.73 
Kuwait 6 75,811.81 102,174.53 92,104.73 92,566.89 9,219.92 -1.12 1.83 
Lebanon 6 18,398.66 39,595.46 28,894.15 28,615.35 8,226.34 0.06 -1.68 
Libya 3 4,332.87 6,794.82 5,818.88 6,328.95 1,307.83 -1.49   
Morocco 6 43,912.60 71,417.83 60,500.99 60,565.55 10,172.76 -0.68 0.28 
Oman 6 14,961.76 32,184.08 24,112.41 24,047.47 5,867.70 -0.30 0.56 
Palestine 6 1,195.94 2,791.83 1,960.77 1,864.12 588.77 0.26 -1.00 
Qatar 6 33,210.56 69,363.91 54,137.66 53,813.69 13,539.82 -0.44 -0.42 
Saudi Arabia 6 154,184.08 267,447.22 208,179.20 201,375.04 37,851.52 0.31 0.93 
Sudan 6 5,832.78 7,787.87 6,879.08 7,012.76 798.45 -0.32 -1.92 
Syria 4 6,104.19 13,609.12 9,893.76 9,930.87 3,117.30 -0.07 0.52 
Tunisia 6 22,515.66 35,043.16 29,378.16 28,747.02 4,833.10 -0.12 -1.21 
Turkey 6 190,885.16 429,318.33 298,810.94 280,631.88 96,271.97 0.35 -1.92 
UAE 6 144,530.98 226,705.79 205,960.43 214,925.40 30,626.72 -2.26 5.31 
Yemen 6 1,558.92 2,070.19 1,822.42 1,834.49 201.84 -0.13 -1.75 
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Algeria 6 6.25 6.66 6.49 6.48 0.14 -0.70 0.55 
Bahrain 6 9.48 9.76 9.64 9.67 0.11 -0.56 -1.06 
Egypt 6 6.68 6.85 6.80 6.83 0.06 -1.88 3.67 
Iran 6 6.66 7.41 7.04 7.04 0.36 -0.01 -3.11 
Iraq 6 4.34 5.98 5.22 5.21 0.63 -0.17 -1.49 
Israel 6 10.03 10.30 10.17 10.18 0.10 -0.24 -0.47 
Jordan 6 7.93 8.18 8.06 8.05 0.09 -0.12 -0.37 
Kuwait 6 10.30 10.45 10.36 10.36 0.05 1.08 2.24 
Lebanon 6 8.40 9.10 8.78 8.80 0.27 -0.28 -1.41 
Libya 3 6.62 7.04 6.88 6.98 0.23 -1.61   
Morocco 6 7.27 7.71 7.55 7.56 0.16 -1.17 1.69 
Oman 6 8.67 9.18 9.03 9.08 0.18 -1.98 4.31 
Palestine 6 5.81 6.54 6.22 6.23 0.26 -0.50 -0.20 
Qatar 6 10.27 10.47 10.40 10.41 0.07 -1.33 2.08 
Saudi Arabia 6 8.69 9.15 8.93 8.92 0.15 -0.28 1.37 
Sudan 6 5.17 5.39 5.27 5.28 0.08 0.05 -0.91 
Syria 4 5.74 6.45 6.13 6.17 0.29 -0.72 1.17 
Tunisia 6 7.70 8.10 7.93 7.92 0.15 -0.40 -0.59 
Turkey 6 7.92 8.67 8.29 8.27 0.30 0.08 -2.09 
UAE 6 10.11 10.35 10.18 10.14 0.09 1.52 1.62 
Yemen 6 4.20 4.56 4.39 4.44 0.14 -0.52 -1.51 
  
251 
Appendix 4 Descriptive statistics by country 
Variable Country N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
C
re
d
it
 m
a
rk
et
 d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
D
o
m
es
ti
c 
cr
ed
it
 t
o
 p
ri
v
a
te
 s
ec
to
r 
to
 G
D
P
 
Algeria 6 13.17 16.61 14.57 14.28 1.33 0.69 -0.83 
Bahrain 6 62.48 84.82 71.55 69.47 7.71 1.03 1.33 
Egypt 6 29.11 45.52 36.29 34.58 6.57 0.55 -1.55 
Iran 6 11.39 37.28 23.42 22.95 12.06 0.07 -3.04 
Iraq 6 2.48 5.99 4.24 4.50 1.47 -0.17 -2.22 
Israel 6 78.97 94.42 89.05 89.62 5.43 -1.50 2.93 
Jordan 6 72.90 91.63 77.94 74.53 7.34 1.71 2.61 
Kuwait 6 55.76 85.17 68.11 64.81 10.72 0.80 -0.18 
Lebanon 6 73.43 92.20 81.36 79.65 8.74 0.23 -2.71 
Libya 3 6.03 10.90 7.91 6.79 2.62 1.57   
Morocco 6 58.37 73.34 66.70 66.67 5.69 -0.30 -1.09 
Oman 6 35.32 48.21 40.44 40.59 4.75 0.65 0.39 
Palestine 6 19.14 32.48 25.37 24.81 4.38 0.42 1.47 
Qatar 6 36.05 51.85 42.34 41.28 5.48 1.06 1.46 
Saudi Arabia 6 34.19 45.63 38.58 37.65 3.83 1.39 3.00 
Sudan 6 11.24 12.84 12.18 12.38 0.74 -0.41 -2.39 
Syria 4 15.11 22.51 18.71 18.60 3.14 0.16 -0.53 
Tunisia 6 57.96 75.47 66.56 65.32 7.69 0.24 -2.31 
Turkey 6 29.50 54.40 41.19 40.35 9.93 0.20 -1.86 
UAE 6 56.04 84.05 67.54 65.53 10.45 0.72 -0.36 
Yemen 6 4.60 8.18 6.57 6.98 1.55 -0.39 -2.24 
S
to
ck
 m
a
rk
et
 d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
M
a
rk
et
 c
a
p
it
a
li
sa
ti
o
n
 (
m
il
li
o
n
 U
S
D
) 
Algeria 6 90.06 196.80 124.75 101.75 45.59 1.08 -0.82 
Bahrain 6 16,064.90 28,133.54 19,981.62 18,790.76 4,488.24 1.43 2.04 
Egypt 6 48,682.64 139,289.00 84,052.05 84,190.08 31,689.15 1.01 1.62 
Iran 6 45,573.81 140,843.43 82,103.63 74,957.61 37,106.00 0.75 -0.56 
Iraq 6 1,763.10 4,568.91 3,095.63 3,010.03 1,131.36 0.19 -1.62 
Israel 6 134,463.33 236,360.55 177,396.63 165,265.77 42,155.42 0.54 -1.81 
Jordan 6 26,998.00 41,216.42 32,328.87 31,364.62 5,451.99 0.84 0.01 
Kuwait 6 95,938.49 188,045.85 118,122.26 104,018.43 35,337.35 2.14 4.72 
Lebanon 6 9,640.56 12,893.19 11,072.77 10,576.84 1,351.32 0.65 -1.74 
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 52,633.71 75,494.55 64,337.83 64,328.97 7,832.33 -0.11 0.28 
Oman 6 14,914.30 23,060.44 19,228.38 19,913.32 2,796.45 -0.40 0.36 
Palestine 6 2,123.06 2,634.10 2,431.55 2,462.34 174.23 -1.14 2.00 
Qatar 6 76,307.11 126,371.32 105,837.72 109,539.68 22,011.66 -0.31 -2.37 
Saudi Arabia 6 246,337.05 515,110.77 357,646.66 346,143.68 88,672.93 1.06 2.48 
Sudan 6 2,552.15 4,931.11 3,314.94 2,903.12 934.21 1.29 0.72 
Syria 0               
Tunisia 6 5,355.08 10,681.71 8,346.55 9,003.51 2,045.18 -0.66 -1.11 
Turkey 6 117,929.86 308,774.56 241,248.56 256,153.64 74,693.94 -0.91 -0.02 
UAE 6 94,250.73 224,541.65 122,706.22 104,083.32 50,179.56 2.39 5.76 
Yemen 0               
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Algeria 6 0.91 1.65 1.17 1.04 0.31 0.99 -1.01 
Bahrain 6 9.41 10.21 9.70 9.63 0.29 1.13 0.98 
Egypt 6 6.42 7.54 6.93 7.00 0.40 0.21 -0.02 
Iran 6 6.45 7.52 6.93 6.91 0.42 0.25 -1.61 
Iraq 6 4.12 4.94 4.56 4.59 0.34 -0.24 -1.67 
Israel 6 9.82 10.40 10.04 9.97 0.25 0.54 -1.82 
Jordan 6 8.36 8.89 8.58 8.56 0.20 0.50 -0.74 
Kuwait 6 10.30 11.21 10.58 10.51 0.33 1.80 3.57 
Lebanon 6 7.74 8.02 7.85 7.81 0.12 0.51 -2.09 
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 7.39 7.81 7.62 7.63 0.14 -0.44 0.55 
Oman 6 8.66 9.10 8.82 8.78 0.16 1.29 1.78 
Palestine 6 6.38 6.56 6.47 6.47 0.06 0.12 2.38 
Qatar 6 10.94 11.32 11.08 11.06 0.15 0.81 0.08 
Saudi Arabia 6 9.14 9.90 9.47 9.44 0.25 0.94 2.58 
Sudan 6 4.27 5.00 4.52 4.40 0.30 1.00 -0.42 
Syria 0               
Tunisia 6 6.26 6.92 6.65 6.74 0.25 -0.83 -0.80 
Turkey 6 7.42 8.35 8.07 8.19 0.36 -1.36 1.53 
UAE 6 9.26 10.56 9.62 9.50 0.48 2.07 4.58 
Yemen 0               
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Algeria 6 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.81 0.95 
Bahrain 6 52.91 129.47 79.51 76.63 27.06 1.47 2.76 
Egypt 6 20.63 106.75 47.91 42.64 31.63 1.57 2.84 
Iran 6 13.78 25.50 18.91 18.87 4.13 0.55 0.19 
Iraq 6 1.53 2.74 2.16 2.18 0.40 -0.24 1.30 
Israel 6 56.14 135.09 82.42 75.79 30.42 1.14 0.87 
Jordan 6 87.05 240.88 139.32 125.29 56.89 1.33 1.67 
Kuwait 6 52.99 163.91 90.46 81.64 39.91 1.50 2.51 
Lebanon 6 23.97 43.33 32.64 32.98 7.29 0.22 -0.79 
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 54.84 100.36 72.52 71.59 15.86 1.08 1.71 
Oman 6 24.55 55.04 33.97 31.32 11.29 1.62 2.81 
Palestine 6 25.69 47.75 33.01 31.70 8.26 1.29 1.71 
Qatar 6 65.68 119.79 85.14 81.05 21.30 0.84 -0.25 
Saudi Arabia 6 47.39 123.85 69.29 59.80 28.69 1.79 3.35 
Sudan 6 3.87 8.88 5.59 5.00 1.94 1.13 0.46 
Syria 0               
Tunisia 6 13.78 24.07 18.88 20.13 4.06 -0.34 -1.39 
Turkey 6 16.15 44.28 34.05 37.93 10.81 -1.08 0.02 
UAE 6 26.89 86.98 41.61 33.99 22.88 2.15 4.84 
Yemen 0               
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Algeria 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Bahrain 4 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Iran 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Iraq 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Israel 6 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 0.00     
Jordan 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Kuwait 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Lebanon 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Oman 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Palestine 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Qatar 4 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 3.00 5.00 3.33 3.00 0.82 2.45 6.00 
Sudan 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Syria 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Tunisia 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Turkey 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
UAE 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Yemen 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
D
ep
th
 o
f 
cr
ed
it
 i
n
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 i
n
d
ex
 
Algeria 6 1.00 2.00 1.83 2.00 0.41 -2.45 6.00 
Bahrain 4 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 2.00 6.00 4.17 4.50 1.83 -0.36 -2.10 
Iran 6 3.00 4.00 3.17 3.00 0.41 2.45 6.00 
Iraq 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Israel 6 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00     
Jordan 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Kuwait 6 3.00 4.00 3.67 4.00 0.52 -0.97 -1.88 
Lebanon 6 4.00 5.00 4.83 5.00 0.41 -2.45 6.00 
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 1.00 5.00 2.50 1.50 1.97 0.82 -1.95 
Oman 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Palestine 6 0.00 3.00 2.33 3.00 1.21 -1.95 3.66 
Qatar 4 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 5.00 6.00 5.67 6.00 0.52 -0.97 -1.88 
Sudan 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Syria 6 0.00 2.00 0.33 0.00 0.82 2.45 6.00 
Tunisia 6 2.00 5.00 3.67 4.00 1.51 -0.21 -2.83 
Turkey 6 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00     
UAE 6 2.00 5.00 3.50 3.50 1.64 0.00 -3.33 
Yemen 6 0.00 2.00 0.67 0.00 1.03 0.97 -1.88 
  
254 
Appendix 4 Descriptive statistics by country 
Variable Country N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
C
re
d
it
o
r 
p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
 r
ig
h
ts
 
P
ri
v
a
te
 b
u
re
a
u
 c
o
v
er
a
g
e 
 
Algeria 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Bahrain 4 23.00 29.10 26.55 27.05 3.06 -0.36 -3.97 
Egypt 6 0.00 10.30 3.87 2.35 4.60 0.54 -1.96 
Iran 6 0.00 4.50 0.75 0.00 1.84 2.45 6.00 
Iraq 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Israel 6 88.20 100.00 93.43 91.30 5.22 0.75 -1.82 
Jordan 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Kuwait 6 14.50 31.20 22.98 22.85 8.16 -0.01 -3.23 
Lebanon 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 0.00 14.00 3.98 0.00 6.31 1.15 -0.80 
Oman 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Palestine 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Qatar 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 10.20 18.00 14.80 15.10 3.11 -0.45 -1.22 
Sudan 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Syria 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Tunisia 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Turkey 6 26.30 42.90 32.27 27.60 7.98 0.96 -1.85 
UAE 6 0.00 17.70 6.33 3.85 7.62 0.65 -1.47 
Yemen 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
P
u
b
li
c 
re
g
is
tr
y
 c
o
v
er
a
g
e 
Algeria 6 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.08 -2.45 6.00 
Bahrain 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 1.20 2.90 2.00 1.95 0.64 0.22 -1.39 
Iran 6 13.70 31.30 20.88 21.95 6.59 0.42 0.09 
Iraq 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Israel 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Jordan 6 0.60 1.50 0.93 0.90 0.32 1.19 1.64 
Kuwait 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Lebanon 6 3.50 8.70 6.05 5.75 2.19 0.17 -2.30 
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 0.00 2.40 1.50 2.15 1.17 -0.91 -1.89 
Oman 6 0.00 23.40 14.98 17.25 8.17 -1.46 2.55 
Palestine 6 0.00 7.80 3.73 3.70 3.30 0.06 -2.50 
Qatar 4 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.05 2.00 4.00 
Saudi Arabia 6 0.00 0.20 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.97 -1.88 
Sudan 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Syria 6 0.00 2.20 0.37 0.00 0.90 2.45 6.00 
Tunisia 6 8.20 22.90 15.20 14.30 5.40 0.32 -0.83 
Turkey 6 4.90 18.30 11.47 11.50 5.20 0.03 -1.51 
UAE 6 1.40 8.40 4.47 4.10 3.27 0.14 -2.91 
Yemen 6 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.10 0.08 1.54 1.43 
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Variable Country N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
S
h
a
re
h
o
ld
er
 p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
 r
ig
h
ts
 
E
x
te
n
t 
o
f 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 i
n
d
ex
 
Algeria 6 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00     
Bahrain 4 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 4.00 5.00 4.50 4.50 0.55 0.00 -3.33 
Iran 6 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00     
Iraq 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Israel 6 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 0.00     
Jordan 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Kuwait 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Lebanon 6 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 0.00     
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 5.00 6.00 5.17 5.00 0.41 2.45 6.00 
Oman 6 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 0.00     
Palestine 6 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 0.00     
Qatar 4 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 7.00 8.00 7.50 7.50 0.55 0.00 -3.33 
Sudan 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Syria 6 6.00 7.00 6.17 6.00 0.41 2.45 6.00 
Tunisia 6 0.00 5.00 1.67 0.00 2.58 0.97 -1.88 
Turkey 6 8.00 9.00 8.50 8.50 0.55 0.00 -3.33 
UAE 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Yemen 6 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 0.00     
E
x
te
n
t 
o
f 
d
ir
ec
to
r 
li
a
b
il
it
y
 i
n
d
ex
 
Algeria 6 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 0.00     
Bahrain 4 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Iran 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Iraq 6 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00     
Israel 6 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 0.00     
Jordan 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Kuwait 6 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 0.00     
Lebanon 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Oman 6 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00     
Palestine 6 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00     
Qatar 4 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 7.00 8.00 7.50 7.50 0.55 0.00 -3.33 
Sudan 6 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 0.00     
Syria 6 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00     
Tunisia 6 4.00 7.00 5.17 4.50 1.47 0.71 -2.05 
Turkey 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
UAE 6 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 0.00     
Yemen 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
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Variable Country N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
S
h
a
re
h
o
ld
er
 p
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
 r
ig
h
ts
 
E
a
se
 o
f 
sh
a
re
h
o
ld
er
 s
u
it
s 
in
d
ex
 
Algeria 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Bahrain 4 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Iran 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Iraq 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Israel 6 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 0.00     
Jordan 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Kuwait 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Lebanon 6 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00     
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Oman 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Palestine 6 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00     
Qatar 4 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 3.00 4.00 3.50 3.50 0.55 0.00 -3.33 
Sudan 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Syria 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Tunisia 6 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 0.00     
Turkey 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
UAE 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Yemen 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
A
n
ti
-d
ir
ec
to
r 
ri
g
h
ts
 i
n
d
ex
 
Algeria 6 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 0.00     
Bahrain 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Iran 6 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 0.00     
Iraq 6 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 0.00     
Israel 6 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 0.00     
Jordan 6 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 0.00     
Kuwait 6 3.00 4.00 3.17 3.00 0.41 2.45 6.00 
Lebanon 6 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 0.00     
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 0.00     
Oman 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Palestine 6 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 0.00     
Qatar 6 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Sudan 6 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 0.00     
Syria 0               
Tunisia 6 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 0.00     
Turkey 6 3.00 4.00 3.33 3.00 0.52 0.97 -1.88 
UAE 6 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 0.00     
Yemen 0               
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Variable Country N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
J
u
d
ic
ia
l 
e
ff
ic
ie
n
cy
 
T
im
e 
(d
a
y
s)
 
Algeria 6 630.00 630.00 630.00 630.00 0.00     
Bahrain 4 635.00 635.00 635.00 635.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 1,010.00 1,010.00 1,010.00 1,010.00 0.00     
Iran 6 505.00 520.00 517.50 520.00 6.12 -2.45 6.00 
Iraq 6 520.00 520.00 520.00 520.00 0.00     
Israel 6 890.00 890.00 890.00 890.00 0.00     
Jordan 6 689.00 689.00 689.00 689.00 0.00     
Kuwait 6 566.00 566.00 566.00 566.00 0.00     
Lebanon 6 721.00 721.00 721.00 721.00 0.00     
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 510.00 510.00 510.00 510.00 0.00     
Oman 6 598.00 598.00 598.00 598.00 0.00     
Palestine 6 540.00 700.00 656.67 700.00 69.76 -1.28 -0.05 
Qatar 4 670.00 670.00 670.00 670.00 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 635.00 635.00 635.00 635.00 0.00     
Sudan 6 810.00 810.00 810.00 810.00 0.00     
Syria 6 872.00 872.00 872.00 872.00 0.00     
Tunisia 6 565.00 565.00 565.00 565.00 0.00     
Turkey 6 420.00 420.00 420.00 420.00 0.00     
UAE 6 537.00 537.00 537.00 537.00 0.00     
Yemen 6 520.00 520.00 520.00 520.00 0.00     
C
o
st
 (
%
 o
f 
cl
a
im
) 
Algeria 6 21.90 21.90 21.90 21.90 0.00     
Bahrain 4 14.70 14.70 14.70 14.70 0.00     
Egypt 6 26.20 26.20 26.20 26.20 0.00     
Iran 6 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 0.00     
Iraq 6 27.30 32.50 30.90 32.50 2.49 -1.01 -1.61 
Israel 6 25.30 25.30 25.30 25.30 0.00     
Jordan 6 31.20 31.20 31.20 31.20 0.00     
Kuwait 6 18.80 18.80 18.80 18.80 0.00     
Lebanon 6 30.80 30.80 30.80 30.80 0.00     
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 25.20 25.20 25.20 25.20 0.00     
Oman 6 13.50 13.50 13.50 13.50 0.00     
Palestine 6 21.20 21.20 21.20 21.20 0.00     
Qatar 4 21.60 21.60 21.60 21.60 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 27.50 27.50 27.50 27.50 0.00     
Sudan 6 19.80 19.80 19.80 19.80 0.00     
Syria 6 29.30 29.30 29.30 29.30 0.00     
Tunisia 6 21.80 21.80 21.80 21.80 0.00     
Turkey 6 27.30 27.90 27.40 27.30 0.24 2.45 6.00 
UAE 6 19.50 19.50 19.50 19.50 0.00     
Yemen 6 26.50 26.50 26.50 26.50 0.00     
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Variable Country N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
J
u
d
ic
ia
l 
e
ff
ic
ie
n
cy
 
P
ro
ce
d
u
re
s 
(n
u
m
b
er
) 
Algeria 6 45.00 47.00 46.33 47.00 1.03 -0.97 -1.88 
Bahrain 4 48.00 48.00 48.00 48.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 42.00 42.00 42.00 42.00 0.00     
Iran 6 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 0.00     
Iraq 6 51.00 51.00 51.00 51.00 0.00     
Israel 6 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 0.00     
Jordan 6 38.00 39.00 38.67 39.00 0.52 -0.97 -1.88 
Kuwait 6 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 0.00     
Lebanon 6 37.00 37.00 37.00 37.00 0.00     
Libya 0               
Morocco 6 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 0.00     
Oman 6 51.00 51.00 51.00 51.00 0.00     
Palestine 6 44.00 44.00 44.00 44.00 0.00     
Qatar 4 43.00 43.00 43.00 43.00 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 43.00 43.00 43.00 43.00 0.00     
Sudan 6 53.00 54.00 53.17 53.00 0.41 2.45 6.00 
Syria 6 55.00 55.00 55.00 55.00 0.00     
Tunisia 6 39.00 39.00 39.00 39.00 0.00     
Turkey 6 36.00 37.00 36.50 36.50 0.55 0.00 -3.33 
UAE 6 49.00 50.00 49.50 49.50 0.55 0.00 -3.33 
Yemen 6 36.00 36.00 36.00 36.00 0.00     
L
a
w
 e
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
R
u
le
 o
f 
la
w
 
Algeria 6 -0.82 -0.64 -0.73 -0.73 0.06 0.02 0.60 
Bahrain 6 0.39 0.57 0.50 0.52 0.08 -0.44 -2.13 
Egypt 6 -0.39 -0.06 -0.17 -0.15 0.12 -1.43 2.23 
Iran 6 -0.98 -0.85 -0.92 -0.93 0.04 0.49 0.78 
Iraq 6 -1.92 -1.51 -1.74 -1.78 0.15 0.62 -0.67 
Israel 6 0.81 1.00 0.87 0.86 0.07 1.23 1.21 
Jordan 6 0.20 0.46 0.34 0.33 0.11 0.00 -2.12 
Kuwait 6 0.55 0.65 0.60 0.61 0.04 -0.57 -0.12 
Lebanon 6 -0.71 -0.63 -0.68 -0.68 0.03 1.10 1.46 
Libya 6 -1.18 -0.70 -0.91 -0.89 0.16 -0.60 0.48 
Morocco 6 -0.29 -0.16 -0.23 -0.23 0.05 0.16 -1.53 
Oman 6 0.37 0.71 0.57 0.59 0.12 -0.75 0.01 
Palestine 6 -0.81 -0.21 -0.51 -0.47 0.23 -0.27 -1.43 
Qatar 6 0.63 1.01 0.82 0.81 0.14 0.05 -1.04 
Saudi Arabia 6 0.11 0.26 0.17 0.17 0.05 0.68 0.79 
Sudan 6 -1.41 -1.22 -1.31 -1.30 0.08 -0.27 -1.57 
Syria 6 -0.86 -0.49 -0.64 -0.64 0.14 -0.59 -0.14 
Tunisia 6 -0.11 0.20 0.12 0.16 0.12 -2.07 4.55 
Turkey 6 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.04 -0.51 -0.64 
UAE 6 0.36 0.53 0.43 0.42 0.07 0.36 -2.14 
Yemen 6 -1.27 -0.96 -1.06 -1.04 0.11 -1.48 2.55 
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Variable Country N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Is
la
m
ic
 c
u
lt
u
re
 
Is
la
m
ic
 p
o
li
ti
ca
l 
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s 
(I
P
I)
 
Algeria 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Bahrain 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Iran 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Iraq 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Israel 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Jordan 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Kuwait 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Lebanon 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Libya 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Morocco 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Oman 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Palestine 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Qatar 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Sudan 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Syria 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Tunisia 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Turkey 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
UAE 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Yemen 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Is
la
m
ic
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s 
(I
F
I)
 
Algeria 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Bahrain 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Iran 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Iraq 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Israel 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Jordan 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Kuwait 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Lebanon 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Libya 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Morocco 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Oman 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Palestine 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Qatar 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Sudan 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Syria 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Tunisia 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Turkey 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
UAE 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Yemen 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
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Variable Country N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Is
la
m
ic
 c
u
lt
u
re
 
Is
la
m
ic
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l 
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s 
(I
E
I)
 
Algeria 6 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 0.00     
Bahrain 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.00     
Iran 6 3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64 0.00     
Iraq 6 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 0.00     
Israel 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Jordan 6 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.00     
Kuwait 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Lebanon 6 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.00     
Libya 6 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 0.00     
Morocco 6 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.56 0.00     
Oman 6 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.00     
Palestine 6 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 0.00     
Qatar 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 0.00     
Sudan 6 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 0.00     
Syria 6 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.00     
Tunisia 6 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.00     
Turkey 6 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65 0.00     
UAE 6 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 0.00     
Yemen 6 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 0.00     
Is
la
m
ic
 i
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
li
sa
ti
o
n
 i
n
d
ex
 (
II
I)
 
Algeria 6 6.29 6.29 6.29 6.29 0.00     
Bahrain 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 0.00     
Iran 6 9.64 9.64 9.64 9.64 0.00     
Iraq 6 7.57 7.57 7.57 7.57 0.00     
Israel 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Jordan 6 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 0.00     
Kuwait 6 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 0.00     
Lebanon 6 5.83 5.83 5.83 5.83 0.00     
Libya 6 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 0.00     
Morocco 6 7.56 7.56 7.56 7.56 0.00     
Oman 6 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 0.00     
Palestine 6 6.37 6.37 6.37 6.37 0.00     
Qatar 6 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 5.59 5.59 5.59 5.59 0.00     
Sudan 6 8.50 8.50 8.50 8.50 0.00     
Syria 6 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67 0.00     
Tunisia 6 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.67 0.00     
Turkey 6 8.65 8.65 8.65 8.65 0.00     
UAE 6 5.20 5.20 5.20 5.20 0.00     
Yemen 6 7.33 7.33 7.33 7.33 0.00     
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Variable Country N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
D
u
a
li
ty
 o
f 
le
g
a
l 
sy
st
em
s 
S
h
a
ri
a
 i
n
d
ex
 
Algeria 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Bahrain 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Egypt 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Iran 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Iraq 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Israel 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Jordan 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Kuwait 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Lebanon 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Libya 6 1.00 3.00 1.67 1.00 1.03 0.97 -1.88 
Morocco 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Oman 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Palestine 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Qatar 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Saudi Arabia 6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00     
Sudan 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
Syria 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Tunisia 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00     
Turkey 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
UAE 6 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00     
Yemen 6 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00     
M
a
cr
o
-e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
G
D
P
 (
m
il
li
o
n
 U
S
D
) 
Algeria 6 117,026.66 199,070.86 153,415.78 149,209.55 29,600.67 0.49 -0.43 
Bahrain 6 18,505.25 29,044.38 23,940.56 24,324.81 3,681.25 -0.17 -0.17 
Egypt 6 107,484.03 236,000.74 174,108.78 175,901.13 50,054.06 -0.12 -1.56 
Iran 6 222,880.53 528,426.10 363,097.00 359,324.74 106,317.36 0.38 0.22 
Iraq 6 65,141.04 191,176.93 121,873.70 121,635.90 44,160.13 0.43 0.16 
Israel 6 150,985.57 258,216.78 205,793.59 209,458.42 38,538.08 -0.17 -0.56 
Jordan 6 15,056.94 28,840.20 22,204.16 22,895.92 5,320.67 -0.25 -1.41 
Kuwait 6 101,561.15 160,600.01 125,021.90 117,328.25 23,724.59 0.79 -1.16 
Lebanon 6 22,438.47 40,094.33 31,574.04 32,365.17 6,943.13 -0.20 -1.71 
Libya 6 40,587.26 93,167.70 67,557.58 67,081.86 18,601.52 -0.09 -0.36 
Morocco 6 65,637.11 99,211.34 85,106.13 89,826.82 12,293.32 -0.82 -0.27 
Oman 6 36,803.64 69,971.91 52,746.08 53,527.96 12,566.25 0.06 -1.41 
Palestine 6 4,619.10 9,775.30 6,812.38 6,483.45 1,943.15 0.59 -0.72 
Qatar 6 60,882.14 173,518.82 109,085.64 106,534.20 39,589.42 0.65 0.45 
Saudi Arabia 6 376,900.13 669,506.67 489,670.33 474,447.33 106,259.16 0.96 0.63 
Sudan 6 35,159.25 64,849.93 52,730.86 53,461.19 11,289.97 -0.54 -0.40 
Syria 6 33,332.84 64,272.53 50,857.52 53,334.82 11,850.05 -0.57 -1.02 
Tunisia 6 34,377.24 46,434.62 42,063.80 43,992.66 4,547.69 -1.18 0.37 
Turkey 6 530,900.10 774,775.18 671,477.70 688,746.31 90,872.36 -0.58 -0.71 
UAE 6 222,105.93 348,594.95 281,052.82 272,668.98 45,796.15 0.36 -0.67 
Yemen 6 18,941.30 31,883.41 25,932.73 25,725.46 5,279.10 -0.04 -1.63 
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Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
M
a
cr
o
-e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
G
D
P
 p
er
 c
a
p
it
a
 (
U
S
D
) 
Algeria 6 3,391.37 5,271.59 4,236.03 4,097.71 702.85 0.45 -1.03 
Bahrain 6 19,251.12 23,037.88 20,968.53 20,797.77 1,545.21 0.30 -1.67 
Egypt 6 1,472.57 2,972.58 2,270.79 2,309.15 587.55 -0.21 -1.55 
Iran 6 3,140.20 7,006.05 4,939.22 4,915.30 1,338.99 0.32 0.25 
Iraq 6 2,321.15 6,019.42 4,036.34 4,086.96 1,296.29 0.30 -0.03 
Israel 6 21,405.16 33,250.51 27,677.50 28,325.88 4,264.65 -0.34 -0.55 
Jordan 6 2,719.82 4,665.94 3,767.25 3,912.23 760.52 -0.41 -1.44 
Kuwait 6 37,160.54 54,548.62 45,018.48 43,457.05 6,731.87 0.48 -1.35 
Lebanon 6 5,499.86 9,148.13 7,432.85 7,672.32 1,443.90 -0.30 -1.73 
Libya 6 6,650.13 15,853.46 11,451.69 11,436.88 3,176.72 -0.20 0.13 
Morocco 6 2,128.07 3,044.11 2,683.25 2,825.01 341.04 -1.00 -0.10 
Oman 6 14,405.09 23,421.36 19,393.90 19,549.19 3,709.22 -0.20 -1.89 
Palestine 6 1,356.03 2,489.22 1,844.35 1,775.99 427.53 0.55 -0.79 
Qatar 6 62,527.64 90,804.67 73,834.31 70,970.14 11,647.97 0.64 -1.36 
Saudi Arabia 6 14,855.00 24,116.17 18,345.67 17,687.58 3,436.15 0.95 0.37 
Sudan 6 862.29 1,537.60 1,224.94 1,221.95 240.93 -0.26 -0.27 
Syria 6 1,772.56 2,947.69 2,458.32 2,578.04 450.57 -0.72 -0.85 
Tunisia 6 3,394.31 4,350.34 4,043.19 4,191.96 374.84 -1.30 0.76 
Turkey 6 7,736.10 10,604.84 9,465.72 9,723.74 1,122.56 -0.68 -0.95 
UAE 6 33,012.82 46,402.64 40,427.45 41,773.24 5,933.35 -0.37 -2.34 
Yemen 6 916.73 1,400.67 1,173.68 1,171.91 192.49 -0.10 -1.73 
G
D
P
 r
e
a
l 
g
ro
w
th
 
Algeria 6 -24.12 20.81 7.96 12.21 16.32 -2.06 4.58 
Bahrain 6 -12.15 14.65 8.62 12.65 10.24 -2.38 5.73 
Egypt 6 -3.55 11.83 5.67 5.09 5.73 -0.53 0.26 
Iran 6 -7.74 5.64 0.54 1.68 5.07 -0.89 -0.04 
Iraq 6 -20.89 38.78 14.50 25.03 24.41 -0.84 -1.43 
Israel 6 -7.08 17.34 8.98 10.87 8.40 -1.76 3.85 
Jordan 6 4.55 17.73 8.85 6.93 4.99 1.38 1.42 
Kuwait 6 -28.99 27.64 8.53 13.11 20.17 -1.57 2.84 
Lebanon 6 -4.26 12.87 5.36 5.09 6.28 -0.35 -0.31 
Libya 6 -60.41 25.62 -1.99 18.21 35.89 -1.18 -0.45 
Morocco 6 -2.27 13.36 7.08 7.53 5.77 -0.70 0.11 
Oman 6 -21.31 29.69 9.99 14.69 17.23 -1.32 2.59 
Palestine 6 -4.26 20.65 8.96 10.57 10.40 -0.31 -1.91 
Qatar 6 -10.82 33.70 19.27 23.98 16.06 -1.66 2.97 
Saudi Arabia 6 -20.63 22.62 7.99 12.89 15.26 -1.65 3.07 
Sudan 6 -16.99 18.83 1.80 4.98 14.98 -0.42 -1.77 
Syria 6 -0.41 15.69 7.09 6.67 6.35 0.21 -1.59 
Tunisia 6 -6.25 10.69 2.21 1.78 6.27 0.07 -1.01 
Turkey 6 -21.01 12.47 0.33 1.39 12.32 -1.04 1.26 
UAE 6 -20.20 20.36 7.03 11.68 14.36 -1.74 3.39 
Yemen 6 -19.22 15.31 -0.03 3.69 14.41 -0.55 -1.73 
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Variable Country N Min Max Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
M
a
cr
o
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a
ri
a
b
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u
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o
n
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m
il
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o
n
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Algeria 6 34.51 37.76 36.09 36.05 1.22 0.11 -1.21 
Bahrain 6 0.95 1.29 1.14 1.15 0.13 -0.36 -1.30 
Egypt 6 72.99 79.39 76.16 76.13 2.40 0.04 -1.20 
Iran 6 70.98 75.42 73.15 73.10 1.66 0.10 -1.17 
Iraq 6 28.06 31.76 29.85 29.80 1.38 0.13 -1.19 
Israel 6 7.05 7.77 7.40 7.40 0.27 0.07 -1.44 
Jordan 6 5.54 6.18 5.85 5.85 0.24 0.05 -1.18 
Kuwait 6 2.42 3.12 2.77 2.78 0.27 -0.03 -1.31 
Lebanon 6 4.08 4.38 4.23 4.22 0.12 0.16 -1.50 
Libya 6 5.69 6.10 5.91 5.92 0.16 -0.25 -1.25 
Morocco 6 30.40 32.06 31.17 31.12 0.62 0.29 -1.03 
Oman 6 2.55 3.02 2.70 2.63 0.18 1.38 1.26 
Palestine 6 3.41 3.93 3.66 3.65 0.20 0.14 -1.22 
Qatar 6 0.97 1.91 1.45 1.46 0.36 -0.09 -1.39 
Saudi Arabia 6 25.37 27.76 26.58 26.58 0.88 -0.03 -0.95 
Sudan 6 32.40 36.43 34.43 34.45 1.51 -0.03 -1.22 
Syria 6 18.80 21.96 20.54 20.69 1.20 -0.38 -1.23 
Tunisia 6 10.13 10.67 10.39 10.38 0.20 0.14 -1.15 
Turkey 6 68.63 73.06 70.82 70.80 1.66 0.04 -1.17 
UAE 6 4.88 8.93 7.09 7.26 1.57 -0.33 -1.38 
Yemen 6 20.66 23.30 21.97 21.97 0.99 0.03 -1.19 
R
a
te
 o
f 
in
fl
a
ti
o
n
 
Algeria 6 2.72 5.75 4.52 4.83 1.08 -0.95 0.56 
Bahrain 6 0.18 5.12 2.15 1.32 1.95 0.88 -1.02 
Egypt 6 7.24 20.18 11.40 10.33 4.59 1.80 3.72 
Iran 6 10.42 22.48 17.94 18.84 4.53 -0.93 0.25 
Iraq 6 -4.41 64.82 13.53 5.35 25.45 2.31 5.51 
Israel 6 -0.10 3.92 2.64 3.03 1.50 -1.47 2.17 
Jordan 6 2.68 9.07 5.61 5.59 2.45 0.20 -1.21 
Kuwait 6 1.18 9.02 5.13 4.70 2.80 0.11 -0.43 
Lebanon 6 3.07 7.21 5.18 5.52 1.66 -0.30 -1.69 
Libya 6 0.33 26.65 9.14 7.40 9.21 1.72 3.58 
Morocco 6 -1.57 4.23 1.83 2.07 2.02 -0.86 1.01 
Oman 6 0.92 11.78 5.46 4.23 3.90 0.85 0.11 
Palestine 6 1.86 9.89 4.37 3.79 2.83 1.95 4.37 
Qatar 6 -4.86 15.05 6.35 6.88 8.26 -0.25 -2.18 
Saudi Arabia 6 2.79 9.50 5.28 4.89 2.41 1.14 1.29 
Sudan 6 8.80 18.88 14.88 15.41 3.30 -1.32 3.30 
Syria 6 1.72 15.39 6.94 6.52 4.56 1.43 3.26 
Tunisia 6 3.27 5.07 4.11 4.09 0.58 0.45 2.35 
Turkey 6 6.40 10.45 8.58 9.02 1.78 -0.42 -2.16 
UAE 6 0.77 11.72 5.24 3.91 4.98 0.40 -2.36 
Yemen 6 7.86 23.17 12.39 10.98 5.54 1.96 4.24 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Appendix 5 Bootstrap results 
Appendix 5 Bootstrap results for legal origin and financial market development 
Dependent variable Reg Legal origin Rate of inflation GDP GDP growth Constant N×T 
R
2
 
Credit Market 
       
Domestic credit to private sector (1) 0.3290 -0.0495
**
 1.0247
***
 
 
-1.3553 121 
  
 
[-0.05 - 0.79] [-0.09 - -0.01] [0.75 - 1.24] 
 
[-4.67 - 2.63] 71.65% 
Domestic credit to population (2) 0.9296
*
 -0.0938
***
 0.4366
**
 
 
-2.6888 121 
  
 
[0.06 - 1.96] [-0.21 - -0.003] [0.08 - 0.76] 
 
[-9.20 - 4.51] 30.16% 
Domestic credit GDP (3) 13.1739
*
 -1.3826
***
 
 
-0.1851 52.2294
***
 121 
  
 
[0.66 - 28.87] [-3.07 - -0.43] 
 
[-0.27 - 0.25] [36.86 - 69.81] 19.67% 
Stock Market 
       
Market capitalisation (4) 0.6344 -0.0285 0.8088
***
 
 
3.5637 108 
  
 
[-0.23 - 1.74] [-0.07 - 0.06] [0.14 - 1.20] 
 
[-2.34 - 12.08] 27.32% 
Market capitalisation to population (5) 1.1850 -0.0693 0.1581 
 
3.8598 108 
  
 
[-0.13 - 2.77] [-0.16 - 0.03] [-0.31 - 0.52] 
 
[-4.51 - 14.70] 10.99% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (6) 7.6433 -1.1478
**
 
 
0.2363 53.3459
***
 108 
  
[-10.65 - 26.09] [-2.71 - -0.08] 
 
[-0.22 - 0.61] [31.85 - 78.87] 6.38% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
Note: Confidence intervals are reported in brackets.  If the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level then the 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles are 
reported.  If the coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level then the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are reported.  If the coefficient is statistically 
significant at 10% or insignificant then the 5th and 95th percentiles are reported. 
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Appendix 5 Bootstrap results for credit market development and creditor protection 
Dependent variable Reg Strength of 
legal rights 
Depth of credit 
information 
Private 
bureau 
coverage 
Public registry 
coverage 
Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP growth Constant N×T 
R
2
 
Domestic credit to 
private sector 
(1) 0.1625
***
 
   
-0.0486
**
 0.9471
***
 
 
0.1505 114 
 
[0.02 - 0.53] 
   
[-0.09 - -0.01] [0.65 - 1.18] 
 
[-3.35 - 4.04] 75.19% 
Domestic credit to 
population 
(2) 0.3625
***
 
   
-0.0960
***
 0.3050 
 
-0.3958 114 
 
[0.12 - 1.20] 
   
[-0.21 - -0.03] [-0.02 - 0.59] 
 
[-7.16 - 6.83] 37.07% 
Domestic credit GDP 
(3) 5.9750
**
 
   
-1.3622
***
 
 
-0.1552 35.7341
***
 114 
 
[1.82 - 8.48] 
   
[-3.07 - -0.45] 
 
[-0.27 - 0.22] [15.15 - 64.65] 27.27% 
Domestic credit to 
private sector 
(4) 
 
0.2918
***
 
  
-0.0345
**
 0.8417
***
 
 
2.4249 114 
  
[0.11 - 0.45] 
  
[-0.07 - -0.01] [0.52 - 1.09] 
 
[-1.40 - 6.60] 83.03% 
Domestic credit to 
population 
(5) 
 
0.4506
***
 
  
-0.0764
***
 0.2192 
 
1.5605 114 
  
[0.12 - 0.75] 
  
[-0.18 - -0.03] [-0.09 - 0.52] 
 
[-5.58 - 8.96] 45.96% 
Domestic credit GDP 
(6) 
 
7.0481
***
 
  
-1.0215
***
 
 
-0.0098 32.3308
***
 114 
  
[2.66 - 11.90] 
  
[-2.68 - -0.36] 
 
[-0.08 - 0.29] [14.88 - 55.50] 37.37% 
Domestic credit to 
private sector 
(7) 
  
0.0119
***
 
 
-0.0441
**
 0.9783
***
 
 
-0.2513 114 
   
[0.004 - 0.04] 
 
[-0.08 - -0.01] [0.67 - 1.21] 
 
[-3.87 - 4.03] 75.56% 
Domestic credit to 
population 
(8) 
  
0.0260
***
 
 
-0.0865
***
 0.3785
**
 
 
-1.3821 114 
   
[0.01 - 0.10] 
 
[-0.19 - -0.02] [0.002 - 0.73] 
 
[-8.33 - 6.23] 37.94% 
Domestic credit GDP 
(9) 
  
0.4844
***
 
 
-1.1489
***
 
 
-0.1255 48.8147
***
 114 
   
[0.12 - 1.06] 
 
[-2.85 - -0.26] 
 
[-0.25 - 0.21] [33.69 - 66.41] 29.91% 
Domestic credit to 
private sector 
(10) 
   
0.0208
*
 -0.0534
***
 1.0387
***
 
 
-1.6708 114 
    
[0.003 - 0.05] [-0.11 - -0.01] [0.81 - 1.27] 
 
[-5.27 - 1.67] 73.86% 
Domestic credit to 
population 
(11) 
   
0.0202 -0.1044
***
 0.5352
***
 
 
-5.0189 114 
    
[-0.01 - 0.08] [-0.22 - -0.05] [0.08 - 0.99] 
 
[-11.76 - 1.12] 30.05% 
Domestic credit GDP 
(12) 
   
0.2554 -1.4372
***
 
 
-0.1374 54.8657
***
 114 
    
[-0.35 - 1.14] [-3.29 - -0.53] 
 
[-0.29 - 0.23] [38.54 - 73.06] 15.52% 
Domestic credit to 
private sector 
(13) 0.1444
*
 0.2823
***
 -0.0035 0.0035 -0.0350
**
 0.7696
***
 
 
3.8131
*
 114 
 
[0.02 - 0.39] [0.12 - 0.48] [-0.02 - 0.01] [-0.02 - 0.02] [-0.07 - -0.01] [0.45 - 1.00] 
 
[0.39 - 8.06] 84.06% 
Domestic credit to 
population 
(14) 0.2967 0.4179
***
 -0.0018 -0.0037 -0.0737
***
 0.0549 
 
4.8221 114 
 
[-0.05 - 0.86] [0.13 - 0.77] [-0.03 - 0.04] [-0.05 - 0.05] [-0.18 - -0.02] [-0.33 - 0.34] 
 
[-1.97 - 13.71] 50.28% 
Domestic credit GDP 
(15) 2.0496 5.7894
***
 0.1321 -0.1411 -0.9892
***
 
 
-0.0381 28.2717
**
 114 
 
[-3.20 - 8.25] [0.91 - 12.57] [-0.42 - 0.50] [-0.86 - 0.67] [-2.65 - -0.28] 
 
[-0.10 - 0.27] [3.17 - 50.58] 41.37% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Appendix 5 Bootstrap results for stock market development and shareholder protection 
Dependent 
variable 
Reg Extent of 
disclosure index 
Extent of 
director liability 
Ease of 
shareholder suits 
Anti-director 
rights 
Rate of inflation GDP GDP growth Constant N×T 
R
2
 
Market cap 
(1) 0.1679
***
 
   
-0.0222 0.8304
***
 
 
2.2099 104 
 
[0.001 - 0.38] 
   
[-0.05 - 0.05] [0.27 - 1.13] 
 
[-2.53 - 9.51] 30.47% 
Market cap to 
population 
(2) 0.2932
***
 
   
-0.0606 0.2156 
 
1.0039 104 
 
[0.02 - 0.58] 
   
[-0.13 - 0.004] [-0.19 - 0.52] 
 
[-5.91 - 10.43] 16.23% 
Market cap to 
GDP 
(3) 1.3301 
   
-1.1382
**
 
 
0.1130 47.3346
***
 104 
 
[-2.39 - 3.98] 
   
[-2.69 - -0.33] 
 
[-0.29 - 0.47] [17.29 – 102.34] 6.29% 
Market cap 
(4) 
 
-0.0148 
  
-0.0345 0.8928
***
 
 
1.6808 104 
  
[-0.22 - 0.13] 
  
[-0.07 - 0.03] [0.29 - 1.24] 
 
[-3.59 - 8.55] 26.83% 
Market cap to 
population 
(5) 
 
0.1986 
  
-0.0749
*
 0.2081 
 
1.8336 104 
  
[-0.06 - 0.39] 
  
[-0.16 - -0.01] [-0.19 - 0.51] 
 
[-5.44 - 11.36] 10.99% 
Market cap to 
GDP 
(6) 
 
2.3021 
  
-1.1835
**
 
 
0.0828 43.1876
***
 104 
  
[-2.39 – 3.98] 
  
[-2.69 - -0.33] 
 
[-0.29 - 0.47] [17.29 – 102.34] 7.08% 
Market cap 
(7) 
  
-0.1553 
 
-0.0395 0.8680
***
 
 
2.7884 104 
   
[-0.47 - 0.003] 
 
[-0.08 - 0.02] [0.20 - 1.24] 
 
[-3.05 - 11.76] 29.33% 
Market cap to 
population 
(8) 
  
-0.1735 
 
-0.0874
**
 0.2921 
 
1.3904 104 
   
[-0.65 - 0.05] 
 
[-0.19 - -0.02] [-0.13- 0.60] 
 
[-6.32 - 12.25] 10.50% 
Market cap to 
GDP 
(9) 
  
-4.4226 
 
-1.3999
***
 
 
0.0804 71.2649
***
 104 
   
[-12.53 - 0.50] 
 
[-3.61 - -0.004] 
 
[-0.28 - 0.46] [35.73 - 116.99] 10.68% 
Market cap 
(10) 
   0.7601 -0.0300 0.6750
**
 
 
4.9549 108 
    
[-0.25 - 1.62] [-0.07 - 0.06] [0.14 - 1.18] 
 
[-3.82 - 14.16] 35.65% 
Market cap to 
population 
(11) 
   
1.4385
**
 -0.0720 -0.0963 
 
6.5150 108 
    
[0.31 - 2.32] [-0.13 - 0.02] [-0.53 - 0.37] 
 
[-3.35 - 16.04] 31.38% 
Market cap to 
GDP 
(12) 
   
4.0106 -1.2055
**
 
 
0.1796 44.8138
*
 108 
    
[-11.02 – 17.18] [-2.68 - -0.25] 
 
[-0.27 - 0.58] [2.03 - 93.77] 6.41%% 
Market cap 
(13) 0.1406 0.0731 -0.1605 0.5652 -0.0249 0.6288
*
 
 
6.0476 104 
 
[-0.03 - 0.32] [-0.17 - 0.24] [-0.48 - 0.07] [-0.54 - 1.60] [-0.05 - 0.06] [0.11 - 1.00] 
 
[-1.71 - 17.35] 38.84% 
Market cap to 
population 
(14) 0.2920
**
 0.3588* -0.2635 0.9856 -0.0542 -0.2694 
 
9.5133* 104 
 
[0.02 - 0.60] [0.06 - 0.60] [-0.66 - -0.01] [-0.31 - 2.05] [-0.10 - 0.04] [-0.82 - 0.18] 
 
[0.04 - 21.87] 39.14% 
Market cap to 
GDP 
(15) 3.2501
*
 5.3918
*
 -6.7363
*
 -6.2407 -1.1566
**
 
 
0.0840 50.1262 104 
 
[0.15 - 6.01] [0.34 - 8.85] [-13.44 - -0.78] [-24.51 - 9.69] [-3.04 - -0.20] 
 
[-0.23 - 0.48] [-12.81 - 112.48] 17.62% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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 Appendix 5 Bootstrap results for law enforcement and financial market development 
Dependent variable Reg Rule of law Legal origin Rate of inflation GDP GDP growth Constant N×T 
R
2
 
Credit Market 
        
Domestic credit (1) 0.9304
***
 
 
-0.0138 0.9397
***
 
 
0.7784 121 
  
[0.50 - 1.16] 
 
[-0.03 - 0.004] [0.80 - 1.08] 
 
[-1.44 - 3.10] 88.08% 
Domestic credit to population (2) 2.0295
***
 
 
-0.0173
*
 0.2682
**
 
 
1.6008 121 
  
[1.58 - 2.45] 
 
[-0.06 - -0.003] [0.07 - 0.44] 
 
[-2.07 - 5.77] 80.91% 
Domestic credit to GDP (3) 24.6307
***
 
 
-0.5046
**
 
 
-0.2173 53.9399
***
 121 
  
 
[12.85 - 34.18] 
 
[-1.60 - -0.05] 
 
[-0.16 - 0.12] [43.50 - 66.35] 52.51% 
Domestic credit (4) 0.9251
***
 0.0432 -0.0138 0.9369
***
 
 
0.8372 121 
  
[0.50 - 1.18] [-0.14 - 0.23] [-0.03 - 0.005] [0.78 - 1.08] 
 
[-1.43 - 3.27] 88.09% 
Domestic credit to population (5) 1.9904
***
 0.3147
*
 -0.0169
*
 0.2477
**
 
 
2.0288 121 
  
[1.47 - 2.42] [0.03 - 0.68] [-0.06 - -0.002] [0.05 - 0.42] 
 
[-1.51 - 6.11] 81.43% 
Domestic credit to GDP (6) 23.9804
***
 4.4147 -0.5048** 
 
-0.2105 52.6766
***
 121 
  
 
[11.53 - 33.38] [-3.56 - 14.51] [-1.59 - -0.06] 
 
[-0.15 - 0.13] [40.45 - 66.58] 52.97% 
Stock Market 
        
Market capitalisation (7) 1.6353
***
 
 
0.0297 0.7246
***
 
 
5.6276
*
 108 
  
[0.68 - 2.86] 
 
[-0.01 - 0.10] [0.24 - 1.05] 
 
[0.40 - 12.09] 55.56% 
Market capitalisation to population (8) 2.7327
***
 
 
0.0274 0.0259 
 
7.1326
**
 108 
  
[1.85 - 4.24] 
 
[-0.03 - 0.09] [-0.27 - 0.26] 
 
[0.38 - 15.80] 63.59% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (9) 34.4536
***
 
 
0.0552 
 
0.2039 50.8437
***
 108 
  
 
[20.53 - 47.64] 
 
[-1.01 - 0.36] 
 
[-0.07 - 0.46] [38.61 - 65.82] 36.58% 
Market capitalisation (10) 1.6106
***
 0.2292 0.0300 0.7108
***
 
 
5.9063
*
 108 
  
[0.68 - 2.78] [-0.28 - 0.85] [-0.01 - 0.11] [0.16 - 1.05] 
 
[0.47 - 13.05] 55.81% 
Market capitalisation to population (11) 2.6776
***
 0.5114 0.0281 -0.0047 
 
7.7543
**
 108 
  
[1.73 - 4.12] [-0.06 - 1.20] [-0.03 - 0.10] [-0.32 - 0.25] 
 
[0.71 - 17.09] 64.42% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (12) 34.7134
***
 -2.1267 0.0550 
 
0.2008 51.4853
***
 108 
  
 
[18.97 – 49.74] [-17.56 - 12.16] [-1.05 - 0.36] 
 
[-0.08 - 0.44] [35.73 - 71.18] 36.63% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Appendix 5 Bootstrap results for judicial efficiency and credit market development 
Dependent variable Reg Time Cost of claim Procedures Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP growth Constant N×T 
R
2
 
Domestic credit (1) 0.0009
*
 
  
-0.0515
***
 1.0772
***
 
 
-3.1552 114 
  
[0.0001 - 0.002] 
  
[-0.11 - -0.01] [0.85 - 1.29] 
 
[-7.04 - 0.26] 73.8% 
Domestic credit to population (2) 0.0004 
  
-0.1025
***
 0.5627
***
 
 
-5.8853 114 
  
[-0.001 - 0.004] 
  
[-0.22 - -0.04] [0.12 - 0.97] 
 
[-13.75 - 0.39] 29.6% 
Domestic credit to GDP (3) 0.0178 
  
-1.4185
***
 
 
-0.1704 44.6042
**
 114 
  
 
[-0.01 - 0.07] 
  
[-3.39 - -0.53] 
 
[-0.32 - 0.19] [4.10 - 71.27] 16.0% 
Domestic credit (4) 
 
-0.0172 
 
-0.0510
***
 1.0588
***
 
 
-1.7016 114 
   
[-0.07 - 0.02] 
 
[-0.10 - -0.01] [0.82 - 1.30] 
 
[-5.09 - 1.81] 73.3% 
Domestic credit to population (5) 
 
-0.0887
**
 
 
-0.1001
***
 0.5532
***
 
 
-3.3223 114 
   
[-0.19 - -0.01] 
 
[-0.22 - -0.05] [0.13 - 1.01] 
 
[-9.33 - 2.87] 35.9% 
Domestic credit to GDP (6) 
 
0.2049 
 
-1.4246
***
 
 
-0.1628 51.2120
***
 114 
  
  
[-1.20 - 1.31] 
 
[-3.28 - -0.55] 
 
[-0.30 - 0.20] [9.20 - 100.41] 15.3% 
Domestic credit 
   
-0.0390
*
 -0.0491
***
 1.0451
***
 
 
-0.0709 114 
 
(7) 
  
[-0.08 - -0.01] [-0.10 - -0.01] [0.78 - 1.27] 
 
[-4.84 - 5.07] 75.4% 
Domestic credit to population 
   
-0.0102 -0.1019
***
 0.5514
***
 
 
-4.9139 114 
 
(8) 
  
[-0.09 - 0.06] [-0.22 - -0.04] [0.09 - 0.96] 
 
[-12.73 - 3.63] 29.6% 
Domestic credit to GDP 
   
-1.4998
**
 -1.2948
***
 
 
-0.0560 119.8676
***
 114 
  (9) 
  
[-2.78 - -0.18] [-3.07 - -0.45] 
 
[-0.23 - 0.25] [43.43 - 193.98] 25.7% 
Domestic credit 
 
0.0014
**
 -0.0502
*
 -0.0583
**
 -0.0466
***
 1.0640
***
 
 
0.5729 114 
 
(10) [0.0002 - 0.003] [-0.10 - -0.01] [-0.11 - -0.01] [-0.11 - -0.02] [0.79 - 1.33] 
 
[-4.57 - 6.02] 78.8% 
Domestic credit to population 
 
0.0012 -0.1184
**
 -0.0524 -0.0961
***
 0.5579
***
 
 
-1.2788 114 
 
(11) [-0.0005 - 0.005] [-0.23 - -0.03] [-0.12 - 0.01] [-0.22 - -0.04] [0.10 - 1.04] 
 
[-10.10 - 7.19] 38.9% 
Domestic credit to GDP 
 
0.0273 -0.7567 -1.8111
**
 -1.2459
***
 
 
-0.0409 133.2386
***
 114 
  (12) [-0.01 - 0.07] [-2.08 - 0.36] [-3.05 - -0.22] [-3.26 - -0.40] 
 
[-0.18 - 0.25] [14.12 - 234.39] 28.7% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Appendix 5 Bootstrap results for judicial efficiency and stock market development 
Dependent variable Reg Time Cost of claim Procedures Rate of inflation GDP GDP growth Constant N×T 
R
2
 
Market capitalisation (1) 0.0011 
  
-0.0350 0.9124
***
 
 
0.3863 104 
  
[-0.001 - 0.003] 
  
[-0.08 - 0.02] [0.28 - 1.30] 
 
[-5.69 - 8.76] 27.43% 
Market capitalisation to population (2) 0.0004 
  
-0.0816
**
 0.3217 
 
-0.2587 104 
  
[-0.002 - 0.004] 
  
[-0.19 - -0.002] [-0.07 - 0.65] 
 
[-9.16 - 9.75] 8.31% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (3) 0.0427
*
 
  
-1.2466
***
 
 
0.0958 27.8196 104 
  
 
[0.002 - 0.10] 
  
[-3.25 - -0.19] 
 
[-0.31 - 0.44] [-7.82 - 56.53] 7.94% 
Market capitalisation (4) 
 
0.0152 
 
-0.0341 0.8812
***
 
 
1.5448 104 
   
[-0.05 - 0.09] 
 
[-0.07 - 0.04] [0.35 - 1.31] 
 
[-4.06 - 8.08] 26.96% 
Market capitalisation to population (5) 
 
-0.0477 
 
-0.0809** 0.3238 
 
1.0687 104 
   
[-0.15 - 0.05] 
 
[-0.19 - -0.01] [-0.05 - 0.70] 
 
[-7.33 - 9.95] 9.32% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (6) 
 
1.5175 
 
-1.2517** 
 
0.0843 20.1668 104 
  
  
[-0.68 - 3.61] 
 
[-2.54 - -0.21] 
 
[-0.34 - 0.39] [-27.66 - 68.69] 9.41% 
Market capitalisation 
   
-0.1050
***
 -0.0223 0.8195
***
 
 
7.9620
*
 104 
 
(7) 
  
[-0.25 - -0.02] [-0.05 - 0.03] [0.32 - 1.17] 
 
[0.72 - 17.57] 34.87% 
Market capitalisation to population 
   
-0.0716 -0.0732
**
 0.2665 
 
4.4875 104 
 
(8) 
  
[-0.19 - 0.02] [-0.17 - -0.003] [-0.12 - 0.60] 
 
[-5.57 - 16.88] 10.92% 
Market capitalisation to GDP 
   
-1.8761
**
 -1.0065
**
 
 
0.2051 134.7534
***
 104 
  (9) 
  
[-3.82 - -0.09] [-2.53 - -0.35] 
 
[-0.24 - 0.49] [31.91 - 253.92] 11.95% 
Market capitalisation 
 
0.0008 -0.0552 -0.1284
**
 -0.0200 0.8383
***
 
 
9.2643
*
 104 
 
(10) [-0.001 - 0.002] [-0.11 - 0.02] [-0.22 - -0.04] [-0.07 - 0.03] [0.20 - 1.27] 
 
[0.26 - 19.97] 36.54% 
Market capitalisation to population 
 
0.0005 -0.1144
*
 -0.1241
*
 -0.0669
**
 0.2747 
 
8.8897 104 
 
(11) [-0.002 - 0.003] [-0.22 - -0.02] [-0.23 - -0.01] [-0.19 - -0.01] [-0.13 - 0.72] 
 
[-4.86 - 22.53] 15.53% 
Market capitalisation to GDP 
 
0.0335 0.5855 -1.4986 -1.0771
**
 
 
0.1692 83.9077 104 
  (12) [-0.01 - 0.08] [-1.70 - 3.36] [-3.16 - 0.61] [-2.60 - -0.34] 
 
[-0.26 - 0.41] [-43.60 - 186.68] 13.85% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Appendix 5 Bootstrap results for Islamic culture and credit market development 
Dependent 
variable 
Reg IPI IFI IEI III Legal origin Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP growth Constant N×T 
R
2
 
Domestic credit 
(1) -0.2079
**
 
    
-0.0447
***
 1.0512
***
 
 
-1.6492 121 
 
[-0.45 - -0.03] 
    
[-0.10 - -0.003] [0.78 - 1.28] 
 
[-5.09 - 2.35] 73.29% 
Domestic credit 
to population 
(2) -0.6724
***
 
    
-0.0776
***
 0.5117
***
 
 
-3.4076 121 
 
[-1.13 - -0.23] 
    
[-0.19 - -0.03] [0.01 - 0.93] 
 
[-9.63 - 4.15] 43.17% 
Domestic credit 
to GDP 
(3) -4.2111 
    
-1.3306
***
 
 
-0.2385 62.1286
***
 121 
 
[-10.34 - 0.75] 
    
[-3.07 - -0.40] 
 
[-0.30 - 0.21] [48.80 - 79.89] 18.39% 
Domestic credit 
(4) 
 
-0.0408 
   
-0.0503
**
 1.0529
***
 
 
-1.8644 121 
  
[-0.30 - 0.07] 
   
[-0.08 - -0.01] [0.81 - 1.25] 
 
[-4.84 - 1.93] 70.89% 
Domestic credit 
to population 
(5) 
 
-0.1296 
   
-0.0956
***
 0.5170
***
 
 
-4.1072 121 
  
[-0.56 - 0.13] 
   
[-0.20 - -0.02] [0.03 - 0.93] 
 
[-10.05 - 3.14] 26.23% 
Domestic credit 
to GDP 
(6) 
 
-4.1331 
   
-1.3341
***
 
 
-0.2299 66.9552
***
 121 
  
[-12.87 - 0.38] 
   
[-2.77 - -0.16] 
 
[-0.33 - 0.18] [39.29 - 102.92] 18.70% 
Domestic credit    
-0.3404
***
 
  
-0.0390
*
 1.1418
***
 
 
-3.8484
**
 121 
(7) 
  
[-0.79 - -0.13] 
  
[-0.06 - -0.004] [0.94 - 1.35] 
 
[-7.72 - -0.23] 73.73% 
Domestic credit 
to population 
   
-0.7565
***
 
  
-0.0718
**
 0.7127
***
 
 
-8.5709
**
 121 
(8) 
  
[-1.67 - -0.19] 
  
[-0.15 - -0.004] [0.29 - 1.18] 
 
[-16.40 - -1.13] 35.32% 
Domestic credit 
to GDP 
   
-11.6898
***
 
  
-0.9947
*
 
 
-0.2399 68.3952
***
 121 
(9) 
  
[-24.55 - -3.61] 
  
[-1.84 - -0.21] 
 
[-0.36 - 0.12] [52.39 - 83.97] 27.33% 
Domestic credit     
-0.1119
***
 
 
-0.0403
*
 1.0861
***
 
 
-2.2517 121 
(10) 
   
[-0.32 - -0.02] 
 
[-0.06 - -0.005] [0.88 - 1.29] 
 
[-5.28 - 1.12] 73.40% 
Domestic credit 
to population 
    
-0.3192
***
 
 
-0.0674
**
 0.6111
***
 
 
-5.2306 121 
(11) 
   
[-0.67 - -0.14] 
 
[-0.14 - -0.01] [0.24 - 0.98] 
 
[-10.58 - 0.43] 39.87% 
Domestic credit 
to GDP 
    
-4.0440
***
 
 
-1.0553
**
 
 
-0.2745 76.6669
***
 121 
(12) 
   
[-9.19 - -0.29] 
 
[-2.11 - -0.11] 
 
[-0.35 - 0.11] [55.31 - 104.05] 25.64% 
Domestic credit 
(13) 
   
-0.1018
**
 0.1845 -0.0401
*
 1.0682
***
 
 
-1.9045 121 
    
[-0.25 - -0.03] [-0.19 - 0.51] [-0.06 - -0.003] [0.83 - 1.28] 
 
[-5.15 - 1.71] 73.65% 
Domestic credit 
to population 
(14) 
   
-0.2911
***
 0.5166 -0.0670
**
 0.5609
***
 
 
-4.2586 121 
    
[-0.67 - -0.07] [-0.33 - 1.35] [-0.14 - -0.01] [0.09 - 0.99] 
 
[-10.17 - 2.01] 41.20% 
Domestic credit 
to GDP 
(15) 
   
-3.6280
**
 8.8382 -1.0466
**
 
 
-0.2544 71.9117
***
 121 
    
[-7.83 - -0.96] [-3.39 - 21.22] [-2.11 - -0.13] 
 
[-0.32 - 0.13] [49.61 - 104.59] 27.45% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Appendix 5 Bootstrap results for Islamic culture and stock market development 
Dependent 
variable 
Reg IPI IFI IEI III Legal origin Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP growth Constant N×T 
R
2
 
Market cap 
(1) -0.6130
***
 
    
-0.0120 0.8562
***
 
 
3.3837 108 
 
[-1.31 - -0.04] 
    
[-0.06 - 0.05] [0.22 - 1.22] 
 
[-2.52 - 11.62] 38.60% 
Market cap to 
population 
(2) -1.0894
***
 
    
-0.0403 0.2463 
 
3.4587 108 
 
[-1.85 - -0.39] 
    
[-0.12 - 0.02] [-0.19 - 0.57] 
 
[-4.75 - 14.64] 34.73% 
Market cap to 
GDP 
(3) -7.9756
*
 
    
-0.9441
**
 
 
0.1534 67.0859
***
 108 
 
[-14.04 - -1.04] 
    
[-2.52 - -0.12] 
 
[-0.24 - 0.54] [48.95 - 90.01] 10.73% 
Market cap 
(4) 
 
0.1668 
   
-0.0368 0.8457
***
 
 
2.3852 108 
  
[-0.21 - 0.85] 
   
[-0.07 - 0.02] [0.03  - 1.18] 
 
[-2.81 - 10.56] 26.10% 
Market cap to 
population 
(5) 
 
0.0486 
   
-0.0772
*
 0.2373 
 
2.1055 108 
  
[-0.46 - 0.95] 
   
[-0.15 - -0.01] [-0.27 - 0.55] 
 
[-5.33 - 13.05] 6.42% 
Market cap to 
GDP 
(6) 
 
-4.6704 
   
-1.0393* 
 
0.2362 68.2136
***
 108 
  
[-12.63 - 5.05] 
   
[-2.26 - -0.22] 
 
[-0.25 - 0.58] [8.48 - 119.32] 7.01% 
Market cap 
(7) 
  
-0.2370 
  
-0.0231 0.9157
***
 
 
1.3167 108 
   
[-0.69 - 0.05] 
  
[-0.05 - 0.06] [0.32 - 1.30] 
 
[-4.38 - 8.72] 26.23% 
Market cap to 
population 
(8) 
  
-0.6747
**
 
  
-0.0504 0.4200
*
 
 
-1.6612 108 
   
[-1.50 - -0.04] 
  
[-0.11 - 0.05] [0.02 - 0.73] 
 
[-9.21 - 7.62] 11.11% 
Market cap to 
GDP 
(9) 
  
-9.4246
*
 
  
-0.7873 
 
0.1873 65.8081
***
 108 
   
[-19.30 - -0.31] 
  
[-1.98 - 0.37] 
 
[-0.31 - 0.50] [41.08 - 98.65] 9.28% 
Market cap 
(10) 
   
-0.1921
***
 
 
-0.0129 0.9125
***
 
 
2.1233 108 
    
[-0.47 - -0.01] 
 
[-0.04 - 0.07] [0.36 - 1.26] 
 
[-3.29 - 9.54] 29.37% 
Market cap to 
population 
(11) 
   
-0.4369
***
 
 
-0.0324 0.3762* 
 
0.9478 108 
    
[-0.82 - -0.20] 
 
[-0.09 - 0.06] [0.03 - 0.65] 
 
[-5.72 - 9.62] 20.43% 
Market cap to 
GDP 
(12) 
   
-5.0911
**
 
 
-0.6613 
 
0.1705 81.9603
***
 108 
    
[-9.86 - -0.66] 
 
[-1.79 - 0.31] 
 
[-0.27 - 0.48] [48.68 - 127.75] 12.25% 
Market cap 
(13) 
   
-0.1657
*
 0.3665 -0.0135 0.8791
***
 
 
2.7153 108 
    
[-0.32 - -0.02] [-0.45 - 1.53] [-0.04 - 0.08] [0.16 - 1.26] 
 
[-3.12 - 11.70] 29.95% 
Market cap to 
population 
(14) 
   
-0.3978
***
 0.5419 -0.0333 0.3269 
 
1.8231 108 
    
[-0.82 - -0.01] [-0.62 - 2.22] [-0.09 - 0.07] [-0.18 - 0.66] 
 
[-5.69 - 13.31] 21.28% 
Market cap to 
GDP 
(15) 
   
-5.0659
**
 0.3944 -0.6621 
 
0.1713 81.7044
***
 108 
    
[-10.78 - -0.04] [-20.11 - 20.53] [-1.82 - 0.36] 
 
[-0.28 - 0.46] [39.47 - 145.79] 12.25% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Appendix 5 Bootstrap results for the duality of legal system 
Dependent variable Reg Sharia index Legal origin Rate of inflation GDP GDP growth Constant N×T 
R
2
 
Credit Market 
        
Domestic credit (1) -0.1876
***
 
 
-0.0426
*
 1.0629
***
 
 
-1.9320 121 
  
[-0.47 - -0.001] 
 
[-0.06 - -0.01] [0.83 - 1.29] 
 
[-5.08 - 1.55] 72.79% 
Domestic credit to population (2) -0.2612
*
 
 
-0.0871
***
 0.5275*** 
 
-4.3032 121 
  
[-0.55 - -0.004] 
 
[-0.20 - -0.001] [0.06 - 1.00] 
 
[-11.02 - 2.68] 28.11% 
Domestic credit to GDP (3) -9.6017
***
 
 
-0.9802
**
 
 
-0.1822 70.5846
***
 121 
  
 
[-17.90 - -3.49] 
 
[-1.84 - -0.04] 
 
[-0.33 - 0.16] [51.90 - 86.76] 30.94% 
Domestic credit (4) -0.2182
***
 0.4376
*
 -0.0383 1.0298
***
 
 
-1.1806 121 
  
[-0.51 - -0.04] [0.06 - 0.90] [-0.06 - 0.005] [0.79 - 1.26] 
 
[-4.47 - 2.40] 74.28% 
Domestic credit to population (5) -0.3379
**
 1.0978
**
 -0.0765** 0.4445** 
 
-2.4183 121 
  
[-0.67 - -0.03] [0.02 - 2.31] [-0.16 - -0.002] [0.10 - 0.79] 
 
[-8.94 - 4.13] 34.41% 
Domestic credit to GDP (6) -11.0216
***
 18.8495
***
 -0.8030 
 
-0.1514 67.0692
***
 121 
  
 
[-18.40 - -5.10] [2.23 - 37.53] [-1.44 - 0.12] 
 
[-0.28 - 0.17] [48.81 - 83.13] 39.37% 
Stock Market 
        
Market capitalisation (7) 0.1379 
 
-0.0381 0.8363
***
 
 
2.8593 108 
  
[-0.18 - 0.52] 
 
[-0.07 - 0.02] [0.15 - 1.20] 
 
[-2.58 - 11.22] 26.00% 
Market capitalisation to population (8) 0.1288 
 
-0.0815* 0.2243 
 
2.3662 108 
  
[-0.28 - 0.63] 
 
[-0.17 - -0.01] [-0.24 - 0.57] 
 
[-5.65 - 13.25] 6.75% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (9) -2.4285 
 
-1.0636* 
 
0.2399 59.3135
***
 108 
  
 
[-10.08 - 4.25] 
 
[-2.47 - -0.20] 
 
[-0.23 - 0.58] [33.86 - 90.22] 6.16% 
Market capitalisation (10) 0.0927 0.5854 -0.0329 0.8015
***
 
 
3.6226 108 
  
[-0.19 - 0.45] [-0.28 - 1.65] [-0.07 - 0.05] [0.02 - 1.21] 
 
[-2.37 - 13.22] 27.59% 
Market capitalisation to population (11) 0.0389 1.1645 -0.0711 0.1551 
 
3.8846 108 
  
[-0.31 - 0.49] [-0.21 - 2.72] [-0.17 - 0.03] [-0.36 - 0.53] 
 
[-4.90 - 15.54] 11.02% 
Market capitalisation to GDP (12) -3.2424 9.5046 -0.9813* 
 
0.2582 57.4615
***
 108 
  
 
[-10.08 - 3.12] [-9.89 - 26.92] [-2.41 - -0.03] 
 
[-0.22 - 0.58] [31.76 - 92.78] 7.13% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Appendix 5 Bootstrap results for influences upon credit market development 
Dependent 
variable 
Legal origin Strength of 
legal rights 
Depth of 
credit 
information 
Private 
bureau 
coverage 
Public 
registry 
coverage 
III Sharia index Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP growth Constant N×T 
R
2
 
Domestic 
credit  
0.2757 0.0533 0.2554
***
 -0.0086 0.0108 -0.0860
**
 -0.1715
*
 -0.0233 0.8901
***
 
 
1.8450 114 
[-0.20 - 0.77] [-0.16 - 0.30] [0.09 - 0.44] [-0.02 - 0.01] [-0.01 - 0.03] [-0.22 - -0.01] [-0.36 - -0.03] [-0.04 - 0.01] [0.55 - 1.22] 
 
[-2.00 - 6.28] 86.21% 
Domestic credit 
to population 
0.6082 0.0681 0.3683
**
 -0.0098 0.0131 -0.2421
**
 -0.1730 -0.0507
**
 0.3117 
 
0.6663 114 
[-0.82 - 1.91] [-0.54 - 0.78] [0.06 - 0.66] [-0.04 - 0.05] [-0.05 - 0.08] [-0.56 - -0.03] [-0.52 - 0.23] [-0.12 - -0.01] [-0.12 - 0.78] 
 
[-8.46 - 10.08] 57.48% 
Domestic credit 
to GDP  
11.9165 0.9691 5.8883
***
 -0.2252 0.1410 -3.0987
**
 -9.9444
***
 -0.3321 
 
-0.0159 62.9222
***
 114 
[-4.75 - 25.96] [-6.09 - 6.97] [1.61 – 12.00] [-0.67 - 0.33] [-0.75 - 0.90] [-6.75 - -0.24] [-18.34 - -0.36] [-0.90 - 0.41] 
 
[-0.15 - 0.17] [28.34 - 121.99] 59.64% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
 
Appendix 5 Bootstrap results for influences upon stock market development 
Dependent 
variable 
Legal origin Extent of 
disclosure 
index 
Extent of 
director 
liability 
Ease of 
shareholder 
suits 
Anti-
director 
rights index 
III Sharia index Rate of 
inflation 
GDP GDP 
growth 
Constant N×T 
R
2
 
Market cap 
0.8285 0.0948 -0.0114 -0.3375
*
 0.5145 -0.2065 -0.2244 -0.0028 0.7008 
 
6.8728 104 
[-0.23 - 2.98] [-0.14 - 0.29] [-0.46 - 0.21] [-0.74 - -0.09] [-0.49 - 1.87] [-0.54 - 0.11] [-0.95 - 0.18] [-0.03 - 0.12] [-0.16 - 1.20] 
 
[-3.57 - 26.16] 45.65% 
Market cap to 
population 
1.1063 0.1901 0.2749 -0.6198
**
 1.0175 -0.3532
*
 -0.6097
**
 -0.0085 -0.1540 
 
11.2283 104 
[-0.06 - 3.53] [-0.08 - 0.44] [-0.29 - 0.54] [-1.15 - -0.25] [-0.08 - 2.49] [-0.71 - -0.01] [-1.57 - -0.03] [-0.03 - 0.14] [-1.13 - 0.41] 
 
[-0.40 - 32.32] 53.98% 
Market cap to 
GDP 
8.8950 1.0815 5.1584 -14.0516
**
 -3.5390 -7.7242
**
 -12.8616
**
 -0.1320 
 
0.0381 139.0969
*
 104 
[-17.73 - 37.53] [-2.50 - 3.82] [-1.13 - 8.65] [-21.93 - -3.78] [-15.22 - 11.45] [-16.05 - -0.99] [-25.14 - -1.13] [-1.02 - 1.08] 
 
[-0.28 - 0.24] [22.62 - 225.60] 37.69% 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Appendix 6 Tobit results 
Appendix 6 Tobit results for investment, legal environment and financial market development 
Dependent variable: Investmentjt Tobit 1 Tobit 2 Tobit 3 Tobit 4 Tobit 5 Tobit 6 
‘Law and Finance’ theory 
Extent of disclosure index 2.2289*** 
   
1.9998*** 2.2448*** 
 
(0.371) 
   
(0.398) (0.401) 
Extent of director liability index 
 
-1.5485*** 
  
0.0609 -1.1582 
  
(0.332) 
  
(0.583) (1.175) 
Ease of shareholder suits index 
  
-2.6358*** 
 
-1.4208 -0.0201 
   
(0.654) 
 
(1.141) (1.437) 
Anti-director rights index 
   
2.6763*** 
 
-3.4903 
    
(0.865) 
 
(2.476) 
Rule of law 0.5496 7.2129*** 10.1753*** -2.3271 6.0611** 8.2872** 
 
(2.007) (2.420) (3.071) (1.950) (3.090) (3.640) 
Legal origin -2.2693 -3.4638** -0.0977 -1.2389 -0.4716 -5.0929 
 
(1.491) (1.479) (1.767) (1.520) (2.155) (4.660) 
Stock market capitalisation 1.6325** 1.9653*** 0.3021 1.4151* 0.9505 1.7886 
 
(0.696) (0.719) (0.773) (0.735) (0.893) (1.424) 
Firm-level controls 
Assets 7.4222*** 7.1921*** 7.1539*** 7.2617*** 7.3417*** 7.3563*** 
 
(0.285) (0.282) (0.284) (0.284) (0.284) (0.526) 
Percentage trading 27.3576*** 27.1698*** 28.5792*** 27.1827*** 27.7881*** 27.7582*** 
 
(2.849) (2.817) (2.783) (2.848) (2.799) (5.717) 
Reward to risk 0.4952** 0.3769 0.3963 0.4442 0.4484* 0.4701 
 
(0.225) (0.327) (0.311) (0.275) (0.261) (0.308) 
Debt to assets -0.1079*** -0.0975*** -0.1069*** -0.1028*** -0.1065*** -0.1052*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) 
Country-level controls 
Double taxation treaty -2.1103 1.2417 9.9080*** -5.0995* 3.7715 5.1617*** 
 
(2.481) (2.494) (3.427) (2.808) (4.533) (1.850) 
Capital controls -3.5450 1.7001 -0.2912 -5.3634* -3.3319 4.8233 
 
(2.371) (2.346) (2.328) (2.878) (2.575) (6.255) 
FOREX -5.6943** 1.9606 4.8735*** 2.1220 -3.5300 -5.2954*** 
 
(2.321) (1.660) (1.847) (1.696) (2.533) (1.815) 
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Dependent variable: Investmentjt Tobit 1 Tobit 2 Tobit 3 Tobit 4 Tobit 5 Tobit 6 
 
Constant -122.1251*** -116.0304*** -80.6494*** -110.0920*** -104.7848*** -118.5376*** 
 
(17.962) (17.857) (19.567) (18.352) (21.563) (30.098) 
Industry and Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
N 7,918 7,918 7,918 7,986 7,918 7,918 
N uncensored observations 1,281 1,281 1,281 1,301 1,281 1,281 
Pseudo R-squared 21.53% 21.17% 21.11% 21.08% 21.58% 21.63% 
Log likelihood -6275.58 -6303.91 -6309.21 -6401.39 -6271.46 -6267.22 
F statistic 60.61*** 59.29*** 60.27*** 58.63*** 56.64*** 61.90*** 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
  
 
2
7
6
 
 
Appendix 6 Tobit results for investment and the interaction between investor protection and market development 
  
Extent of disclosure index  Anti-director rights index 
Dependent variable: Investmentjt Tobit 1 Tobit 2 Tobit 3  Tobit 4 Tobit 5 Tobit 6 
‘Law and Finance’ theory 
HiMktDevHiInvPro (β1) -1.5603 0.9137 3.6214***  0.2837 -1.6315 0.8198 
 
(1.269) (1.263) (1.210)  (1.691) (1.643) (1.691) 
HiMktDevLoInvPro (β2) -4.4099** 0.7166 2.3180  -5.7759*** 1.6467 3.2215 
 
(1.759) (1.604) (1.624)  (1.819) (2.001) (2.100) 
LoMktDevLoInvPro (β3) -17.8306*** -16.4538*** -13.7984***  -6.5111*** -7.7522*** -7.9571*** 
 
(5.400) (5.358) (5.269)  (2.512) (2.450) (2.401) 
Legal origin 
 
-6.7341*** -5.4476***  
 
-9.8524*** -7.9844*** 
  
(1.666) (1.662)  
 
(1.965) (1.985) 
Rule of law 
  
-7.9995***  
  
-8.6296*** 
   
(2.155)  
  
(2.168) 
Firm-level controls 
Size 7.2555*** 7.4239*** 7.3703***  7.4729*** 7.5187*** 7.4776*** 
 
(0.278) (0.286) (0.282)  (0.286) (0.287) (0.284) 
Percentage trading 30.0024*** 29.3313*** 29.3763***  29.8294*** 29.1608*** 29.3394*** 
 
(2.844) (2.864) (2.835)  (2.855) (2.805) (2.786) 
Return to risk 0.4997** 0.3791 0.3026  0.4042 0.2571 0.2031 
 
(0.220) (0.382) (0.625)  (0.331) (0.632) (0.775) 
Debt to assets -0.1211*** -0.1256*** -0.1164***  -0.1230*** -0.1220*** -0.1137*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020)  (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
Country-level controls 
Double taxation treaties -16.1721*** -13.1608** -13.7522**  -0.5031 -1.0067 -4.2451 
 
(5.875) (5.843) (5.794)  (2.882) (2.857) (2.858) 
Country capital controls -14.8781** -11.6339** -6.1759  -1.4689 -0.9609 1.7855 
 
(5.888) (5.858) (5.882)  (3.105) (3.142) (3.243) 
FOREX 2.3102 4.0160*** 6.5268***  1.6679 2.9631** 6.0846*** 
 
(1.479) (1.527) (1.774)  (1.440) (1.495) (1.783) 
Free trade agreements  -0.3565 4.5189*** 7.6508***  4.9445*** 4.7376*** 8.4496*** 
 
(1.197) (1.583) (1.649)  (1.678) (1.645) (1.687) 
 
Constant -56.5345*** -63.0464*** -66.3748***  -75.2266*** -72.7590*** -73.9505*** 
  
(7.845) (7.714) (7.736)  (5.950) (5.787) (5.901) 
 
Industry and time effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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Extent of disclosure index  Anti-director rights index 
Dependent variable: Investmentjt Tobit 1 Tobit 2 Tobit 3  Tobit 4 Tobit 5 Tobit 6 
 
N 7,986 7,986 7,986  7,986 7,986 7,986 
 
N uncensored observations 1,301 1,301 1,301  1,301 1,301 1,301 
 
Pseudo R-squared 20.97% 21.34% 21.52%  21.19% 21.38% 21.60% 
 
Log likelihood -6410.82 -6380.86 -6366.11  -6392.96 -6377.64 -6359.87 
 
F statistic 61.15*** 58.18*** 56.07***  61.09*** 58.67*** 56.14*** 
Wald test 
β1=β2 Chi-squared 4.44** 0.03 1.09  11.35*** 2.20* 1.21 
β1=β3 Chi-squared 9.65*** 10.93*** 11.25***  9.47*** 7.11*** 16.73*** 
β2=β3 Chi-squared 6.30*** 10.20*** 9.21***  0.12 19.20*** 26.33*** 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Appendix 6 Tobit results for investment and accounting standards selection 
Dependent variable: Investmentjt Tobit 1 Tobit 2 Tobit 3 Tobit 4 Tobit 5 Tobit 6 
Firm discretionary policy 
IFRS 9.5782*** 2.8876* 
    
 
(2.062) (1.679) 
    
Extent of disclosure index  
  
2.5521*** 3.2080*** 
  
   
(0.572) (0.528) 
  
IFRS_disclosure  
  
0.9768*** 0.1759 
  
   
(0.246) (0.188) 
  
IFRS_Hi Disclosure (β1)     
12.8205*** 6.7888** 
     
(3.300) (2.889) 
No IFRS-Hi Disclosure(β2)     
2.0885 5.2168*** 
     
(1.811) (1.754) 
Firm-level controls 
Size 
 
8.4474*** 
 
8.6013*** 
 
8.4840*** 
  
(0.526) 
 
(0.523) 
 
(0.529) 
Percentage trading 24.9302*** 13.4903*** 21.9847*** 9.8463** 23.8814*** 11.9685*** 
 
(4.853) (3.949) (4.803) (3.933) (4.987) (4.031) 
Return to risk 0.4559 0.1323 1.3122 0.4514 0.3937 0.1807 
 
(1.642) (0.149) (2.017) (1.412) (1.239) (0.172) 
Debt to assets -0.0671* -0.1333*** -0.0630* -0.1375*** -0.0668* -0.1305*** 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) 
Country-level controls 
FOREX 2.2499 6.1738*** -6.6998** -4.7263* 2.7501 5.6250*** 
 
(2.305) (1.818) (2.971) (2.581) (2.249) (1.772) 
Free trade agreement 7.5355** 2.8536 7.0322** 1.1539 6.1322* 2.0903 
 
(3.397) (2.635) (3.248) (2.431) (3.560) (2.745) 
 
Constant -28.5439** -66.2872*** -32.4382** -74.6753*** -27.4189** -67.4039*** 
  
(13.977) (8.331) (13.102) (8.982) (13.899) (8.346) 
 
Industry and time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
N 2,559 2,559 2,559 2,559 2,435 2,435 
 
N uncensored observations 546 546 546 546 543 543 
 
Pseudo R-squared 4.38% 15.64% 4.80% 16.94% 4.19% 15.52% 
 
Log likelihood -3097.57 -2733.00 -3084.05 -2690.86 -3059.07 -2697.48 
 
F statistic 9.61*** 30.23*** 9.20*** 27.60*** 7.72*** 26.30*** 
Wald test β1=β2 Chi-squared      
14.76*** 0.47 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
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Appendix 6 Tobit results for investment and auditor selection 
Dependent variable: Investmentjt Tobit 1 Tobit 2 Tobit 3 Tobit 4 Tobit 5 Tobit 6 Tobit 7 Tobit 8 
Firm discretionary policy 
Big-four auditor 0.7344*** 0.0198 
      
 
(0.087) (0.076) 
      
Extent of disclosure index 
  
0.0587* 0.1658*** 
    
   
(0.033) (0.027) 
    
Big-four_disclosure 
  
0.1039*** -0.0069 
    
   
(0.015) (0.012) 
    
Big-four_Hi disclosure (β1)     
0.5203*** 0.2711*** 
  
     
(0.113) (0.092) 
  
Nobig-four_Hi disclosure (β2)     
-0.2567* 0.1512 
  
     
(0.131) (0.103) 
  
Big-four_Lo disclosure (β3)       
0.0623 -0.2692*** 
       
(0.122) (0.098) 
Nobig-four_Lo disclosure (β4)       
-0.7208*** -0.1698 
       
(0.143) (0.111) 
Firm-level controls 
Size 
 
0.5063*** 
 
0.5175*** 
 
0.5022*** 
 
0.5130*** 
  
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
Percentage trading 3.5205*** 2.2326*** 3.4403*** 2.1397*** 
 
2.2275*** 3.4911*** 2.2098*** 
 
(0.239) (0.204) (0.239) (0.206) (0.247) (0.214) (0.251) (0.214) 
Return to risk 0.0548*** 0.0325* 0.0534*** 0.0302 0.2336** 0.0547 0.2822*** 0.0594 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.097) (0.080) (0.099) (0.080) 
Debt to assets -0.0013 -0.0086*** -0.0009 -0.0081*** -0.0001 -0.0078*** -0.0000 -0.0079*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
Country-level controls 
FOREX -0.3601*** 0.0624 -0.6729*** -0.3492*** -0.5215*** -0.1261 -0.5145*** -0.1167 
 
(0.091) (0.077) (0.119) (0.098) (0.107) (0.086) (0.108) (0.086) 
Free trade agreements -0.2978*** 0.1168 -0.3543*** 0.0699 -0.3742*** 0.0917 -0.1699* 0.1137 
 
(0.090) (0.076) (0.091) (0.076) (0.093) (0.078) (0.094) (0.075) 
 
Constant -3.6080*** -5.4007*** -3.6150*** -6.1232*** -2.9958*** -5.4068*** -2.8913*** -5.2210*** 
  
(0.377) (0.385) (0.391) (0.419) (0.376) (0.384) (0.408) (0.393) 
 
Industry and time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
N 7,122 7,122 7,072 7,072 6,584 6,584 6,584 6,584 
 
N uncensored observations 1,154 1,154 1,134 1,134 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 
 
Pseudo R-squared 18.31% 34.86% 18.18% 35.93% 18.07% 35.83% 17.43% 35.80% 
 
Log likelihood -3392.98 -2705.79 -3350.81 -2624.02 -3148.49 -2465.93 -3173.16 -2467.15 
 
F statistic 34.3584*** 61.1654*** 33.0663*** 58.8683*** 31.4780*** 56.16*** 29.93*** 56.01*** 
Wald test β1=β2 Chi-squared      
43.89*** 1.66* 28.76*** 0.70 
Source: Thesis analysis. 
  
280 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abraham, A., Seyyed, F.  J., & Alsakran, S.  A. (2002).  Testing the random walk behavior and 
efficiency of the Gulf stock markets.  Financial Review, 37(3), 469-480. 
Abu Loghod, H.  S. (2008).  Do Islamic banks perform better than conventional banks? Evidence 
from Gulf Cooperation Council countries.  API Working Paper Series No. 1011.  Arab 
Planning Institute.  Kuwait. 
Abumustafa, N.  I., & Al-Abduljader, S.  T. (2011).  Investigating the implications of derivative 
securities in emerging stock markets: The Islamic perspective.  Journal of Derivatives and 
Hedge Funds, 17(2), 115-121. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J.  A. (2001).  The colonial origins of comparative 
development: An empirical investigation.  American Economic Review, 91(5), 1369-1401. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J.  A. (2002).  Reversal of fortune: Geography and 
institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution.  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 117(4), 1231-1294. 
Achilov, D. (2010).  Can Islam and democracy coexist? A cross-national analysis of Islamic 
institutions in the Muslim world. (Doctoral dissertation), University of Arizona, USA. 
Adler, M., & Dumas, B. (1983).  International portfolio choice and corporation finance: A 
synthesis.  Journal of Finance, 38(3), 925-984. 
African Development Bank. (2012).  Capital market development in North Africa: Current status 
and future potential.  Retrieved from 
http://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/economic-brief-capital-market-
development-in-north-africa-current-status-and-future-potential-31220/ 
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M., & Matos, P. (2011).  Does governance travel around the 
world? Evidence from institutional investors.  Journal of Financial Economics, 100(1), 
154-181. 
Aggarwal, R., Kearney, C., & Lucey, B. (2012).  Gravity and culture in foreign portfolio 
investment.  Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(2), 525-538. 
Aggarwal, R., Klapper, L., & Wysocki, P.  D. (2005).  Portfolio preferences of foreign 
institutional investors.  Journal of Banking and Finance, 29(12), 2919-2946. 
Ahearne, A.  G., Griever, W.  L., & Warnock, F.  E. (2004).  Information costs and home bias: 
An analysis of US holdings of foreign equities.  Journal of International Economics, 
62(2), 313-336. 
Ahern, K.  R., Daminelli, D., & Fracassi, C. (2015).  Lost in translation? The effect of cultural 
values on mergers around the world.  Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1), 165-189. 
Ahmed, A.  D., & Mmolainyane, K.  K. (2014).  Financial integration, capital market 
development and economic performance: Empirical evidence from Botswana.  Economic 
Modelling, 42, 1-14. 
Ahmed, H. (2006).  Islamic Law, adaptability and financial development.  Islamic Economic 
Studies, 13(2), 79-101. 
Ahmed, S., & Zlate, A. (2014).  Capital flows to emerging market economies: A brave new 
world? Journal of International Money and Finance, 48, , 221-248. 
Al-Rimawi, L.  M. (2012).  Raising capital on Arab equity markets: Legal and juridical aspects 
of Arab securities regulation.  Netherlands: Kulwer Law International. 
Al-Suwaidi, A. (1993).  Developments of the legal systems of the Gulf Arab States.  Arab Law 
Quarterly, 8(4), 289-301. 
Albouy, D.  Y. (2012).  The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical 
investigation: Comment.  American Economic Review, 102(6), 3059-3076. 
Ang, J.  B. (2013).  Are modern financial systems shaped by state antiquity? Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 37(11), 4038-4058. 
Anwar, S., & Sun, S. (2015).  Can the presence of foreign investment affect the capital structure 
of domestic firms? Journal of Corporate Finance, 30, 32-43. 
  
281 
Badr, G.  M. (1978).  Islamic Law: Its relation to other legal systems.  American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 26(2), 187-198. 
Baha-Eldin, Z.  A. (1996).  Banking regulation and supervision in Egypt: The view from a 
developing country.  In J.  J.  Norton (Ed.), Emerging financial markets and the role of 
international financial organizations (Vol. 4, pp. 309-331).  London: UK: Kiluwer Law 
International. 
Bali, A.  U. (2011).  Perils of judicial independence: Constitutional transition and the Turkish 
example.  Pacific Rim Law Policy Journal, 21(1), 235-320. 
Ballantyne, W.  M. (1985).  The states of the GCC: Sources of law, the Shari’a and the extent to 
which it applies.  Arab Law Quarterly, 1(1), 3-18. 
Baltagi, B.  H. (2008).  Econometric analysis of panel data.  Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. 
Barton, J.  A.  N. (2005).  Who cares about auditor reputation? Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 22(3), 549-586. 
Beck, N. (2001).  Time-series-cross-section data: What have we learned in the past few years? 
Annual Review of Political Science, 4(1), 271-293. 
Beck, N., & Katz, J.  N. (1995).  What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data.  
American Political Science Review, 89(3), 634-647. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2000).  A new database on the structure and 
development of the financial sector.  World Bank Economic Review, 14(3), 597-605. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2001).  Law, politics, and finance.  Policy Research 
Working Paper No 2585.  Development Research Group.  World Bank. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2003a).  Law and finance: Why does legal origin 
matter? Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4), 653-675. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2003b).  Law, endowments, and finance.  Journal of 
Financial Economics, 70(2), 137-181. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2005).  Law and firms’ access to finance.  American 
Law and Economics Review, 7(1), 211-252. 
Beck, T., & Levine, R. (2002).  Industry growth and capital allocation: Does having a market- or 
bank-based system matter? Journal of Financial Economics, 64(2), 147-180. 
Beck, T., & Levine, R. (2004).  Stock markets, banks, and growth: Panel evidence.  Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 28(3), 423-442. 
Beck, T., Levine, R., & Loayza, N. (2000).  Finance and the sources of growth.  Journal of 
Financial Economics, 58(1-2), 261-300. 
Bekaert, G. (1995).  Market integration and investment barriers in emerging equity markets.  
World Bank Economic Review, 9(1), 75-107. 
Bekaert, G., & Harvey, C.  R. (2003).  Emerging markets finance.  Journal of Empirical Finance, 
10(1–2), 3-55. 
Beneish, M.  D., Miller, B.  P., & Yohn, T.  L. (2010).  IFRS adoption and cross-border 
investment in equity and debt markets.  Indiana University.  Bloomington, IN. 
Beneish, M.  D., Miller, B.  P., & Yohn, T.  L. (2012).  The impact of financial reporting on 
equity versus debt markets: Macroeconomic evidence from mandatory IFRS adoption.  
Indiana University.  Bloomington, IN. 
Beneish, M.  D., & Yohn, T.  L. (2008).  Information friction and investor home bias: A 
perspective on the effect of global IFRS adoption on the extent of equity home bias.  
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 27(6), 433-443. 
Berkel, B. (2007).  Institutional determinants of international equity portfolios - A country-level 
analysis.  B.E.  Journal of Macroeconomics: Topics in Macroeconomics, 7(1), 1-31. 
Berrill, J., & Kearney, C. (2013).  Investing in emerging and devleoping markets.  In H.  K.  
Baker & L.  A.  Riddick (Eds.), International finance : a survey (pp. 331-349).  Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bertin, W.  J., & Prather, L. (2011).  What do emerging market mutual funds offer domestic US 
investors? Bond University.  Gold Coast, QLD. 
  
282 
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004).  How much should we trust differences-in-
differences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 249-275. 
Beugelsdijk, S., & Frijns, B. (2010).  A cultural explanation of the foreign bias in international 
asset allocation.  Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(9), 2121-2131. 
Beugelsdijk, S., & Maseland, R.  K.  J. (2011).  Culture in economics: History, methodological 
reflections, and contemporary applications.  New York; Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bloomberg. (2015).  Online: Bloomberg Professional. 
Blue Current Global Dividend Fund. (2014).  Prospectus.   Retrieved from 
http://www.bluecurrentfunds.com/Data/Sites/28/docs/Blue_Current_Prospectus.pdf 
Bohn, H., & Tesar, L.  L. (1996).  U.S.  equity investment in foreign markets: Portfolio 
rebalancing or return chasing? American Economic Review, 86(2), 77-81. 
Bradshaw, M.  T., Bushee, B.  J., & Miller, G.  S. (2004).  Accounting choice, home bias, and 
U.S.  investment in non-U.S.  firms.  Journal of Accounting Research, 42(5), 795-841. 
Braendle, U.  C. (2006).  Shareholder protection in the USA and Germany - “Law and Finance” 
revisited.  German Law Journal, 7(3), 257-278. 
Braendle, U.  C. (2012).  Corporate governance in the Middle East –another Arabic Spring? A 
focus on the financial sector.  Paper presented at the Improving financial institutions: The 
proper balance between regulation and governance, Helsinki, Finland. 
Branson, D.  M. (2001).  The very uncertain prospect of "global" convergence in corporate 
governance.  Cornell International Law Journal, 34(2), 321-362. 
Breen, R. (1996).  The Tobit model for censored data Regression Models (pp. 12-34).  Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Brennan, M.  J., & Cao, H.  H. (1997).  International portfolio investment flows.  Journal of 
Finance, 52(5), 1851-1880. 
Brennan, M.  J., Henry Cao, H., Strong, N., & Xu, X. (2005).  The dynamics of international 
equity market expectations.  Journal of Financial Economics, 77(2), 257-288. 
Bruno, V., & Claessens, S. (2010).  Corporate governance and regulation: Can there be too much 
of a good thing? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 19(4), 461-482. 
Bushee, B.  J., Carter, M.  E., & Gerakos, J. (2014).  Institutional investor preferences for 
corporate governance mechanisms.  Journal of Management Accounting Research, 26(2), 
123-149. 
Cameron, A.  C., & Trivedi, P.  K. (2010).  Microeconometrics using Stata.  College Station, TX: 
Stata Press. 
Carballo, A. (2007).  The law of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Common law oasis or 
mirage within the UAE? Arab Law Quarterly, 21(1), 91-104. 
Celiker, U., Chowdhury, J., & Sonaer, G. (2015).  Do mutual funds herd in industries? Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 52, 1-16. 
Chan, K., & Covrig, V. (2012).  What determines mutual fund trading in foreign stocks? Journal 
of International Money and Finance, 31(4), 793-817. 
Chan, K., Covrig, V., & Ng, L. (2005).  What determines the domestic bias and foreign bias? 
Evidence from mutual fund equity allocations worldwide.  Journal of Finance, 60(3), 
1495-1534. 
Chang, X., Dasgupta, S., & Hilary, G. (2009).  The effect of auditor quality on financing 
decisions.  Accounting Review, 84(4), 1085-1117. 
Cho, S.-S., El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., & Suh, J. (2014).  Creditor rights and capital structure: 
Evidence from international data.  Journal of Corporate Finance, 25, 40-60. 
Chou, J., Zaiats, N., & Zhang, B. (2014).  Does auditor choice matter to foreign investors? 
Evidence from foreign mutual funds worldwide.  Journal of Banking and Finance, 46, 1-
20. 
Claessens, S., & Laeven, L. (2003).  Financial development, property rights, and growth.  Journal 
of Finance, 58(6), 2401-2436. 
  
283 
Coffee, J.  C. (2001).  The rise of dispersed ownership: The roles of law and the state in the 
separation of ownership and control.  Yale Law Journal, 111(1), 1-82. 
Colón, J.  C. (2011).  Choice of law and Islamic finance.  Texas International Law Journal, 46(2), 
411-435. 
Cools, S. (2005).  The real difference in corporate law between the United States and continental 
Europe: Distribution of powers.  Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 30(3), 697-766. 
Covring, V.  M., Defond, M.  L., & Hung, M. (2007).  Home bias, foreign mutual fund holdings, 
and the voluntary adoption of international accounting standards.  Journal of Accounting 
Research, 45(1), 41-70. 
Dahlquist, M., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R.  M., & Williamson, R. (2003).  Corporate governance and 
the home bias.  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1), 87-110. 
Dam, K.  W. (2006).  The law growth nexus: The rule of law and economic development.  
Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 
Daude, C., & Fratzscher, M. (2008).  The pecking order of cross-border investment.  Journal of 
International Economics, 74(1), 94-119. 
DeAngelo, L.  E. (1981a).  Auditor independence, ‘low balling’, and disclosure regulation.  
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3(2), 113-127. 
DeAngelo, L.  E. (1981b).  Auditor size and audit quality.  Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
3(3), 183-199. 
DeFond, M., Hu, X., Hung, M., & Li, S. (2011).  The impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
foreign mutual fund ownership: The role of comparability.  Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 51(3), 240-258. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (1999).  Bank-based and market-based financial systems: 
Cross-country comparisons.  Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 2143.  World 
Bank. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2002).  Funding growth in bank-based and market-based 
financial systems: Evidence from firm level data.  Journal of Financial Economics, 65, 
337–363. 
Diyarbakirlioglu, E. (2011).  The determinants of international equity holdings: information vs. 
culture.  Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences.  Galatasaray University.  
Istanbul. 
Djankov, S., Hart, O., McLiesh, C., & Shleifer, A. (2008).  Debt enforcement around the world.  
Journal of Political Economy, 116(6), 1105-1149. 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003).  Courts.  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118(2), 453-517. 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008).  The law and economics 
of self-dealing.  Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3), 430-465. 
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., & Shleifer, A. (2007).  Private credit in 129 countries.  Journal of 
Financial Economics, 84(2), 299-329. 
Doidge, C., Andrew Karolyi, G., & Stulz, R.  M. (2007).  Why do countries matter so much for 
corporate governance? Journal of Financial Economics, 86(1), 1-39. 
Driscoll, J., & Kraay, A.  C. (1998).  Consistent covariance matrix estimation with spatially 
dependent data.  Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(4), 549-560. 
Dubai International Financial Centre. (2012).  Laws and regulations.   Retrieved from 
http://www.difc.ae/laws-regulations 
Efron, B. (1981).  Nonparametric standard errors and confidence intervals.  Canadian Journal of 
Statistics, 9(2), 139-158. 
Efron, B., & Tibshirani, R. (1993).  An introduction to the bootstrap.  New York: Chapman & 
Hall. 
Elsaman, R.  S. (2011).  Factors to be considered before arbitrating in the Arab Middle East: 
Examples of religious and legislative constraints.  International Commercial Arbitration 
Brief, 1(2), 8-14. 
  
284 
Enders, W. (2004).  Applied econometric time series (2nd ed.).  Hoboken, N.J. ; Great Britain: J.  
Wiley. 
Esmaeili, H. (2011).  The nature and development of law in Islam and the rule of law challenge in 
the Middle East and the Muslim world.  Connecticut Journal of International Law, 26(2), 
329-366. 
Farazi, S., Feyen, E., & Rocha, R. (2011).  Bank ownership and performance in the Middle East 
and North Africa region.  Policy Research Working Paper 5620.  World Bank. 
Farooq, O., Derrabi, M., & Naciri, M. (2013).  Corporate governance and liquidity: pre- and post-
crisis analysis from the MENA region.  Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, 
8(3), 1-19. 
Ferreira, M.  A., & Matos, P. (2008).  The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional 
investors around the world.  Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3), 499-533. 
Florou, A., & Pope, P.  F. (2012).  Mandatory IFRS adoption and institutional investment 
decisions.  Accounting Review, 87(6), 1993-2025. 
Foster, N.  H.  D. (2010).  Islamic perspectives on the law of business organisations I: An 
overview of the classical Sharia and a brief comparison of the Sharia regimes with 
Western-style law.  European Business Organization Law Review, 11(1), 3-34. 
Francis, J.  R., Khurana, I.  K., & Pereira, R. (2001).  Investor protection laws, accounting and 
auditing around the world.  University of Missouri-Columbia.  Columbia, MO. 
French, K.  R., & Poterba, J.  M. (1991).  Investor diversification and international equity 
markets.  American Economic Review, 81(2), 222-226. 
Fu, V.  K., Winship, C., & Mare, R.  D. (2004).  Sample selection bias models.  In M.  H.  a.  A.  
Bryman (Ed.), Handbook of Data Analysis (pp. 408-431).  London, England: SAGE 
Publications, Ltd. 
Gavin, J. (2011).  Reaching out to institutions.  MEED: Middle East Economic Digest, 55(13), 
38-39. 
Gelos, R.  G., & Wei, S.-J. (2005).  Transparency and international portfolio holdings.  Journal of 
Finance, 60(6), 2987-3020. 
Gemmell, A.  J. (2006).  Commercial arbitration in the Islamic Middle East.  Santa Clara Journal 
of International Law, 5(1), 169-193. 
Giannetti, M., & Koskinen, Y. (2010).  Investor protection, equity returns, and financial 
globalization.  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(1), 135–168. 
Giannetti, M., & Simonov, A. (2006).  Which investors fear expropriation? Evidence from 
investors' portfolio choices.  Journal of Finance, 61(3), 1507-1547. 
Giofré, M. (2014).  Domestic investor protection and foreign portfolio investment.  Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 46, 355-371. 
Girard, E., Omran, M., & Zaher, T. (2003).  On risk and return in MENA capital markets.  
International Journal of Business, 8(3), 285-314. 
Glaeser, E.  L., & Shleifer, A. (2002).  Legal origins.  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 
1193-1229. 
Goldschmidt, A., & Davidson, L. (2012).  A concise history of the Middle East.  Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Gordon, L.  A., Loeb, M.  P., & Zhu, W. (2012).  The impact of IFRS adoption on foreign direct 
investment.  Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 31(4), 374-398. 
Gould, W., & Pitblado, J. (2010).  How large should the bootstrapped samples be relative to the 
total number of cases in the dataset? Stata FAQ. 
Graff, M. (2008).  Law and finance: Common law and civil law countries compared: An 
Empirical critique.  Economica, 75(297), 60–83. 
Greene, W.  H. (2012).  Econometric analysis (7th ed.).  Boston ; London: Prentice Hall. 
Grinblatt, M., & Keloharju, M. (2000).  The investment behavior and performance of various 
investor types: a study of Finland's unique data set.  Journal of Financial Economics, 
55(1), 43-67. 
  
285 
Gupta, M., Obrimah, O., Prakash, P., & Rangan, N.  K. (2011).  Investor protections and their 
impact on capital markets.  In Alireza Tourani-Red & C.  Ingley (Eds.), Handbook on 
emerging issues in corporate governance (pp. 9-22).  Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing. 
Habib, A. (2007).  Legal environment, accounting information, auditing and information 
intermediaries: Survey of the empirical literature.  Journal of Accounting Literature, 26, 
1-75. 
Hamberg, M., Mavruk, T., & Sjögren, S. (2013).  Investment allocation decisions, home bias and 
the mandatory IFRS adoption.  Journal of International Money and Finance, 36, 107-130. 
Hamoudi, H.  A. (2011).  Surprising irrelevance of Islamic bankruptcy.  American Bankrupcy 
Institute Law Review, 19(1), 505-522. 
Haselmann, R., Pistor, K., & Vig, V. (2010).  How law affects lending.  Review of Financial 
Studies, 23(2), 549-580. 
Hayek, F.  A.  v. (1960).  The constitution of liberty.  USA: University of Chicago Press. 
Heritage Foundation. (2012).  Economic freedom: Global and regional patterns.   Retrieved from 
http://www.heritage.org/index/book/chapter-2 
Hermalin, B.  E., & Weisbach, M.  S. (2003).  Boards of directors as an endogenously determined 
institution: A survey of the economic literature.  Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 7-26. 
Hill, E. (1988).  Al-Sanhuri and Islamic law: The place and significance of Islamic law in the life 
and work of ’Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri, Egyptian jurist and scholar, 1895-1971.  
Arab Law Quarterly, 3(1), 33-64. 
Hill, R.  C., Griffiths, W.  E., & Lim, G.  C. (2008).  Principles of econometrics.  Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley. 
Hoechle, D. (2007).  Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-sectional 
dependence.  Stata Journal, 7(3), 281-312. 
Hong, H., & Kacperczyk, M. (2009).  The price of sin: The effects of social norms on markets.  
Journal of Financial Economics, 93(1), 15-36. 
Horowitz, J.  L. (1997).  Bootstrap methods in econometrics: Theory and numerical performance.  
In David M.  Kreps & Kenneth F.  Wallis (Eds.), Advances in Economics and 
Econometrics: Theory and Applications (pp. 188-222).  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Horowitz, J.  L. (2001).  The bootstrap.  In J.  J.  Heckman & E.  Leamer (Eds.), Handbook of 
Econometrics (Vol. 5, pp. 3159-3228).  Amesterdam: North Holland. 
Howard, D. (2007).  Map of the Middle East and North Africa.  Retrieved from 
http://mabryonline.org/blogs/howard/archives/n_africa_mid_east_pol_95.jpg 
Ibbotson, R.  G., & Kaplan, P.  D. (2000).  Does asset allocation policy explain 40, 90, or 100 
percent of performance? Financial Analysts Journal, 56(1), 26-33. 
Im, K.  S., Pesaran, M.  H., & Shin, Y. (2003).  Testing for unit roots in heterogenous panels.  
Journal of Econometrics, 115(1), 53-74. 
Internal Revenue Service. (2014).  United States income tax treaties.   Retrieved from 
http://www.irs.gov 
International Labour Organisation. (2011).  Challenges in the Arab world: An ILO response.   
Retrieved from 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/pardev/download/development/mena/mena-
strategy.pdf 
International Monetary Fund. (2010).  Regional economic outlook: Middle East and Central Asia.  
Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2010/mcd/eng/mreo1024.htm 
International Monetary Fund. (2013).  Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey   Retrieved from 
http://cpis.imf.org/.   http://cpis.imf.org/ 
International Monetary Fund. (2014).  World Economic Outlook Database   Retrieved from 
http://www.imf.org.   http://www.imf.org 
  
286 
International Monetary Fund. (several editions 2007-2012).  Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  Retrieved from 
http://www.elibrary.imf.org/page/AREAER/www.imfareaer.org 
Investment Company Institute. (2014). 2014 Investment Company Fact Book.  Chapter 1: 
Overview of U.S.-Registered Investment Companies.  Retrieved from 
http://www.icifactbook.org/ 
Jensen, M.  C., & Meckling, W.  H. (1976).  Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure.  Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Kaminsky, G.  L., Lyons, R.  K., & Schmukler, S.  L. (2001).  Mutual fund investment in 
emerging markets: An overview.  World Bank Economic Review, 15(2), 315-340. 
Kang, J.-K., & Stulz, R.  M. (1997).  Why is there a home bias? An analysis of foreign portfolio 
equity ownership in Japan.  Journal of Financial Economics, 46(1), 3-28. 
Kar, M., Nazlıoğlu, Ş., & Ağır, H. (2011).  Financial development and economic growth nexus in 
the MENA countries: Bootstrap panel Granger causality analysis.  Economic Modelling, 
28(1–2), 685-693. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2013).  Worldwide governance indictors.  Retrieved 
from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
Ke, D., Ng, L., & Wang, Q. (2010).  Home bias in foreign investment decisions.  Journal of 
International Business Studies, 41(6), 960-979. 
Kern, S. (2012).  GCC financial markets: Long-term prospects for finance in the Gulf region.  
Retrieved from https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-
PROD/PROD0000000000296909/GCC+financial+markets%3A+Long-
term+prospects+for+finance+in+the+Gulf+region.pdf 
Kho, B.-C., Stulz, R.  M., & Warnock, F.  E. (2009).  Financial globalization, governance, and 
the evolution of the home bias.  Journal of Accounting Research, 47(2), 597-635. 
Kilborn, J.  J. (2011).  Foundations of forgiveness in Islamic bankruptcy law: Sources, 
methodology, diversity.  American Bankruptcy Law Journal, 85, 323-362. 
Kim, S.-J., & Wu, E. (2008).  Sovereign credit ratings, capital flows and financial sector 
development in emerging markets.  Emerging Markets Review, 9(1), 17-39.  
Kmenta, J. (1986).  Elements of Econometrics.  New York: MacMillan. 
Koldertsova, A. (2011).  The second corporate governance wave in the Middle East and North 
Africa.  OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2010(2). 
Koraytem, T. (2000).  The Islamic nature of the Saudi regulations for companies.  Arab Law 
Quarterly, 15(1), 63-69. 
Kortas, M., L'Her, J.-F., & Roberge, M. (2005).  Country selection of emerging equity markets: 
benefits from country attribute diversification.  Emerging Markets Review, 6(1), 1-19. 
Kouamé, A.  T. (2008).  Impact of the international financial crisis on MENA capital markets.  
Retrieved from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/BeirutForumonImpactCrisispres
entation.pdf 
Kumar, A., Page, J.  K., & Spalt, O.  G. (2011).  Religious beliefs, gambling attitudes, and 
financial market outcomes.  Journal of Financial Economics, 102(3), 671-708. 
Kuran, T. (2005).  The logic of financial Westernization in the Middle East.  Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 56(4), 593-615. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999).  Corporate ownership around the world.  
Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002).  Government ownership of banks.  
Journal of Finance, 57(1), 265-301. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2006).  What works in securities laws? 
Journal of Finance, 61(1), 1-32. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008).  The economic consequences of legal 
origins.  Journal of Economic Literature, 46(2), 285–332. 
  
287 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2013).  Law and finance after a decade of 
research.  In M.  H.  George M.  Constantinides & M.  S.  Rene (Eds.), Handbook of the 
Economics of Finance (Vol. 2, Part A, pp. 425-491): Elsevier. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997).  Legal determinants of 
external finance.  Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131-1150. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998).  Law and finance.  Journal 
of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1999).  The quality of government.  
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 15(1), 222-279. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000).  Investor protection and 
corporate governance.  Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3-27. 
Lagoarde-Segot, T., & Lucey, B.  M. (2007).  International portfolio diversification: Is there a 
role for the Middle East and North Africa? Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management, 17(5), 401-416. 
Lagoarde-Segot, T., & Lucey, B.  M. (2008).  Efficiency in emerging markets evidence from the 
MENA region.  Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 
18(1), 94-105. 
Lane, P.  R., & Milesi-Ferretti, G.  M. (2008).  International investment patterns.  Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 90(3), 538-549. 
Lee, H., Staats, J.  L., & Biglaiser, G. (2012).  The importance of legal systems for portfolio 
investment in the developing world.  International Area Studies Review, 15(4), 339-358. 
Lemi, A. (2003).  Foreign direct investment in developing countries: Uncertainty, trade and 
welfare. (Doctoral dissertation), Western Michigan University, USA. 
Leuz, C., Lins, K.  V., & Warnock, F.  E. (2009).  Do foreigners invest less in poorly governed 
firms? Review of Financial Studies, 22(8), 3245-3285. 
Levine, R. (1998).  The legal environment, banks, and long-run economic growth.  Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking, 30(3), 596–620. 
Levine, R., Loayza, N., & Beck, T. (2000).  Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and 
causes.  Journal of Monetary Economics, 46(1), 31-77. 
Licht, A.  N. (2001).  The mother of all path dependencies: Toward a cross-cultural theory of 
corporate governance systems.  Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 26(1), 147-205. 
Licht, A.  N., Goldschmidt, C., & Schwartz, S.  H. (2005).  Culture, law, and corporate 
governance.  International Review of Law and Economics, 25(2), 229-255. 
Licht, A.  N., Goldschmidt, C., & Schwartz, S.  H. (2007).  Culture rules: The foundations of the 
rule of law and other norms of governance.  Journal of Comparative Economics, 35(4), 
659-688. 
Lintner, J. (1965).  The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risky investments in stock 
portfolios and capital budgets.  Review of Economics and Statistics, 47(1), 13-37. 
Lombardi, C.  B., & Feener, R.  M. (2012).  Why study Islamic legal professionals? Pacific Rim 
Law and Policy Journal, 21(1), 1-12. 
Madeddu, O. (2010).  The status of information sharing and credit reporting infrastructure in the 
Middle East and North Africa region.  Retrieved from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMNAREGTOPPOVRED/Resources/MENAFlagsh
ipCreditReporting12_20_10.pdf 
Mahmoud, A.  S. (2005).   ةمكحملا فقوم نأشب ريرقتنم ةدحتملا ةيبرعلا تاراملاا ةلود يف ايلعلا ةيداحتلاا  ةيفرصملا دئاوفلا Report 
on the position of the Federal Supreme Court in the United Arab Emirates about bank 
interest.  Paper presented at the رشع عبارلا يونسلا يملعلا رمتؤملا :ةيملاسلإا ةيلاملا تاسسؤملا   The fourteenth 
annual scientific conference: Islamic financial institutions, Dubai, UAE. 
Mahoney, P.  G. (2001).  The common law and economic growth: Hayek might be right.  Journal 
of Legal Studies, 30(2), 503-525. 
Majid, S., & Majid, F. (2003).  Application of Islamic Law in the Middle East: Interest and 
Islamic banking.  International Construction Law Review, 20(1), 177-196. 
  
288 
Mako, W., & Sourrouille, D. (2010).  Investment funds in MENA.  Retrieved from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMNAREGTOPPOVRED/Resources/MENAFlagsh
ipMutualFund2_28_11.pdf 
Mansourfar, G., Mohamad, S., & Hassan, T. (2010).  The behavior of MENA oil and non-oil 
producing countries in international portfolio optimization.  Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance, 50(4), 415-423. 
Markaz. (2008).  The golden portfolio: Reach of sovereign wealth funds in GCC.  Retrieved from 
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/press_releases/detail/16664 
Markowitz, H. (1952).  Portfolio selection.  Journal of Finance, 7(1), 77-99. 
Massa, M., & Simonov, A. (2006).  Hedging, familiarity and portfolio choice.  Review of 
Financial Studies, 19(2), 633-685. 
Maynes, E., & Rumsey, J. (1993).  Conducting event studies with thinly traded stocks.  Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 17(1), 145-157. 
McAndrew, S., & Voas, D. (2011).  Measuring religosity using surveys.  University of 
Manchester.  Manchester. 
Méon, P.-G., & Sekkat, K. (2004).  Does the quality of institutions limit the MENA's integration 
in the world economy? World Economy, 27(9), 1475-1498. 
Merton, R.  C. (1987).  A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete 
information.  Journal of Finance, 42(3), 483-510. 
Mishra, A., & Daly, K. (2006).  Where do Australians invest? Australian Economic Review, 
39(1), 47-59. 
Mohamed, S., & Sidiropoulos, M. (2010).  Another look at the determinants of foreign direct 
investment in MENA Countries: An empitical investigation.  Journal of Economic 
Development, 35(2), 75. 
Mohammed, N. (1988).  Principles of Islamic contract law.  Journal of Law and Religion, 6(1), 
115-130. 
Mooney, C.  Z., & Duval, R.  D. (1993).  Bootstrapping: a nonparametric approach to statistical 
inference.  Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Morningstar
®
 Principia
®
.. (several editions 2008-2011).  Principa Pro for Mutual Funds. 
Newey, W.  K., & West, K.  D. (1987).  A simple, positive definite, heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix.  Econometrica, 55(3), 703–708. 
North, D.  C. (2010).  Understanding the process of economic change.  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Norton, J.  J., & Sari-Eldin, H. (1996).  Securities law models in emerging economies.  In J.  J.  
Norton (Ed.), Emerging financial markets and the role of international financial 
organizations (Vol. 4, pp. 335-349).  London: UK: Kiluwer Law International. 
OECD. (2005).  Advancing the corporate governance agenda in the Middle East and North 
AFrcia: A survey of legal and institutional frameworks.  Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceprinciples/38186933.pdf 
OECD. (2006).  Ownership structures in MENA countries: Listed companies, state-owned, 
family enterprises and some policy implications Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/mena/investment/35402110.pdf 
OECD. (2012).  The role of MENA stock exchanges in corporate governance.  Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/RoleofMENAstockexchanges.pdf 
Omran, M., & Bolbol, A. (2003).  Foreign direct investment, financial development, and 
economic growth: Evidence from the Arab countries.  Review of Middle East Economics 
and Finance, 1(3), 231–249. 
Onyeiwu, S. (2003).  Analysis of FDI flows to developing countries: is the MENA region 
different? ERF Working Paper.  Allegheny College.  Meadville, PA. 
OPEC. (2015).  Annual statistical bulletin.  Retrieved from 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB20
15.pdf 
  
289 
Pagano, M., & Volpin, P.  F. (2005).  The political economy of corporate governance.  American 
Economic Review, 95(4), 1005-1030. 
Pampel, F.  C. (2000).  Interpreting logistic regression coefficients Logistic Regression (pp. 19-
40).  Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Parks, R. ( 1967).  Efficient estimation of a system of regression equations when disturbances are 
both serially and contemporaneously correlated.  Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 62(318), 500-509. 
Pendle, L. (2008).  What determines Australia's foreign equity investment? (Bachelor of 
Commerce Honours Thesis), University of Sydney, Australia. 
Petersen, M.  A. (2009).  Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing 
approaches.  Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435-480. 
Pistor, K. (2009).  Rethinking the "Law and Finance" paradigm.  Brigham Young University Law 
Review, 2009(6), 1647-1670. 
Platteau, J.-P. (2008).  Religion, politics, and development: Lessons from the lands of Islam.  
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68(2), 329-351. 
Portes, R., & Rey, H. (2005).  The determinants of cross-border equity flows.  Journal of 
International Economics, 65(2), 269-296. 
Poshakwale, S.  S., & Thapa, C. (2011).  Investor protection and international equity portfolio 
investments.  Global Finance Journal, 22(2), 116-129. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2014).  IFRS adoption by country.  Retrieved from 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/issues/ifrs-reporting/publications/assets/pwc-ifrs-by-
country-2014.pdf 
Puddington, A. (2012) Freedom in the world 2012: The Arab uprisings and their global 
repercussions.  Freedom House. 
Rajan, R.  G., & Zingales, L. (2003).  The great reversals: The politics of financial development 
in the twentieth century.  Journal of Financial Economics, 69(1), 5-50. 
Ramady, M.  A. (2010).  The Saudi Arabian economy: Policies, achievements, and challenges 
(2nd ed.).  New York: Springer. 
RBC Bluebay Emerging Market Select Bond Fund.  Investment Strategy.   Retrieved from 
https://us.rbcgam.com/mutual-funds/emerging-markets-global-fixed-income-funds/fg-
9/fsg-8/fid-17/individual/overview/rbc-bluebay-emerging-market-select-bond-fund.fs 
Reed, W.  R., & Ye, H. (2009).  Which panel data estimator should I use? Applied Economics, 
43(8), 985-1000. 
Reynolds, T.  H., & Flores, A.  A. (1989).  Foreign law: Current sources of codes and basic 
legislation in jurisdictions of the world: Littleton, CO: Fred B.  Rothman. 
Roe, M.  J. (2006).  Legal origins, politics, and modern stock markets.  Harvard Law Review, 
120(2), 460-527. 
Roque, V., & Cortez, M.  C. (2014).  The determinants of international equity investment: Do 
they differ between institutional and noninstitutional investors? Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 49, 469-482. 
Ross, S.  A. (1977).  The determination of financial structure: The incentive-signalling approach.  
Bell journal of economics, 8(1), 23-40. 
Salaber, J. (2013).  Religion and returns in Europe.  European Journal of Political Economy, 32, 
149-160. 
SAS Institute Inc.  SAS/ETS® 9.2 User’s Guide.   Retrieved from 
http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/etsug/60372/HTML/default/viewer.htm#etsu
g_qlim_sect021.htm 
SAS Institute Inc. (2013).  SAS/STAT® 13.1 User’s Guide.  Cary, NC: SAS Institute Inc. 
Schmidbauer, R. (2006).  On the fallacy of LLSV revisited: Further evidence about shareholder 
protection in Austria and the United Kingdom.  University of Manchester.  Manchester. 
Sercu, P., & Vanpee, R. (2007).  Home bias in international equity portfolios: A review.  
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.  Leuven, Belgium. 
  
290 
Serra, A.  P. (2000).  Country and industry factors in returns: Evidence from emerging markets’ 
stocks.  Emerging Markets Review, 1(2), 127-151. 
Shaaban, H.  S. (1999).  Commercial transactions in the middle east: What law governs.  Law and 
Policy in International Business, 31(1), 157-172. 
Shari'a and Riba: Decision in Case no. 20 of Judicial Year no. 1  (Supreme Constitutional Court 
(Egypt) 1985). 
Sharpe, W.  F. (1964).  Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of 
risk.  Journal of Finance, 19(3), 425-442. 
Shima, K.  M., & Gordon, E.  A. (2011).  IFRS and the regulatory environment: The case of U.S.  
investor allocation choice.  Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 30(5), 481-500. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.  W. (1997).  A Survey of corporate governance.  Journal of Finance, 
52(2), 737-783. 
Siems, M. (2007).  Legal origins: Reconciling law & finance and comparative law.  McGill Law 
Journal, 52(1), 55-81. 
Siems, M., & Deakin, S. (2010).  Comparative law and finance: Past, present, and future research.  
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 166(1), 120-140. 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. (2012).  Sovereign wealth fund rankings.   Retrieved from 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ 
Spamann, H. (2010).  The “Antidirector Rights Index” revisited.  Review of Financial Studies, 
23(2), 467-486. 
Staats, J.  L., & Biglaiser, G. (2011).  The effects of judicial strength and rule of law on portfolio 
investment in the developing world.  Social Science Quarterly, 92(3), 609-630. 
Stewart, D.  J. (2009).  The Middle East today: Political, georgraphical and cultural 
perspectives.  London ; New York: Routledge. 
Stovall, H.  L. (2000).  Arab commercial laws - into the future.  International Lawyer, 34(3), 839-
847. 
Stulz, R.  M. (1981).  On the effects of barriers to international investment.  Journal of Finance, 
36(4), 923-934. 
Stulz, R.  M. (2005).  The limits of financial globalization.  Journal of Finance, 60(4), 1595-
1638. 
Stulz, R.  M., & Williamson, R. (2003).  Culture, openness, and finance.  Journal of Financial 
Economics, 70(3), 313-349. 
Sultan, N.  A., Weir, D., & Karake-Shalhoub, Z. (Eds.). (2011).  The new post-oil Arab Gulf: 
Managing people and wealth.  London: Saqi. 
Tamimi, H. (2002).  Interest under the UAE law and as applied by the courts of Abu Dhabi.  Arab 
Law Quarterly, 17(1), 50-52. 
Testy, K.  Y. (1997).  Old questions, new contexts: Corporate law in emerging nations.  New York 
Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law, 17(2-3), 503. 
The World Factbook. (2012).   Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/index.html 
Tobin, J. (1958).  Estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables.  Econometrica, 
26(1), 24-36. 
Transparency International. (2011).  Corruption perceptions index.   Retrieved from 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ 
US Department of the Treasury. (2012).  Foreign portfolio holdings of U.S.  securities.  Retrieved 
from http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/index.aspx 
Vermeulen, R., & de Haan, J. (2014).  Net foreign asset (com)position: Does financial 
development matter? Journal of International Money and Finance, 43, 88-106. 
Weingast, B.  R. (2009).  Why developing countries prove so resistant to the rule of law.  In J.  J.  
Heckman, R.  L.  Nelson, & L.  Cabatingan (Eds.), Global perspectives on the rule of law 
(pp. 28-52).  Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 
  
291 
White, H. (1980).  A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test 
for heteroskedasticity.  Econometrica, 48(4), 817–838. 
Wooldridge, J.  M. (2010).  Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data (2nd ed.).  
Cambridge, MA: MIT. 
World Bank. (2011).  Financial access and stability: A road map for the Middle East and North 
Africa.  Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-8835-8 
World Bank. (2014a).  Doing Business Project.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology 
World Bank. (2014b).  World Development Indicators.  Retrieved from: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
Xu, G. (2011).  The role of law in economic growth: A literature review.  Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 25(5), 833–871. 
Zweigert, K., & Kotz, H. (1987).  Introduction to comparative law (T.  Weir, Trans.  Second 
Revised ed.  Vol. 1).  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
  
292 
LEGISLATIONS 
Algerian Code of Commerce, Ordinance No. (75-59) of 1975. 
Amendments to Bahrain Commercial Companies Law No. (21) of 2001, Law No. (50) of 2014. 
Bahraini Commercial Companies Law, Decree No. (21) of 2001. 
Basic Law of Palestine. (2003).  Retrieved from http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/. 
Basic Law of Saudi Arabia. (1993 (1412 H)).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5a44.html. 
Basic Law of the Sultanate of Oman. (1996).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b51f4.html. 
Civil Code of Kuwait. (1980).  Retrieved from http://www.moj.gov.kw/newlaws.htm. 
Commercial Law of Kuwait. (1980).  Retrieved from http://www.moj.gov.kw/newlaws.htm. 
Constitution of Kuwait. (1962).  Retrieved from 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Kuwait_1992. 
Constitution of Lebanon. (1926).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/44a24a674.html 
Constitution of Qatar. (2004).  Retrieved from http://www.gcc-legal.org/. 
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt. (1971).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5368.html. 
Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. (1988).  Retrieved from 
http://www.moj.gov.sd/constitution.php. 
Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. (1952).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b53310.html. 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (1979).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b56710.html. 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain. (2002).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48b54f262.html. 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco. (1996).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5454.html. 
Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria. (1989).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ffc3b584.html. 
Constitution of the Republic of Iraq. (2005).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f50804.html. 
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. (1982).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5be0.html. 
Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic. (1973).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/44d8a4e84.html. 
Constitution of the United Arab Emirates. (1971).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48eca8132.html 
Constitution of the Yemen Republic. (2001).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3fc4c1e94.html. 
Constitution of Tunisia. (1959).  Retrieved from 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7201. 
Corporate Governance Code for Shareholding Companies Listed on the Amman Stock Exchange, 
2008. 
Corporate Governance Code of the Kingdom of Bahrain (2011). 
Corporate Governance Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Resolution No. 
(1/212/2006) dated 21/10/1427AH. 
Egypt Code of Corporate Governance (2011). 
Egypt Code of Corproate Governance (2005). 
Egypt Executive Regulation for the Capital Market Law, Decree No. (135) of 1993. 
Egypt Executive Regulation of Companies Law, Decree No. (96) of 1982. 
  
293 
Egyptian Capital Market Law, No. (95) of 1992. 
Egyptian Companies Law, No. (159) of 1981. 
Executive Regulation of Bahrain Commercial Companies Law No. (21) of 2001, Ministerial 
Order No. (6) of 2002. 
Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan. (2005).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ba749762.html. 
Iran. (1969).  Commercial Code: Treatise 1, Joint stock companies: Ratified by both houses of 
parliament on 15th March 1969 (M.  Sabi, Trans.).  Tehran: Iran: Musa Sabi: 
International Consultants Association. 
Iraqi Companies Law, No. (21) of 1997. 
Israeli Companies Law, No. (5759) of 1999. 
Israeli Securities Law, No. (5728) of 1968. 
Jordanian Companies Law, No. (22) of 1997. 
Jordanian Corporate Governance Code [Private shareholding companies, limited liability 
companies, Non-listed public shareholding companies] 2012. 
Kuwaiti Commercial Companies Law, No. (15) of 1960. 
Kuwaiti Companies Law, No. (25) of 2012. 
Lebanon Corporate Governance Guidelines for Listed Companies (2010). 
Lebanon on the Land Commerce, Decision No. (304) of 1942. 
Libya: Constitution Proclamation. (1969).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5a24.html. 
Libya: Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage. (2011).  Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e80475b2.html. 
Moroccan Code of Good Corporate Governance Practices (2008). 
Morocco Companies Law, No. (17) of 1995. 
Oman Rules and Conditions for the Election of Directors of Public Joint Stock Companies and 
their Responsibilities, Ministerial Order No. (137) of 2002. 
Omani Capital Market Law, Royal Decree No. (80) of 1998. 
Omani Commercial Companies Law, No. (4) of 1974. 
Palestine [Gaza] Companies Law, 1929. 
Palestine [WestBank] Jordanian Company Law, No. (12) of 1964. 
Palestine Corporate Governance (2009). 
Qatari Commercial Companies, Act No. (5) of 2002. 
Qatari Corporate Governance Code, 2009. 
Saudi Arabia Companies Regulations, Royal Decree No. (M/6) of 1385 Hijri. 
State of Israel. (2005).  Constitution.  Knesset in the Government System.  Retrieved 24 June, 
2012, from http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_hoka.htm 
Sudan Companies Act of 1925. 
The Commercial Code: treetise 1, Joint Stock Companies: Ratified by both houses of Parliament 
on 15th March 1969 (1969). 
The Lebanese Code of Corporate Governance (2006). 
Tunisia Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2008). 
Tunisia Companies Law, No. (93) of 2000. 
Turkey Capital Market Law, No. (2499) of 2007. 
Turkey Communiqué on Corporate Governance, No. (28871) of 2014. 
Turkish Commercial Law, No. (6102) of 2011. 
United Arab Emirates Commercial Companies Law, No. (8) of 1984. 
United Arab Emirates Corporate Governance Code for joint-stock companies and institutional 
discipline criteria, Decision No. (32\R) of 2007. 
United Arab Emirates Governance Rules and Corporate Discipline Standards, Ministerial 
Resolution No. (518) of 2009. 
